The 

JAMES  A.  THOMAS 
COLLECTION 


DUKE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
DURHAM,  N.  C. 


Date _ MksgW  2,3,1307 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2018  with  funding  from 
Duke  University  Libraries 


//archive. org/details/cecilrhodesOI  hens 


CECIL  EHODES 


^*2-  (a  0  (o 


CECIL  RHODES 


A  STUDY  OF  A  CAREER 


By 

HOWARD  HENSMAN 

(A 

WITH  PORTRAITS 

6r 

OTHER  ILLUSTRATIONS 


NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

HARPER  AND  BROTHERS 

PUBLISHERS  MCMII 


February,  1902 


9  2  3  .  £,  /  2- 
~7 ^  y  7  £  TV 


cW 


TO 

MISS  RHODES, 

IN  SOME  SLIGHT  RECOGNITION  OP  HER 
VALUAELE  ASSISTANCE, 

THIS  RECORD  OP  HER  BROTHER’S  LIFE 
IS  GRATEFULLY  DEDICATED  BY 


THE  AUTHOR. 


PREFACE. 


A  few  words  explaining  how  and  why  this  book  came 
to  be  written  may  not  be  out  of  place.  For  some 
years  past  I  have  been  brought  into  rather  intimate 
contact  with  Mr  Cecil  Rhodes  and  his  works,  and 
have  taken  a  great  interest  in  studying  the  methods 
and  character  of  one  who — whatever  his  faults  and 
shortcomings  may  be — plays  a  very  important  part 
in  the  history  of  the  British  Empire  at  the  present 
time.  It  had  long  struck  me  as  a  remarkable  fact 
that  no  real  attempt  to  describe  Mr  Rhodes’  career 
had  ever  been  made  ;  and  in  view  of  the  great  amount 
of  attention  which  has  been  devoted  to  South  Africa 
for  the  past  three  years,  I  at  length,  after  much  con¬ 
sideration,  decided  to  make  some  sort  of  an  attempt  to 
fill  this  gap.  Hence  this  book. 

As  at  first  designed,  the  work  was  only  intended 
to  be  a  comparatively  small  one,  setting  forth  without 
bias  or  prejudice  the  salient  features  so  far  of  Mr 
Rhodes’  life.  As  I  progressed,  however,  the  book 
grew  and  grew  until  it  assumed  its  present  form.  I 


VI 11 


PREFACE. 


venture  to  think  that  in  the  pages  which  follow  the 
reader  will  find  set  out  the  life -story  of  the  man 
who  has  for  many  years  past  dominated  South  African 
politics,  with  nothing  omitted  that  is  essential  and 
nothing  included  that  is  superfluous. 

Unfortunately  for  his  biographer,  Mr  Rhodes  is  in 
somewhat  a  similar  position  to  Mr  Chamberlain,  inas¬ 
much  as  he  acts  with  many  people  as  the  proverbial 
red  rag  to  a  bull.  This  being  so,  a  certain  amount 
of  adverse  criticism  is  only  to  be  expected.  I  have, 
however,  made  it  my  constant  effort  to  hold  the  scales 
of  justice  evenly,  and  I  may  at  once  say  that  I  decline 
absolutely  to  regard  Mr  Rhodes  either  as  a  heaven¬ 
sent  statesman  or  the  incarnation  of  all  that  is  wicked. 
He  is  in  my  eyes  an  empire-builder  of  great  origin¬ 
ality,  and  a  man  who  makes  a  most  fascinating  study. 

The  writing  of  this  book  would  have  been  a  well- 
nigh  impossible  task  if  I  had  not  been  accorded  much 
valuable  assistance  by  many  of  those  who  have  known 
Mr  Rhodes  intimately  for  many  years  past.  To  the 
aid  rendered  me  by  Miss  Rhodes  I  have  already  re¬ 
ferred  in  the  Dedication,  and  for  the  photograph  of 
Mr  Rhodes  as  a  child  I  am  indebted  to  the  courtesy 
of  Colonel  F.  W.  Rhodes,  D.S.O.  Among  those  I 
would  now  especially  thank  are  Mr  R.  Geare,  M.A., 
the  Principal  of  the  Bishop’s  Stortford  Grammar- 
School,  who  kindly  placed  the  records  of  the  school 
at  my  disposal  for  information  as  to  Mr  Rhodes’ 
career  there  ;  the  Rev.  A.  G.  Butler,  who  was  a  tutor 
at  Oriel  College,  Oxford,  in  Mr  Rhodes’  undergraduate 


PREFACE. 


IX 


days  ;  and  the  Rev.  A.  L.  Barnes -Lawrence,  M.A., 
one  of  Mr  Rhodes’  closest  friends  at  the  university. 
I  have  also  to  thank  the  Secretary  of  the  British 
South  Africa  Company,  Mr  J.  F.  Jones,  and  other 
officials,  for  their  assistance  and  for  the  loan  of  several 
of  the  photographs  which  are  included  in  the  book. 
The  Appendices  and  map  of  Rhodesia  are  also  in¬ 
cluded  by  special  permission  of  the  Chartered  Com¬ 
pany.  There  are  many  others,  too,  who  by  their 
advice  and  willing  assistance  have  contributed  to 
lighten  very  considerably  a  heavy  undertaking,  and 
to  all  of  these  I  would  tender  my  very  best  thanks. 

HOWARD  HENSMAN. 


Forest  Gate,  Essex, 
November  1901. 


CONTENTS. 


V 


CHAP. 

I.  EARLY  YEARS,  1853-1870 
II.  SOUTH  AFRICA  AS  RHODES  FOUND  IT 
III.  RHODES  AT  OXFORD  .... 

.  IV.  ENTRANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE 

V.  SAVING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH 

VI.  RHODES,  THE  MAN  .... 

VII.  THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES 
III.  THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED  . 

IX.  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RULE  PARTY 
THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY 
XI.  THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER  . 

XII.  THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER — continued 
XHI.  BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR  . 

SIV.  AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE 
XV.  RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION 
.XVI.  THE  RAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES  . 

XVII.  RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE  . 

XVIII.  RHODES  AND  THE  MATABELE  REBELLION 
XIX.  EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION 
XX.  THE  TRANS-AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME  . 


\ 


PAGE 

1 

8 

20 

33 

48 

66 

81 

97 

114 

130 

147 

164 

182 

199 

217 

234 

251 

268 

282 

298 


Xll 

CONTENTS. 

XXI. 

BEFORE 

THE  WAR 

. 

.  316 

XXII. 

RHODES 

BESIEGED 

IN 

KIMBERLEY  . 

.  332 

XXIII. 

RHODES’ 

GIFT  TO 

THE 

LIBERAL  PARTY  . 

.  346 

APPENDIX. 

I.  COPY  OP  AGREEMENT  SIGNED  BY  LOBENGULA  WITH  THE 

IMPERIAL  GOVERNMENT  .  .  .  .  .  .358 

II.  LOBENGULA’s  CONCESSION  TO  MESSRS  RUDD,  MAGUIRE,  AND 

THOMPSON  ........  360 

III.  COPY  OP  CHARTER  GRANTED  TO  THE  BRITISH  SOUTH 

AFRICA  COMPANY  BY  THE  IMPERIAL  GOVERNMENT  .  362 


INDEX 


375 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


cecil  Rhodes  .....  Frontispiece 

THE  HOUSE  WHERE  CECIL  RHODES  WAS  BORN  .  To  face  p.  2 

CECIL  RHODES  AS  A  BOY  .  .  .  .  .  n  4 

GROOT  SCHUUR  .  .  .  .  .  .  M  66 

TABLE  MOUNTAIN  FROM  THE  GROUNDS  OF  GROOT 

SCHUUR  .  .  .  .  .  .  it  70 

COLONEL  F.  W.  RHODES,  D.S.O.  .  .  .  .  n  170 

map  of  rhodesia  .  .  .  .  .At  end 


* 


CECIL  RHODES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

EARLY  YEARS,  1853-1870. 

The  first  mention  of  the  family  from  which  the 
subject  of  this  book  is  descended  occurs,  so  far  as  can 
be  ascertained  with  any  degree  of  certainty,  about 
the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  when  a 
William  Rhodes  came  to  London  and  bought  a  farm 
situated  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Bloomsbury  and 
close  to  Gray’s  Inn.  Here  he  settled  down  to  cul¬ 
tivate  assiduously  his  land,  and  soon  gained  some 
local  reputation  as  a  successful  farmer  and  grazier. 
Part  of  his  estate  occupied  the  site  now  covered  by 
the  Foundling  Hospital ;  while  the  records  of  the 
period  indicate  that  this  William  Rhodes  also  owned 
a  small  detached  estate  farther  out  in  the  country, 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  St  John’s  Wood,  forming 
part  of  what  is  now  known  as  Regent’s  Park. 

Devoting  himself  to  his  family  and  his  farm,  and 
leaving  politics  and  affairs  of  State  severely  alone, 
William  Rhodes  amassed  a  considerable  fortune,  and 
was  able  to  give  each  of  his  children  such  advantages 

A 


2 


EARLY  YEARS. 


in  the  way  of  education  as  in  those  days  did  not 
usually  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  family  of  a  yeoman. 

For  a  generation  or  two  we  lose  sight  of  the  family, 
the  next  member  of  it  to  attract  any  attention  being 
a  Samuel  Rhodes,  who  flourished  in  the  latter  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  dwelt  on  what  was 
then  the  northern,  or  north-eastern,  boundary  of  the 
Metropolis.  By  trade  he  was  a  burner  of  bricks  in 
rather  a  substantial  way  of  business,  and,  aided  by 
a  family  of  energetic  sons,  he  soon  became  known  as 
one  of  the  largest  owners  of  brickfields  round  about 
London. 

Like  most  of  his  family  who  preceded  and  followed 
him,  Samuel  Rhodes  was  gifted  with  the  faculty  for 
making  money  and  for  turning  it  to  good  account, 
and  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  his  family 
mounting  steadily  in  the  social  scale.  He  was  able 
to  buy  a  considerable  estate  at  Dalston,  then  a  little 
detached  village.  This  estate,  by  the  way,  still  re¬ 
mains  in  the  family,  and  Mr  Cecil  Rhodes  possesses, 
roughly  speaking,  a  three-fifths  interest  in  it. 

Of  Samuel  Rhodes’  sons,  one  of  them — William,  a 
favourite  name  in  the  Rhodes  family — quitted  sub¬ 
urban  London,  and  settled  down  at  Layton  Grange 
in  the  heart  of  rural  Essex,  where  he  acquired  a  large 
estate.  From  Thomas,  another  son,  is  descended  the 
Northamptonshire  branch  of  the  family,  now  repre¬ 
sented  by  Mr  William  Rhodes,  whose  seat  is  at  West 
Haddon  Hall. 

William  Rhodes,  the  owner  of  Layton  Grange,  was 
succeeded  in  his  estate  by  his  son,  Francis  William 
Rhodes,  the  father  of  Cecil,  who  had  been  educated 
for  the  Church  and  had  already  entered  into  Holy 
Orders.  This  gentleman  was  twice  married,  his 


THE  HOUSE  WHERE  CECIL  RHODES  WAS  BORN. 


THE  BISHOP’S  STORTFORD  VICARAGE. 


3 


second  wife  being  a  member  of  an  old  Lincolnshire 
family  living  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Sleaford. 
While  still  a  comparatively  young  man,  the  Lev. 
F.  W.  Rhodes  received  the  appointment  of  vicar  of 
the  parish  church  of  the  little  country  town  of 
Bishop’s  Stortford  ;  consequently  he  quitted  his  Essex 
home  to  live  in  Hertfordshire. 

He  had  a  numerous  family,  in  which  boys  greatly 
outnumbered  girls,  and  it  was  his  fifth  son  who  was 
destined  to  make  the  name  of  Rhodes  known  to  the 
uttermost  ends  of  the  civilised  world.  By  a  blunder 
which  might  easily  have  been  avoided  by  the  exercise 
of  a  little  care,  most  current  books  of  reference  state 
that  Cecil  Rhodes  was  his  father’s  fourth  son,  whereas 
he  was  instead  the  fifth.  The  children  of  the  Rhodes 
family  were  as  follows  :  Herbert  (destined,  as  will  be 
seen  later,  to  meet  with  an  untimely  and  terrible 
death  in  the  heart  of  Central  Africa  while  big-game 
shooting),  Louisa,  Edith,  Francis  William  (the  dis¬ 
tinguished  soldier),  Basil  (died  in  infancy),  Ernest, 
Cecil  John,  Frederick  (died  in  infancy),  Elmhurst, 
Arthur  Montague,  and  Bernard  Maitland. 

Cecil  Rhodes  was  born  on  July  5,  1853,  three  * 
months  after  the  British  Government  had  definitely 
decided  to  abandon  the  sovereignty  of  the  Orange 
River  State,  and  about  eighteen  months  after  the 
signing  of  the  document,  since  famous  as  the  Sand 
River  Convention,  by  which  Great  Britain  recognised 
the  full  independence  of  the  Transvaal  State. 

The  vicarage  of  Bishop’s  Stortford  was  a  typical^ 
English  country  clergyman’s  abode,  and  no  better 
environment  for  one  of  Cecil  Rhodes’  quiet,  thought¬ 
ful  temperament  could  possibly  have  been  found.  It 
was  in  this  atmosphere  of  refinement  and  sincere 


4 


EARLY  YEARS. 


religion  that  the  child’s  character  was  moulded,  and) 
the  effects  of  his  early  upbringing  are  still  to  be 
observed  in  Mr  Rhodes’  character. 

One  of  the  earliest  acts  of  the  Rev.  F.  W.  Rhodes 
on  receiving  the  living  of  Bishop’s  Stortford  was  to 
resuscitate  and  reorganise  the  ancient  grammar-school 
of  the  town,  which  had  fallen  into  neglect  and  decay. 
To  this  school  each  boy  of  the  Rhodes  family  ^gas 
sent  in  turn.  It  was  on  November  4,  1861,  that 
Cecil  followed  his  three  elder  brothers  there.  At 
this  time  he  was  little  more  than  eight  years  of  age, 
and  so  far  had  been  educated  entirely  at  home. 
Even  at  this  tender  age,  however,  the  boy  who  was 
in  after-years  to  loom  so  large  in  his  country’s  history 
gave  promise  of  talents  above  the  ordinary. 

At  school  Cecil’s  strongest  subjects  from  the  very 
first  were  religion,  French,  and  the  classics.  In 
mathematics  he  was  strangely  weak.  History  and 
geography  also  were  favourite  subjects  of  his.  While 
working  hard  at  his  studies  and  overcoming  difficulties 
with  that  dogged  determination  and  iron  will  which 
has  ever  been  a  dominant  feature  of  his  character, 
Rhodes  did  not  neglect  athletics,  and  on  several  oc¬ 
casions  he  took  part  in  the  school  sports.  His  frame, 
to  look  at,  was  slender  and  delicate.  His  face  was 
only  slightly  tinged  with  colour,  and  a  mass  of  dark, 
waving  hair  coupled  with  his  thoughtful  grey  eyes 
served  to  give  him  an  air  of  delicacy  which  the 
general  state  of  his  health  did  not  quite  justify. 
Studious  and  “  bookish  ”  he  undoubtedly  was ;  but 
he  could  scarcely  be  called  delicate  in  health  at  this 
period. 

A  notable  event  at  the  Bishop’s  Stortford  grammar- 
school  at  the  time  when  Rhodes  was  a  pupil  there 


CECIL  RHODES  AS  A  BOY. 


THE  SCHOOLBOY. 


5 


was  the  annual  “  festival  ”  which  preceded  the  prize 
distribution,  and  it  was  customary  on  these  occasions 
to  give  excerpts  from  various  Greek,  French,  and 
English  plays.  In  these  Rhodes  took  his  share.  He 
finally  quitted  the  grammar-school  at  Christmas  1869, 
after  having  been  there  for  twenty-four  terms.  Dur¬ 
ing  this  time  he  had  endeared  himself  to  his  masters 
and  his  companions  alike,  and  there  has  been  no  pupil 
of  the  little  grammar  -  school  of  Bishop’s  Stortford 
more  popular  than  the  one  who  has  shed  the  most 
lustre  upon  it. 

In  his  schoolboy  days  Rhodes  manifested  many 
traits  which  have  been  among  his  most  prominent 
characteristics  in  later  years.  He  had  an  indomitable 
spirit  and  a  dogged  perseverance,  which  enabled  him 
to  accomplish  almost  any  task  which  he  set  himself. 
A  disinclination  to  be  behind  any  of  his  rivals,  whether 
in  their  studies  or  in  their  games,  likewise  distin¬ 
guished  him ;  and  whatever  it  was  he  did,  he  did 
it  thoroughly  and  earnestly.  His  temper  was,  in 
the  main,  genial  and  sunny  ;  but  at  times  he  had 
outbursts  of  that  imperiousness  of  will  which  has 
marked  his  later  career,  and  was  wont  to  chafe  some¬ 
what  at  the  admonitions  of  his  masters.  A  story 
is  current  at  his  old  school  to-day  that  on  one  oc¬ 
casion,  when  chastised  somewhat  severely,  and,  as 
appeared  to  him,  unjustly,  by  a  junior  master,  Rhodes 
in  a  momentary  fit  of  anger  seized  a  heavy  book 
lying  on  the  desk  beside  him  and  made  a  motion  as 
though  to  assault  the  master  with  it.  However,  he 
seemed  to  quickly  recollect  the  unseemliness  of  his 
conduct,  and  replaced  the  book  on  the  desk  with  an 
incoherent  apology. 

When  Rhodes  had  left  the  school,  carrying  with 


6 


EARLY  YEARS. 


him  the  goodwill  and  esteem  of  his  masters  and  com¬ 
rades,  he  continued  his  studies  for  some  months  under 
the  direction  of  his  father ;  but  he  seemed  unable  to 
fix  upon  a  career.  His  brother  Francis  was  at  this 
time  in  the  army  class  at  Eton,  and  it  was  evident 
that  at  least  one  of  his  other  brothers  would  adopt 
a  military  career.  Cecil,  however,  had  no  inclination 
for  the  life  of  a  soldier,  and  to  decide  on  a  profession 
was  a  hard  task.  His  name  was  entered  at  #xford, 
and  for  a  short  period  it  seemed  possible  that  he 
would  follow  An  his  father’s  footsteps  and  go  into 
the  Church.  /  Providence,  however,  directed  his  un¬ 
willing  footsteps  into  the  path  that  was  to  lead  to 
fortune  and  to  fame,  though  at  the  time  it  seemed 
as  if  his  life  were  destined  to  come  to  an  untimely 
end  before  he  had  reached  his  majority.  As  has 
been  seen,  his  health,  though  not  really  bad,  was 
never  of  the  strongest,  and  his  close  attention  to 
his  studies,  together  with  a  severe  chill,  brought  on 
a  serious  affection  of  the  lungs  which  left  him  very 
weak  for  some  time.  This  was  in  the  early  part  of 
1870.  On  his  convalescence  the  family  doctor  recom¬ 
mended  that  the  youthful  invalid  should  take -a  long 
sea  -  voyage  as  the  best  means  of  restoring  his 
shattered  health,  and  this  view  was  confirmed  by  a 
London  specialist  who  was  consulted  on  the  subject. 

This  being  so,  it  was  decided  that  Cecil  should 
visit  his  eldest  brother,  Herbert,  who  some  few  years 
previously  had  quitted  the  family  circle  to  try  his 
fortune  as  a  cotton-planter  in  Southern  Natal,  a 
colony  which  at  that  time  was  attracting  much  at¬ 
tention.  Accordingly  preparations  were  made  for 
his  departure,  and  he  set  sail  for  Durban  on  June 
21,  1870.  As  the  pale-faced,  delicate  lad  paced  the 


ARRIVAL  IN  AFRICA. 


7 


deck  of  the  little  sailing-vessel,  and  saw  its  head 
turned  southwards  and  the  cliffs  of  England  rapidly 
fading  out  of  sight  behind  him,  he  little  thought  of 
the  brilliant  career  he  was  destined  to  carve  out  for 
himself  in  South  Africa,  and  how  the  parting  from 
his  family  and  the  abandonment  of  a  university  career 
were  in  reality  blessings  in  disguise. 

He  had  within  him,  however,  that  power  which 
probably  would  have  ensured  his  success  in  any  career 
he  had  turned  his  mind  to.  It  is  difficult  for  us  now 
to  imagine  Cecil  Rhodes  as  a  bishop  in  gaiters  and 
shovel  hat,  but  there  can  be  little  doubt  among  any 
who  have  studied  him  at  all  closely  that,  had  he  at 
the  age  when  he  sailed  for  Africa  determined  upon 
entering  into  Holy  Orders,  he  would  to-day  have 
been  prominent  in  the  counsels  of  the  Church  of 
England. 

In  these  days  of  quick  steamships  doing  the  journey  *' 
from  England  to  the  Cape  in  seventeen  days,  it  is 
not  easy  to  realise  that  at  the  time  that  Rhodes 
sailed  for  Africa  the  voyage  to  Durban  took  about 
seventy  days ;  but  so  it  was.  It  was  not  until 
September  1,  1870,  that  he  landed  on  African  soil. 
Making  a  short  stay  at  Durban,  he  was  soon  on  his 
way  to  his  brother’s  plantation,  where  he  settled  and 
speedily  began  to  win  back  his  lost  health  and  vigour. 


8 


CHAPTER  II. 

SOUTH  AFRICA  AS  MR  RHODES  FOUND  IT. 

At  this  point  it  is  interesting,  and  indeed  necessary, 
to  delay  the  narrative  of  Mr  Rhodes’  life  in  order  to 
examine  the  condition  of  the  southern  portion  of  the 
African  continent  at  the  time  when  he  first  arrived 
there.  So  many  things  were  transpiring  about  this 
time  which  were  to  have  great  influence  on  Mr 
Rhodes’  career,  that  it  would  be  almost  impossible  to 
form  a  correct  judgment  of  it  if  these  were  not 
thoroughly  understood  and  explained. 

Three  years  previously,  in  1867,  diamonds  had  been 
discovered  in  the  region  to  the  north  of  the  Orange 
river.  This  discovery  was  made  accidentally.  A 
Boer  farmer  one  day  saw  a  native  child  gleefully 
playing  with  a  small  pebble  that  glittered  and 
coruscated  in  the  sun  with  unusual  brilliance.  He 
took  the  stone  from  the  child,  examined  it,  and 
carried  it  home  with  him.  He  could  have  had  but 
little  idea  of  what  the  stone  really  was,  for,  probably, 
the  only  time  he  had  ever  heard  of  diamonds  was 
when  he  read  the  Old  Testament ;  but  a  Boer  has 
always  a  keen  eye  for  business,  and  thinking  that  the 
stone  might  have  some  commercial  value,  the  farmer 
showed  it  to  a  British  trader  named  O’Reilly.  O’Reilly 


THE  DISCOVERY  OF  DIAMONDS. 


9 


seems  to  have  recognised  the  stone  immediately  as  a 
diamond,  and  bought  it  of  the  Boer — after  consider¬ 
able  haggling— for  £20.  Next  he  submitted  it  to 
Dr  Atherstone  of  Grahamstown — an  authority  on 
mineralogy — who  unhesitatingly  declared  it  to  be  a 
diamond  of  the  purest  water.  The  diamond  was  then 
shown  to  Sir  Philip  Wodehouse,  High  Commissioner 
at  the  Cape,  and  was  bought  by  him  from  O’Reilly 
for  £500. 

This  discovery  at  once  led  to  a  rush  to  the  Vaal 
and  Orange  rivers,  and  several  stones,  varying  in 
purity  and  value,  were  found  during  the  next  year  or 
two  by  fortunate  diggers.  The  largest  of  them  was 
the  “Star  of  Africa,”  discovered  in  1869.  This  stone 
weighed  83^  carats  uncut,  and  was  valued  at  £20,000. 
It  seemed  as  though  every  yard  of  ground  on  the 
banks  of  the  Orange  and  Yaal  rivers  had  been  pros¬ 
pected,  and  the  diamond  “  boom  ”  was  dying  away, 
when,  in  1870,  the  Du  Toit’s  Pan  mine  was  discovered 
j  about  eighteen  miles  from  the  Yaal  river.  So  soon  as 
the  richness  of  this  mine  in  diamonds  became  apparent, 
a  large  number  of  “  claims  ”  were  taken  up  in  the 
district.  Following  quickly  on  the  discovery  of  the 
Du  Toit’s  Pan  mine  came  the  finding  of  the  Colesberg 
Kopje  mine  and  the  De  Beers  mine.  These  revela¬ 
tions  of  vast  and  unsuspected  wealth  caused  another 
rush  to  the  diamond  -  fields,  much  greater  than  the 
first ;  and  it  was  when  this  second  rush  was  at  its 
height  that  Cecil  Rhodes  landed  in  Africa.  It  is 
rather  a  strange  coincidence  that  the  discovery  of  the 
diamond-fields  of  Griqualand  West  should  synchronise 
with  the  arrival  in  Africa  of  the  man  who  was  in 
course  of  time  to  become  the  controller  of  the  whole 
output  of  diamonds  in  South  Africa. 


10 


SOUTH  AFRICA  AS  MR  RHODES  FOUND  IT. 


All  this  affected  the  internal  affairs  of  Cape  Colony, 
and  of  South  Africa  generally.  Thousands  of  diggers 
were  attracted  to  the  diamondiferous  tract  of  land  in 
the  fork  between  the  Yaal  and  Modder  rivers.  Mining 
camps  of  considerable  size  began  to  spring  up  in  every 
direction,  and  men  of  many  nations  jostled  one  another 
in  the  race  for  wealth.  The  influx  of  these  miners  had 
a  very  marked  effect  on  the  commerce  and  revenue  of 
Cape  Colony,  as  will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the 
following  figures,  which  show  the  rapid  increase  in  the 
prosperity  of  the  colony  between  1870,  the  year  in 
which  the  “dry  diggings  ”  were  discovered,  and  1874, 
when  the  “boom”  had  given  way  to  the  steady  and 
quiet  development  of  the  resources  of  the  diamond- 
fields  : — 

1870.  1874. 


Imports  into  Cape  Colony  .  .  £2,352,043 

Exports  from  Cape  Colony  .  .  £2,453,768 

Shipping  of  Cape  Colony  (in  tons)  335,509 
Revenue  of  Cape  Colony  .  .  £831,211 
Expenditure  of  Cape  Colony  .  £795,695 


£5,558,215 

£5,138,838 

691,855 

£1,907,951 

£1,199,970 


It  will  be  seen  thus  that  the  economic  results  of  the 
discovery  of  the  diamond-fields  were  far-reaching,  and 
formed  the  first  stone  in  the  erection  of  the  future 
prosperity  of  Cape  Colony. 

The  political  changes  brought  about  by  the  finding  of 
diamonds  also  were  very  considerable,  and  indeed  may 
be  said  to  have  influenced  the  relations  between  the 
British  and  the  Dutch  in  South  Africa  down  to  the 
present  day.  The  chief  cause  of  these  political  effects 
was  the  fact  that  the  diamond  -  fields  were  within 
debatable  territory,  claimed  alike  by  the  Orange  Free 
State,  the  Transvaal,  and  Waterboer,  the  chief  of  the 
Griqua  tribe.  The  Free  State  was  the  first  to  assert 
its  sovereignty  over  the  diamond  -  fields,  and  an  im- 


THE  GRIQUALAND  WEST  DISPUTE. 


11 


partial  judge  must  admit  that  it  had  good  grounds  for 
claiming  that  they  lay  within  its  territory.  The  Free 
State  set  about  trying  to  establish  some  form  of 
settled  control  of  the  fields,  and  for  some  months  was 
permitted  to  do  so  without  protest.  Adhering  to  the 
policy  of  non-interference  in  events  which  transpired 
in  South  Africa  outside  the  limits  of  British  territory, 
the  Imperial  Government  remained  passive  for  some 
time,  and  watched  with  merely  academic  interest  the 
contentions  for  the  diamond-fields  between  the  Orange 
Free  State  and  Waterboer,  who  claimed  that  his  tribe 
was  independent  of  Boer  control,  and  that  his  terri¬ 
tory  lay  outside  the  Boer  boundaries.  Lord  Kim¬ 
berley  was  at  that  time  Colonial  Secretary  in  Mr 
Gladstone’s  Administration.  At  length,  acting  on 
the  urgent  advice  of  the  High  Commissioner  at  the 
Cape,  the  Imperial  Government  decided  to  take  a 
more  active  share  in  the  dispute  and  sided  with 
Waterboer,  declaring  that  Griqualand  West  lay  out¬ 
side  the  limits  of  the  Free  State  as  defined  by  Sir 
Harry  Smith  and  accepted  by  the  Free  State  at  the 
time  when  its  independence  was  granted. 

It  is  difficult  to  form  a  correct  judgment  on 
the  rights  and  wrongs  of  this  case.  Though  the 
boundary  of  the  Free  State  was  very  vaguely 
defined  in  this  region,  the  weight  of  evidence  seems 
to  be  in  favour  of  the  Boers.  The  British  Gov¬ 
ernment,  however,  decided  to  refer  the  matter  to 
arbitration,  though  the  Free  State  protested  against 
this  course  being  adopted ;  and  with  great  short¬ 
sightedness  they  selected  Lieutenant-Governor  Keate 
of  Natal  as  arbiter.  It  was  a  most  unfortunate  choice. 
Mr  Keate,  of  course,  was  a  gentleman  of  unblemished 
integrity  and  a  most  upright  administrator,  and  it  is 


12 


SOUTH  AFRICA  AS  MR  RHODES  FOUND  IT. 


certain  that  he  did  his  best  to  be  impartial  in  deciding 
this  question  of  the  ownership  of  the  diamond-fields. 
The  fact  remains,  however,  that  he  was  a  servant  of 
the  British  Government,  which,  although  not  an  actual 
party  in  the  arbitration,  made  no  secret  of  the  direc¬ 
tion  in  which  its  sympathies  lay. 

The  suspicions  of  the  Boers  were  at  once  aroused, 
therefore,  and  there  was  great  discontent  among 
them  when  Mr  Keate  gave  his  verdict  in  favour 
of  Waterboer,  and  the  diamond-fields  were  declared 
to  be  outside  the  limits  of  the  Orange  Free  State. 
The  Boers  felt  that  they  had  been  “jockeyed”  out 
of  their  rights  by  the  sharp  practice  of  the  British 
Government ;  and  this  feeling  was  intensified  when 
almost  immediately  Waterboer  placed  his  territory 
under  the  protection  of  the  British  Government,  who 
at  once  organised  Griqualand  West  into  a  lieutenant- 
governorship.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  this  placing 
of  the  diamond-fields  under  the  control  of  a  strong 
Power  like  Great  Britain  was  for  the  best ;  but  the 
Boers — small  blame  to  them — could  not  be  brought 
to  see  the  matter  in  this  light.  The  beaten  party 
never  recognises  the  justice  of  its  opponent’s  cause. 
The  fact  that  the  award  which  placed  the  diamond- 
fields  under  the  control  of  Great  Britain  was  made 
by  an  official  of  the  British  Colonial  Office  rankled 
in  their  minds  for  many  years  ;  nor  is  it  surprising. 
Supposing  that  the  conditions  had  been  reversed  :  if 
the  President  of  the  Transvaal  had  been  the  arbiter 
and  had  awarded  the  diamond-fields  to  the  Free 
State,  it  would  have  been  a  very  difficult  task  to 
convince  the  British  colonists  that  the  award  was 
absolutely  just  and  impartial.  Bight  or  wrong,  how¬ 
ever,  the  diamond-fields  passed  under  the  control  of 


FOREIGN  IMMIGRATION  TO  THE  TRANSVAAL. 


13 


the  British  Government,  and  here  for  a  time  we  can 
leave  them. 

By  its  interference  in  the  dispute  between  Water- 
boer  and  the  Orange  Free  State,  the  British  Govern¬ 
ment  showed  that  it  had  once  more  changed  its 
attitude  with  regard  to  South  Africa,  and  further 
evidence  of  this  was  soon  supplied  by  the  annexation 
of  Basutoland  to  the  Cape.  The  Colonial  Office  had, 
temporarily  at  any  rate,  abandoned  its  position  of 
non-intervention  outside  the  limits  of  the  British 
South  African  States.  Lord  Kimberley  and  his  suc¬ 
cessor  at  the  Colonial  Office,  Lord  Carnarvon,  both 
gave  evidence  by  their  actions  that  the  British 
Government  was  recognising  its  position  in  South 
Africa,  and  the  necessity  for  pushing  the  British 
rule  into  the  interior.  This,  however,  as  will  be 
seen  later,  was  only  a  flash  in  the  pan,  and  Downing 
Street  quickly  relapsed  into  its  traditional  attitude 
of  Inrstsp?.  fniiiLL - . 

Simultaneously  with  the  adoption  of  a  limited 
policy  of  expansion  in  Africa  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Government,  the  Government  of  the  Trans¬ 
vaal  seemed  disposed  to  modify  its  attitude  with 
regard  to  outside  states.  Strangely  suspicious  and 
distrustful  of  the  immigration  of  foreigners,  and  especi¬ 
ally  of  British,  into  its  territories,  the  Boer  Govern¬ 
ment  had  all  along  done  all  it  could  to  keep  aliens 
at  bay  and  to  close  the  Transvaal  to  all  save  its  own 
people.  With  the  discovery  of  the  Lydenberg  gold¬ 
fields  in  1869  the  Transvaalers  saw  with  feelings  akin 
to  consternation  a  sudden  influx  of  foreign  miners  into 
the  heart  of  their  country.  The  Boers  strove  des¬ 
perately  to  stifle  the  gold  industry  in  its  birth,  and 
by  repressive  laws  and  regulations  succeeded  in  pre- 


14 


SOUTH  AFRICA  AS  MR  RHODES  FOUND  IT. 


venting  the  mines  being  worked  to  any  great  extent. 
Such  was  the  traditional  attitude  of  the  Boers.  But 
it  was  suddenly  reversed  in  1871,  when  the  first  law 
permitting  the  working  of  the  gold  mines  in  the 
country  was  passed  by  the  Transvaal  Raad,  and  a 
Mining  Commissioner  was  appointed  for  the  Zout- 
pansberg  district. 

While,  as  had  been  said,  steadfastly  averse  from 
the  admission  of  foreigners  within  the  limits  of  the 
territories  they  were  already  in  possession  of,  the 
Boers  of  both  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free 
State  were  ever  restlessly  endeavouring  to  extend 
their  borders  and  to  bring  the  land  occupied  by 
various  independent  native  tribes  under  their  control. 
Totally  incapable  of  developing  the  country  they  al¬ 
ready  possessed,  the  Boers  were  a  prey  to  that  land- 
hunger  which  we  have  been  lately  taught  to  believe 
is  the  exclusive  vice  of  the  British  nation.  It  was 
the  rich  corn-growing  country  of  Basutoland  that  first 
attracted  their  attention,  and  for  many  years  the 
Orange  Free  State  waged  almost  incessant  war  on 
the  Basuto  nation.  As  far  back  as  1866  the  Free 
State  had  compelled  Moshesh,  the  paramount  chief 
of  the  Basutos,  to  cede  to  them  a  portion  of  the 
best  corn -growing  country  of  Basutoland,  and  to 
acknowledge  himself  and  his  tribe  their  vassals. 

Moshesh  had  appealed  to  Great  Britain  in  vain  for 
protection  against  these  inroads.  England  in  those 
days  regarded  colonies  as  a  burden  and  a  bore, — or, 
rather,  for  the  people  of  the  country  had  more  good 
sense,  the  British  Government  so  regarded  them, 
— and  therefore  was  not  disposed  to  undertake  any 
fresh  responsibilities  in  South  Africa  merely  for  the 
sake  of  saving  a  few  miserable  natives  from  extermin- 


THE  BOERS  AND  BASUTOLAND. 


15 


ation  at  the  hands  of  the  Boers.  The  man  who 
was  to  be  the  first  to  recognise  the  importance  of 
Great  Britain  being  the  paramount  Power  in  South 
Africa  was  at  the  time  of  Moshesh’s  appeal  to  the 
British  Government  a  schoolboy  in  the  playground 
of  the  Bishop’s  Stortford  grammar-school,  and  appar¬ 
ently  there  was  no  one  either  in  South  Africa  or  in 
London  with  foresight  sufficient  to  see  it. 

Not  content  with  the  land  they  had  already  torn 
from  Moshesh,  the  Boers  continued  to  ravage  his 
country.  From  1866  to  1868  they  waged  almost 
continuous  war  on  him.  In  the  latter  year  Moshesh 
found  himself  with  2000  of  his  bravest  warriors  slain 
or  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  Boers,  the  kraals 
of  his  tribe  broken  up  and  burnt,  his  crops  destroyed, 
and  starvation  staring  him  and  the  remnant  of  his 
tribe  in  the  face.  In  despair  the  Basuto  chief  again 
approached  the  British  Government,  and  in  a  letter 
full  of  genuine  pathos  begged  that  he  and  his  people 
might  “  rest  and  live  under  the  large  fold  of  the 
English  flag.”  This  time  his  prayer  was  heard,  and, 
though  with  considerable  reluctance  and  misgiving, 
a  proclamation  was  issued  declaring  Basutoland  to 
be  British  territory,  and  calling  upon  the  Boers  to 
withdraw  from  the  country.  As  was  only  to  be 
expected,  this  step  caused  an  angry  protest  from  the 
Boers ;  but  by  an  agreement  signed  at  Aliwal  North 
in  1869,  substantial  compensation  was  paid  to  them 
for  their  withdrawal  from  a  country  in  which  they 
had  not  the  slightest  right  to  be,  and  they  were 
permitted  to  retain  the  land  which  Moshesh  had 
ceded  to  them  in  1867. 

While  the  Boers  of  the  Free  State  were  thus 
fighting  for  the  possession  of  Basutoland,  those  of 


16 


SOUTH  AFEICA  AS  MR  RHODES  FOUND  IT. 


the  Transvaal  were  attempting  to  gain  a  footing  in 
the  countries  around  their  borders.  In  1868  Presi¬ 
dent  Pretorius  issued  a  proclamation  extending  the 
boundaries  of  the  Transvaal  as  far  eastwards  as 
Delagoa  Bay,  and  westward  to  Lake  ’Ngami,  on 
the  western  side  of  what  is  now  known  as  the 
Bechuanaland  Protectorate.  The  Transvaal  based 
its  claim  to  this  latter  territory  on  various  alleged 
concessions  by  chiefs  of  the  Bechuana,  Baralong, 
Batlapin,  and  other  tribes.  The  claim  to  the  country 
to  the  east  of  the  Transvaal  and  extending  to  Delagoa 
Bay  was  received  with  amazement  by  both  Portugal 
and  Great  Britain,  who  immediately  declined  to  re¬ 
cognise  the  pretensions  of  Pretorius.  After  fruitless 
discussion  and  negotiation,  it  was  decided  to  refer 
the  ownership  of  Delagoa  Bay  and  the  surrounding 
country  to  the  arbitration  of  the  President  of  the 
French  Republic.  Parenthetically  it  may  be  men¬ 
tioned  here  that  Great  Britain  had  also  put  in  a 
claim  for  the  ownership  of  Delagoa  Bay,  but  had 
very  little  evidence  on  which  to  base  her  contention. 
Ultimately  the  decision  of  Marshal  MacMahon  was 
in  favour  of  Portugal,  with  a  saving  clause  to  the 
effect  that  the  Transvaal  was  to  have  free  access  over 
Portuguese  territory  to  the  sea. 

The  determined  attitude  of  the  natives  in  the  por¬ 
tion  of  the  Bechuana  country  claimed  by  the  Boers 
effectually  prevented  the  Transvaal  from  extending 
its  borders  in  that  direction,  while  the  commendably 
— and  unwontedly — firm  attitude  of  the  British  Gov¬ 
ernment  showed  Pretorius  and  the  Boers  generally  that 
they  would  not  be  permitted  indefinitely  to  enlarge 
their  territory  whenever  the  fancy  took  them  to  do  so. 

Nevertheless,  the  Boers  stubbornly  maintained 


KRUGER  COMES  TO  THE  FRONT. 


17 


their  ground  in  Bechuanaland  ;  and,  while  ostensibly 
withdrawing  their  forces  and  leaving  the  natives 
their  independence,  in  reality  they  had  decided  not 
to  yield  one  jot  of  their  claims.  Montsoia,  the  para¬ 
mount  chief  of  the  Baralongs,  successfully  proved  his 
contention  that  his  tribe  was  free  from  any  Dutch 
control ;  and  Pretorius  and  his  chief  adviser,  Com¬ 
mandant  Paul  Kruger, — suspected  by  many  to  be 
the  moving  spirit  in  these  schemes  of  Boer  expansion, 
—affected  to  withdraw  their  claims  to  occupy  the 
Baralong  country.  In  spite  of  this,  however,  in 
March  1870  Montsoia  found  it  necessary  to  write  a 
letter  of  protest  to  the  Landdrost  of  the  Potchef- 
stroom  district  against  a  renewed  attempt  by  Boer 
agents  to  levy  taxes  on  his  people.  In  this  letter 
Montsoia  stated  that  unless  the  claim  of  the  Boers 
to  tax  the  Baralongs  was  finally  relinquished  he 
would  be  compelled  to  appeal  to  the  British  High 
Commissioner  at  the  Cape  to  arbitrate  between  them. 

The  entrance  of  the  British  into  the  dispute  be¬ 
tween  them  and  the  Baralongs  was  the  very  last 
thing  that  the  Transvaalers  desired,  and  their  reply 
to  Montsoia  was  characteristic  in  the  extreme,  and 
seems  to  bear  in  every  word  of  it  the  master-hand 
of  the  wily  Paul  Kruger.  This  reply  was  delayed 
for  some  months,  and  when  at  last  it  was  delivered 
the  discovery  of  diamonds  on  the  Orange  river  had 
been  made.  The  Boer  note  avoided  anything  like  a 
direct  reply  to  the  points  raised  by  Montsoia,  content¬ 
ing  itself  with  a  specious  invitation  to  the  chiefs  of 
the  Baralong,  Batlapin,  and  other  tribes  to  meet 
President  Pretorius  and  Commandant  Kruger  at  a 
great  assembly  near  where  the  historic  little  town 
of  Mafeking  now  stands.  The  chiefs  responded  to 


18 


SOUTH  AFRICA  AS  MR  RHODES  FOUND  IT. 


this  invitation,  and  the  meeting  was  held,  when  the 
Boers’  delegates,  with  a  great  show  of  tender  regard 
for  the  wellbeing  of  the  native  tribes,  which  was  as 
surprising  as  it  was  unusual,  invited  the  chiefs  to  join 
their  lands  to  the  Transvaal  and  so  “  save  ”  them  from 
the  British.  This  was  akin  to  one  traveller  suggesting 
to  another  that  he  should  hand  over  his  money  and 
valuables  to  him  at  once  in  case  he  was  stopped  by 
highwaymen  at  some  future  time.  Montsoia  and  his 
fellow-chiefs  were  not  to  be  deceived  by  the  honied 
words  of  the  Boers,  however,  and  they  declined 
point-blank  to  consider  the  proposal.  As  Montsoia 
put  it,  with  a  happily  turned  phrase  which  must  have 
excited  the  admiration  of  Kruger,  himself  a  past- 
master  at  phrase-making,  “No  one  ever  spanned  an 
ox  and  an  ass  in  the  same  yoke.” 

“  Let  us  live  together,”  pleaded  the  Boers ;  but 
the  chiefs  shook  their  heads  and  remained  obdurate 
to  all  the  blandishments  Pretorius  and  Kruger  could 
bestow  upon  them.  The  meeting  therefore  broke  up 
without  any  tangible  result,  and  the  Boers  were  com¬ 
pelled  to  cast  about  them  for  other  grounds  upon 
which  to  base  their  claims  to  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Baralong  country. 

Another  event  of  some  interest  which  occurred 
about  the  time  that  Mr  Rhodes  landed  in  South 
Africa  was  the  death  of  Umsiligaas,  the  chief  of  the 
powerful  Matabele  tribe.  His  successor  was  his 
second  son,  the  afterwards  famous  Lobengula,  with 
whom  Mr  Rhodes  was  destined  to  come  into  such 
close  contact  in  the  future. 

With  regard  to  the  great  stretch  of  country  lying 
to  the  north  and  north-west  of  the  Transvaal,  across 
the  Limpopo  or  Crocodile  river,  which  to-day  bears 


RHODES  APPEARS  ON  THE  SCENE. 


19 


the  name  of  Mr  Rhodes,  little  was  known  in  1870. 
Isolated  parties  of  Boers  had  from  time  to  time 
crossed  the  Limpopo  and  visited  the  apparently 
boundless  plains  of  southern  Matabeleland,  but  so 
far  no  systematic  attempt  to  settle  there  had  been 
made.  As  early  as  1864,  however,  a  German  ex¬ 
plorer  named  Karl  Mauch  had  discovered  the  Tati 
goldfield  in  the  south-west  corner  of  Matabeleland, 
and  in  1869  two  explorers,  named  Baines  and  Nelson, 
discovered  the  gold-belt  of  Mashonaland  while  making 
an  extensive  tour  in  that  region,  which  was  then 
almost  entirely  unknown. 

To  sum  up.  At  the  time  when  Cecil  Rhodes  . 
arrived  in  Africa  Cape  Colony  was  at  the  commence¬ 
ment  of  a  period  of  great  commercial  prosperity 
following  upon  the  discovery  of  the  diamond-fields. 
The  British  Colonial  Office  was  once  more  “  wobbling,” 
and,  after  a  period  of  steadfast  non-intervention  out¬ 
side  the  limits  of  the  British  colonies,  was  showing 
signs  of  an  inclination  to  extend  its  sphere  of  influ-  ^ 
ence  by  taking  over  the  lands  of  several  native  tribes 
in  danger  of  extermination  by  the  Boers.  Paul 
Kruger  was  rapidly  coming  to  the  front  in  the  coun¬ 
sels  of  the  Transvaal,  and  was  at  the  head  of  the 
majority  of  the  Burghers  who  demanded  the  exten¬ 
sion  of  their  territory.  - 

The  moment  was  opportune  for  the  appearance  of 
a  British  champion  who,  counteracting  the  machin¬ 
ations  and  intrigues  of  the  Boers,  should  weld  the 
fragments  of  the  native  states  together  and  make 
them  into  a  compact  whole  under  the  British  flag ; 
and  it  was  at  this  moment  that  Cecil  Rhodes  arrived 
in  Southern  Natal,  and  settled  down  for  a  short  time 
to  the  prosaic  life  of  a  cotton-planter. 


20 


CHAPTER  III. 

RHODES  AT  OXFORD. 

In  1871  Herbert  Rhodes,  with  that  restlessness  of  dis¬ 
position  which  was  ever  the  most  prominent  feature 
in  his  character,  grew  tired  of  the  humdrum,  unex¬ 
citing  life  of  a  cotton-planter  in  Natal,  and  deter¬ 
mined  to  set  off  for  the  diamond-fields,  there  to  try 
his  fortune.  Cecil  stayed  on  at  his  brother’s  planta¬ 
tion  for  some  few  months  after  his  departure  ;  then 
he  in  turn  was  seized  with  a  desire  for  diamond¬ 
digging,  and  attracted  by  the  possibilities  of  great 
wealth  quickly  acquired  which  that  industry  offered. 
The  cotton  plantation  was  sold,  and  Cecil  made  his 
way  across  Africa  to  Colesberg  Kopje,  where  his 
brother  had  previously  taken  up  his  abode. 

The  laws  controlling  the  diamond-fields  at  that  time 
did  not  permit  any  one  to  own  more  than  one  claim.  A 
“  claim,”  it  may  be  explained,  was  a  piece  of  diamond- 
iferous  ground  about  thirty-one  feet  square.  At  the 
beginning,  Cecil  Rhodes  and  his  eldest  brother  shared 
a  single  claim  between  them,  and  the  two  young  men 
set  about  developing  their  property  in  energetic  fashion, 
though  with  no  very  conspicuous  success  at  first. 

From  the  day  of  his  first  arrival  in  South  Africa 
Rhodes  had  been  growing  steadily  stronger,  and  by  the 


IN  RESIDENCE  AT  ORIEL. 


21 


time  he  had  spent  a  few  months  in  the  dry  and  bracing 
atmosphere  of  the  diamond-fields  he  seemed  to  have 
completely  shaken  off  the  chest  complaint  which  had 
only  a  short  time  previously  threatened  to  have  a  fatal 
termination.  This  being  the  case,  he  decided  to 
follow  the  wishes  of  his  family, — the  more  readily, 
perhaps,  because  they  coincided  with  his  own  aspira¬ 
tions, — and  to  return  to  England  in  order  to  matricu¬ 
late  at  the  university.  His  name  was  entered  at  Oriel 
College,  Oxford,  and  in  1873  the  young  man  quitted 
the  democratic  and  cosmopolitan  community  of  the 
South  African  diamond-fields  to  enter  into  the  quiet, 
studious  atmosphere  which  ever  hangs  over  a  university 
town.  During  the  whole  of  the  time  that  Rhodes  had 
been  in  Africa  he  had  managed  to  keep  up  his  studies, 
and  therefore  he  experienced  no  difficulty  whatever  in 
passing  the  matriculation  examination,  which  he  did 
on  October  13,  1873,  being  then  a  few  months  over 
twenty  years  of  age.  During  the  time  he  was  at 
Oxford  it  was  Rhodes’  habit  to  spend  the  summer 
term  at  the  university,  and  then  at  the  end  of  about 
six  months  to  return  to  the  Cape  and  the  diamond- 
fields.  Dividing  his  time  between  England  and 
Africa,  he  was  able  to  read  for  his  university  degree 
and  at  the  same  time  to  maintain  his  connection  with 
the  diamond  mines.  He  also  avoided  the  rigour  of  the 
English  winter,  for  though  by  this  time  he  seems  to 
have  shaken  off  the  effects  of  his  chest  complaint,  to 
have  wintered  in  England  would  have  been  to  submit 
his  lungs  to  a  strain  under  which  they  would  have 
probably  broken  down  once  more. 

The  demands  which  his  calling  made  upon  his  time 
did  not  prevent  Rhodes  from  pursuing  his  studies, 
and  in  due  course  he  passed  the  necessary  examina- 


22 


RHODES  AT  OXFORD. 


tions  and  took  his  B.A.  and  M.A.  degrees  together  in 
1881,  after  he  had  been  a  member  of  the  university 
for  about  eight  years.  Strangely  enough,  one  often 
comes  across  statements  in  the  public  press  at  the 
present  day  to  the  effect  that  though  Mr  Rhodes  was 
up  at  Oxford  for  some  years,  he  quitted  the  univer¬ 
sity  without  taking  his  degree.  How  this  fiction 
became  current  it  is  impossible  to  say,  but  a  reference 
to  the  records  of  Oriel  will  show  the  incorrectness  of 
the  statement. 

With  regard  to  Mr  Rhodes’  career  at  Oxford,  I 
have  been  fortunate  enough  to  receive  some  personal 
impressions  of  him  as  he  appeared  to  his  contempo¬ 
raries,  and  these  may  be  given  here  with  convenience, 
and  any  comment  upon  them  reserved  for  a  somewhat 
later  stage.  It  is  necessary,  however,  to  preface 
these  reminiscences  with  the  remark  that  in  one  or 
two  instances  slight  errors  have  crept  into  them,  due, 
no  doubt,  to  the  length  of  time  which  has  elapsed 
since  the  events  related  occurred  :  these  will  be 
pointed  out  nearer  the  end  of  the  chapter.  Those 
supplying  these  “  personal  recollections  ”  are  the  Rev. 
A.  G.  Butler,  M.A.,  of  Oxford,  who  in  Rhodes’  uni¬ 
versity  days  was  a  tutor  at  Oriel,  and  the  Rev. 
A.  L.  Barnes-Lawrence,  M.A.,  who  was  an  under¬ 
graduate  at  Oriel  in  Mr  Rhodes’  time  and  was  in 
his  “  set.”  I  judge  it  better  to  give  each  of  these 
gentlemen’s  impressions  of  Mr  Rhodes  in  separate 
and  distinct  form  as  they  reached  me.  The  first  is 
the  narrative  of  the  Rev.  A.  G.  Butler. 

I.  The  Rev.  A.  G.  Butler ,  M.A.,  writes: — 

“  Rhodes  got  an  attack  on  the  lungs  while  rowing 
in  our  [Oriel]  boat  one  spring  term — I  have  not  the 


MR  butler’s  reminiscences. 


23 


date  [1874 — Ed.] — and  had  to  go  to  the  Cape  for  the 
following  winter.  Then  he  went  up  to  Kimberley  and 
began  his  connection  with  the  diamond-fields,  which 
has  led  to  such  great  results.  He  still  continued  his 
connection  with  Oriel  and  Oxford,  returning  to  us  in 
the  summer,  and  in  general  spending  six  months  at 
the  Cape  and  six  months  in  Oxford  or  England.  Such 
a  life  gave  no  time  for  reading  for  Honours,  even  if  he 
had  wished  it,  but  he  passed  the  usual  Pass  Examina¬ 
tions  with  ease  at  the  proper  times.  Much  of  his 
reading  was  carried  on  in  out-of-the-way  places  and 
on  board  steamers,  and  it  is  not  a  little  remarkable 
how  he  got  at  the  heart  of  subjects  which  many  fail 
in  reaching. 

“  Thus,  in  an  interesting  speech  in  our  Oriel  Hall 
last  summer  term  (1899),  when  he  came  to  Oxford  to 
take  his  doctor’s  degree,  he  told  us  how  much  he  had 
been  interested  in  Aristotle’s  definition  of  virtue  in 
the  ‘  Ethics,’  ‘  as  the  highest  activity  of  the  soul  living 
for  the  highest  object  in  a  perfect  life.’  That  had 
always  seemed  to  him  the  noblest  rule  for  a  man  to 
follow,  and  he  had  made  it  his  rule  from  the  first.  But 
he  had  been  told  that  he  had  misunderstood  Aristotle, 
that  he  did  not  speak  of  ‘  living  for  the  highest 
object  ’  but  of  ruling  life  £  by  the  highest  principle  of 
right.’  If  that  was  so,  perhaps  he  had  sometimes 
offended ;  but  his  hearers  must  remember  that  in  a 
somewhat  rude  state  of  society,  such  as  was  to  be 
encountered  in  some  parts  of  South  Africa,  certain 
rights  are  not  clearly  defined  and  understood  as  in 
more  civilised  countries — that,  in  short,  it  is  some¬ 
what  of  the  old  wild  struggle  for  existence  in  which 
often  ‘  liberty  suffers  and  justice  is  trampled  under¬ 
foot.’  It  was  a  long  and  riveting  speech  of  great 


24 


RHODES  AT  OXFORD. 


power,  and  at  the  end  Rhodes  emphasised  his  earlier 
assertion  that  he  should  continue  to  live  for  his  old 
highest  object  of  empire-making,  though  not  unguided 
by  the  wisdom  of  experience  and — in  some  respects — 
of  suffering. 

“  In  an  earlier  part  of  his  college  career  Rhodes  was 
once  reported  to  his  college  dean  as  not  coming  to 
lectures  properly.  C.  R.  defended  himself  by  stating 
that  the  lecture  was  at  a  very  early  hour,  which  did 
not  suit  him.  Then  on  being  pressed  with  the  difficulty 
of  getting  through  his  examination  without  lectures, 
he  replied,  ‘  Oh,  I  promise  you  I’ll  manage  it.  Leave 
me  alone  and  I  shall  pull  through.’  The  dean,  who 
knew  his  man,  recognised  a  person  who  could  be 
trusted,  and  turned  his  blind  eye  for  the  future,  as  far 
as  possible,  to  sundry  negligences  of  this  sort  on  the 
part  of  so  masterful  and  yet  so  reliable  a  pupil. 

“  Rhodes’  career  at  Oxford  was  uneventful.  He 
belonged  to  a  set  of  men  like  himself,  not  caring  for 
distinctions  in  the  schools  and  not  working  for  them, 
but  of  refined  tastes,  dining  and  living  for  the  most 
part  together,  and  doubtless  discussing  passing  events 
in  life  and  politics  with  interest  and  ability.  Such  a  set 
is  not  very  common  at  Oxford,  living  as  it  does  a  good 
deal  apart  from  both  games  and  work ;  but  it  does 
exist,  and  somehow  includes  men  of  much  intellectual 
power  which  bears  fruit  later. 

“  On  Rhodes’  return  to  Oxford  to  take  his  degree 
(I  have  not  the  date  —  probably  when  he  was  about 
twenty-seven  years  of  age)  [it  was  in  1883 — Ed.]  he 
was  then  a  growing  power  at  Kimberley,  and  was 
about  to  be  elected  member  for  the  diamond-fields  in 
the  Cape  Parliament.  When  he  joined  us  in  common 
room  after  dinner  there  was  much  talk  about  African 


MR  butler’s  reminiscences. 


25 


politics,  and  he  spoke  with  a  clearness  and  vigour 
which  greatly  interested  us.  He  explained  how  ‘  the 
racial  question  between  Dutch  and  English  was  the 
greatest  problem  of  the  hour  out  there,  and  how  he 
meant  to  do  all  he  could  to  mediate  between  the  two.’ 
Later  on 1  again,  wdien  he  had  been  Premier,  just 
after  the  conquest  of  Matabeleland,  he  visited  Oriel 
with  Dr  Jameson,  and  when  asked  how  soon  he  was 
going  to  build  his  college  at  the  Cape,  which  he  pro¬ 
posed  to  erect  himself  on  the  model  of  his  old  college, 
he  said  £  he  could  not  do  it  yet,  because  Hofmeyer 
would  not  like  it,  as  it  would  interfere  with  a  Dutch 
college  established  somewhere  up  country.’ 

“  This  was,  of  course,  shortly  before  the  raid,  made, 
as  he  has  lately  stated,  not  against  the  Boers,  but 
against  Krugerism.” 

Such  are  the  recollections  of  Rhodes  in  his  college 
days  as  supplied  by  Mr  Butler,  and  a  few  comments 
on  these  may  be  made  before  passing  on.  Mr  Butler 
seems  to  be  slightly  incorrect  when  he  states  that  it 
was  not  until  Rhodes  was  compelled  to  return  to 
South  Africa  in  1874  through  a  chill  that  he  became 
connected  with  the  diamond-fields.  This  chill  was 
caught,  as  Mr  Butler  states,  while  rowing,  and  very 
nearly  proved  fatal ;  indeed,  had  it  not  been  for  the  dry, 
pure,  and  invigorating  air  of  Kimberley,  to  which  Mr 
Rhodes  returned  in  the  nick  of  time,  the  illness  must 
almost  inevitably  have  taken  a  fatal  turn.  As  it  was, 
it  was  a  very  narrow  escape  indeed.  At  this  time, 


1  The  occasion  of  his  visit,  in  company  with  Dr  Jameson,  was  in  1894, 
when  he  was  sworn  of  the  Privy  Council  and  a  C.  B.  was  awarded  to  Dr 
Jameson,  for  their  efforts  in  bringing  the  Matabele  war  to  a  successful 
conclusion. 


26 


RHODES  AT  OXFORD. 


however,  Mr  Rhodes  had  been  connected  with  the 
diamond  industry  in  South  Africa  for  nearly  three 
years,  and  the  only  change  which  occurred  then  was 
that  he  took  over  ten  claims  instead  of  the  one  he  had 
previously  held,  and  which  had  been  jointly  worked 
by  his  brother  and  himself.  About  this  time  Herbert 
Rhodes  tired  of  the  diamond-fields,  and  decided  to 
push  on  farther  north  into  unknown  lands. 

The  statement  which  Rhodes  made  in  1883,  that  he 
should  endeavour  to  stamp  out  the  racial  feeling  be¬ 
tween  Boers  and  British  in  South  Africa,  has  been 
amply  borne  out  by  his  later  actions ;  and  his  recent 
discrimination  between  the  Boers  and  the  Kruger 
coterie,  though  patent  and  easy  to  understand,  seems 
either  to  be  totally  disregarded  by  his  opponents  or 
is  declared  to  be  nothing  but  a  distinction  without  a 
difference.  This  is  a  question,  however,  which  we  will 
deal  with  more  fully  later. 

The  reminiscences  of  the  Rev.  A.  L.  Barnes-Law- 
rence,  M.A.,  can  now  be  passed  to  with  the  mention 
that  this  gentleman  was  one  of  those  who  formed  Mr 
Rhodes’  immediate  circle  of  friends  at  Oxford. 

II.  The  Rev.  A.  L.  Barnes- Laivrence  ivrites : — 

“  It  has  always  seemed  to  me  that  confidences 
between  boys  at  school  and  between  young  men  at 
college  —  innocent  and  honourable  though  they  may 
have  been — ought  not  to  be  exposed  in  after-life  to 
that  fierce  light  which  beats  upon  a  throne.  I  may  be 
allowed,  however,  to  express  in  general  terms  the 
interest  which  I  felt  in  Mr  Rhodes  at  that  time,  and 
which  naturally  enough  has  increased  as  time  has 
gone  on. 

“It  is  a  little  difficult  in  the  retrospect  to  dis- 


me  baenes-laweence’s  beminiscences.  27 

associate  the  Cecil  Rhodes  of  the  present  day  from 
one’s  view  of  him  then ;  and  just  because  it  is  so  easy 
to  be  wise  after  the  event,  there  is  need  of  caution 
lest,  after  the  events  which  have  taken  place  since 
the  undergraduate  became  a  public  man,  we  should 
imagine  that  we  had  been  wise  enough  to  have  dis¬ 
cerned  in  that  undergraduate  those  germs  of  ability 
which  have  developed  into  greatness  in  after-life. 
There  were  men  among  our  contemporaries  and  friends 
concerning  whom  it  would  not  have  been  difficult  to 
predict  that,  if  health  and  opportunity  were  theirs, 
they  would  be  likely  to  be  heard  of  in  a  world  which 
is  some  degrees  larger  than  Oxford.  But  Mr  Rhodes 
no  doubt  will  agree  with  me  that  if  he  personally  felt, 
as  young  men  are  apt  to  feel,  that  he  had  it  in  him  to 
be,  or  to  do,  something  great,  he  did  not  betray  his 
secret  or,  as  the  modern  phrase  is,  ‘  give  himself  away.’ 
I  think  we  all  liked  Rhodes  because  he  was  natural 
and  unaffected  ;  but  he  was  reserved  about  his  own 
private  affairs,  and  I  can  recollect  that,  notwith¬ 
standing  a  certain  coldness  of  speech  and  manner 
which  betokened  an  unconventional  attitude  towards 
things  in  general  and  towards  the  university  in  par¬ 
ticular,  there  was  an  evident  anxiety  on  his  part  to 
conform  to  college  rules  and  university  regulations. 
His  experience  of  life  had  been  more  varied  than  that 
of  the  ordinary  public  schoolboy  coming  straight  from 
school  life  to  the  university  ;  and  I  think  we  some¬ 
times  tried  to  draw  from  him  some  revelation  of  that 
experience — much  in  the  same  way  as  the  Lord  High 
Chancellor,  in  a  speech  at  the  Oriel  Commemoration 
Dinner  in  1899,  gave  expression  to  the  general  wish 
that  Mr  Rhodes,  who  was  present  with  us,  should 
make  a  speech,  and  added,  ‘  If  only  Mr  Rhodes  chose 


28 


RHODES  AT  OXFORD. 


to  open  his  mouth,  what  secrets  he  could  tell  us  in 
connection  with  that  South  African  problem  which 
confronts  us.’ 

£C  I  daresay  in  those  earlier  days  Mr  Rhodes  could 
have  told  us  something  about  South  Africa,  and  no 
doubt  did  tell  us  something,  for  I  remember  how,  in 
the  hearts  of  some  of  us,  he  stirred  some  spirit  of 
adventure  and  some  longing  to  go  over  some  of  the 
ground  which  he  had  even  then  traversed,  and  to 
penetrate  into  regions  which  were  only  dimly  visible 
to  us  then  under  the  halo  of  romance. 

“  Just  a  quarter  of  a  century  later,  in  talking  with 
me  about  those  old  times,  Rhodes  has  told  me  that 
even  then  he  was  fired  with  an  ambition  to  advance 
the  boundaries  of  civilisation  by  extending  the  British 
Empire  to  the  regions  beyond  ;  and  it  was  deeply 
interesting  to  me  to  hear  him  say  how  much  he  had 
always  felt  indebted  to  the  educational  course  at 
Oxford,  which  had  cleared  his  vision,  fixed  his  aim, 
stimulated  his  enthusiasm,  and  sustained  him  in  his 
after-life  amid  the  thousand  difficulties  which  beset 
him  in  the  pursuit  of  his  ideal.  These  phrases  are 
perhaps  mine  rather  than  his,  but  they  represent 
accurately  what  he  intended  to  convey  with  reference 
to  his  indebtedness  to  the  university  and  to  his  old 
college. 

“  As  far  as  my  recollection  goes,  Rhodes’  knowledge 
of  classical  literature  was  only  elementary ;  but  he 
struggled  manfully  with  the  Latin  and  Greek  which 
lay  between  him  and  the  pass  degree  at  which  he 
aimed,  and  was  not  above  asking  questions  from 
friends  or  tutors  to  elucidate  the  text  or  the  point 
to  be  solved.  In  his  attitude  towards  most  questions 
and  difficulties  he  was  decidedly  philosophic,  and  it  is 


MR  BARNES-LAWRENCE’S  REMINISCENCES. 


29 


my  belief  that,  like  some  other  men  at  that  time,  he 
worked  at  his  books  a  great  deal  harder  than  he 
appeared  to  do,  and  more  than  he  would  have  cared 
to  admit. 

“  One  or  two  incidents  of  undergraduate  life  I  may 
be  allowed  to  record,  quite  trivial  in  themselves  and 
only  interesting  in  the  light  of  these  later  days.  We 
were  walking  along  the  ‘High’ — Rhodes  and  I  and 
another — when  a  proctor  appeared  coming  towards 
us  at  a  pace  which  betokened  business  and  accom¬ 
panied  by  his  ‘  bulldogs.’  At  once  we  became  su¬ 
premely  conscious  of  the  fact  that  we  were  without 
caps  and  gowns,  which  at  that  hour  of  the  evening, 
though  not  criminal,  was  a  statutable  offence  and 
punishable  by  a  fine.  What  was  to  be  done  ?  The 
proctor  with  his  satellites  was  still  some  little  distance 
from  us,  but  to  have  turned  and  fled  would  have 
resulted  in  instant  chase,  and  would  have  been  an 
aggravation  of  the  offence.  Our  companion,  however, 
taking  advantage  of  a  side -street,  instantly  turned 
down  it,  and  then,  being  out  of  the  proctor’s  sight, 
took  to  his  heels  and  disappeared. 

“  ‘  Look  here,’  said  Rhodes  to  me ;  ‘  these  fellows 
won’t  know  me,  as  I  am  only  just  up  and  am  in 
lodgings,  so  you  make  off  without  any  hurry-scurry 
and  I’ll  meet  them.’  Decision  and  action  necessarily 
were  simultaneous.  With  a  friendly  wave  of  the 
hand,  I  strode  off  in  the  direction  of  my  college,  and 
as  I  turned  a  corner  and  looked  back,  one  glance 
showed  me  a  group  of  which  Mr  Rhodes  and  the 
proctor  were  the  central  figures,  the  two  ‘  bulldogs  ’ 
standing  around. 

“  Next  day,  of  course,  we  compared  notes.  I  had 
won  the  shelter  of  Oriel  without  difficulty,  and  how 


30 


RHODES  AT  OXFORD. 


had  Rhodes  fared  ?  ‘  Oh,  gloriously  !  ’  he  said.  ‘  It 

was  such  fun  !  The  proctor  took  off  his  cap  to  me 
with  the  utmost  politeness,  and  I  did  the  same  to 
him.  “  Well,  sir,'’  said  the  proctor  to  me,  “  your 
name  and  college  ?  ”  “  My  name  is  Rhodes,”  replied 

C.  R.,  “and  I  have  come  here  from  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  and  I  am  making  a  short  stay  in  Oxford  ;  and 
now,  sir,  may  I  ask  your  name  and  college  ?  ”  ■  I 
Rhodes  was  right  in  supposing  that  neither  proctor 
nor  ‘  bulldogs  ’  would  know  him.  The  proctor  apolo¬ 
gised  for  what  he  suppbsed  to  be  his  mistake,  and 
again  with  much  show  of  politeness  he  and  the  Oriel 
undergraduate  parted,  and  next  day  Rhodes  nearly 
died  of  laughter  in  relating  the  success  of  his  man¬ 
oeuvre  to  me. 

“  At  dinner  we  usually  sat  next  each  other,  and 
one  night  I  remember  that  I  felt  compelled  to  act 
decisively  in  a  matter  of  a  most  unusual  kind,  and 
received  from  him  moral  support  such  as  I  felt  thank¬ 
ful  to  obtain.  It  was  a  case  of  an  undergraduate 
expressing  his  opinion  of  some  very  excellent  persons, 
and  using  language  about  them  of  a  very  gross 
character ;  and  to  add  to  the  horror  of  it,  these 
persons  thus  reviled  were  the  young  man’s  own 
father  and  mother,  with  whom  I  happened  to  be 
acquainted.  I  was  so  filled  with  indignation  that 
I  told  the  culprit  that  if  he  uttered  another 
word  of  the  kind,  he  subsequently  would  receive 
the  severest  thrashing  he  had  ever  experienced  in 
his  life.  A  dead  silence  instantly  ensued,  for  of 
course  my  warning  was  almost  as  unparliamentary 
as  the  language  which  had  provoked  it.  Then  some 
one  said  to  me,  ‘  Don’t  be  so  warm  about  it,’  to  which 
I  replied  that  ‘  on  no  account  would  I  tolerate  such 


MR  BARNES-LAWRENCE’S  REMINISCENCES. 


31 


language  at  the  dinner-table,’  &c.  At  this  juncture 
Rhodes  seized  me  by  the  arm  and  said,  ‘  Why  !  you 
are  a  regular  Briton !  ’  and  then,  turning  to  the 
offender,  added,  ‘  You  have  heard  what  Barnes- 
Lawrence  has  said,  and  if  you  give  us  any  more  talk 
of  that  kind  we  will  all  have  to  give  you  a  thrashing, 
so  you  had  better  hold  your  tongue.’  And  hold  his 
tongue  he  did.  The  cheerful  way  in  which  Rhodes 
thus  intervened  and  restored  the  status  quo  remained 
in  my  memory,  as  also  did  his  expression  about  ‘  a 
regular  Briton,’  which  incidentally  serves  to  show 
that  even  at  that  time  his  acquaintance  with  South 
Africa  had  accustomed  him  to  a  comparison  between 
Briton  and  anything  un  -  English,  or,  as  we  have 
learned  to  say  nowadays,  between  Briton  and  Boer. 

“I  cannot  remember  that  Mr  Rhodes  took  any 
acitive  part  in  our  college  sports,  though  there  was 
much  keenness  then  to  get  any  man  who  could  do 
anything  in  rowing,  cricket,  football,  or  athletics  to 
represent  the  college  worthily  against  all  outsiders. 
He  could  handle  an  oar,  and  we  have  rowed  together  ; 
but  notwithstanding  that  he  was  active -limbed  and 
rather  big  and  well-proportioned,  there  was  a  delicacy 
of  constitution  which  prohibited  him  from  taking  part 
in  any  violent  exercises  ;  and  he  did  not  present  then 
that  massive  appearance  to  which  we  are  accustomed 
to-day,  and  to  which  a  lady  bore  eloquent  testimony 
upon  the  occasion  of  Mr  Rhodes  taking  his  honorary 
D.C.L.  degree  in  1899.  He  was  standing  in  front 
of  the  vice  -  chancellor  in  the  Sheldonian  Theatre, 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Lord  Kitchener,  who  was 
recipient  of  the  same  degree,  and  the  cheering  of 
the  immense  concourse  of  privileged  persons  who 
were  present  quite  prevented  Dr  Shadwell  of  Oriel 


32 


RHODES  AT  OXFORD. 


College,  who  filled  the  office  of  public  orator,  from 
proceeding  with  his  introductory  address,  and  it  was 
then  that  a  lady  who  was  close  to  me  exclaimed 
ecstatically,  ‘  Oh,  don’t  they  just  look  like  two  great 
pillars  of  the  Empire  !  ’ 

“It  is  difficult  after  a  lapse  of  years  to  add  more 
to  this  fragmentary  notice  of  Mr  Rhodes  as  he  ap¬ 
peared  to  me  in  his  undergraduate  days,  for  he 
resided  out  of  college  and  did  not  keep  full  terms. 
But  it  is  pleasant  to  find  that  the  genial  man  of 
those  days,  notwithstanding  all  the  stress  and  strain 
of  the  unique  experiences  of  his  later  life,  has  pre¬ 
served  his  sense  of  good  comradeship  in  his  inter¬ 
course  with  college  friends. 

“  The  last  words  I  heard  him  utter  before  he  re¬ 
turned  to  South  Africa  to  be  back,  as  he  said,  before 
the  war  broke  out,  were  words  which  every  college 
don  in  every  college  and  in  every  university  would 
do  well  to  take  note  of  as  some  encouragement  to 
them  in  labours  which  are  not  confined  to  giving 
lectures  and  coaching  men  for  their  examinations. 
£  I  may  have  made  some  mistakes  in  life,’  said  Mr 
Rhodes,  ‘  and  I  can  only  hope  that  I  have  been 
forgiven ;  but  whatever  difficulties  and  troubles  I 
may  meet  with  in  the  future,  I  shall  always  feel  that 
I  shall  be  able  to  turn  to  my  old  college  with  the 
certainty  of  receiving  just  the  comfort  and  advice 
I  may  need.’  ” 

In  other  portions  of  the  book  it  will  be  found 
necessary  from  time  to  time  to  refer  to  this  instruc¬ 
tive  narrative  of  Mr  Barnes-Lawrence. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


ENTRANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE. 


It  was  in  Kimberley,  between  the  years  1873  and 
1881,  that  Mr  Rhodes  by  his  successful  speculation  in 
diamond  mines  began  to  amass  the  wealth  without 
which  his  political  career  on  the  lines  he  had  mapped 
out  for  himself  would  have  been  impossible. 

Exactly  when  it  was  that  the  idea  of  British  expan-) 
sion  in  Africa  first  came  to  him  it  is  impossible  to  say  ;  / 
but  it  must  have  been  very  soon  after  he  first  reached  \ 
Kimberley,  or  New  Rush,  as  that  town  was  called  fori 
the  first  few  years  of  its  existence.  In  those  days  1 
Rhodes  was  essentially  a  “dreamer  of  dreams.”  The"' 
glamour  of  Africa,  which  has  at  different  times  cast  its 
spell  over  such  mighty  minds  as  Cambyses  and  Na¬ 
poleon  Bonaparte,  had  seized  hold  of  the  grey-eyed, 
delicate  English  lad.  Unlike  most  dreamers,  however, 
Rhodes  was  gifted  with  the  power  to  materialise  his 
visions/  His  character,  in  truth,  is  a  strange  blend. 
On  the  one  side  is  the  thoughtful  student  and  philos¬ 
opher  imagining  big  schemes ;  and  on  the  other  is  the 
cool  -  headed  financial  genius  who  can  provide  the 
means  whereby  the  great  schemes  evolved  by  the 
other  side  of  his  character  are  rendered  possible. 

From  the  very  first  Rhodes  seems  to  have  been  con- 


34 


ENTEANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE. 


vinced  of  the  future  of  South  Africa ;  but  he  recog¬ 
nised  that  for  it  to  assume  its  proper  place  among  the 
States  of  the  world  the  scattered  fragments  which 
then  existed  must  be  welded  into  a  coherent  whole. 
This,  together  with  the  bringing  of  the  then  unknown 
interior  under  civilised  control,  was  the  task  to  which 
he  set  himself,  and  he  has  devoted  himself  to  it  for 
nearly  thirty  years.  “  That  is  my  dream,”  he  once 
said,  drawing  his  hand  across  the  map  of  Africa, 
“  that  all  red.”  He  foresaw  that  some  day  or  other 
the  South  African  states  must  be  federated,  and  he 
'  was  determined  in  his  own  mind  that  when  this 
federation  came  about  the  states  should  form  a  por¬ 
tion  of  the  British  Empire.  From  this  object,  the 
federation  of  the  states  of  South  Africa  under  British 
control,  and  the  extension  of  the  British  Empire 
northwards  through  Africa,  he  has  never  wavered. 
j  This,  in  a  sentence,  has  been  the  lifework  of  Cecil 
Rhodes. 

Having  at  length  found  a  definite  object  in  life  to 
which  to  devote  himself,  Rhodes  with  characteristic 
energy  set  about  his  colossal  task  of  expanding  and 
consolidating  the  British  Empire  in  Africa.  His  well- 
balanced  mind,  however,  enabled  him  to  see  that  it 
was  of  no  use  to  attempt  the  erection  of  the  keystone 
of  his  edifice  before  he  had  laid  the  foundation.  The 
preliminary  steps  to  be  taken  were  two.  ^  jTli e-  first 
was  the  possession  of  sufficient  wealth  to  enable  him 
to  accomplish  his  purpose  ;  *the  second,  a  position  of 
authority  in  the  administration  of  Cape  Colony.  It 
was  thus  that  very  early  in  his  life  he  decided  to  enter 
upon  a  political  career — before  he  had  left  Oxford,  in 
fact ;  but  he  recognised  that  even  more  important,  if 
he  was  to  bring  his  ideas  to  fruition,  than  a  seat  in  the 


WHY  RHODES  VALUES  MONEY. 


35 


Cape  Assembly  was  the  possession  of  great  wealth.  * 
As  he  remarked  a  few  years  later  to  General  Gordon, 
“It  is  no  use  having  big  ideas  if  one  has  not  the 
money  to  carry  them  out.” 

For  money  as  money  Rhodes  has  never  cared  the 
slightest.  Vdt  was  only  for  the  power  which  the  con¬ 
trol  of  wealth  brings  with  it  that  Rhodes  strove  to 
become  a  millionaire.  To-day,  though  he  is,  as  he 
himself  has  stated,  a  millionaire  ten  times  over,  he 
probably  spends  less  upon  himself  than  a  good  many 
of  those  in  his  employ.  Had  it  only  been  for  the 
luxuries  which  money  buys,  Rhodes  would  never  have 
worked  early  and  late  to  obtain  it.  But,  as  has  just 
been  said,  a  large  capital  at  his  command  was  the 
first  step  towards  the  accomplishment  of  his  ideas, 
and  therefore  he  devoted  himself  to  the  task  of 
making  money  with  that  dogged  earnestness  and  con¬ 
centration  of  energy  which  had  previously  carried 
him  triumphantly  through  so  many  difficulties  at 
school  and  college. 

In  1874  the  laws  controlling  the  diamond-fields  were 
revised  so  as  to  permit  a  person  to  hold  ten  claims  in¬ 
stead  of  the  one  which  had  previously  been  the  limit. 
Rhodes  promptly  took  advantage  of  this  to  buy  up 
nine  of  the  most  promising  claims  in  the  neighbour¬ 
hood.  A  short  time  afterwards  this  law  also  was 
abolished,  and  one  man  could  hold  an  indefinite 
number  of  claims  on  certain  conditions. 

As  was  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter,  Herbert 
Rhodes  tired  of  the  diamond-fields  about  this  time, 
and  quitted  Kimberley  to  enter  upon  the  more  con¬ 
genial  role  of  hunter,  explorer,  and  gold-seeker  in  the 
interior.  Left  to  himself,  Cecil  quickly  contracted 
four  friendships  which  have  been  of  great  benefit  to 


36 


ENTRANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE. 


him  and  are  maintained  to  this  day.  These  were  with 
C.  D.  Rudd  (who,  like  Rhodes,  had  been  compelled  to 
leave  school  and  visit  South  Africa  owing  to  a  break¬ 
down  in  his  health),  Rochefort  Maguire,  Alfred  Beit, 
and  Dr  L.  S.  Jameson.  The  first  -  named  became 
in  a  short  time  Rhodes’  partner,  and  they  embarked 
upon  many  speculations  together.  In  addition  to 
buying  and  working  several  diamond  claims,  they 
tendered  for  and  obtained  the  contract  to  pump  out 
a  mine  which  had  been  flooded  by  a  waterspout. 
This  meant  the  importation  of  hydraulic  machinery 
from  England,  but  in  the  end  Rhodes  and  Rudd 
were  amply  repaid  for  their  enterprise.  They  also 
erected  a  refrigerating  plant  to  supply  the  town  with 
ice  during  the  hot  weather,  and  made  large  profits 
out  of  it.  Rhodes  had  set  himself  to  make  a  for¬ 
tune  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  and  anything  that 
tended  to  hasten  that  consummation  was  welcomed 
by  him,  and  in  all  his  efforts  he  was  willingly  seconded 
by  his  youthful  partner.  He  found  that  his  mining 
claims  were  giving  very  good  results,  and  he  soon 
became  known  as  one  of  the  ablest  speculators  in 
claims  in  or  around  Kimberley.  Everything  he  took 
up  seemed  to  turn  out  well. 

A  short  and  cursory  description  of  the  Kimberley 
diamond  mines  and  their  methods  of  working  may  not 
be  out  of  place  here.  The  diamondiferous  earth  occurs 
in  two  forms,  and  is  thought  to  be  of  volcanic  origin. 
The  upper  layer,  which  in  some  cases  comes  up  to  the 
surface  of  the  land,  is  a  soft  clay  of  a  yellowish  colour, 
and  underneath  it  is  a  harder  clay  of  a  dark  blue  tint. 
It  is  in  this  second  layer  that  the  bulk  of  the  diamonds 
is  found.  To-day  the  mines  are  being  worked  down 
to  a  considerable  depth,  as  much  as  1200  feet  in  places, 


THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 


37 


by  means  of  vertical  and  incline  shafts  and  horizontal 
galleries  or  “  drives,”  in  much  the  same  manner  as  is 
adopted  in  a  gold  mine  or  a  coal  mine. 

Some  of  the  mines,  however,  are  open,  and  resemble 
great  pits  of  the  nature  of  a  stone  quarry.  Prominent 
among  these  open  mines  is  the  famous  Wesselton  pro¬ 
perty,  from  which  diamonds  to  the  value  of  over 
twelve  millions  sterling  have  been  taken  in  less  than 
thirty  years.  There  is  a  story  that  when  the  “  dia¬ 
mond  boom  ”  first  set  in,  the  land  on  which  this  mine 
is  situated  was  offered  for  sale  for  £50  and  found  no 
buyer.  The  Wesselton  mine  has  a  circumference 
round  the  top  of  the  pit  of  over  a  quarter  of  a  mile, 
and  is  fenced  in  with  row  upon  row  of  barbed  wire  to 
prevent  outsiders  having  access  to  the  small  army  of 
Kafirs  engaged  in  hewing  out  the  solid  masses  of 
blue  earth.  A  striking  feature  of  this  mine  is  the 
network  of  wire  ropeways  for  hauling  small  trucks 
filled  with  earth  to  the  summit. 

The  present  method  of  treating  the  earth  is  to 
bring  it  to  the  surface,  and  leave  it  exposed  to  the 
action  of  the  sun  for  a  few  months  in  some  care¬ 
fully  protected  spot ;  and  then,  when  it  shows  signs 
of  crumbling,  it  is  broken  into  small  fragments,  and 
passed  through  a  crushing-machine  which  reduces  the 
earth  to  a  fine  powder.  A  stream  of  water  is  next 
directed  across  it,  and  this  washes  the  earth  away 
through  very  fine  sieves,  leaving  the  diamonds 
behind. 

Such  are  the  modern  methods  of  diamond-mining ; 
but  in  the  early  days  of  small  groups  of  claims,  and 
when  the  diamondiferous  earth  lay  nearer  the  sur¬ 
face,  the  working  was  carried  out  in  more  primitive 
fashion.  A  small  shaft  was  sunk  into  the  “  blue 


38 


ENTRANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE. 


ground,”  and  the  earth  was  hoisted  to  the  surface  by- 
means  of  a  bucket  and  windlass.  It  was  then  im¬ 
mediately  pounded  into  gravel  by  the  workmen 
under  the  watchful  eye  of  the  owner,  on  the  alert 
to  see  that  none  of  the  stones  was  appropriated 
by  the  natives,  and>  emptied  into  small  hand-sieves 
and  water  run  through  it.  This  done,  the  diamonds 
were  sorted  out  from  the  residue,  and  weighed  and 
tested.  * 

A  stranger  landing  in  Kimberley  in  those  days, 
and  seeing  Rhodes  in  his  shirt-sleeves  seated  on  an 
upturned  bucket  sorting  with  keen  eyes  the  diamonds 
from  the  gravel  on  an  improvised  table  in  the  open 
air,  or  reading  a  text-book  for  his  next  examination 
at  Oxford  with  one  eye  on  the  volume  and  the  other 
on  his  native  workmen,  would  have  found  it  hard 
to  believe  that  in  this  man  the  destinies  of  South 
Africa  were  virtually  bound  up.  To  all  appearances  he 
seemed  to  have  no  other  object  in  life  than  his  books 
and  the  successful  working  of  his  diamond  claims. 

Among  the  population  of  Kimberley  there  were  few, 
if  any,  outside  his  little  circle  of  intimates  who  could 
understand  Rhodes.  All  recognised  in  him  a  very 
successful  speculator,  and  one  whom  it  was  impossible 
to  get  the  best  of  in  a  bargain,  and  therefore  he 
received  a  certain  amount  of  respect ;  but  they  could 
not  follow  or  sympathise  with  the  intricate  working 
of  his  mind.  They  set  him  down  as  eccentric  and 
“queer.”  Among  his  friends,  however,  his  abilities 
were  appreciated,  and  Dr  Jameson  has  placed  on 
record  that  at  a  very  early  stage  in  their  acquaintance¬ 
ship,  which  dates  from  1878,  he  realised  that  “for 
sheer  natural  power  he  had  never  met  a  man  to  come 
near  Cecil  Rhodes.”  Rhodes  further  possessed  the 


ELECTED  FOR  BARKLY  WEST. 


39 


power  of  convincing  his  auditors  that  what  at  first 
seemed  to  be  his  wildest  and  most  visionary  schemes 
were  well  within  the  bounds  of  possibility,  and  that 
he  had  within  him  the  gifts  necessary  to  bring  those 
schemes  into  actual  being. 

Rhodes  and  Jameson  for  many  years  shared  a  small 
bachelor  establishment  at  Kimberley,  and  were  very 
close  friends.  The  young  Scottish  doctor  quickly  suc¬ 
cumbed,  as  most  persons  do  who  are  brought  into 
close  contact  with  him,  to  Rhodes’  masterful  per¬ 
sonality,  and  became  a  willing  follower  under  his 
bapner. 

y  Towards  the  year  1880  Rhodes  decided  that  he  was 
making  money  at  a  rate  which  would  justify  him  in 
going  a  step  forward  towards  the  materialisation  of 
his  ambitions.  He  decided,  therefore,  upon  entering 
the  political  world  of  South  Africa.  In  October  of 
this  year  the  district  of  Griqualand  West,  which  had 
until  that  time  existed  as  a  separate  colony  under  a 
lieutenant-governor,  was  formally  annexed  to  Cape 
Colony,  and  Rhodes  was  elected  a  member  of  the 
Cape  House  of  Assembly  for  the  district  of  Barkly 
West,  near  Kimberley,  a  constituency  for  which  he 
has  sat  ever  since. 

About  the  time  that  Rhodes  first  entered  the  House 
of  Assembly  he  met  with  very  severe  domestic  afflic¬ 
tions.  On  February  25,  1878,  his  father,  who  had 
been  in  failing  health  for  some  time  previously,  died 
at  Fairlight  Place,  Hastings,  whither  he  had  gone  for 
the  benefit  of  the  sea-air.  In  September  1879  his 
eldest  brother,  Herbert,  was  burnt  to  death  on  the 
banks  of  the  Shire  river.  A  mystery  has  always 
hung  over  this  incident,  but  the  facts  seem  to  be 
as  follows  :  Herbert  Rhodes  and  his  party  of  natives 


40 


ENTRANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE. 


bad  been  tracking  elephants  all  day  across  the  plains 
of  Nyassaland,  and  darkness  found  them  at  the  Shire 
river.  Here  it  was  decided  to  halt  for  the  night,  and 
a  small  wooden  hut  was  hastily  built  for  the  hunter. 
After  supper  Rhodes  turned  in,  and  a  large  fire  was 
lit  near  his  hut  to  keep  the  lions  and  other  prowlers 
of  the  jungle  away  from  the  camp.  It  was  probably  a 
spark  from  this  fire  that  caught  the  hut,  which  blazed 
like  so  much  tinder,  and  the  unfortunate  young  fellow 
was  literally  roasted  to  death.  The  sight  of  the  hut 
on  fire  terrified  his  native  followers,  who  fled  in  all 
directions,  screaming  with  terror.  Had  they  stood 
their  ground  and  attempted  to  master  the  flames,  it 
is  possible  that  Herbert  Rhodes  might  have  escaped 
with  nothing  worse  than  a  severe  burning. 

In  addition  to  becoming  a  member  of  the  Cape 
House  of  Assembly,  Rhodes  about  this  time  gave 
evidence  of  his  increasing  power  in  other  directions. 
The  scheme  for  the  amalgamation  of  all  the  diamond 
mines  around  Kimberley  into  one  great  corporation, 
which  should  control  the  output  and  so  ensure  the 
prices  remaining  at  a  high  level,  took  possession  of 
him  at  this  period,  and  little  by  little  he  moved  to¬ 
wards  this  end. 

The  many  diamond  mines  being  exploited  around 
Kimberley,  and  the  large  and  unrestricted  annual 
output,  had  the  effect  of  diminishing  appreciably  the 
value  of  the  stones,  and  a  “glut”  in  the  market  was 
threatened.  It  was  to  prevent  the  further  lowering 
of  prices,  and  to  ensure  the  supply  of  diamonds  being 
somewhat  less  than  the  demand,  that  this  idea  of  the 
amalgamation  of  the  various  companies  and  proprietors 
first  occurred  to  Rhodes,  as  it  had  occurred  to  many 
others  about  this  time. 


CONSOLIDATION  OF  DIAMOND  MINES. 


41 


After  nearly  thirteen  years  of  hard  work  on  the 
part  of  Rhodes  and  his  supporters,  this  amalgamation 
was  accomplished  in  1888.  The  effect  was  immediate. 
The  supply  of  diamonds  was  regulated  in  accordance 
with  the  demand,  and  the  further  decrease  of  prices 
prevented.  The  consolidation  also  had  the  effect  of 
checking  and  decreasing  the  population  of  Kimberley; 
one  portion  of  the  town  almost  immediately  fell  into 
decay.  One  great  corporation,  howsoever  many  men 
it  may  find  employment  for,  must  need  much  less 
labour  than,  say,  twenty  smaller  concerns,  each  pos¬ 
sessing  separate  and  distinct  staffs.  Many  of  the 
miners  of  Kimberley,  who  found  their  occupation  in 
the  same  condition  as  that  of  Othello,  betook  them¬ 
selves  to  other  parts  of  South  Africa,  principally  to 
the  Transvaal,  to  prospect  for  gold  and  other  precious 
metals. 

As  has  been  said,  it  was  about  1875  that  the  idea 
of  amalgamation  first  occurred  to  Rhodes,  and  in  1888 
he  saw  his  efforts  in  this  direction  crowned  with  suc¬ 
cess  and  the  diamond  industry  of  South  Africa  under 
the  control  of  the  De  Beers  Consolidated  Mines, 
Limited.  For  thirteen  years  he  had  plodded  along 
towards  the  goal  he  had  marked  out,  and  had  not 
suffered  himself  to  be  turned  from  it  by  any  obstacle ; 
and  in  the  end  he  achieved  his  object.  Naturally 
of  an  impatient  and  petulant  disposition,  Rhodes 
has  a  singular  tenacity  of  purpose. 

Rhodes  made  his  first  speech  in  the  House  of 
Assembly  at  Cape  Town  on  April  19,  1881,  when 
he  was  a  little  under  twenty-eight  years  of  age,  and 
three  months  after  the  defeat  of  the  British  forces  on 
Majuba  Hill.  The  subject  of  this  speech  was  the 
attempted  general  disarmament  of  the  Basuto  tribe 


42 


ENTRANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE. 


by  the  Cape  authorities,  which  had  led  to  a  revolt 
in  that  tribe  and  to  severe  fighting.  Rhodes  was 
much  opposed  to  this  disarmament  of  the  natives. 
He  recognised  that  without  their  weapons  the  tribes 
dwelling  on  the  Transvaal  frontier  were  incapable 
of  defending  themselves  against  Boer  aggression. 
Something  like  four  millions  sterling  had  been  spent 
by  the  Cape  Government  in  attempting  to  quell  this 
revolt,  but  with  very  little  result,  for  the  natives  held 
their  own  against  any  force  which  the  Colonial  Gov¬ 
ernment  could  send  against  them.  Worse  than  the 
monetary  loss  incurred,  as  Mr  Rhodes  pointed  out  in 
a  later  speech,  was  the  fact  that  a  native  tribe  should 
be  able  successfully  to  defy  the  might  of  what  claimed 
to  be  the  paramount  authority  of  South  Africa.  The 
Cape  Government  was  at  length  glad  to  refer  the 
whole  question  of  the  disarmament  to  the  arbitration 
of  the  High  Commissioner,  Sir  Hercules  Robinson. 
It  was  a  pitiful  business,  terribly  mismanaged  from 
beginning  to  end. 

Rhodes’  maiden  speech  was  short  and  not  very 
important ;  but  a  week  later  he  spoke  at  greater 
length,  and  with  more  effect,  on  the  disarmament  of 
the  Basutos.  In  this  speech  he  denounced  the  dis¬ 
armament  in  vigorous  terms.  He  likened  it  to  “  the 
greased  cartridges  in  the  Indian  Mutiny.”  He  urged 
also  that  the  settlement  of  Basutoland  should  be  left 
to  the  mother  country,  holding  that  Cape  Colony, 
with  it  sparse  and  widely  scattered  white  population, 
could  not  afford  to  extend  its  territories  any  farther. 
“  Look  at  it  on  practical  grounds,”  he  said.  “  Are 
we  a  great  and  independent  South  Africa  ?  No  ;  we 
are  only  the  population  of  a  third-rate  English  city 
spread  over  a  great  country.  The  colony  has  under- 


MAIDEN  SPEECH. 


43 


taken  enormous  public  works,  and  in  addition  has  to 
face  the  burden  of  the  defence  of  the  country.  There 
seem  to  be  certain  overtures  made  to  us  from  the 
mother  country,  as  if  the  Home  Government  were 
inclined  to  take  over  the  native  territories.  There 
will  probably  be  a  new  native  territory  formed  out  of 
the  Transvaal  settlement,  and  there  is  Natal,  taking 
all  which  together  the  Imperial  Government  could 
have  a  compact  and  important  black  settlement  under 
its  sway.  Can  we  afford,”  he  continued,  “to  go  on 
spending  an  amount  on  defence  which  is  equivalent 
to  England  spending  200  millions  sterling  a-year? 
England  would  not  let  any  feeling  of  pride  force 
her  to  spend  such  an  amount  as  that  every  year, 
nor  should  we.” 

This  sensible  and  business-like  speech,  made  by 
Rhodes  at  the  very  outset  of  his  career,  combats  the 
absurd  statement,  so  often  repeated  by  his  enemies, 
that  he  is  merely  a  senseless  land-grabber  and  ex¬ 
pansionist,  who  pounces  on  territory  with  incredible 
greed  and  without  a  thought  of  the  responsibilities 
which  the  control  of  large  tracts  of  country  involve. 

The  days  when  Rhodes  entered  the  Cape  Parlia¬ 
ment  were  momentous  in  the  history  of  South 
Africa.  The  Burghers  of  the  Transvaal  had  success¬ 
fully  defied  the  might  of  Great  Britain.  They  had 
repulsed  the  British  troops  at  Laing’s  Nek,  and  had 
totally  defeated  them  at  Majuba.  To  add  to  the 
misery  of  it,  the  British  Government,  instead  of 
standing  firm,  had  scuttled  and  run  before  the  rifles 
of  the  victorious  Transvaalers.  They  were  dark  times 
for  British  influence  in  South  Africa,  and  corre¬ 
spondingly  times  of  great  jubilation  for  the  Boers  of 
the  Transvaal.  With  splendid  audacity  Paul  Kruger, 


44 


ENTRANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE. 


who  had  by  this  time  succeeded  Burgers  as  Presi¬ 
dent  of  the  Transvaal,  determined  to  push  forth  the 
borders  of  his  republic  in  every  direction,  though  his 
exchequer  virtually  was  empty.  He,  too,  realised  the 
importance  of  having  the  control  of  the  interior. 

Thus  commenced  the  duel  between  Kruger  and 
Rhodes,  which  was  destined  to  last  for  so  many  years 
and  to  undergo  so  many  changes  and  fluctuations. 

As  has  been  mentioned  above,  the  Transvaal  treas¬ 
ury  was  almost  entirely  depleted,  and  that  State 
could  not  have  met  its  liabilities  had  it  been  pressed 
to  do  so  :  nevertheless  Kruger  determined  to  pursue 
his  policy  of  expansion  to  the  utmost  limits.  His 
aim  was  the  same  as  that  of  Rhodes  —  a  federated 
South  Africa  from  Cape  Town  to  the  Zambesi ;  but 
the  objects  of  the  two  apostles  of  expansion  were  very 
different.  It  has  become  the  habit  of  many  writers 
to  refer  to  the  Boer  supporters  of  Kruger’s  expansion 
movement  as  freebooters  and  filibusters.  If  this  is 
correct,  then  those  who  advocated  British  expansion 
must  come  into  the  same  category.  The  interior  and 
the  native  states  were  open  to  all :  it  was  clear  that 
the  natives  could  not  continue  to  govern  themselves 
regardless  of  the  march  of  civilisation  and  the  spread 
of  white  colonisation,  and  the  Boers  had  as  much  right 
to  aim  at  being  the  paramount  Power  in  South  Africa 
as  we  had. 

It  is  when  the  principles  which  underlay  the  schemes 
of  Kruger  and  of  Rhodes  are  analysed  that  one  sees 
which  of  the  two  was  the  true  friend  of  South  Africa, 
and  that  the  sympathies  of  every  impartial  thinker 
are  given  to  Rhodes.  His  aim  was  the  federation  of 
South  Africa  into  a  harmonious  whole  under  the 
British  flag,  but  with  full  rights  and  liberty  for  all, 


BRITISH  AND  DUTCH  AIMS. 


45 


British  and  Dutch  alike,  and  with  humane  regula¬ 
tions  for  the  natives  and  a  due  respect  for  native  laws 
and  customs,  so  far  as  they  did  not  tend  to  the  further 
demoralisation  of  the  tribes.!  Kruger’s  aim,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  for  a  Dutch  hegemony  in  which  the 
Boers  should  be  the  masters,  and  all  other  races,  white 
and  coloured,  vassals  and  slaves,  permitted  to  dwell 
in  the  country  only  so  long  as  they  did  not  interfere 
with  the  government  of  it  and  claimed  no  more  rights 
than  the  Dutch  rulers  were  willing  to  give  them. 
But  to  call  the  Boers  freebooters  because  they  at¬ 
tempted  to  enlarge  their  territories,  and  to  laud  up 
to  the  skies  the  English  pioneers  of  expansion,  is  to 
overstep  the  mark. 

Had  the  Dutch  aim  been  to  consolidate  the  govern¬ 
ment  of  South  Africa  into  a  concrete  and  enlightened 
group  of  states,  and  to  afford  a  fair  field  for  all 
colonists,  irrespective  of  race,  and  without  placing 
galling  restrictions  on  one  portion  of  the  people  for 
the  benefit  of  the  other,  their  idea  would  have  been 
almost  identical  with  Mr  Rhodes’  aspirations,  and 
there  would  only  have  been  questions  of  detail  to 
contend  about.  Rhodes  has  ever  upheld  the  sup¬ 
remacy  of  Great  Britain,  while  the  Dutch  of  the 
Transvaal  and  the  Free  State  wished  for  complete 
independence  from  this  country.  That  would  have 
been  the  principal  point  at  issue. 

Mr  Kruger’s  aims,  however,  had  nothing  of  this 
free  character  in  them,  and  therefore  his  scheme  for 
a  United  South  Africa  is  to  be  condemned.  A  wiser 
man  than  Kruger,  and  one  less  stubborn,  would  have 
realised  in  1881  the  unsoundness  of  the  attitude  he 
had  assumed  in  his  relations  with  Great  Britain  ;  but 
the  victories  he  had  gained  in  the  field,  and  the  weak- 


46 


ENTRANCE  INTO  POLITICAL  LIFE. 


ness  of  the  British  Government,  caused  him  to  think 
that  South  Africa  lay  at  his  feet,  and  that  the  days 
of  British  supremacy  in  that  part  of  the  world  had 
passed  by  for  ever.  Fortunately,  the  man  who  alone 
has  shown  himself  able  to  cope  with  the  methods  of 
Kruger  and  his  clique  had  entered  the  Cape  House 
of  Assembly,  and  was  already  watching  the  Transvaal 
President  closely,  preparing  to  oppose  him  so  far  as 
lay  in  his  power,  and  to  maintain  the  principles  of 
progress  and  enlightenment  against  those  of  retro¬ 
gression  and  conservatism. 

At  the  close  of  the  Basuto  war  Rhodes  was  ap¬ 
pointed  a  member  of  the  Commission  of  the  Cape 
Parliament  to  proceed  to  Basutoland  to  decide  what 
compensation  was  to  be  paid  to  those  natives  who 
had  remained  loyal  to  the  Cape  during  the  revolt, 
and  had  suffered  in  consequence.  It  was  while  serv¬ 
ing  on  this  Commission  that  he  met  General  Gordon, 
who  had  proceeded  to  Basutoland  to  arrange  con¬ 
ditions  of  peace.  Gordon  from  the  first  was  greatly 
attracted  by  Rhodes’  personality,  and  the  two  men, 
so  dissimilar  in  many  respects  but  at  one  in  their 
intense  patriotism,  soon  became  great  friends.  They 
had  something  in  common  in  their  natures — chiefly, 
perhaps,  a  supreme  confidence  in  their  own  abilities 
and  a  fondness  for  having  their  own  way.  “You 
always  contradict  me,”  said  Gordon  to  Rhodes  one 
day  when  they  were  out  together.  “  I  never  saw 
such  a  man  for  his  own  opinion  ;  you  think  you  are 
always  right  and  every  one  else  is  wrong.”  There 
was  perhaps  a  slight  exaggeration  in  this  remark ; 
but  confidence  in  his  own  opinions  has  from  his 
earliest  days  been  a  leading  trait  in  Rhodes’  char¬ 
acter.  Yet,  despite  their  occasional  differences  of 


MR  RHODES  AND  GENERAL  GORDON. 


47 


opinion,  the  two  men  got  on  very  well  together ; 
and  when  at  length  the  work  of  the  Compensation 
Commission  was  completed,  and  Rhodes  was  prepar¬ 
ing  to  return  to  Kimberley  to  superintend  once  more 
the  working  of  his  diamond  mines,  Gordon  extended 
to  him  a  pressing  invitation  to  stay  and  assist  him 
in  his  work  of  pacifying  the  Basutos  and  resettling 
the  country.  Rhodes,  however,  saw  that  to  do  this 
would  mean  that  he  must  turn  aside  from  the  path 
he  had  mapped  out  for  himself,  and  he  declined 
to  stay,  though  not  without  some  reluctance  and 
hesitation. 

Another  public  work  which  was  occupying  a  great 
deal  of  his  attention  at  this  time  was  the  proposed 
railway  line  to  Kimberley  from  the  south.  He 
strongly  urged  upon  the  Cape  Government  the  con¬ 
struction  of  such  a  line,  because,  in  the  first  place, 
he  saw  that  great  benefit  would  accrue  to  the 
diamond  -  fields  through  such  a  line,  and,  in  the 
next,  because  he  recognised  that  a  line  to  Kimberley 
might  in  course  of  time  be  extended  farther  north 
towards  that  great  country  which  even  then  he  had 
his  eyes  on. 

In  one  way  and  another  Rhodes  had  now  thoroughly 
embarked  upon  his  political  career,  and  was  rapidly 
making  his  way  into  the  front  rank  of  the  public  men 
of  South  Africa. 


48 


CHAPTER  Y. 

SAVING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 

Fairly  embarked  upon  his  political  career,  Mr 
Rhodes  devoted  the  whole  of  his  energies  to  the 
attainment  of  his  great  object  of  the  expansion  and 
consolidation  of  the  British  Empire  in  South  Africa. 
From  the  day  he  made  his  first  speech  in  the  House 
of  Assembly  some  of  its  members  recognised  in  him 
a  man  of  no  mean  ability,  who  would,  if  he  devoted 
himself  seriously  to  politics,  make  his  mark.  Few, 
however,  imagined  the  heights  to  which  the  young 
politician  would  so  quickly  rise. 

There  were  many  matters  of  importance  before  the 
Cape  House  of  Assembly  at  this  time,  to  all  of 
which  Rhodes  gave  his  share  of  attention.  Prominent 
among  them  was  a  proposal  to  introduce  Dutch  into 
the  House  as  the  official  language  side  by  side  with 
English.  This  was  one  of  the  first  ways  in  which  the 
Dutch  community  of  Cape  Colony  showed  how  the 
triumph  of  the  Transvaal  Boers  over  the  British  had 
awakened  their  racial  ambitions  and  brought  about  a 
feeling  something  akin  to  contempt  for  the  British 
colonists  and  everything  appertaining  to  them. 

Mr.  Rhodes  was  opposed  to  this  measure,  and 
seconded  an  amendment  moved  by  Mr  Fuller  to 


THE  AFRIKANDER  SPIRIT. 


49 


defer  the  consideration  of  the  matter.  His  motives 
for  so  doing  were  fully  explained  in  a  speech  which 
he  delivered  in  the  House  on  the  subject.  He  had 
not  the  slightest  objection  to  the  Dutch  -  speaking 
members  being  allowed  to  address  the  House  in 
their  own  tongue ;  only,  he  desired  to  have  an 
assurance  from  the  Dutch  inhabitants  of  the  colony 
generally  that  they  wished  for  this  change.  He 
considered  also  that  so  important  a  matter  should 
not  have  been  introduced  at  so  late  a  period  in  the 
session,  when  many  members  were  away  and  unable 
to  give  their  opinions  one  way  or  the  other. 

Rhodes’  policy  from  the  first  day  he  entered  polit¬ 
ical  life  has  been  to  conciliate,  in  every  wayjossible.^ 
the  Dutch  or  Afrikander  element,  for  he  realised 
thalT  Co  AtcKieve  his  ambitions  he  must  work  with,  \ 
and  through,  the  Dutch.  For  many  years  after  he/ 
entered  the  Cape  Parliament,  he  was  prepared  alsc( 
to  work  amicably  with  the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal,  )> 
on  condition  that  they  were  his  allies  and  not  his 
masters.  “  Equality  ”  has  ever  been  Rhodes’  watch-  /  ' 
word ;  and  he  would  have  welcomed  any  move  on 
the  part  of  President  Kruger  to  assist  him  in  bring¬ 
ing  about  that  consolidation  of  South  Africa  which 
he  so  desired.  Such  assistance  must  have  been 
rendered,  however,  on  the  understanding  that  there 
were  to  be  equal  privileges  for  both  races  alike.  He 
was  prepared  to  give  the  Dutch  the  same  freedom 
that  he  claimed  for  the  British ;  but  he  expected 
the  Dutch  on  their  part  to  act  in  the  same  manner. 

The  person  who  fails  to  grasp  this  fundamental 
condition  in  Rhodes’  lifework  will,  of  necessity,  fail 
:o  understand  the  motives  underlying  it. 

At  this  period  the  Afrikander  spirit  was  very 


50 


SAVING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


strong  in  Cape  Colony.  The  Afrikander  Bond  was 
established  in  1882,  and  was  not  long  before  it  made 
its  influence  felt  in  the  Cape  House  of  Assembly  and 
throughout  South  Africa  generally.  The  object  of 
the  Bond,  as  stated  by  its  founders,  was  to  unite 
the  Dutch  or  Afrikander  element  into  a  conglomerate 
whole  for  political  purposes.  It  further  professed  “to 
recognise  no  nationality  whatever  beyond  that  of  the 
Afrikanders,  regarding  as  such  all,  of  whatever  origin, 
who  promised  to  work  within  the  limits  of  its  con¬ 
stitution  for  the  wellbeing  of  South  Africa.”  Not¬ 
withstanding  this  profession  of  impartiality,  and  the 
fact  that  many  of  British  descent  joined  the  Bond, 
its  aims  almost  from  the  first  have  been  retrogressive 
and  anti-British.  Mr  Hofmeyr  was  one  of  the  princi¬ 
pal  organisers  of  the  Bond,  and  has  ever  since  retained 
the  controlling  power.  Despite  his  intimacy  with  the 
Afrikander  section,  and  his  policy  of  conciliating  the 
Dutch  settlers,  Mr  Bhodes  has  never  been  a  member 
of  the  Bond,  preferring,  as  he  has  explained,  to 
maintain  his  complete  independence  of  thought  and 
action. 

In  Kimberley,  which  has  really  been  his  South 
African  home,  Rhodes  was  a  growing  power.  His 
extraordinary  skill  in  finance  and  his  success  on  the 
diamond  -  fields  had  brought  him  into  prominence, 
and  the  first  important  speech  on  public  affairs  which 
he  made  in  the  town  set  the  seal  on  his  political  fame. 
Humours  had  reached  Kimberley  of  Rhodes’  success¬ 
ful  debut  in  the  House  of  Assembly,  and  when  it 
became  known  that  he  was  to  address  a  meeting  in 
the  “city  of  diamonds”  on  the  question  of  the  dis¬ 
armament  of  the  Basutos  and  the  extension  of  the 
railway  to  Kimberley  from  the  south,  much  interest 


RHODES  AS  A  SPEAKER. 


51 


was  aroused.  On  the  night  of  the  meeting  the  hall 
was  crowded,  and  many  were  unable  to  gain  admit¬ 
tance.  Rhodes  was  only  one  of  several  speakers,  and 
his  turn  did  not  come  until  late  in  the  evening. 
When  at  length  it  did  arrive,  he  quickly  seized  the 
attention  of  the  cosmopolitan  audience,  and  held  it 
with  a  grip  which  never  relaxed  until  he  sat  down 
again. 

Cecil  Rhodes  possesses  in  a  marked  degree  that 
rare  magnetism  which  compels  even  those  who 
differ  most  strongly  from  him  to  listen  with  interest 
to  his  arguments  and  to  feel  a  certain  amount  of 
respect,  if  not  of  sympathy,  for  his  attitude.  He  is, 
however,  not  an  orator  in  any  sense  of  the  word, 
and  it  is  curious  that  one  so  unconventional  in  his 
manner  of  speaking  should  be  able  to  attract  the 
attention  and  interest  which  he  invariably  commands. 
In  place  of  polished  oratory,  such  as  distinguished 
John  Bright  or  Mr  Gladstone,  there  is  an  easy  col¬ 
loquial  style  and  a  facility  for  putting  the  crux  of 
any  subject  into  a  few  terse,  sharp  sentences.  As 
one  of  his  auditors  remarked  after  Rhodes  had  made 
a  long  speech  at  a  general  meeting  of  the  British 
South  Africa  Company  in  London,  “  He  doesn’t  make 
a  speech  at  all.  He  gets  up  and  has  a  sort  of  a 
confidential  chat  with  the  chairman  for  the  benefit 
of  those  who  happen  to  be  listening.”  His  abrupt, 
jerky  style,  it  may  be  added,  has  made  him  the  terror 
of  shorthand  reporters,  who  find  some  difficulty  in 
following  his  alternate  halts  and  very  quick  dashes 
of  speech. 

To  revert  to  his  first  speech  at  Kimberley  :  he  put 
before  his  mixed  audience,  in  that  concise  and  homely 
form  of  speech  which  he  has  made  his  own,  his 


52 


SAVING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


attitude  with  regard  to  the  two  questions  at  issue, 
and,  metaphorically,  tore  the  existing  Colonial  Gov¬ 
ernment  of  Mr  (afterwards  Sir)  Gordon  Sprigg  to 
rags.  When  he  drew  to  a  close  and  resumed  his 
seat  he  was  greeted  with  a  perfect  storm  of  applause, 
and  had,  further,  the  satisfaction  of  afterwards 
Learning  that  he  had  converted  more  than  one 
prominent  townsman  to  his  way  of  thinking.  His 
speech  was,  by  common  consent,  the  best  of  the 
evening ;  from  that  night  his  political  position  on 
the  diamond-fields  was  assured,  and  almost  im¬ 
mediately  he  assumed  in  the  Cape  House  of  Assembly 
the  position  of  spokesman  for  Kimberley  and  district, 
which  he  has  maintained  right  away  down  to  the 
present  day. 

Mr  Rhodes’  chief  work  at  this  time,  1881-82,  was 
the  question  of  the  boundaries  of  Griqualand  West. 
This  question,  he  saw,  bore  closely  on  the  very  object 
which  had  led  him  to  enter  upon  a  political  career 
—  the  British  expansion  to  the  north ;  therefore 
he  devoted  considerable  attention  to  the  matter. 
It  was  found  that  under  the  award  of  Mr  Keate, 
which  had  placed  Griqualand  West  under  the  ad¬ 
ministration  of  this  country,  an  error  had  been  made 
in  the  survey  by  which  several  farms  belonging  to 
an  independent  chief  named  Mankoroane  had  been 
unwittingly  included  in  the  territory  of  Griqualand 
West.  Mr  Rhodes  brought  this  fact  to  the  notice 
of  the  House  of  Assembly  in  May  1882,  and  succeeded 
in  obtaining  the  appointment  of  a  Commission  to 
inquire  into  the  matter  and  to  decide  what  should 
be  done. 

He  was  himself  selected  as  one  of  the  Commission, 
which  set  off  for  the  disputed  territory  almost  as  soon 


FIGHTING  KRUGER  IN  THE  DARK. 


53 


as  it  was  appointed.  Here  it  was  found  that  there 
were  some  seventy  farms  on  the  territory  in  question, 
and  that  they  were  occupied  entirely  by  Boers  from 
the  Transvaal  who  had  set  up  the  quasi  -  republic 
of  Stellaland.  These  Boers,  though  this  fact  was 
not  suspected  at  the  time  either  by  Mr  Bhodes  or 
by  any  other  member  of  the  Cape  Assembly,  save, 
possibly,  Mr  Hofmeyr  and  other  leaders  of  the 
Afrikander  Bond,  were  in  reality  emissaries  of  Presi¬ 
dent  Kruger,  sent  for  the  express  purpose  of  seizing 
the  trade  -  route  from  Cape  Colony  to  the  interior. 
Kruger’s  object  at  this  time  was  undoubtedly  to  build 
a  wall,  as  it  were,  of  Boer  territory  which  should 
stretch  from  Delagoa  Bay  on  the  east  to  beyond 
Lake  ’Ngami  on  the  west,  and  so  shut  off  Cape  Colony 
from  any  intercourse  with  the  vast  hinterland. 

Mr  Rhodes  was  almost  alone  in  recognising  the  im¬ 
portance  of  keeping  this  trade-route  through  Griqua- 
land  West  and  Bechuanaland  under  British  control. 
He  had  no  idea,  however,  of  the  formidable  opponent 
he  had  in  the  background,  nor  did  he  realise  it  until 
after  he  had  visited  Stellaland.  At  this  time,  in  fact, 
he  was  fighting  with  Kruger  in  the  dark. 

After  examining  the  territory  and  carefully  turning 
the  matter  over  in  his  mind,  Rhodes  decided  that 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  restore  the  territory  to 
Mankoroane,  for  that  would  merely  mean  that  it 
would  become  the  undisputed  property  of  the  Stella¬ 
land  Boers ;  therefore  he  determined  to  obtain,  if 
possible,  a  formal  cession  of  the  territory  in  question 
from  Mankoroane  himself.  In  this  he  was  successful. 
The  chief  saw  that,  if  he  did  not  hand  over  the  land 
to  British  protection,  the  Boers  would  wrench  it 
from  him  by  force,  and  he  chose  the  lesser  of  the 


54 


SAVING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


two  evils.  So  as  to  justify  his  action  further,  Rhodes 
set  about  obtaining  signatures  to  a  petition  from 
the  dwellers  on  the  farms  in  the  disputed  territory, 
asking  that  they  might  be  annexed  to  the  Cape. 
The  Stellalanders  were  at  first  unwilling  to  do  this, 
but  in  the  end  they  were  brought  round  to  see 
things  in  the  same  light  as  Rhodes.  Thus  armed 
with  authority  from  both  the  native  owners  of  the 
land  and  the  white  dwellers  in  the  country,  he  re¬ 
turned  to  Cape  Town  in  high  spirits  at  the  successful 
conclusion  of  the  task  he  had  set  himself. 

He  never  dreamed  for  a  moment  that  the  Colonial 
Government  would  hesitate  to  assume  the  control 
of  the  territory,  especially  as  it  had  so  long  been 
regarded  as  a  part  of  Griqualand  West ;  but,  as 
events  proved,  he  had  not  correctly  gauged  the 
feeling  of  the  House.  Mr  Hofmeyr  and  his  friends 
of  the  Bond  party  regarded  the  whole  of  the  interior 
of  South  Africa,  beyond  the  existing  limits  of  Cape 
Colony  and  Natal,  as  the  rightful  heritage  of  the 
Boers,  and  therefore  strongly  opposed  the  ratification 
of  the  concession  which  Mr  Rhodes  had  gained  from 
Mankoroane.  Several  other  members  of  the  House, 
while  not  sharing  this  extreme  view,  were  nervous 
of  undertaking  further  responsibilities  until  the  finan¬ 
cial  condition  of  the  colony  was  in  a  sounder  state 
than  was  the  case  at  that  moment.  It  was  in  vain 
that  Mr  Rhodes  pointed  out  to  the  House  the  value 
—  nay,  the  positive  necessity  —  of  the  colony  con¬ 
trolling  the  trade-route  to  the  interior.  The  opposing 
forces  were  too  strong  for  him,  and  he  was  perforce 
compelled  to  retire  from  the  struggle,  baffled  and 
disheartened. 

After  considering  the  matter  for  a  short  time,  he 


A  CHECK. 


55 


determined  upon  a  very  bold  step.  He  would  write 
to  the  Imperial  Government,  and  urge  it  to  assume 
the  control  of  this  strip  of  territory  independently 
of  the  Cape  Government.  Lord  Derby  was  Colonial 
Secretary  at  this  time,  and  though  he  was  in  many 
ways  one  of  the  weakest  and  most  vacillating 
ministers  who  have  ever  held  that  appointment, 
yet  he  saw  a  certain  amount  of  truth  in  Rhodes’ 
arguments,  and  was  in  the  end  persuaded  so  far  as 
to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Imperial  Government 
to  a  protectorate  being  established  over  the  territory 
in  question,  on  condition  that  the  Cape  Government 
paid  one  -  half  of  the  annual  sum  necessary  for  its 
administration. 

Elated  by  this  measure  of  success,  Rhodes  returned 
to  the  Cape  Ministry  and  placed  this  offer  before 
them,  urging  its  acceptance  with  all  the  powers  of 
persuasion  at  his  command.  This  time  some  of 
those  who  had  previously  opposed  the  scheme  for 
annexation  on  account  of  the  cost  veered  round  and 
favoured  the  proposal  for  a  joint  -  administration. 
The  opposition,  however,  was  still  too  strong,  and 
the  Cape  Government  declined  finally  to  bear  any 
share  in  the  cost  of  administering  the  territory 
in  question.  Thereupon  the  Imperial  authorities 
notified  Mr  Rhodes  that,  so  far  as  they  were  con¬ 
cerned,  the  incident  was  closed. 

Rhodes  now  retired  to  Kimberley  disgusted  with 
the  short  -  sightedness  of  his  fellow  -  members.  The 
trade-route  to  the  north  had  apparently  passed  out  of 
British  hands  for  all  time,  and  the  Boers  of  the  Trans¬ 
vaal  seemed  destined  to  become  the  paramount  Power 
of  South  Africa.  This  was  undoubtedly  the  blackest 
period  of  Mr  Rhodes’  whole  political  career,  not  even 


56 


SAVING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


V 


excepting  those  dark  days  after  the  failure  of  the 
Jameson  Raid  ;  for  it  seemed  as  though  his  ambitions 
for  British  expansion  northwards  across  Africa  were 
finally  nipped  in  the  bud,  and  that  there  was  no  need 
for  him  to  follow  his  political  career  further.  He 
dropped  politics  entirely  for  a  time,  and  devoted 
himself  exclusively  to  forwarding  the  amalgamation 
movement  among  the  diamond  companies. 

His  visit  to  Stellaland  had  opened  Rhodes’  eyes 
to  the  fact  that  the  Boers  who  had  settled  in  that 
country  and  in  other  parts  of  Bechuanaland  were  not, 
as  had  previously  been  supposed,  isolated  parties  of 
freebooters  and  adventurers,  but  were  all  controlled 
by  a  master-hand,  President  Kruger,  who  was  as  fully 
bent  on  holding  the  key  to  the  interior  as  was  Rhodes 
himself.  The  more  he  thought  over  this,  the  more 
convinced  was  he  that  his  surmise  was  correct ;  and, 
as  he  has  since  stated,  he  could  not  refrain  from 
admiring  the  tactics  of  the  Transvaal  President  in 
his  daring  policy,  which  he  contrasted  bitterly  with 
the  blind  parochialism  at  that  time  prevailing  in 
the  Cape  Parliament. 

The  gods,  however,  seemed  to  be  fighting  for  Rhodes 
at  this  time.  There  was  a  sudden  volte-face  on  the 
part  of  the  Imperial  Government,  which,  at  the  very 
time  that  it  seemed  to  have  slipped  completely  from 
his  grasp,  brought  the  control  of  the  route  from  the 
Cape  to  the  interior  once  more  within  the  range  of 
probability. 

This  change  of  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  home  Gov¬ 
ernment  was  really  brought  about  by  the  unexpected 
action  of  Germany  in  annexing  the  huge  slice  of  terri¬ 
tory  around  Walfish  Bay  now  known  as  German  South- 
West  Africa.  It  was  Germany’s  first  move  towards 


A  SUPREME  EFFORT. 


57 


the  acquisition  of  a  colonial  empire,  and  everything 
points  to  the  fact  that  Prince  Bismarck  had  a  hand 
in  it.  The  British  Government  seems  to  have  been 
completely  ignorant  of  Germany’s  intentions  in  this 
matter  until  a  few  days  before  the  annexation  was 
actually  proclaimed  ;  and  then  a  cruiser  was  hastily 
despatched  from  the  Cape  station  to  take  over  the 
whole  of  the  territory  on  behalf  of  this  country. 
On  its  way — so  the  story  goes — this  ship  was  met 
by  a  German  gunboat,  which  announced  to  it  the 
formal  annexation  of  the  country  by  Germany,  and 
the  British  boat  had  therefore  no  option  but  to  re- 
tuyh  to  Cape  Town  and  report  its  failure. 

^Rhodes  now  braced  himself  up  for  one  supreme 
effort  to  keep  in  British  hands  the  road  to  the 
hinterland.  Knowing,  as  he  did  by  this  time,  that 
President  Kruger  was  behind  these  pseudo-republics 
that  were  springing  up  mushroom  -  like  all  over 
Bechuanaland,  he  was  not  long  in  perceiving  that 
the  next  move  of  the  wily  old  Dopper  President 
would  be  to  proclaim  the  extension  of  the  Trans¬ 
vaal  boundary  westward  to  the  limits  of  the  German 
territory.  As  it  was  obvious  that  the  Transvaal 
Government  was  actively  intriguing  at  this  time  for 
the  possession  of  Delagoa  Bay,  by  this  policy  Cape 
Colony  was  in  danger  of  being  effectively  shut  in 
and  prevented  from  any  future  expansion,  while  the 
whole  of  the  trade  of  the  interior  would  of  necessity 
be  diverted  into  Transvaal  territory. 

Fortunately,  Rhodes  found  a  willing  listener  to  his 
views  and  fears  in  Sir  Hercules  Robinson,  who  was  at 
this  time  the  High  Commissioner  at  the  Cape.  Sir 
Hercules  had  long  had  a  suspicion  in  his  mind  that 
Kruger  and  the  Transvaal  Government  generally 


58 


SAYING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


were  behind  the  Boer  adventurers  in  Griqualand 
and  Bechuanaland ;  and  this  Bhodes  was  able  to 
confirm.  The  High  Commissioner  had  no  hesitation, 
therefore,  in  writing  immediately  to  the  Imperial 
Government,  and  recommending  that  a  protectorate 
over  the  southern  portion  of  Bechuanaland  should  be 
forthwith  proclaimed.  This  letter  found  Lord  Derby 
in  a  more  pliable  mood  than  usual :  the  sudden  move 
on  the  part  of  Germany  had  aroused  some  severe 
strictures  on  the  home  authorities,  and  there  was 
much  anxiety  to  know  what  the  policy  of  the  Govern¬ 
ment  would  be  in  reply  to  this  annexation.  With' 
the  thought  of  a  general  election  before  him,  Lord 
^  Derby  recommended  the  Government  to  agree  to  this 
protectorate  being  established. 

/  Had  it  not  been  for  the  party  system  which  pre- 
I  vails  in  England,  and  the  fear  of  the  electors  being 
unfavourably  impressed  by  the  actions  of  the  Govern¬ 
ment,  the  British  Empire  would  never  have  been  what 
it  is  to-day.  It  is  rather  humiliating  to  have  to  say 
it,  but  the  fact  remains,  that  nearly  every  important 
step  which  has  ever  been  taken  with  regard  to  the 
Colonies  has  been  taken  more  with  a  view  to  gain¬ 
ing  a  party  triumph  at  the  polls  than  with  any  idea 
of  benefiting  the  Empire. 

On  the  very  day  that  the  since  famous  London 
Convention  was  signed  by  the  representatives  of 
Great  Britain  and  the  Transvaal,  February  27,  1884, 
Lord  Derby  telegraphed  to  Sir  Hercules  Bobinson 
authorising  him  to  proclaim  a  protectorate  in  Bechu¬ 
analand  within  the  limits  that  had  been  fixed  by  the 
\  Colonial  Secretary  after  a  conference  with  the  Trans- 
vaal  delegates.  At  last  Mr  Bhodes,  iiaiLgamed  what 
he  had  battled  for  so  long.  The  trade-route  from 


ME  JOHN  MACKENZIE. 


59 


Cape  Colony  to  Zambesia  (as  the  country  to  the 
north  of  Bechuanaland  and  the  Transvaal  was  then 
called)  ‘was  secured  to  the  British. 

Mr  John  Mackenzie,-  a  missionary  of  considerable 
experience  in  this  part  of  Africa,  but  an  Imperialist 
of  somewhat  narrow  views,  was  appointed  Deputy- 
Commissioner  of  the  newly  established  protectorate, 
and  forthwith  took  up  his  residence  in  the  country. 
His  most  difficult  task  was  to  make  the  Boer  settlers 
in  the  country,  who  had  established  the  republics  of 
Stellaland  and  Booi-Grond,  recognise  the  new  order 
of  things  and  accept  British  control.  As  events 
proved,  Mr  Mackenzie,  though  in  many  ways  an  able 
and  talented  man,  was  unfitted  for  this  delicate 
mission.  He  immediately  visited  the  two  republics, 
and  was  fairly  well  received  by  the  Boers  in  Stella¬ 
land  under  Commandant  Van  Niekerk,  who  had  been 
elected  president  of  that  republic,  for  they  bore  pleas¬ 
ant  memories  of  the  manner  in  which  Mr  Rhodes  had 
treated  them  on  the  occasion  of  his  former  visit.  At 
Rooi-Grond,  on  the  other  hand,  Mr  Mackenzie  was 
received  with  open  defiance  by  the  Boers,  who  per¬ 
sisted  in  attacking  Montsoia,  as  previously  mentioned, 
and  in  raiding  his  cattle,  despite  the  proclamations 
and  threats  which  Mr  Mackenzie  launched  at  their 
heads.  They  knew  that  they  had  the  support  of 
President  Kruger  and  the  Transvaal  Government  in 
what  they  did,  and  their  recent  experiences  seemed 
to  show  them  that  they  had  only  to  persist  in  their 
rebellious  attitude  long  enough  to  cause  the  British 
Government  to  beat  a  hasty  and  undignified  retreat. 
Instead  of  proving  by  his  firmness  that  the  British 
control  of  the  country  would  be  upheld  at  all  costs, 
and  relying  upon  the  moral  support  of  the  Stella- 


60 


SAVING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


landers  in  his  conflict  with  the  Boers  of  Booi-Grond, 
Mr  Mackenzie  very  unwisely  issued  a  proclamation 
declaring  the  whole  of  the  land  in  both  Booi-Grond 
and  Stellaland  to  be  the  property  of  the  British 
Government,  who  would  exercise  the  right  to  dispose 
of  it  in  any  way  which  seemed  best  to  them. 

This  only  served  to  add  fuel  to  the  fire  of  Boer 
opposition.  It  demolished  at  once  the  good  feeling 
of  the  Stellaland  Boers  towards  the  British  Govern¬ 
ment  which  Mr  Bhodes  had  been  at  such  pains  to 
bring  about.  Bhodes  had  said  to  these  Stellalanders 
in  effect :  “  Keep  your  land  titles  by  all  means,  but 
consent  to  write  them  in  English  instead  of  Dutch. 
Permit  the  Cape  Colony  to  administer  the  country, 
and  I  will  promise  that  you  shall  not  be  disturbed  on 
your  farms.”  The  farmers  had  trusted  Bhodes  in 
this,  for  they  could  see  that  he  was  quite  honest  in 
what  he  said ;  but  now  Mr  Mackenzie  by  his  action 
had  raised  a  feeling  of  distrust  in  their  minds  which 
undid  all  that  Bhodes  had  done. 

Sir  Hercules  Bobinson  realised  the  gravity  of  the 
situation  in  Bechuanaland,  and  in  a  conversation  with 
Bhodes  on  the  subject  said,  “  I  am  afraid  Bechuana¬ 
land  is  gone  ;  these  freebooters  will  take  the  country, 
and  of  course  Kruger  is  behind  it  all.”  Bhodes  agreed 
as  to  the  gloomy  outlook,  but  was  not  disposed  to 
accept  the  view  that  things  had  gone  too  far  for 
redemption,  and  that  the  route  to  the  north  was  to 
be  relinquished  just  as  it  seemed  to  be  within  his 
grasp.  At  any  rate,  he  was  determined  to  make  one 
last  effort  before  he  consented  to  Bechuanaland  passing 
under  the  control  of  the  Transvaal,  and  with  that 
end  in  view  he  sought  the  permission  of  the  High 
Commissioner  to  go  up  to  the  country  and  see  what 


THE  STELLALAND  DISPUTE. 


61 


he  could  do  to  remedy  Mr  Mackenzie’s  mistakes. 
Sir  Hercules  agreed  to  his  going  up  to  Bechuana- 
land  if  he  so  desired,  but  was  careful  to  point  out 
that  he  could  give  him  no  force  to  back  up  his  con¬ 
tentions.  “  Oh,  that  will  be  all  right,”  responded 
Rhodes  with  his  customary  cheery  optimism.  “  Give 
me  permission  to  do  as  I  think  best,  and  I  shall  get 
through  all  right.”  “  Yes,”  replied  the  High  Com¬ 
missioner,  “  you  can  have  that  permission ;  but  if 
you  get  into  a  mess,  I  cannot  back  you  up.”  “  That 
is  good  enough  for  me,”  was  Rhodes’  answer,  and 
he  at  once  made  preparations  for  his  journey.  Mr 
Mackenzie  was  recalled  to  Cape  Town,  and  his  author¬ 
ity  as  Deputy-Commissioner  of  the  Bechuanaland  Pro¬ 
tectorate  was  transferred  to  Rhodes. 

When  Rhodes  arrived  in  Stellaland  he  found  Van 
Niekerk  stationed  on  the  banks  of  the  Hartz  river, 
and — more  ominous  still — the  President  of  the  Stella¬ 
land  Republic  was  supported  by  a  large  commando 
from  the  Transvaal.  Kruger  seemed  at  last  to  be 
about  to  reveal  his  hand.  To  add  to  the  difficulties 
of  the  situation,  the  Boers  of  Rooi-Grond  were  pursuing 
their  policy  of  attacking  the  chief  Montsoia  and  ravag¬ 
ing  his  country,  displaying  the  while  a  fine  contempt 
for  the  British  protectorate.  Altogether  there  was, 
in  Mr  Rhodes’. words,  “a  pretty  kettle  of  fish.”  He 
did  not  falter,  however.  He  made  at  once  for  Van 
Niekerk’s  camp.  His  assurance  and  contempt  for 
danger  in  putting  himself  unarmed  and  alone  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Stellalanders  rather  took  the  Boers 
aback,  while  the  free  and  easy  manner  in  which  he 
mingled  with  them,  as  though  totally  unconscious  of 
their  threatening  attitude,  completely  nonplussed 
them. 


62 


SAYING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


Rhodes’  meeting  with  Delarey,  the  most  prominent 
man  among  the  Boers  of  Stellaland  after  Van  Niekerk, 
was  typical  of  his  whole  conduct  at  this  time,  and 
is  worth  recounting.  Seeing  that  Delarey  possessed 
a  considerable  amount  of  control  and  influence  over 
the  Boers,  Rhodes  determined  to  conciliate  him  if 
it  was  humanly  possible  to  do  so — though  it  was 
obvious  that  Delarey  was  at  the  head  of  the  party 
who  urged  war  rather  than  submit  to  the  control 
of  Great  Britain.  Bent  on  prosecuting  his  scheme 
of  conciliation  without  loss  of  time,  Rhodes  strolled 
over  to  Delarey’s  tent  one  morning  and  quietly  in¬ 
vited  himself  to  breakfast.  With  that  hospitality 
which  is  one  of  the  pleasantest  features  of  the  Boer 
character,  the  unexpected  visitor  was  made  welcome 
and  a  meal  hastily  got  ready.  While  this  was  being 
done,  Delarey  turned  to  Rhodes  with  a  grim  look, 
and  said  abruptly,  “Blood  must  flow  !”  If  this  ogre- 
like  remark  startled  Rhodes  at  all,  he  was  careful 
not  to  show  it.  “Well,”  he  retorted  coolly,  “give 
me  my  breakfast,  and  we  will  talk  about  blood 
afterwards.” 

Even  the  most  truculent  mortal  would  be  unable 
to  make  much  headway  against  such  total  unconcern 
as  Rhodes  displayed,  and  in  the  end  Delarey  was  won 
over  to  Rhodes’  way  of  thinking.  In  describing  in 
after-days  the  course  which  events  took  with  Delarey, 
Rhodes  said :  “I  stayed  with  Delarey  a  week ;  I 
became  godfather  to  his  grandchild,  and  in  the  end 
we  made  a  settlement.  Those  who  were  serving 
under  Van  Niekerk  and  Delarey  got  their  farms, 
and  I  secured  the  government  of  the  country  for 
her  Majesty,  which  I  believe  was  the  right  policy, 
and  so  both  sides  were  satisfied.” 


SIR  CHARLES  WARREN’S  EXPEDITION. 


63 


The  Boers  of  Rooi-Grond  were  more  difficult  to 
handle,  and  it  seemed  as  though  nothing  would  serve 
here  but  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword.  General 
Piet  Joubert,  the  Boer  commandant -general,  came 
up  into  the  country,  ostensibly  to  aid  Rhodes  in 
bringing  about  a  settlement,  but  in  reality  to  urge 
the  Boers  to  persevere  in  their  defiant  attitude.  In 
vain  Rhodes  parleyed  with  them,  and  alternately 
coaxed  and  threatened  them.  It  was  all  to  no  pur¬ 
pose.  In  Rhodes’  presence  they  again  assailed  Montsoia 
and  his  men,  and  though  Rhodes  urged  Joubert  to 
speak  to  the  Boers,  over  whom  he  had  great  authority, 
the  Boer  commandant-general  declined  to  interfere, 
and  Rhodes  seemed  to  be  finally  baffled. 

He  was  not  inclined,  however,  to  give  up  his  task. 
He  clung  with  great  obstinacy  to  the  belief  that 
even  at  the  eleventh  hour  he  would  be  able  to  bring 
about  a  peaceful  settlement.  But  President  Kruger 
administered  the  deathblow  to  these  hopes  by 
audaciously  issuing  a  proclamation  adding  Bechuana- 
land  to  the  Transvaal  !  This  was  done  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  by  the  London  Convention  the  Trans¬ 
vaal  was  not  to  extend  its  boundaries  in  any  direction 
without  the  prior  knowledge  and  consent  of  the 
British  Government ;  and  of  course  it  completely 
ignored  the  fact  that  a  British  protectorate  had  been 
established  over  the  country. 

Such  conduct  was  too  flagrant  to  be  allowed  to 
pass  unnoticed.  The  Imperial  Government  decided 
to  send  up  a  military  force  to  uphold  the  supremacy 
of  Great  Britain  in  this  region.  Sir  Charles  Warren 
was  selected  to  command  this  expedition,  which  was 
about  4000  strong,  and  was  composed  of  a  joint-force 
of  regular  troops  and  Colonial  levies.  President 


64 


SAVING  THE  ROUTE  TO  THE  NORTH. 


Kruger  now  realised  that  he  had  gone  a  little  too  ~ 
far,  and  that  the  time  was  not  ripe  for  him  to  en¬ 
deavour  once  more  to  oppose  the  military  forces  of 
Great  Britain  ;  and  he  urged  a  peaceable  settlement 
with  all  the  means  at  his  command.  In  this  he  was 
well  seconded  by  the  Bond  members  of  the  Cape 
Parliament,  who  could  see  nothing  very  wrong  in 
the  attitude  of  the  Transvaal  President ;  and  in  the 
end  it  was  arranged  that  Kruger  should  meet  Sir 
Charles  Warren  and  Mr  Rhodes  for  a  conference  some¬ 
where  along  the  frontier. 

The  place  finally  selected  for  this  meeting  was  the 
village  of  Fourteen  Streams,  in  the  district  of  Barkly 
West.  This  was  at  the  beginning  of  1885.  Accom¬ 
panying  President  Kruger  was  a  young  Hollander 
named  Leyds,  then  comparatively  unknown,  though 
he  has  since  become  notorious ;  and  this  conference 
is  further  remarkable  for  the  fact  that  at  it  for  the 
first  time  were  brought  face  to  face  Kruger  and 
Rhodes,  who  may  fittingly  be  taken  to  represent  the 
two  great  influences  that  have  been  the  cause  of  so 
much  strife  and  dispute  in  South  Africa. 

So  soon  as  the  conference  opened,  Kruger  adopted 
a  very  humble  and  suppliant  tone,  and  endeavoured 
to  prevent  Warren’s  troops  being  moved  up  into  the 
disturbed  country.  Rhodes  put  the  situation  before 
the  Transvaal  President  in  incisive  terms,  and  em¬ 
phasised  the  fact  that  Joubert  could  easily  have  put 
an  end  to  the  whole  difficulty  had  he  been  disposed 
to  do  so.  “  Why,”  asked  Rhodes  very  pertinently — 

“  why  is  not  Joubert  here  to  explain  his  actions  and 
to  answer  for  himself  ?  ”  The  only  answer  which 
Kruger  could  make  was  that  “  what  was  done  was 
done  and  could  not  be  helped.”  As  for  Joubert  not 


THE  TRADE  ROUTE  SECURED. 


65 


using  his  influence  to  recall  the  Boers  from  raiding 
British  territory,  all  Kruger  had  to  say  was  :  “I  did 
not  see  my  way  to  send  armed  men  to  oppose  them  ; 
I  thought  it  better  and  simpler  to  take  over  the  land 
by  proclamation.”  Such  naivete  of  reasoning  appealed 
to  Rhodes’  sense  of  humour  ;  but  with  relentless  sever¬ 
ity  he  pressed  his  point,  until  in  the  end  Kruger  was 
obliged  to  give  in,  and  to  promise  to  recall  his  pro¬ 
clamation,  and  to  relinquish  all  further  claims  to  the 
possession  of  Bechuanaland  either  by  himself  or  his 
Burghers. 

I  Thus  the  trade  route  from  Cape  Colony  to  the 
'north  was  finally  secured  to  this  country  by  the 
j  dogged^  pertinacity  of  Mr  Rhodes.  Sir  Charles 
Warren"" has  very  often  been  eulogised  for  bringing 
about  a  bloodless  settlement  of  the  Bechuanaland 
question,  at  a  time  when  it  seemed  certain  that 
another  war  between  the  Boers  and  the  British  was 
about  to  break  out ;  but  the  great  share  which  Mr 
Rhodes  had  in  bringing  about  the  settlement  is  apt ' 
to  be  overlooked.  Had  Sir  Charles  Warren  been  left 
to  his  own  resources  in  the  matter,  it  is  more  than 
probable  that  either  he  would  have  been  overreached 
by  Kruger  and  Leyds  or  that  war  would  have  broken 
out. 


E 


66 


CHAPTER  YI. 

RHODES,  THE  MAN. 

It  is  a  difficult  task  to  separate  Cecil  Rhodes  the 
man  from  Cecil  Rhodes  the  politician  and  empire- 
builder.  Since  his  first  entry  into  political  life  his 
whole  existence  has  been  devoted  to  the  accomplish¬ 
ment  of  his  vast  projects  ;  everything  else  has  been 
made  subservient  to  this.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  an  account  of  the  purely  private  life  of  Mr 
Rhodes,  as  distinct  from  his  public  career,  would  be 
less  attractive  and  more  uninteresting  than  that  of 
any  fox-hunting  country  squire  who  ever  vegetated 
in  the  heart  of  rural  England.  It  is  only  when 
Rhodes  is  considered  in  the  light  of  a  pioneer  of 
Empire,  and,  in  a  lesser  degree,  as  a  financier  of 
considerable  genius,  that  he  offers  any  points  of 
interest  for  his  biographer  to  lay  hold  of. 

Coupled  with  the  uneventfulness  and  placid  monot¬ 
ony  of  his  private  life  is  Rhodes’  great  and  almost 
insurmountable  aversion  to  talking  about  himself.  It 
is  possible  for  one  to  spend  days,  and  even  weeks,  in 
his  company  without  hearing  him  speak  of  his  own 
affairs  or  of  the  events  of  his  past  life ;  though  in 
the  same  space  of  time  an  intelligent  listener  would 
gain  a  great  insight  into  his  plans  and  ambitions  for 


GROOT  SCHUUR, 


HIS  HOME  AT  GROOT  SCHUUR. 


67 


the  future.  As  one  of  his  friends  once  remarked 
about  him,  “  Rhodes  is  always  planning  to  himself 
the  things  he  must  do  the  year  after  next.” 

As  has  previously  been  mentioned  in  these  pages,  for 
many  years  he  shared  a  small  bachelor  establishment 
at  Kimberley  with  his  jidus  Achates,  Dr  Jameson. 
When  his  political  duties  compelled  him  to  be  in 
Cape  Town  he  dwelt  entirely  at  his  club.  About 
the  time  of  the  Bechuanaland  difficulty,  however,  he 
grew  tired  of  club  life,  and  yearned  for  a  mode  of 
living  which  would  afford  him  more  room  to  turn 
round  in,  as  it  were ;  so  he  set  about  seeking  for  a 
suitable  house  on  the  outskirts  of  Cape  Town  which 
he  could  convert  into  his  home.  At  length  he 
pitched  upon  an  old  rambling  house  in  that  heavy 
Dutch  style  of  architecture  which  is  so  common  at 
the  Cape.  The  place  was  called  Groot  Schuur,  and 
it  was  here  that  Rhodes  decided  to  pitch  his  tent. 
The  position  of  this  house  is  one  of  the  most  charming 
that  it  is  possible  to  find  anywhere  in  the  neighbour¬ 
hood  of  Cape  Town.  It  stands  on  the  main  road  from 
Cape  Town  to  the  little  suburb  of  Rondesbosch,  in 
the  heart  of  a  most  beautiful  country.  At  the  time 
that  Rhodes  bought  it  the  house  was  in  rather  a 
dilapidated  condition,  but  he  soon  had  it  restored 
and  put  to  rights.  It  stands  some  distance  from  the 
roadway,  and  is  approached  by  a  fine  avenue  of  lofty 
pines  and  oaks. 

With  the  object  of  gaining  as  much  seclusion  as 
possible,  Rhodes  purchased  several  of  the  adjoining 
farms,  and  his  estate  now  stretches  for  some  distance 
up  the  lower  slopes  of  Table  Mountain,  which  frowns 
in  the  rear  of  Groot  Schuur.  The  house,  as  already 
mentioned,  is  of  a  rather  curious  type  of  architecture, 


68 


.RHODES,  THE  MAN. 


and  a  prominent  feature  is  the  deep  stoep,  or  ver¬ 
andah,  which  runs  the  entire  length  of  the  house 
and  has  its  roof  supported  by  massive  stucco  pillars. 
Its  quaintly  twisted  chimneys,  too,  and  its  many 
gables,  tend  to  give  it  an  air  of  great  antiquity. 
The  house  which  stands  at  present  on  the  site  is  the 
second  that  has  existed  there  since  Mr  Rhodes  bought 
the  place,  the  original  Groot  Schuur  being  almost 
totally  destroyed  by  fire  in  1896.  The  present  build¬ 
ing,  however,  is  an  exact  replica  of  the  old  one. 

The  interior  of  the  house  is  typical  of  its  owner. 
Everything  is  massive  and  of  heavy  construction,  yet 
an  air  of  simplicity  pervades  the  whole.  The  walls 
are  lined  with  teak,  and  this,  coupled  with  the  fact 
that  almost  all  the  furniture  and  hangings  are  rather 
dark  in  colour,  tends  to  make  the  house  seem  more 
sombre  and  gloomy  than  would  otherwise  be  the 
case.  Groot  Schuur,  however,  is  far  from  being  dull. 
Its  air  of  homeliness  appeals  to  the  stranger  so 
soon  as  he  enters. 

The  two  entrance-halls  have  their  dark  walls  liter¬ 
ally  covered  with  trophies  of  the  chase,  some  very 
beautiful  heads  of  the  South  African  fauna  being 
among  them,  together  with  native  spears,  shields, 
guns,  and  other  implements  of  warfare,  most  of  them 
relics  of  the  Matabele  wars. 

In  many  respects  the  spacious  library  is  the  most 
attractive  room  in  the  house.  Here  Mr  Rhodes  does 
most  of  his  work  ;  it  is  in  this  room  that  the  details  of 
many  of  his  big  schemes  have  been  thought  out  and 
decided  upon.  The  old-fashioned  Dutch  style  of  fur¬ 
nishing  which  prevails  throughout  the  house  is  adhered 
to  here.  The  most  striking  thing  in  the  room,  taking 
the  owner’s  life  and  disposition  into  account,  is  a 


HIS  MENAGERIE. 


69 


tattered  old  union-jack,  a  memento  of  some  hard- 
fought  field  or  another,  which  hangs  on  the  wall 
of  the  apartment  facing  the  chair  in  which  Rhodes 
usually  sits.  Facing  this  flag  on  the  opposite  wall  is 
a  Portuguese  standard  which  the  Rhodesian  Pioneers 
under  Major  Forbes  captured  in  Manicaland  during 
the  friction  between  the  two  countries  in  1891.  A 
feature  of  the  well-filled  book-shelves  with  which  the 
library  is  lined  is  a  series  of  handsomely  bound,  type¬ 
written  translations  of  classical  literature  which  were 
executed  specially  for  Mr  Rhodes.  Ever  since  his 
schoolboy  days  Rhodes  has  had  an  intense  love  for  the 
literature  of  Greece  and  Rome,  and  in  his  spare  mo¬ 
ments  he  is  very  fond  of  dipping  into  one  of  these 
translations. 

The  grounds  of  Groot  Schuur  are  even  more  in¬ 
teresting  than  the  house.  In  one  portion  is  the  famous 
private  menagerie  which  Mr  Rhodes  has  established, 
containing  specimens  of  all  the  rarer  South  African 
animals,  with  few  exceptions.  The  smaller  animals, 
such  as  antelopes,  are  not  confined  in  cages,  but  are 
permitted  to  range  in  freedom  over  a  considerable 
tract  of  land  carefully  railed  in.  It  was  from  this 
menagerie,  by  the  way,  that  the  lion  cub  which 
Rhodes  sent  to  Kruger  was  taken.  It  will  be  re¬ 
membered  that  the  Transvaal  President  returned  this 
gift  of  Rhodes’  with  some  show  of  indignation. 

The  flowers  in  the  gardens  are  one  of  the  special 
sights  of  Groot  Schuur.  Contrary  to  the  English 
fashion,  they  are  not  grouped  together  in  trim  beds 
and  carefully  contrasted  one  kind  with  another,  but 
are  permitted  to  grow  in  semi- wildness  in  huge  masses. 
The  principal  flowers  thus  flourishing  are  multicoloured 
kannas  or  Ceylon  lilies,  bougainvilleas,  and  fuchsias. 


70 


RHODES,  THE  MAN. 


Running  round  one  end  of  the  house  are  the  rose- 
gardens,  which  in  the  flowering-season  form  a  veritable 
feast  for  the  gods.  Here  the  same  wild  profusion 
prevails  as  in  other  parts  of  the  ground  :  the  masses 
of  blooms  of  every  colour  and  variety  are  positively 
bewildering  to  the  eye.  The  heavy  scent  of  the 
flowers  and  the  pellucid  clearness  of  the  air  together 
tend  to  make  the  rose-gardens  at  Groot  Schuur  seem 
a  perfect  paradise  to  many  of  those  who  are  privileged 
to  enter  them.  It  may  be  mentioned  that  the  grounds 
of  Groot  Schuur  are  thrown  open  to  the  inhabitants  of 
Cape  Town  every  Sunday — a  concession  that  is  much 
appreciated. 

Mr  Rhodes’  second  sister,  Miss  Edith  Rhodes,  has 
for  many  years  past  performed  the  part  of  hostess  at 
Groot  Schuur,  and  among  the  visitors  at  the  house 
she  is  every  whit  as  popular  as  her  brother.  As  most 
people  are  aware,  Mr  Rhodes  has  never  married. 
Popular  rumour  has  credited  him  with  being  “a 
woman-hater,”  which,  however,  is  rather  wide  of  the 
mark,  as  the  following  anecdote  will  show.  Rhodes 
was  once  staying  at  a  country-house  in  England  when 
a  lady  of  the  party  made  it  in  her  way  to  question 
him  on  his  reputed  dislike  for  the  opposite  sex.  “Will 
you  tell  me  why  you  dislike  women,  Mr  Rhodes?”'1, 
she  asked.  “  Has  any  member  of  the  sex  ever  played  1 
you  a  nasty  trick  ?  ”  “  Indeed  no,”  was  Rhodes’ 

smiling  reply.  “It  is  all  a  mistake,  I  assure  you.  I 
cannot  think  where  the  idea  came  from  that  I  dislike 
women.  On  the  contrary,  I  like  and  admire  them 
very  much,  and  I  assure  you  that  I  realise  the  value 
of  their  help.”  Despite  this  denial,  however,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  Mr  Rhodes  fights  very  shy  of  the  fail 
sex,  and  this,  perhaps,  is  not  to  be  lamented,  foi 


TABLE  MOUNTAIN  FROM  THE  GROUNDS  OF  GROOT  SCHUUR. 


HIS  RECREATIONS. 


71 


domestic  ties  would  greatly  hamper  him  in  his  work. 
Probably  there  is  some  reason  for  Mr  Rhodes  remain¬ 
ing  single  through  life  ;  but  if  there  is,  he  has  kept  it 
studiously  to  himself. 

Mr  Rhodes’  principal,  and  indeed  almost  his  only, 
form  of  outdoor  recreation  at  the  present  day  is  riding. 
From  his  youth  he  has  been  accustomed  to  rise  early 
in  the  morning  and  set  off  for  a  long  ride  before  the 
sun  has  had  time  to  take  the  edge  off  the  keen  air. 
Nearly  every  morning  about  six  o’clock,  when  he  is 
residing  at  Groot  Schuur,  he  goes  for  a  gallop  over  the 
slopes  of  the  Mountain.  These  rides  are  usually  taken 
alone.  Sometimes  an  intimate  friend  may  be  invited 
to  join  him,  but  this  is  of  rare  occurrence.  Riding  by 
himself  over  the  deserted  slopes  of  Table  Mountain, 
and  with  that  stupendous  work  of  nature  frowning 
down  upon  him,  Rhodes  is  able  to  commune  with  him¬ 
self  in  peace,  and  many  projects  have  been  worked  out 
and  solutions  found  for  many  difficulties  during  these 
morning  rides,  from  which  he  returns  refreshed  alike 
in  mind  and  body.  When  Rhodes  is  in  London,  he  is 
to  be  seen  early  every  morning  cantering  along  the 
Row,  with  only  the  few  grooms  exercising  sheeted 
horse  to  bear  him  company. 

With  regard  to  his  indoor  recreations,  his  great 
hobby  is  reading,  in  which  his  taste  is  very  catholic. 
His  favourite  subject  is  history,  especially  the  history 
of  his  own  country.  He  is  a  great  admirer  of  Froude 
and  Carlyle,  and  is  credited  with  knowing  Gibbon 
almost  by  heart.  Biography  is  another  favourite 
subject,  and  reference  has  been  made  already  to  his 
delight  in  classical  story.  In  fiction  his  favourite 
book  is  ‘  Vanity  Fair,’  which  he  enjoys  more  than 
any  other  book  he  has  ever  read.  With  regard  to 


72 


RHODES,  THE  MAN. 


his  fondness  for  reading,  he  has  often  lamented  that 
the  vast  amount  of  work  he  has  to  get  through 
daily  prevents  him  from  devoting  more  time  to  his 
books. 

Apropos  of  this  there  is  a  story  related  of  him  to  the 
effect  that,  just  after  the  trial  at  the  bar  of  Dr  Jameson 
and  his  companions,  and  when  Rhodes  was  being  at¬ 
tacked  on  all  sides  both  in  South  Africa  and  in  London, 
a  friend  said  to  him,  more  in  joke  than  in  earnest, 
“  Suppose  the  Imperial  Government  decides  to  send 
you  to  prison  along  with  Jameson,  Rhodes,  how  will 
you  like  that  ?  ”  Rhodes  turned  the  matter  over  in 
his  mind  for  a  moment  in  that  curiously  grave  manner 
with  which  he  approaches  even  the  most  trivial  sub¬ 
jects,  and  then  said:  “Well,  I  suppose  I  should  get 
along  all  right.  There  are  a  lot  of  books  I  have  been 
wanting  to  read  for  many  years  now,  without  having 
an  opportunity  of  doing  so.  I  should  go  in  for  a  course 
of  reading.  I  suppose,”  he  went  on  meditatively, 
“they  would  allow  me  to  have  books  in  prison.” 
This  story  incidentally  illustrates  the  philosophical 
temperament  which  Rhodes  brings  to  bear  upon  the 
events  of  his  life,  and  his  steadfast  determination  to 
look  ever  on  the  bright  side  of  things.  As  a  noted 
figure  in  London  Society  once  remarked,  “  Cecil  Rhodes 
is  the  high-priest  of  optimism.” 

One  of  Rhodes’  hobbies  is  the  collection  of  antique 
furniture,  china,  paintings,  &c.  Anything  Dutch  or 
Flemish  he  has  an  intense  admiration  for,  and  Groot 
Schuur  is  literally  crammed  with  curios  of  this  nature. 
He  has  an  especial  penchant  for  old  carved  oaken 
chests,  of  which  he  possesses  a  large  number  of  beau¬ 
tiful  workmanship.  His  gardens  absorb  a  good  deal 
of  his  attention,  and  he  is  very  fond  of  the  cultivation 


HIS  COMPLEX  CHAEACTEE. 


73 


of  roses.  As  has  been  seen,  he  has  rather  unconven¬ 
tional  ideas  as  to  what  a  garden  should  be  like,  and 
evinces  a  strong  preference  for  nature’s  plan  of  horti¬ 
culture  over  that  of  the  landscape-gardener.  Rhodes 
is  a  fair  billiard-player,  is  fond  of  pyramids,  and  is  a 
decent  though  not  a  very  keen  shot.  Music  is  another 
of  his  recreations,  and  though  by  no  means  a  brilliant 
performer  himself,  he  is  a  very  good  judge  of  other 
people’s  capabilities  in  the  art. 

The  character  of  Mr  Rhodes  has  proved  an  enigma 
to  every  one  who  has  come  in  contact  with  him. 
Many  men  of  note  have  put  their  impressions  of  Cecil 
Rhodes  upon  paper,  but  scarce  two  of  them  can  be 
found  to  agree  in  their  estimate.  Mr  Rudyard  Kip¬ 
ling,  as  might  be  expected,  is  an  enthusiastic  devotee. 
Interviewed  on  his  idea  of  Rhodes  in  1898,  Mr 
Kipling  said  that  he  was  “  the  greatest  of  living 
men,”  an  opinion  which,  though  exaggerated,  is  in 
some  measure  correct.  Certainly  Rhodes  is  one  of 
the  most  interesting  personages  at  present  before  the 
public  notice.  Another  gifted  writer,  Mr  Justin 
M'Cartby,  in  his  ‘  History  of  Our  Own  Times,’  says 
of  Mr  Rhodes  that  “  he  was  above  all  things  an 
adventurer  by  temperament  and  by  career.  He  was 
an  adventurer  as  some  of  Walter  Raleigh’s  colleagues 
and  compatriots  were  adventurers,  .  .  .  who,  eager 
as  they  were  to  extend  the  Empire,  were  not  unwill¬ 
ing  at  the  same  time  to  make  money  out  of  the 
enterprise.”  This  must  mean,  if  it  means  anything, 
that  Mr  M‘Carthy  believes  that  Mr  Rhodes’  chief 
object  has  been  to  make  money  :  if  in  the  doing  of  it 
he  has  incidentally  benefited  the  Empire,  well  and 
good,  but  that  has  not  been  his  primary  object.  This 
view  cannot  be  accepted  for  a  moment.  A  man  who 


74 


RHODES,  THE  MAN. 


only  spends  £600  a-year  on  himself — and  that  has 
been  Mr  Rhodes’  limit  for  purely  personal  expenses 
for  many  years  past — cannot  be  accused  of  an  over¬ 
weening  desire  to  make  money.  Rhodes’  aim  all 
through  life  has  been  to  extend  the  British  Empire, 
and  to  do  this  he  has  been  compelled  to  accumulate  a 
large  capital.  But  for  money  itself  Rhodes  has  a 
cohtempt  which  at  times  he  carries  a  little  too  far. 
V  In  the  sense  of  being  a  pioneer  of  civilisation 
Rhodes  is  undoubtedly  an  adventurer,  using  that 
word  in  its  best  and  truest  sense  ;  but  to  compare 
him  to  Raleigh’s  colleagues  and  compatriots  is  surely 
to  overshoot  the  mark,  and  seems  to  point  to  the  fact 
that  Mr  M‘Carthy  has  never  devoted  any  very  close 
attention  to  Mr  Rhodes  and  his  character.  The  truth 
"vis  that  Rhodes  is  a  bundle  of  inconsistencies,  and  that 
we  no  sooner  feel  that  at  length  we  have  estimated 
his  character  correctly,  and  fathomed  all  its  depths, 
than  he  does  or  says  something  which  upsets  the 
whole  of  our  calculations,  and  it  is  necessary  to 
begin  all  over  again.  ^  He  is  undoubtedly  an  oppor¬ 
tunist  :  there  are  few  great  men  who  are  not.  He 
has  been  headstrong  at  times — very  notably  immedi¬ 
ately  after  the  unfortunate  raid,  when  he  flatly  refused 
to  make  any  effort  to  recall  Jameson  from  the  Trans¬ 
vaal,  in  spite  of  the  entreaties  and  demands  of  the 
High  Commissioner  and  the  Cape  Government  .V  On 
the  other  hand,  he  can  be  extremely  politic  and  diplo¬ 
matic  on  occasions.  In  conversation  he  can  be  smooth 
and  gentle,  as,  again,  he  can  be  abrupt  and  curt 
almost  to  the  point  of  brutality.  By  nature  kindly 
and  easeful,  once  he  is  offended  or  thwarted  in  his 
desires  he  is  obstinate  and  implacable.  Slow  to  anger, 
he  is  slower  still  to  forgive. 


HIS  ORIGINALITY. 


75 


There  is  a  certain  cynicism  in  his  nature  which 
displays  itself  rather  prominently  at  times,  but  this 
quality  has  been  much  overrated  by  many  writers. 
The  oft-quoted  phrase,  to  the  effect  that  “  he  never 
met  a  man  whom  he  could  not  buy,”  was,  it  may  be 
authoritatively  stated,  never  used  by  him.  The  germ 
of  this  fiction  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  one  day, 
many  years  ago,  when  discussing  his  proposed  tele¬ 
graph-wire  from  one  end  of  Africa  to  the  other,  some¬ 
body  asked  him  how  he  proposed  to  carry  it  across 
the  Soudan,  which  was  then  under  the  domination  of 
the  Khalifa.  “  Oh,  leave  it  to  me,”  Rhodes  answered. 
“  I  never  met  the  man  yet  that  I  could  not  come  to 
an  agreement  with,  and  I  shall  be  able  to  fix  things 
up  with  the  Khalifa  right  enough  when  the  time 
comes.”  This  is  the  true  version  of  a  story  that  in 
its  distorted  form  has  been  so  widely  circulated. 

The  keynote  of  Rhodes’  whole  life  is  unconven¬ 
tionality,  and  unconventionality,  it  must  be  confessed, 
he  carries  at  times  to  extreme  limits.  In  illustration 
of  his  original  methods  of  conducting  business,  it  may 
be  mentioned  that  a  great  part  of  his  work  is  trans¬ 
acted  in  all  sorts  of  out-of-the-way  places.  He  has 
been  seen  standing  in  the  streets  of  Kimberley  tran¬ 
quilly  writing  cheques  with  as  much  disregard  for 
his  surroundings  as  though  he  were  in  the  privacy  of 
his  own  office. 

His  brusque  habit  of  saying  exactly  what  he  thinks 
in  the  most  pointed  language  has  had  varying  effects 
on  the  different  public  men  with  whom  he  has  come 
in  contact.  It  has  already  been  seen  how  General 
Gordon  received  these  opinions.  During  his  visit  to 
England  in  1890  or  1891,  Rhodes  met  Mr  Gladstone, 
and  the  two  conversed  for  some  time  together.  It 


RHODES,  THE  MAN. 


76 


was  then  that  Rhodes  gave  the  great  statesman  his 
views  on  the  Home  Rule  Bill.  Mr  Gladstone  ex¬ 
pressed  some  surprise  that  Rhodes  (as  he  thought) 
should  have  changed  his  views  with  regard  to  the 
Irish  question  since  the  days  when  he  sent  his  much- 
talked-about  cheque  of  £10,000  to  Mr  Parnell.  Rhodes 
denied  having  altered  his  opinions  in  the  slightest, 
but  said  bluntly  that  he  regarded  Mr  Gladstone’s  bill 
with  abhorrence  because  it  rendered  the  separation  of 
Ireland  from  England  inevitable.  As  is  well  known, 
it  was  Mr  Gladstone’s  firm  belief  that  his  bill  would 
tend  rather  to  strengthen  the  bonds  between  the  two 
countries  than  to  weaken  them,  and  he  inquired  how 
Mr  Rhodes  justified  his  belief.  “  Because,”  answered 
Rhodes,  “  by  that  bill  you  would  have  made  Ireland  a 
taxed  republic  !  ”  “A  taxed  republic  !  ”  repeated  Mr 
Gladstone,  in  evident  surprise  ;  “  how  do  you  mean  ?  ” 
“  Yes,”  continued  Rhodes,  “  a  taxed  republic :  taxed 
to  the  tune  of  four  millions  a-year,  without  a  single 
vote  in  the  distribution  and  control  of  that  colossal 
tribute.” 

Lord  Salisbury  does  not  appear  to  have  come  into 
very  close  contact  with  Mr  Rhodes  in  any  but  a 
strictly  official  way.  He  showed  the  effect  which 
Rhodes’  personality  had  made  upon  him,  however,  by 
stating  on  one  occasion  in  the  House  of  Lords,  with  a 
plaintive  motion  of  his  hands,  that  “  Mr  Cecil  Rhodes 
was  a  ofentleman  with  a  considerable  force  of  charac- 
ter.”  Another  prominent  politician,  Sir  William 
Harcourt,  once  said,  regarding  Mr  Rhodes’  well- 
known  views  on  preferential  tariffs  between  England 
and  her  colonies,  and  the  necessity  for  compelling  the 
African  natives  to  work :  “  Reasonable  man,  Mr 

Rhodes  !  He  is  so  easily  satisfied  !  All  he  asks  us 


HIS  PERSONAL  HABITS. 


77 


to  do  is  to  give  up  free  trade  and  to  restore  slavery  !  ” 
There  is,  of  course,  exaggeration  here  ;  but  it  may  be 
pardoned  for  the  sake  of  the  joke. 

In  his  dress  and  person  Mr  Rhodes  is  simple  to  a 
fault :  outward  show  is  nothing  at  all  to  him.  This 
is  well  illustrated  by  his  visit  to  the  Cannon  Street 
Hotel  in  London,  in  May  1898,  to  address  the  share¬ 
holders  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  on  the 
result  of  his  negotiations  with  the  British  Government 
and  the  German  Emperor  concerning  the  construction 
of  the  Cape  to  Cairo  railway  and  the  trans-continental 
telegraph-wire.  The  courtyard  of  the  hotel  was  filled 
with  an  interested  crowd,  waiting  to  see  Rhodes  arrive. 
Many  carriages  drawn  by  high-stepping  horses  rolled 
in,  and  as  each  of  these  drew  up  at  the  entrance  of  the 
hotel  the  spectators  pressed  eagerly  forward  to  see  if 
Rhodes  was  the  occupant ;  but  on  each  occasion  they 
were  disappointed.  At  length,  when  the  crowd  was 
growing  almost  tired  of  waiting,  a  ramshackle  old 
“  four-wheeler,”  pulled  by  a  horse  that  was,  like  its 
driver,  obviously  “  in  the  sere  and  yellow  leaf,”  entered 
the  courtyard  and  made  its  way  to  the  door  of  the 
hotel  almost  without  notice.  Before  those  on  the 
watch  could  realise  what  was  going  forward,  Rhodes 
and  one  of  his  private  secretaries  quickly  alighted, 
and  entered  the  hotel  almost  unnoticed.  The  crowd 
had  never  supposed  that  a  millionaire  would  ride 
about  London  in  a  broken-down  “growler.” 

Rhodes’  clothes,  too,  are  always  designed  more  with 
an  eye  for  comfort  than  with  any  idea  of  being  fashion¬ 
able  or  “  smart,”  and  those  who  know  him  best  admit 
that  he  looks  more  like  himself  in  his  rough-and-ready 
jacket  suit  of  blue  serge,  to  which  he  is  so  devoted, 
than  in  anything  else  that  he  dons.  When  he  was 


78 


RHODES,  THE  MAN. 


the  Prime  Minister  of  Cape  Colony  he  had  the 
reputation  of  wearing  the  shabbiest  hat  in  the 
House  of  Assembly.  A  lady  who  had  long  admired 
Rhodes,  but  had  never  previously  seen  him  in  the 
flesh,  once  plaintively  remarked  when  he  rose  to  make 
a  speech  in  London,  “  That  Cecil  Rhodes  !  Why,  my 
gardener  dresses  better  than  he  does !  I  am  dis¬ 
appointed.”  This  is,  of  course,  a  very  wrong  stand¬ 
point  to  take — to  judge  the  man  by  his  outward  ap¬ 
pearance — but  very  few  will  deny  that  it  is  an  essen¬ 
tially  feminine  one. 

Rhodes  takes  a  delight  in  shocking  the  sticklers  for 
etiquette  and  conventionality.  There  is  a  story,  well 
known  in  Cape  Town,  but  new,  it  is  believed,  in  this 
country,  of  Rhodes  opening  an  extension  of  the  Cape 
Town  suburban  railway.  This  line  runs  to  various  little 
villages  along  the  coast,  and  the  spot  at  which  the  cere¬ 
mony  was  to  be  performed  was  one  of  those  delightful 
little  bays  so  plentiful  round  about  Cape  Town.  The 
day  was  of  the  most  sultry  description.  Rhodes  was  at 
the  time  Premier  of  Cape  Colony,  and  many  notable 
j)ersonages  were  invited  to  be  present  on  the  occasion. 
A  luncheon  was  first  held  in  the  village,  at  which 
Rhodes  was  present,  and  then  a  move  was  made  in 
the  direction  of  the  shore,  near  to  which  the  railway 
station  was  situated.  Everything  was  in  readiness  for 
the  opening  ceremony,  when  suddenly  it  was  noticed 
that  the  central  figure,  Rhodes,  was  missing.  There 
was  some  little  consternation  at  this,  and  messengers 
were  sent  in  all  directions  to  find  him.  Presently  the 
Prime  Minister  was  espied  calmly  enjoying  a  bathe  in 
the  blue  waters,  totally  oblivious  of  the  fact  that  he 
was  keeping  every  one  waiting,  and  that  he  was 
rapidly  becoming  the  cynosure  of  all  eyes.  At  length 


HIS  RHODESIAN  HOME. 


79 


the  situation  seemed  to  dawn  upon  him,  and  hastily 
getting  into  his  clothes,  with  the  sea-water  dripping 
from  his  hair,  he  declared  the  line  open  for  traffic, 
maintaining  the  while  a  perfectly  serious  and  composed 
face.  The  story  as  given  above  was  related  by  one 
who  claimed  to  witness  the  whole  affair  ;  and  those 
who  know  Mr  Rhodes’  love  of  unconventionality  will 
not  find  much  difficulty  in  accepting  it  as  correct. 

In  addition  to  his  home  at  Groot  Schuur,  Mr 
Rhodes  also  possesses  a  very  extensive  farm  in 
Rhodesia,  near  the  edge  of  the  Matoppo  Hills,  to 
the  south  -  east  of  Bulawayo.  This  farm  is  called 
Saurdale,  and  lies  in  the  midst  of  some  striking 
scenery.  Here  Mr  Rhodes  has  erected  a  huge  dam 
for  the  purpose  of  collecting  water  for  the  irrigation 
of  the  surrounding  country,  thereby  rendering  it 
better  fitted  for  agricultural  purposes  than  it  has 
previously  been.  Saurdale  is  used  by  Mr  Rhodes  as  a 
retreat  during  such  times  as  he  desires  to  leave  his 
work  behind  him  for  a  spell.  In  Cape  Town  or  in 
London  he  finds  so  much  work  waiting  for  him  that  he 
has  but  little  time  for  rest  or  recreation,  so  that  as 
soon  as  he  finds  that  he  imperatively  needs  a  rest,  off 
he  goes  to  his  farm  with  one  or  two  of  his  inner  circle 
of  friends,  and  there,  according  to  popular  rumour,  at 
any  rate,  throws  off  the  cares  which  usually  beset  him, 
and  for  a  brief  space  enjoys  a  life  unencumbered  by 
pressing  thoughts  of  politics  or  finance. 

Before  this  rather  rambling  estimate  of  Rhodes  the 
man  is  brought  to  a  close,  mention  should  be  made  of 
his  generosity  and  accessibility.  When  he  is  at  Groot 
Schuur  he  is  to  be  seen  by  all  who  have  business  with 
him.  He  gives  all  a  patient  hearing.  His  poorer 
neighbours  know  that  in  Mr  Rhodes  they  always  find 


so 


RHODES,  THE  MAN. 


one  who  is  willing  to  help  them  either  with  his  purse 
or  with  his  advice.  He  devotes  considerable  sums 
annually  to  charity,  though  in  discriminating  fashion. 
Any  one  thinking  to  impose  upon  Rhodes  with  a  con¬ 
cocted  story  of  hardship  or  privation  would  speedily 
find  himself  undeceived. 

Rhodes’  treatment  of  the  natives  will  be  dealt  with 
more  fully  farther  on  ;  but  it  may  be  said  here  that 
the  “  boys  ”  employed  at  Groot  Schuur  positively 
worship  him.  When  the  baas  appears  within  their 
sight  he  is  greeted  by  a  row  of  grinning  brown  faces 
which  speak  more  eloquently  than  words  of  the  kind¬ 
ness  which  his  native  servants  experience  at  his  hands. 

Since  the  death  of  Lobengula  Mr  Rhodes  has  main¬ 
tained  and  educated  out  of  his  own  pocket  two  young 
sons  of  the  Matabele  king,  sending  them  to  a  first-class 
college  in  Cape  Town  and  having  them  over  to  spend 
their  vacations  with  him  at  Groot  Schuur. 

Among  his  immediate  neighbours  Rhodes  is,  apart 
from  politics,  highly  popular,  and  many  and  varied  are 
the  stories  that  one  hears  to  his  credit  round  about 
Rondesbosch  and  Groot  Schuur. 


81 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

In  bringing  about  the  withdrawal  of  the  Transvaal 
claims  to  Bechuanaland,  and  the  submission  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  pseudo-republics  of  Goshen,  Stella- 
land,  and  Rooi-Grond  to  British  rule,  Mr  Rhodes  and 
Sir  Charles  Warren  had  worked  amicably  together. 
So  soon,  however,  as  the  question  of  the  settlement 
and  future  administration  of  the  Protectorate  came 
under  notice,  and  details  of  government  had  to  be 
arranged,  the  two  were  found  to  be  at  cross-purposes. 
Sir  Charles  Warren  was  above  all  things  a  soldier, 
and  one,  moreover,  who  was  deeply  imbued  with 
admiration  for  that  iron  discipline  and  absolute  con¬ 
trol  of  subordinates  which  attains  its  apotheosis  in 
the  German  army.  His  aim  apparently  was  to 
govern  the  Bechuanaland  Protectorate  with  a  stern 
hand,  and  to  prove  to  the  Boer  population  of  that 
region,  by  continuous  show  of  firmness,  necessary  or 
unnecessary,  that  England’s  control  was  to  be  some¬ 
thing  more  than  merely  nominal. 

Throughout  the  whole  of  the  negotiations  Rhodes 
had  been  careful  to  distinguish  between  the  Boers 
of  Stellaland,  who  had  shown  themselves  open  to 
reason  and  agreed  to  accept  the  British  protectorate 

F 


82  THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

without  demur,  and  the  Burghers  of  Booi-Grond,  who 
had  defied  tire  power  of  Great  Britain,  and  had  treated 
the  proclamations  of  the  Commissioner  with  contempt. 
In  pursuance  of  this  policy,  he  had  pledged  his  word 
that  the  Stellalanders  should  continue  in  undisturbed 
possession  of  their  farms.  He  agreed  also  that,  for 
the  time  being  at  any  rate,  the  government  of  Stella- 
land  should  be  left  in  the  hands  of  Van  Niekerk  and 
the  Boers,  of  course  under  the  final  direction  and 
control  of  the  High  Commissioner.  In  this  policy  Mr 
Rhodes  had  the  full  approval  of  both  the  High  Com¬ 
missioner,  Sir  Hercules  Robinson,  and  the  Colonial 
Secretary,  Lord  Derby. 

Sir  Charles  Warren  had  in  the  first  instance  ac¬ 
quiesced  in  Rhodes’  settlement,  and  had  telegraphed 
from  Cape  Town  to  Van  Niekerk  stating  that  he  was 
prepared  to  adhere  to  the  terms  arranged  between 
him  and  Mr  Rhodes.  In  spite  of  this,  no  sooner  was 
he  on  the  spot  than  he  suddenly  veered  round  and 
repudiated  Rhodes’  settlement  almost  in  its  entirety, 
declining  to  be  bound  by  it  in  any  way.  This  seeming 
double-dealing  not  unnaturally  incensed  the  Boers 
of  Stellaland,  and  rendered  them  suspicious  and  dis¬ 
trustful  of  the  British  Special  Commissioner. 

As  soon  as  the  change  in  Sir  Charles  Warren’s 
attitude  became  known  at  the  Cape,  Rhodes  set  off 
for  Bechuanaland  to  confer  with  the  Special  Com¬ 
missioner  and  urge  him  to  reconsider  his  position 
and  to  respect  the  pledges  which,  with  the  sanction, 
be  it  remembered,  of  both  the  Cape  Government  and 
the  Colonial  Office,  Rhodes  had  given.  Warren  took 
this  visit  of  Rhodes  very  badly ;  indeed  he  went  so 
far  as  to  threaten  to  resign  his  post  as  Special  Com¬ 
missioner  if  some  change  were  not  at  once  made  in 


DIFFERENCE  WITH  SIR  CHARLES  WARREN. 


83 


Rhodes’  status — for  the  latter  was  still  the  Deputy- 
Commissioner  of  Bechuanaland.  In  order  to  prevent 
a  rupture,  which  he  perceived  would  seriously  en¬ 
danger  the  good  government  of  Bechuanaland,  Rhodes 
at  once  offered  to  act  in  direct  subordination  to 
Warren  instead  of  to  the  High  Commissioner,  with 
the  stipulation  that  the  promises  which  he  had  made 
to  the  people  of  Stellaland  should  be  respected. 

The  differences  between  Warren  and  Rhodes  were 
thus  patched  up  ;  but  it  was  obvious  that  two  men 
of  such  diametrically  opposite  views  could  not  work 
in  harmony  for  long.  On  February  14,  1884,  a  con¬ 
ference  was  held  between  the  Special  Commissioner 
and  the  Burghers  of  Stellaland  at  Yryburg,  and  at 
this  Mr  Rhodes  was  present.  The  chief  point  of  this 
conference  was  that  Sir  Charles  Warren  announced 
his  intention  of  observing  an  entirely  new  boundary¬ 
line  on  the  south  of  Stellaland,  in  place  of  the  one 
which  had  been  previously  recognised.  The  effect 
was  to  place  several  of  the  farms  which  Mr  Rhodes 
had  included  in  his  agreement  outside  the  limits  of 
the  republic,  and  therefore  beyond  the  terms  of  the 
settlement  which  Rhodes  had  come  to  with  the  people 
of  Stellaland.  Rhodes,  needless  to  say,  dissented 
from  this  arbitrary  proceeding,  and  perhaps  he  ex¬ 
pressed  his  opinion  more  bluntly  than  was  advisable 
under  the  circumstances.  At  the  request  of  Sir 
Charles  Warren  he  placed  his  objections  to  the  latter’s 
speech  to  the  Boer  settlers  on  paper.  In  answer  to 
this  Mr  Rhodes  received  a  letter  from  Sir  Charles, 
the  tone  ofwrhich  compelled  him  to  resign  his  position, 
and  to  bring  the  matter  under  the  notice  of  the  High 
Commissioner. 

In  his  letter  to  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  resigning  his 


84  THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

deputy-commissionership,  Mr  Rhodes  said,  regarding 
the  letter  he  had  received  from  Sir  Charles  Warren 
which  led  to  his  taking  that  step  :  “  Whatever  may 
have  been  my  differences  with  the  Special  Com¬ 
missioner  upon  public  grounds,  I  was  at  all  times 
anxious  to  avoid  even  the  appearance  of  a  personal 
feud  or  misunderstanding  ;  but  I  feel  that  I  should  be 
entirely  wanting  in  self-respect  if  I  did  not  bring 
specially  to  your  Excellency’s  notice  the  terms  of  this 
communication,  addressed  to  an  officer  who  had  been 
humbly  but  loyally  endeavouring  for  several  months 
past,  without  any  of  the  ordinary  inducements  which 
such  service  offers,  to  promote  such  a  settlement  of 
difficult  affairs  as  would  tend  to  the  maintenance  of 
British  interests  and  the  settled  peace  of  this  portion 
of  her  Majesty’s  dominions.” 

“  Under  the  circumstances  which  had  arisen,”  the 
letter  continued,  “  I  felt  that  I  could  no  longer 
retain  my  position  with  honour.  Every  promise 
which  I  had  made  to  the  Stellaland  people  as  regards 
their  form  of  government,  their  land  grants,  and  their 
losses  from  cattle -thefts,  had,  although  ratified  by 
Sir  Charles  Warren,  been  repeatedly  violated  ;  whilst 
proceedings  almost  ludicrous  in  their  illegality  had 
been  instituted  against  Mr  Van  Niekerk,  who  had  !■ 
been  made  use  of  by  us  for  our  own  purposes  almost 
up  to  the  moment  of  his  arrest.  I  accordingly 
hastened  to  Cape  Town  for  the  purpose  of  placing 
in  your  Excellency’s  hands,  which  I  do  now,  the 
commission  with  which  you  did  me  the  honour  to 
intrust  me.” 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  this  quarrel  between 
Mr  Rhodes  and  Sir  Charles  Warren  would  be  allowed 
to  pass  without  notice  in  the  Cape  House  of  Assembly. 


ATTACKED  BY  BOTH  SIDES. 


85 


By  the  attitude  he  had  taken  up,  Rhodes  had  laid 
himself  open  to  attack  both  from  the  extreme  pro- 
British  party  and  from  the  supporters  of  the  Afri¬ 
kander  Bond.  The  British  jingoes  were  incensed  at 
what  they  considered  Rhodes’  weakness  in  dealing 
with  the  Boers  of  Stellaland,  by  conceding  to  them 
such  a  large  proportion  of  their  demands  ;  while  the 
leaders  of  the  Bond,  professing  to  regard  the  interior 
beyond  the  then  existing  limits  of  Cape  Colony  as  the 
birthright  of  the  Transvaal,  held  that  a  great  wrong 
had  been  done  to  President  Kruger  and  his  Burghers 
by  the  proclamation  of  a  British  protectorate  over 
Bechuanaland.  Students  of  South  African  history 
must  ever  bear  in  mind  that  from  the  first  day  it  was 
formed  the  Afrikander  Bond  has  been  consistently 
anti-British — an  attitude  which  may  have  been  more 
or  less  concealed  on  some  occasions,  but  has  never 
been  relinquished. 

Speaking  on  the  Bechuanaland  settlement  about 
this  time  in  the  Cape  Assembly,  Rhodes  riddled 
through  and  through  the  Afrikander  argument  that 
Bechuanaland  belonged  by  right  to  the  Transvaal. 
In  a  speech  which  displayed  a  considerable  amount  of 
statesmanlike  foresight,  he  pointed  out  that,  even  if 
Great  Britain  had  permitted  the  Transvaal  to  acquire 
Bechuanaland,  that  state  would  not  have  been  allowed 
to  remain  long  in  undisputed  possession  of  the  land. 
Germany  would,  he  was  convinced,  have  forced  some 
quarrel  on  the  Transvaal,  thereby  bringing  about  a 
war  that  would  in  all  probability  have  resulted  in 
Germany  annexing  the  Transvaal,  and  thus  effectually 
shutting  Cape  Colony  out  from  the  interior.  “  What,” 
asked  Mr  Rhodes,  “  was  the  bar  to  this  being  done, 
and  what  prevented  Germany  accomplishing  her  object 


86  THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

of  the  conquest  of  the  Transvaal  ?  Bechuanaland. 
What  was  the  use  to  Germany,”  he  continued,  “  of  a 
few  sand-heaps  at  Angra  Pequena  and  the  arid  deserts 
between  Angra  Pequena  and  the  interior,  with  this 
English  and  Colonial  bar  between  her  and  the 
Transvaal  ? ” 

It  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  any  other  man 
in  the  Cape  Government  at  this  time  that  the  real  aim 
of  Germany  was  the  conquest  and  subjection  of  the 
Transvaal ;  yet  there  can  be  little  doubt  to-day  that 
this  was  really  what  Bismarck  was  working  for,  and 
that  it  was  only  the  timely  establishment  of  a  British 
protectorate  over  Bechuanaland  which  prevented  this 
ambitious  scheme  being  carried  into  effect. 

The  Bechuanaland  settlement  once  disposed  of, 
Bhodes  relinquished  for  a  time  his  prominent  share 
in  the  government  of  Cape  Coloiry.  For  one  thing, 
there  was  little  business  of  more  than  purely  local 
interest  to  be  transacted,  and  Rhodes  has  always 
disliked  “  the  politics  of  the  parish  pump,”  preferring 
“  to  deal  in  millions  and  to  think  in  empires.”  A 
second  reason  which  led  Rhodes  temporarily  to  sink 
into  comparative  obscurity,  so  far  as  politics  were 
concerned,  was  the  pressing  work  waiting  him  at 
Kimberley  in  connection  with  the  amalgamation  of  the 
diamond  mines.  In  1885  Rhodes  left  Cape  Town  for 
Kimberley,  determined  to  put  things  into  train  for  the 
bringing  about  of  this  object,  and  he  threw  himself  into 
the  affair  with  characteristic  energy  and  impetuosity. 

At  this  time  the  two  principal  mines  being  worked 
in  Kimberley  were  the  De  Beers  mine  and  the 
Kimberley  mine.  On  each  of  these  properties  there 
were  many  separate  and  distinct  companies  and 
syndicates  at  work,  while  several  more  were  scattered 


THE  MINING  GROUPS. 


87 


around  the  neighbourhood  exploiting  less  important 
mines.  The  chief  figures  in  the  group  of  companies 
working  in  the  De  Beers  mine  were  Mr  Rhodes  and 
Mr  Alfred  Beit,  while  in  the  Kimberley  mine  two 
young  Jews,  B.  I.  Barnato  and  Woolf  Joel,  were  rapidly 
acquiring  a  controlling  influence.  In  fact,  it  may  be 
said  that  these  four  men  dominated  the  diamond-fields 
at  this  time.  Rhodes  and  Beit  were  steadfastly 
following  out  their  policy  of  buying  up  all  the  smaller 
companies  interested  in  the  De  Beers  mine,  and 
incorporating  their  interests  in  the  De  Beers  Mining 
Company.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Kimberley  Central 
Mining  Company,  of  which  Barnato  and  Woolf  Joel 
were  the  leading  spirits,  was  pursuing  exactly  the 
same  tactics  with  regard  to  the  Kimberley  mine.  The 
two  opposing  groups  were  working  towards  the  same 
end,  and  though  they  seemed  to  be  running  on  parallel 
lines,  in  reality  they  were  converging  towards  a 
junction  in  the  future. 

It  was  thought  at  first  that  when  the  policy  of 
absorption  was  complete,  and  only  the  De  Beers 
Company  and  the  Kimberley  Central  Company  were 
left,  the  two  might,  without  any  actual  amalgamation, 
come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  regulation  of  the  out¬ 
put  and  the  price  at  which  the  diamonds  were  to  be 
sold.  Such  was  Barnato’s  belief  at  any  rate.  Rhodes, 
looking  farther  into  the  future,  decided  that  sooner 
or  later  the  two  companies  would  have  to  coalesce 
and  form  one  great  monopoly,  and  this  he  was  deter¬ 
mined  to  bring  about  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
despite  the  strenuous  opposition  which  he  foresaw  he 
would  meet  with  from  Barnato  and  his  group.  K 

Both  Rhodes  and  Barnato  had  the  same  end  in  view 
— the  control  of  the  diamond  output  of  South  Africa  ; 


8S  THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

but  their  motives  were  very  different.  Barnato  was 
a  financier  pure  and  simple,  with  no  thoughts  beyond 
making  good  dividends  for  the  shareholders  in  his 
companies  ;  and  he  saw  that  if  the  supply  of  diamonds 
could  be  regulated  so  as  to  keep  a  little  in  the  wake 
of  the  demand,  higher  prices  would  be  realised  and 
increased  profits  made.  With  Rhodes  the  question 
was  entirely  on  another  footing.  From  his  point  of 
view  the  control  of  the  diamond  mines  was  only  a 
means  to  an  end  :  what  he  was  working  for  was  the 
formation  of  a  gigantic  monopoly  with  ample  funds 
at  its  command,  which  he  would  be  able  to  use  for  the 
purpose  of  developing  his  scheme  of  British  expansion 
towards  the  Zambesi. 

To  obtain  the  means  of  coercing  to  some  extent 
the  Kimberley  Central  Company,  Rhodes  determined 
on  buying  up  all  the  shares  he  could  obtain  in  the  only 
company  working  in  the  Kimberley  mine,  the  French 
Diamond  Mining  Company,  which  the  Barnato  group 
had  not  been  able  to  absorb.  This  company  owned  a 
very  important  section  of  the  Kimberley  mine,  and 
though  Barnato  possessed  a  considerable  proportion  of 
the  shares  in  this  company,  he  had  not  the  controlling 
interest  necessary  to  bring  about  the  amalgamation 
with  his  own  company  that  he  so  greatly  desired. 
The  absorption  of  the  French  company,  it  will  be 
understood,  would  have  given  the  Kimberley  Central 
Company  the  entire  control  of  the  Kimberley  mine. 

In  order  to  combat  Barnato’s  efforts  to  amalgamate 
with  the  French  company,  Rhodes  about  this  time 
visited  England  for  the  purpose  of  raising  sufficient 
capital  to  enable  him  to  follow  up  the  line  of  action  he 
had  mapped  out  for  himself.  In  this  he  was  very  suc¬ 
cessful,  obtaining  the  support  of  the  historic  Rothschild 


“barney”  barnato.  89 

firm  among  others.  Returning  to  the  diamond-fields 
with  this  strong  backing,  he  at  once  set  about  buying 
up  all  the  shares  of  the  French  company  in  the  market. 

At  the  end  of  a  short  time  things  had  progressed  so 
far  that  Rhodes,  in  his  turn,  was  able  to  offer  a  scheme 
to  the  shareholders  in  the  French  company  for  amalgam¬ 
ation  with  the  De  Beers  Company.  But  if  Barnato  s 
influence  in  the  French  company  was  not  sufficiently 
powerful  to  enable  him  to  carry  his  own  scheme  of 
amalgamation,  he  was  at  least  in  such  a  position  as  to 
be  able  to  veto  any  rival  scheme  such  as  that  brought 
forward  by  Rhodes.  Things,  therefore,  were  brought 
to  an  absolute  deadlock,  for  neither  side  would  budge 
an  inch  from  the  position  it  had  taken  up. 

Open  war  was  declared  by  the  two  great  groups. 
The  wily,  keen-eyed  Hebrew  opposed  himself  to  the 
impetuous  and  far-sighted  Anglo-Saxon,  and,  as  events 
proved,  was  out-matched  and  out-manoeuvred  all  along 
the  line.  With  ample  capital  at  his  command,  Rhodes 
continued  his  policy  of  buying  all  the  shares  in  the 
French  company  that  he  could  lay  his  hands  on.  In 
retaliation,  Barnato  adopted  the  same  tactics.  It  was 
a  veritable  battle  of  giants,  and  the  whole  history  of 
finance  can  show  nothing  more  interesting  or  more 
exciting  than  the  long-drawn-out  war  which  raged 
on  the  South  African  diamond-fields  between  Cecil 
Rhodes  and  “  Barney  ”  Barnato. 

The  methods  adopted  by  these  two  geniuses  of  fin¬ 
ance  had  the  immediate  effect  of  sending  the  shares  of 
the  French  company  bounding  up  in  unprecedented 
fashion,  and  here  it  was  that  the  weakness  in  Barnato’s 
armour  first  became  apparent.  While  every  share 
which  Rhodes  bought  was  carefully  locked  up  and 
retained,  Barnato  found  that  many  individual  share- 


90  THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

holders,  who  were  in  other  respects  strong  supporters 
of  his  policy,  were  unable  to  resist  the  high  prices 
which  the  shares  were  fetching  ;  so  that  in  the  end,  to 
his  deep  disgust,  he  was  forced  into  buying,  at  inflated 
prices,  many  shares  which  had  already  been  in  the 
hands  of  those  who  supported  his  scheme  for  amalgam¬ 
ation  against  that  of  De  Beers.  It  was  obvious  that 
Barnato  was  labouring  under  a  disadvantage  which 
pointed  to  total  defeat  in  the  future. 

As  Rhodes  had  been  the  first  to  commence  the 
duel,  so  was  he  the  first  to  make  overtures  for  peace. 
He  saw  that  he  held  Barnato  in  the  hollow  of  his 
hand,  but  he  realised  that  it  would  be  impossible  for 
him,  powerful  as  he  was,  to  crush  the  Kimberley 
Central  Compan}T  out  of  existence,  and  therefore  he 
went  to  see  Barnato  to  talk  things  over  with  him. 
In  terse  language  he  pointed  out  to  his  rival  that 
the  battle  between  them  had  chiefly  benefited .  those 
traitors  who,  while  vowing  staunch  allegiance  to 
Barnato,  were  throwing  their  shares  on  to  the  market 
for  purchase  by  Barnato  or  by  Rhodes  or  by  any  one 
else  who  was  prepared  to  give  the  highest  price  for 
them.  Barnato  admitted  the  truth  of  this,  and 
bluntly  demanded  to  know  what  Rhodes  had  to 
propose ;  for,  though  cornered,  Barnato  was  much 
too  astute  not  to  see  that,  however  much  his  op¬ 
ponents  might  strive  to  gain  the  supremacy,  his 
influence  was  still  too  great  to  prevent  any  one 
else  gaining  the  day  save  at  a  prohibitive  figure. 

Rhodes  offered  to  buy  the  whole  of  Barnato’s 
holding  in  the  French  company  at  the  current 
market  value  of  the  shares  if  he  would  consent  to 
the  amalgamation  of  that  company  with  De  Beers. 
Barnato  declined  point-blank.  The  very  last  thing 


THE  FIRST  ROUND. 


91 


he  desired  was  that  the  rival  concern  of  De  Beers 
should  acquire  any  footing  in  the  Kimberley  mine. 

Protracted  negotiations  followed,  and  in  the  end 
Bhodes  agreed  to  a  compromise  by  which  the 
French  company  was  to  be  amalgamated  with  the 
Kimberley  Central  Company,  and  Rhodes  was  to 
receive  in  return  a  large  shareholding  in  the  last- 
named  corporation. 

Thus  the  first  part  of  the  war  between  Rhodes  and 
Barnato  ended  with  honours  fairly  even.  The  more 
important  stage  of  the  fight  was  still  to  come. 
Rhodes  had  made  up  his  mind  that  the  Kimberley 
Central  Company  and  De  Beers  ought  to  be  welded 
together  into  one  huge  monopoly,  and,  though  the 
Barnato  group  opposed  this  tooth  and  nail,  he  was 
determined  to  carry  his  scheme  into  effect.  He 
employed  the  same  tactics  which  had  previously 
proved  so  successful,  and  set  about  increasing  his 
holding  in  the  Kimberley  Central  Company  by  buy¬ 
ing  up  every  share  which  came  on  the  market. 
Barnato  was  perforce  compelled  to  follow  his  ex¬ 
ample,  and  what  had  happened  in  the  case  of  the 
French  company’s  shares  was  now  repeated  with 
regard  to  the  stock  of  the  Kimberley  Central  Com¬ 
paq 

Prices  were  greatly  inflated,  and  the  high  value 
of  the  shares  led  to  many  people  throwing  their 
holdings  into  the  market  for  the  sake  of  the  large 
profits  to  be  realised.  Barnato  was  steadily  losing 
ground,  and  it  seemed  only  a  matter  of  time  before 
he  would  be  compelled  to  admit  himself  vanquished. 
At  this  point,  however,  a  new  factor  entered  into 
the  situation  which  threatened  danger  to  the  Barnato 
group  and  to  Rhodes  and  his  friends  alike.  This 


92  THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

was  the  appearance  on  the  scene  of  a  foreign  group 
of  speculators  controlling  a  large  capital  and  headed 
by  Mr  J.  X.  Merriman,  the  well-known  member  of 
the  Cape  Assembly  and  a  prominent  leader  of  the 
Afrikander  Bond.  The  aim  of  this  clique  was 
obviously  anti  -  British,  and  menaced  not  only  the 
diamond-fields  but  South  Africa  generally.  Profit¬ 
ing  b}?-  the  feud  between  Rhodes  and  Barnato,  these 
new-comers  soon  began  to  make  their  presence  felt, 
and  their  influence  was  in  the  end  checked  by  the 
only  means  possible — an  alliance  between  the  two 
previously  contending  forces. 

A  conference  was  called  at  which  Rhodes  and  Mr 
Beit  represented  the  De  Beers  Company,  while  Bar¬ 
nato  and  Woolf  Joel  appeared  on  behalf  of  the 
Kimberley  Central  Company.  These  four  sat  closeted 
together  from  the  forenoon  of  one  day  until  the  early 
morning  of  the  next,  and  several  times  it  seemed 
as  though  the  meeting  would  have  to  break  up  with¬ 
out  any  settlement  having  been  arrived  at.  All  were 
agreed  upon  the  necessity  for  presenting  a  united 
front  to  the  efforts  of  the  foreign  group  ;  but  the 
deadlock  was  provoked  by  Rhodes,  who  tenaciously 
clung  to  his  condition  that,  in  the  event  of  the  two 
great  companies  amalgamating,  there  was  to  be  a 
clause  in  the  trust-deed  permitting  him  to  employ 
the  surplus  funds  of  the  monopoly  to  further  his 
northern  expansion  schemes.  Mr  Beit  heartily  sup¬ 
ported  him,  but  the  other  two  could  not  be  brought 
to  reconcile  themselves  to  the  proposal.  With  them 
it  was  a  matter  of  business  and  of  business  only,  and 
they  could  not  see  that  a  company,  whose  primary 
object  was  to  work  the  diamond  mines  round  Kim¬ 
berley,  should  take  part  in,  or  assume  any  portion 


THE  CONSOLIDATED  MINES. 


93 


of  the  risk  of,  building  an  empire  in  the  interior  of 
Africa. 

Rhodes,  however,  held  the  trump-card,  as  the  op¬ 
position  perfectly  well  knew,  and  there  was,  more¬ 
over,  a  lingering  fear  in  Barnato’s  mind  that,  if  he 
refused  to  accept  Rhodes’  terms,  the  latter  would 
straightway  ally  himself  with  the  Merriman  group, 
and  so  gravely  menace  the  very  existence  of  the 
Kimberley  Central  Company.  This  fear,  by  the  way, 
was  totally  without  reason,  for  it  is  unlikely  in  the 
extreme  that  Rhodes  would  under  any  circumstances 
have  consented  to  work  with  a  group  whose  objects 
were  so  avowedly  anti  -  British.  At  last,  at  four 
o’clock  in  the  morning,  Barnato  capitulated,  and 
accepted  Rhodes’  terms,  with  the  proviso  that  the 
amalgamated  companies  should  be  controlled  by  a 
small  number  of  life  governors,  of  which  he  was  to 
be  one,  so  as  to  place  him  in  a  position  to  oppose 
any  scheme  that  he  considered  detrimental  to  the 
best  interests  of  the  shareholders  in  the  consolidated 
company. 

This  great  step  gained,  there  were  only  matters  of 
detail  to  settle,  and  the  great  diamond  monopoly, 
for  which  the  name  of  the  “  De  Beers  Consolidated 
Mines,  Limited,”  was  chosen,  came  into  being,  and 
the  foreign  speculators  under  Mr  Merriman  were 
routed  and  compelled  to  retire  from  the  contest. 

The  formation  of  the  consolidated  company,  how¬ 
ever,  was  not  allowed  to  take  place  without  a 
struggle,  for  a  small  proportion  of  the  shareholders 
in  the  Kimberley  Central  Company,  instigated,  as 
was  currently  believed,  by  Mr  Merriman  and  his 
allies,  declared  that  the  directors  of  that  company 
had  no  power  to  amalgamate  with  De  Beers,  and 


94  THE  AMALGAMATION  OE  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

carried  the  matter  into  the  High  Court  at  Cape 
Town.  The  affair  turned  upon  the  interpretation  to 
be  placed  upon  a  clause  in  the  articles  of  association 
of  the  Kimberley  Central  Company  giving  the  direc¬ 
tors  power,  upon  receiving  a  vote  representing  three- 
fourths  of  the  total  shareholding  in  the  company,  to 
amalgamate  at  any  time  “  with  any  similar  company.” 

These  malcontents  argued  that  the  De  Beers  Con¬ 
solidated  Company,  by  reason  of  the  wide  powers 
included  in  its  trust-deed,  was  not  a  similar  company 
within  that  section,  and  their  view  was  upheld  by 
the  judge  who  heard  the  case.  He  pointed  out  that, 
as  the  De  Beers  Consolidated  Company  had  the 
power  to  acquire  lands  in  the  interior,  and  generally 
to  undertake  the  government  and  administration  of 
any  such  regions,  it  could  not  be  held  that  it  was  a 
similar  company  to  the  Kimberley  Central,  whose 
sole  object  was  to  work  the  diamond  mines  around 
the  town  from  which  it  took  its  name. 

The  clever  group  of  financiers  who  were  at  the 
head  of  the  De  Beers  Consolidated  Company  were 
not,  however,  to  be  beaten  in  this  fashion,  and  the 
Kimberley  Central  Company  was  immediately  carried 
into  voluntary  liquidation,  and  the  whole  of  its  assets 
sold  to  the  new  company. 

Thus  a  very  important  step  in  Bhodes’  preparations 
for  an  empire  to  the  north  of  the  Limpopo  was  taken 
after  many  years  of  arduous  labour  and  the  over¬ 
coming  of  difficulties  which  might  well  have  daunted 
any  less  courageous  and '  persevering  spirit  than  his 
own.  Even  Barnato,  who  had  very  few  aims  in  life 
beyond  the  actual  accumulation  of  wealth  for  himself 
and  the  shareholders  who  had  intrusted  their  money 
to  him,  found  himself  compelled  to  take  an  interest 


EFFORTS  FOR  A  PREFERENTIAL  TARIFF. 


95 


in  the  accomplishment  of  Rhodes’  great  schemes, 
and  from  the  day  that  the  De  Beers  Consolidated 
Company  first  came  into  existence  down  to  the  time 
he  so  unhappily  perished  by  his  own  act,  “Barney” 
Barnato  was  one  of  Rhodes’  warmest  admirers  and 
staunchest  supporters. 

At  the  meeting  already  mentioned,  which  resulted 
in  the  amalgamation  of  the  two  companies,  Barnato’s 
remark  after  consenting  to  Rhodes’  stipulations  was — 
“  Well,  some  of  us  have  a  fancy  for  one  thing  and 
some  for  another :  you  evidently  have  a  fancy  for 
building  an  empire  in  the  north,  and  I  suppose  we 
must  give  you  the  means  to  do  so.” 

Having  gained  the  control  of  a  capital  sufficient  to 
enable  him  to  carry  forward  his  schemes  for  expansion, 
Rhodes  next  turned  his  attention  to  the  confederation 
of  the  South  African  states,  which  was  the  other  great 
object  of  his  life.  With  this  end  in  view  he  set  him¬ 
self  to  conciliate  the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal,  whose 
racial  hatred  of  the  British  was  at  this  time  very 
strong.  He  urged  upon  President  Kruger  with  all 
the  power  at  his  command  the  advantages  which 
would  accrue  through  the  establishment  of  a  prefer¬ 
ential  tariff  between  the  four  leading  states  of  the 
sub-continent,  Cape  Colony,  Natal,  the  Orange  Free 
State,  and  the  South  African  Republic.  In  this  idea 
is  to  be  found  the  germ  of  the  South  African  Customs 
Union  which  afterwards  came  into  being.  The  Trans¬ 
vaal  president,  however,  remained  obstinate,  and  re¬ 
garded  all  Rhodes’  advances  with  that  suspicion  which 
has  ever  been  so  prominent  in  his  character. 

Another  way  in  which  Rhodes  sought  to  bring  about 
a  closer  union  between  the  Transvaal  and  Cape  Colony 
was  by  means  of  a  railway  from  Cape  Town  to  Pretoria, 


96  THE  AMALGAMATION  OF  THE  DIAMOND  MINES. 

which  would  have  greatly  aided  the  development  of 
the  resources  of  both  states ;  but  here  again  he  met 
with  only  small  success.  The  policy  of  the  Transvaal 
at  this  time  was,  as  indeed  it  has  ever  been,  aggres¬ 
sively  anti-British.  With  the  memories  of  their  tri¬ 
umphs  in  the  late  war  still  in  their  minds,  the  Burghers 
of  the  South  African  Republic  felt  a  great  contempt 
for  the  British  colonists  and  their  overtures.  They 
looked  upon  themselves  as  a  people  much  above  the 
British  in  every  respect,  and  regarded  the  efforts  of 
the  latter  towards  a  closer  union  as  a  sign  of  some- 
thing  akin  to  despair,  and  the  desire  of  a  weak  race 
for  protection  by  a  strong. 

Rhodes’  efforts,  however,  had  one  good  effect.  The 
unanswerable  logic  of  his  arguments,  and  his  obviously 
sincere  desire  to  work  amicably  with  the  Dutch  popu¬ 
lation,  caused  the  saner  members  of  the  Afrikander 
Bond  to  look  more  favourably  upon  him  and  his  works 
than  they  had  previously  done.  Rhodes  at  this  period 
chose  to  appeal  not  so  much  to  the  Bond  wirepullers 
as  to  the  great  body  of  the  Dutch  colonists  direct. 
Accordingly  he  devoted  some  considerable  attention 
to  the  complaints  of  the  Dutch  farmers  in  the  midland 
districts  of  Cape  Colony  as  to  the  difficulties  and  dis¬ 
advantages  under  which  they  laboured,  and  by  so 
doing  he  was  able  to  bring  about  several  much-needed 
reforms,  which  gained  him  the  good-will  of  the  dwellers 
in  those  districts,  and  immensely  increased  his  popu¬ 
larity  with  the  Dutch  throughout  the  colony. 


97 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 

Mr  Rhodes’  policy  of  conciliating  the  Dutch-speaking 
population  of  Cape  Colony  was  undoubtedly  wise. 
Not  only  was  the  support  of  this  section  of  the 
community  imperatively  necessary  to  him  in  his  twin- 
schemes  of  expansion  to  the  north  and  a  federated 
South  Africa  under  the  flag  of  England,  and  extend¬ 
ing  from  Cape  Town  to  the  Zambesi  and  beyond  ;  but 
if  South  Africa  was  to  prosper  and  flourish  as  its 
supporters  wished,  it  could  only  be  by  the  two  white 
races  working  hand  in  hand  in  common  means  towards 
a  common  end. 

In  this  effort  to  cultivate  the  goodwill  of  the  Dutch, 
and  to  gain  their  sympathies  with  his  plans,  Mr  Rhodes 
was  ultimately  successful.  The  concessions  he  had 
been  instrumental  in  obtaining:  for  the  Dutch  farmers 
and  wine-growers  in  the  colony  were  much  appreciated 
by  those  whom  the  concessions  were  chiefly  intended 
to  benefit.  His  action,  too,  on  the  question  of  the 
settlement  of  Bechuanaland  re, acted  in  Mr  Rhodes’ 
favour  as  soon  as  the  first  fierce  heat  of  the  contro¬ 
versy  had  subsided,  and  it  was  possible  to  see  what 
his  true  attitude  had  been.  The  more  intelligent 
portion  of  the  Dutch  inhabitants  of  Cape  Colony 

G 


98 


THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 


quickly  realised  that  Mr  Rhodes  had  held  out  against 
all  the  pressure  that  was  brought  against  him  for  his 
ideal  principle  of  equal  rights  for  all  settlers  in  Bechu- 
analand  without  reference  to  their  race  or  creed. 

This  feeling  of  friendliness  towards  Mr  Rhodes  on 
the  part  of  the  Dutch  portion  of  the  population 
steadily  grew  as  time  went  on,  and  not  even  the 
fulminations  of  the  Bond  leaders,  who  saw  with  feel¬ 
ings  akin  to  dismay  the  rapid  spread  of  Mr  Rhodes’ 
popularity,  could  prevent  it. 

Not  long  ago  a  London  morning  paper,  whose  views 
on  African  affairs  are  of  the  most  extraordinary  and 
contradictory  description,  gravely  informed  its  readers 
that  “  Mr  Rhodes  is  cordially  hated  by  the  Cape 
Dutch.”  This  is,  of  course,  absolutely  incorrect.  Mr 
Rhodes  is  not  to-day,  and  never  has  been,  hated  by 
the  Dutch  of  Cape  Colony.  Even  after  the  Jameson 
Raid,  when  some  soreness  might  reasonably  have  been 
expected,  Mr  Rhodes  received  the  warmest  welcome 
from  every  Dutch  stronghold  in  Cape  Colony  that  he 
visited.  It  is  safe  to  declare  that  never  at  any  time 
in  his  career  has  Mr  Rhodes  been  hated  by  the  great 
body  of  the  Dutch  population  in  Cape  Colony,  and 
tKose  who  assert  the  contrary  do  so  either  from 
ignorance  or  from  spleen. 

I  This  goodwill  of  the  Dutch  towards  Mr  Rhodes  did 
not,  of  course,  come  about  all  in  a  minute.  It  was  the 
growth  of  years ;  but,  as  Mr  Rhodes  once  said,  when 
referring  to  his  determination  to  carry  through  any 
scheme  on  which  he  had  set  his  mind,  “  It  took  me 
/fifteen  years  to  get  a  mine,  but  I  got  it.  Though  my 
boat  may  be  slow  in  the  race,  I  know  exactly  what 
I  am  starting  for.”  In  this  terse  sentence  will  be 
found  the  secret  of  much  of  his  success.  In  the  first 


RAILWAYS  IN  THE  TRANSVAAL. 


99 


place,  he  makes  up  his  mind  as  to  exactly  what  it  is 
he  wants ;  once  he  has  done  so,  he  suffers  nothing  to 
prevent  him  from  carrying  his  point. 

While  quietly  preparing  for  his  move  to  the  north,  ^ 
Mr  Rhodes  set  on  foot  negotiations  for  a  railway  from 
Cape  Town  to  Pretoria';  but  President  Kruger  was 
obdurate,  and  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  all  arguments  in 
favour  of  such  a  scheme.  It  was  about  this  time  that 
Kruger  and  Rhodes,  unconsciously  perhaps,  embarked 
upon  that  long  duel  which  was  to  culminate,  though 
not  to  end,  in  the  wretched  Jameson  Raid.  The 
wonderfully  rich  goldfields  of  the  Witwatersrand  had 
just  been  discovered,  and  the  influx  of  miners  into 
the  Transvaal  was  unprecedented.  It  was  plain  that 
the  Transvaal  could  no  longer  maintain  its  attitude  of 
keeping  aloof  from  the  remainder  of  South  Africa. 
President  Kruger’s  dream  of  a  pastoral  republic, 
pursuing  its  own  road  unhampered  with  and  dis¬ 
connected  from  anything  which  went  on  outside  its 
borders,  was  no  longer  possible.  The  sudden  inrush 
of  a  large  European  population,  which  threatened  to 
swamp  the  original  Burgher  population,  shattered  at  a 
single  blow  this  Boer  ideal. 

Kruger,  however,  was  determined  that  if  he  could 
not  actually  prevent  the  gold  mines  being  worked,  as 
he  would  have  wished  to  do,  he  would  at  any  rate 
hamper  them  and  repress  their  development  as  much 
as  possible.  The  idea  of  railways  running  through  his 
country  was  most  distasteful  to  the  president  of  the 
Transvaal,  and  for  a  long  time  he  sternly  set  his  face 
against  their  introduction  ;  but  in  the  end  he  relented 
so  far  as  to  consent  to  a  line  being  constructed  from 
Delagoa  Bay  to  Pretoria.  This  concession  rendered 
him,  if  anything,  more  determined  than  ever  to  resist 


100 


THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 


Mr  Rhodes’  scheme  for  a  railway  northwards  from 
Cape  Town  through  the  Orange  Free  State  and  the 
Transvaal,  and  so  on  to  the  north.  In  1887  a  company 
was  formed  by  an  American,  Colonel  McMurdo,  to  build 
that  portion  of  the  Delagoa  Bay-Pretoria  line  which 
ran  through  Portuguese  territory. 

The  Government  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  fairly  favourable  to  Mr  Rhodes’ 
scheme  for  a  railway  through  that  country  to  the 
Transvaal.  President  Brand  and  his  advisers  were 
sufficiently  far-sighted  to  see  that,  with  the  continued 
development  of  the  Rand  goldfield,  the  carrying  trade 
to  Johannesburg  from  the  south  would  increase  year 
by  year,  and  they  were  not  averse  from  receiving  their 
share  of  this  trade.  Despite  the  intrigues  of  Kruger 
to  get  the  Free  State  to  oppose  this  railway  scheme  of 
Mr  Rhodes,  it  was  obvious  to  all  that  when  the  Cape 
Government,  which  supported  Mr  Rhodes  in  his  plan 
for  the  northern  extension  of  the  railway,  was  in  a 
position  to  go  ahead  with  their  project,  the  Free  State 
would  agree  to  the  line  passing  through  its  territory. 

While  these  negotiations  with  the  Transvaal  were 
in  progress,  Rhodes  was,  as  has  been  said,  preparing 
to  take  his  first  step  towards  the  realisation  of  his 
northern  expansion  scheme.  In  1885  the  Imperial 
Government  had  extended  the  Bechuanaland  Pro¬ 
tectorate  as  far  northwards  as  the  twenty  -  second 
parallel  of  south  latitude,  so  as  to  embrace  Khama’s 
country  ;  and  it  was  to  the  north  of  this  that  Mr 
Rhodes  intended  to  commence  his  move  towards  the 
interior. 

The  vast  country  to  the  north  of  the  Limpopo  river 
was  under  the  iron  rule  of  Lobengula,  the  king  of  the 
powerful  and  warlike  Matabele  tribe.  Mr  Rhodes 


THE  BOERS  AND  MATABELELAND. 


101 


was  not  alone  in  desiring  the  control  of  this  rich 
country.  In  1887  the  Portuguese  Government  had 
published  an  official  map  showing  the  whole  of  Loben- 
gula’s  dominions  as  Portuguese  territory.  This  led 
to  a  protest  by  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Lord 
Salisbury,  and  in  the  end  the  authorities  at  Lisbon 
withdrew  their  claims  to  the  country  west  of  the 
thirty -second  degree  of  east  longitude.  At  a  later 
period  a  rectification  of  the  Portuguese  frontier  took 
place,  with  the  assent  of  Great  Britain. 

It  was  the  Transvaal,  however,  that  led  Mr  Rhodes 
to  moye  earlier  than  otherwise  he  would  have  done. 
The  warlike  nature  of  the  powerful  Matabele  tribe 
had  prevented  President  Kruger  following  out  his 
custom  of  sending  isolated  parties  of  raiding  Boers 
into  country  he  coveted,  there  to  form  pseudo-re¬ 
publics  that  should,  by  a  species  of  natural  transi¬ 
tion,  in  due  course  become  incorporated  with  the 
Transvaal.  Accordingly  he  was  forced  to  adopt  other 
tactics,  which  will  be  referred  to  more  fully  presently. 

Matabeleland,  with  its-  attached  province  of  Masho- 
naland,  had  always  been  marked  down  by  the  Boers 
of  the  Transvaal  for  addition  to  their  country  when 
occasion  offered,  and  the  authorities  at  Pretoria  em¬ 
ployed  every  means  in  their  power  to  keep  the  British 
from  gaining  any  foothold  in  the  country  to  the  north 
of  the  Limpopo.  In  pursuance  of  this  policy  General 
Joubert,  the  commandant-general  of  the  forces  of  the 
South  African  Republic,  so  far  back  as  1882,  wrote 
a  letter  to  Lobengula  urging  him  to  unite  with  the 
Boers  in  opposing  British  expansion.  This  letter  was 
handed  to  Mr  F.  C.  Selous,  the  well-known  hunter,  to 
translate  from  Dutch  to  the  Matabele  tongue.  This 
gentleman,  strangely  enough,  in  later  years  became 


102 


THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 


one  of  Mr  Rhodes’  principal  agents  in  founding  the 
British  colony.  The  letter  was  rather  long,  and  was 
intended  to  arouse  Lobengula’s  suspicions  of  the 
British.  It  began  as  follows  :  “  Now  you  must  have 
heard  that  the  English  took  away  our  country,  the 
Transvaal,  or,  as  they  say,  annexed  it.  We  then 
talked  nicely  for  four  years  and  begged  for  our  country. 
But  no ;  when  an  Englishman  once  has  your  property 
in  his  hands  he  is  like  an  ape  with  its  hands  full  of 
pumpkin  seeds.  If  you  don’t  beat  him  to  death  he 
will  never  leave  go.  And  thus  all  our  nice  talk  did 
not  help  us  at  all.  Then  the  English  commenced  to 
arrest  us  because  we  were  dissatisfied,  and  that  caused 
the  shooting  and  the  fighting.  It  was  then  that  the 
English  first  found  that  it  would  be  better  to  give  us 
back  our  country.” 

The  letter  proceeded  in  this  ranting  fashion  for 
some  time,  and  concluded  with  the  suggestion  that 
the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal  should  “  live  in  friendliness 
with  Lobengula  as  they  lived  in  friendship  with  his 
father,  Umsiligaas ;  and  such  must  be  their  friendship 
that  so  long  as  there  is  one  Boer  and  one  Matabele 
living  they  must  remain  friends.”  This  anxiety  to 
live  on  good  terms  with  the  native  tribes  reads  rather 
strangely  when  the  wars  of  extermination  which  the 
Burghers  of  the  Transvaal  waged  upon  the  Basutos, 
the  Zulus,  and  the  Bechuanas  are  borne  in  mind. 

Towards  the  end  of  1887  Mr  Rhodes  received  the 
serious  news  that  the  Boers  dwelling  in  the  Zoutpans- 
berg  district  of  the  Transvaal  were  organising  a  trek 
on  a  large  scale  which  had  Matabeleland  for  its  object¬ 
ive.  This  served  to  show  him  that  if  he  meant  to 
move  he  must  move  quickly,  else  he  would  find  him¬ 
self  forestalled. 


KRUGER  AND  LOBENGULA. 


103 


Fortunately  for  him,  and  for  the  Empire  as  well,  he 
found  a  willing  listener  to  his  plans  and  ambitions  in 
Sir  Hercules  Robinson.  The  High  Commissioner, 
however,  knew  perfectly  well  that  the  Imperial 
Government  would  not  consent  to  any  further  respon¬ 
sibilities  being  assumed  by  Great  Britain  in  South 
Africa,  so  that  the  hopes  of  a  British  protectorate  up 
to,  and  possibly  beyond,  the  Zambesi,  which  had  been 
Mr  Rhodes’  first  idea,  had  perforce  to  be  abandoned. 
His  experience  in  Bechuanaland,  when  first  the  Cape 
Government  and  then  the  Imperial  authorities  refused 
to  undertake  any  responsibility  with  regard  to  that 
country,  convinced  Mr  Rhodes  that  he  must  find  some 
other  means  for  obtaining  and  administering  his  em¬ 
pire  in  the  north.  The  British  Empire  has  not  been 
built  by  its  rulers,  but  in  spite  of  them  ! 

What  was  this  other  way  to  be  ?  That  was  the 
matter  which  Mr  Rhodes  was  revolving  in  his  mind 
when  the  Transvaal  president  took  the  step  forward 
which  compelled  Rhodes  to  stop  thinking  and  get  to 
work,  if  he  was  to  “head  off”  the  Boers  from  the 
north,  as  he  was  fully  determined  on  doing.  This  step 
of  President  Kruger’s  was  the  sending  up  of  a  Trans¬ 
vaal  consul  to  the  court  of  King1  Lobengula.  The  real 
mission  of  this  official,  of  course,  was  to  pave  the  way 
for  a  Boer  inroad  into  Matabele  country. 

Rhodes  at  once  had  an  interview  with  the  High 
Commissioner.  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  could  not  hold 
out  hope  of  the  British  Government  proclaiming  a 
protectorate  over  Lobengula’s  country,  as  Mr  Rhodes 
desired.  The  latter  was  not  to  be  denied,  however, 
and  at  once  proposed  an  alternative  to  the  formal 
proclamation  of  a  protectorate.  “  Suppose,”  he  said 
in  effect  to  the  High  Commissioner,  —  “suppose  I 


104 


THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 


were  to  obtain  from  Lobengula  a  guarantee  that,  in 
the  event  of  him  at  any  time  deciding  to  ask  for  the 
protection  of  some  Great  Power,  the  first  offer  of  this 
nature  should  be  made  to  Great  Britain — would  the 
Imperial  authorities  act  on  that  ?  ” 

Sir  Hercules  Robinson  thought  over  this  for  a  short 
time — he  saw  the  reasonableness  of  this  proposition 
— and  at  length  said  that  he  believed  that  Downing 
Street  might  be  brought  to  assent.  He  was  as  firmly 
convinced  as  Mr  Rhodes  himself  that  Great  Britain 
and  Cape  Colony  should  by  rights  have  the  control 
of  the  interior,  but  he  knew  the  supineness  and  short¬ 
sightedness  which  prevails  in  the  Government  offices 
in  London,  and  did  not  hold  out  any  very  glowing 
hopes  of  success.  Fortunately  the  Colonial  Office  at 
the  moment  was  a  little  more  alive  than  usual  to  the 
necessities  of  the  situation,  and  the  Imperial  Govern¬ 
ment  at  once  agreed  to  Mr  Rhodes’  scheme  in  the 
event  of  Lobengula  giving  the  required  guarantee. 

This  was  a  great  point  gained.  With  the  willing 
co-operation  of  the  High  Commissioner,  without  which 
he  might  have  laboured  in  vain,  Mr  Rhodes  cast  about 
him  for  a  suitable  person  to  act  as  envoy  to  the 
Matabele  king.  Such  a  one  was  not  easy  to  find, 
but  at  length  Mr  Moffat,  the  Assistant-Commissioner 
of  Bechuanaland,  was  selected  for  the  mission.  It 
must  be  said  at  once  that  he  conducted  his  task  with 
great  credit.  He  found  Lobengula  at  his  principal 
kraal  of  Gu-Buluwayo,  and  after  much  palaver  and 
negotiation  succeeded  in  obtaining  from  the  dusky 
monarch  the  written  assurance  that  in  the  event  of 
his  deciding  at  any  time  to  place  his  country  under 
the  protection  of  any  other  state,  Great  Britain  was 
to  have  the  right  of  pre-emption.  This  agreement 


RHODES  AND  LOBENGULA. 


105 


with  Lobengula  is  generally  known  as  the  Moffat 
Treaty.  It  prepared  the  way  for  the  British  colon¬ 
isation  of  the  interior,  and  effectually  prevented 
President  Kruger  from  obtaining  any  real  hold  on 
Matabeleland. 

This  much  being  gained,  how  was  the  country  to 
be  brought  under  white  control  ?  Mr  Rhodes  de¬ 
bated  that  problem  with  himself  for  many  months. 
Clearly  it  was  hopeless  to  expect  any  further 
help  from  the  Imperial  Government,  while,  even 
had  the  Cape  been  sufficiently  strong  financially  to 
control  that  vast  region,  the  inclination  to  do  so 
was  wanting.  At  this  juncture  Mr  Rhodes  thought 
of  India.  India,  he  reasoned,  had  been  saved  for  the 
British  Empire  by  means  of  private  enterprise  at  a 
period  when  the  Government  would  have  scouted  the 
idea  of  undertaking  any  responsibility  in  that  direc¬ 
tion.  Why  should  not  history  repeat  itself  with 
regard  to  the  interior  of  South  Africa  ? 

Mr  Rhodes  was  convinced  that  herein  lay  the  true 
solution  of  the  question  that  had  been  troubling  him 
for  so  long ;  and  finding  that  Mr  Beit  agreed  with 
him,  he  at  once  set  about  getting  a  concession  to 
search  for  minerals  in  the  country  of  the  Matabele. 
He  was  not  the  first  to  make  this  move.  The  dis¬ 
covery  of  the  rich  Witwatersrand  goldfield,  and  the 
knowledge  that  gold  existed  in  some  quantities  on 
the  west  coast  of  Africa,  had  led  to  many  adventurous 
prospectors  turning  longing  eyes  to  the  country  north 
of  the  Limpopo.  Was  it  likely,  they  argued,  that  in 
the  whole  of  South  Africa  the  only  valuable  goldfield 
was  the  one  which  had  been  stumbled  on  by  accident 
in  the  Witwatersrand  district  of  the  Transvaal  ?  Gold 
was  found  in  other  parts  of  the  Transvaal  farther 


106 


THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 


north  than  Johannesburg,  and  travellers  in  the  north 
had  brought  back  tales  of  a  rich  gold  country  which 
had  been  successfully  worked  by  a  long  -  vanished 
race. 

It  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind,  however,  that  at 
this  time,  1888,  while  the  existence  of  gold  and  other 
valuable  mineral  deposits  in  Lobengula’s  dominions 
was  strongly  suspected,  there  was  no  direct  proof 
that  they  existed  in  anything  like  payable  quantities. 
A  small  goldfield  within  the  district  known  as  the 
Tati  Concessions,  situated  in  Matabeleland,  though 
some  eight  years  previously  it  had  been  added  to 
Cape  Colony,  had  long  been  profitably  worked,  and 
this  added  weight  to  the  supposition  that,  in  some 
portions  of  the  country  under  the  sway  of  the  Mata- 
bele,  goldfields  as  rich  as  that  around  Johannesburg 
might  exist.  Many  small  groups  of  adventurous 
speculators,  therefore,  had  at  various  times  sought 
permission  from  Lobengula  to  search  for  gold  and 
other  metals  in  different  parts  of  his  country.  To 
all  of  them,  however,  save  one,  which  will  be  referred 
to  later,  Lobengula  had  returned  a  curt  refusal. 

It  was  to  press  for  this  concession  of  the  sole  right 
to  search  for  mineral  deposits  in  the  whole  of  the 
Matabele  country  that  Mr  Rhodes,  in  conjunction 
with  his  ardent  supporter,  Mr  Beit,  decided  in  the 
early  part  of  1888  to  send  up  an  envoy,  Mr  Fry,  a 
well-known  hunter  and  explorer,  to  the  king  of  the 
Matabele.  Unfortunately  Mr  Fry  was  unable  to  carry 
through  the  negotiations,  being  seized  with  an  illness 
at  Buluwayo  which  soon  after  proved  fatal. 

The  amount  of  success  which  he  had  met  with,  how¬ 
ever,  convinced  Mr  Rhodes  that  he  was  on  the  high¬ 
road  to  achieving  his  object,  and  accordingly  another 


THE  MOFFAT  TREATY. 


107 


and  larger  expedition  was  equipped,  and  sent  up  to 
the  kraal  of  the  Matabele  king.  This  expedition  was 
under  the  command  of  three  very  able  men  :  Mr 
C.  D.  Rudd,  Mr  Rhodes’  early  partner  at  Kimberley  ; 
Mr  Rochefort  Maguire,  who  had  been  one  of  Rhodes’ 
closest  friends  at  Oxford ;  and  Mr  F.  R.  Thomp¬ 
son,  a  gentleman  with  an  intimate  knowledge  of 
Lobengula  and  his  country,  who  is  known  through¬ 
out  South  Africa  by  the  cognomen  of  “Matabele” 
Thompson. 

These  three,  after  some  very  anxious  moments, 
managed  to  carry  through  their  negotiations  with 
Lobengula,  and  on  October  30,  1888,  a  document  was 
signed  conceding  to  the  three  envoys  and  their  repre¬ 
sentatives  the  sole  right  to  search  for  minerals  in  the 
regions  over  which  Lobengula  ruled.  In  return  for 
the  concession  Lobengula  was  to  receive  a  monthly 
payment  of  £100  sterling  in  British  currency, 
together  with  1000  Martini-Henry  rifles  and  100,000 
rounds  of  ball  cartridge,  and  a  steam  gunboat  to 
patrol  the  Zambesi  river.  The  gunboat,  it  may  be 
mentioned  here,  was  never  delivered,  for  Lobengula 
elected  to  receive  a  sum  of  £500  in  its  stead.  With 
regard  to  the  rifles  and  cartridges,  it  is  a  matter  for 
regret  that  the  concessionaires  should  have  been  so  ill- 
advised  as  to  offer  these,  or  to  assent  to  Lobengula 
receiving  them.  They  might  have  been  fairly  certain 
that  a  warlike  tribe  like  the  Matabele  would  not  long 
be  content  to  use  their  newly  acquired  weapons  for 
sport,  but  would  sigh  for  nobler  quarry  to  attack. 

A  notable  paragraph  in  Lobengula’s  concession  was 
that  which  authorised  the  concessionaires  to  exclude 
from  the  Matabele  kingdom  all  persons  seeking  con¬ 
cessions  of  land  or  mining  rights  ;  while  the  Mata- 


108 


THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 


bele  king  promised  to  grant  no  such  rights  from  that 
date  without  the  previous  consent  of  the  present  con¬ 
cessionaires. 

It  has  been  contended  in  various  interested  quarters 
that  Lobengula  was  “bluffed”  into  signing  this  docu¬ 
ment,  and  that  he  did  so  without  fully  realising  what 
he  was  doing.  Any  one  who  knew  the  crafty  old  king 
is  fully  aware  that  he  was  by  no  means  a  fool,  and 
that  he  rarely  took  any  step  without  fully  weighing 
the  consequences.  Each  sentence  of  the  concession 
was  carefully  read  over  to  him  in  the  Matabele 
tongue  by  a  qualified  interpreter,  and  Lobengula 
pondered  each  one  carefully  before  showing  by  a  curt 
nod  of  the  head  that  he  agreed  to  it. 

It  seemed  to  him,  and  to  many  others  at  that  time, 
that  he  had  driven  an  extremely  good  bargain  with 
the  three  Englishmen.  He  was  to  receive  a  large 
annual  sum  of  money,  together  with  a  supply  of  rifles 
and  ammunition,  for  the  right  to  work  minerals  which 
were  at  that  time  not  really  known  to  exist.  The 
three  Englishmen  at  his  kraal,  and  the  master-brain 
behind  them,  however,  knew  what  they  were  doing, 
and  would  not  have  given  away  so  much  had  they  not 
been  convinced  that  they  would  recoup  themselves  in 
the  future. 

Now  that  he  had  gained  this  concession  from 
Lobengula,  Mr  Rhodes  found  himself  virtually,  if  not 
actually,  the  ruling  power  of  Matabeleland ;  and 
though  in  some  measure  he  had  been  forced  into  this 
position  against  his  will  (for  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  at  this  period  Mr  Rhodes  would  by  far  have 
preferred  that  the  British  Government  should  have 
established  a  protectorate  over  the  country),  it  cannot 
be  said  that  the  position  was  altogether  displeasing  to 


RHODES  APPLIES  FOR  A  CHARTER. 


109 


him.  But  he  did  not  desire  to  exercise  sovereign 
rights  over  Matabeleland.  All  he  wanted  was  the 
power  to  colonise  the  country,  and  to  retain  it  for 
Great  Britain  until  such  time  as  the  trend  of  events 
forced  the  Imperial  Government  to  take  up  its 
administration. 

Having  gained  the  concession  from  Lobengula, 
Rhodes’  next  step  was  to  procure  a  charter  for  his 
company  from  the  British  Government.  It  was 
decided  that  the  capital  of  this  company  should  be  a 
million  sterling,  a  sum  that  was  then  regarded  as 
ample  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  powers  it  had 
received  from  Lobengula.  Messrs  Rhodes  and  Beit 
could  have  provided  this  capital  themselves,  had  they 
so  desired,  and  in  addition  there  was  the  De  Beers 
Company,  which  guaranteed  the  sum  of  £200,000  in 
return  for  the  exclusive  right  to  work  any  diamond 
mines  that  might  be  discovered  in  the  country,  and 
the  Consolidated  Goldfields  Company  of  Johannes¬ 
burg,  which  likewise  was  prepared  to  take  up  a 
substantial  interest  in  the  new  country.  Mr  Rhodes’ 
vast  scheme  was  not  likely  to  fail  for  want  of  money, 
even  though  the  British  public  refused  to  invest  a 
single  farthing  in  it. 

Before  Mr  Rhodes  was  able  to  apply  for  his  charter 
he  found  it  necessary  to  deal  with  the  single  concession 
previously  granted  by  Lobengula,  to  which  reference 
has  been  made  earlier  in  this  chapter.  This  con¬ 
cession  was  held  by  a  small  group  of  British 
speculators,  who,  after  some  negotiation,  were  pre¬ 
vailed  upon  to  amalgamate  their  interests  with  those 
of  Mr  Rhodes. 

Apart  from  the  glamor^1  of  constructing  an  empire 
in  an  almost  virgin  country,  a  point  of  view  that 


110 


THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 


would  be  regarded  with  but  small  interest  by  the 
majority  of  business  men,  this  company  was  a  very 
speculative  venture  in  which  to  embark  one’s  money. 
So  far  as  was  known  of  its  mineral  wealth  the  country 
might  have  been  as  rich  as  El  Dorado,  or,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  might  have  been  as  barren  as  the  Sahara. 
The  probabilities  were  that  the  country  could  in  a 
few  years  be  made  to  pay  its  way,  but  they  were 
probabilities  only,  and  none  could  say  with  the  least 
authority  what  the  real  value  of  the  newly  acquired 
country  was. 

r  Mr  Rhodes  was  perfectly  convinced  in  his  own  mind 

Ithat  in  this  vast  territory,  some  174,000  miles  in 
extent,  a  great  future  outlet  for  the  surplus  popula¬ 
tion  of  Great  Britain  would  be  afforded,  and  therefore 
he  never  wavered  in  his  determination  to  bring  the 
land  under  the  British  flag.  Whether  it  is  right  or 
wrong  to  acquire  in  this  manner  the  land  of  a  native 
population,  and  to  throw  it  open  for  white  colonisation, 
must  always  remain  a  debatable  point,  and  to  discuss 
it  would  be  out  of  place  in  this  present  work.  Mr 
I  Rhodes’  view  of  the  matter  is  that  the  African  natives, 
as  weaker  races  manifestly  unfit  to  govern  the  land 
A.,  they  hold,  must  sooner  or  later  give  way  before  the 
irresistible  advance  of  the  stronger  white  people.  R 
is  the  old  doctrine  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest — a 
brutal  theory,  no  doubt,  but  one  impossible  to  alter  or 
amend.  Whatever  proves  itself  to  be  the  best  and  the 
fittest  to  exist  must  and  will  exist,  and,  by  the  sheer 
weight  of  its  greater  fitness  to  continue  in  existence, 
will  crush  out  all  opposition  on  the  part  of  its  weaker 
rivals.  If  Central  Africa,  or  any  other  portion  of  the 
earth’s  surface,  proves  habitable  for  white  men,  the 
aborigines  must  some  day  or  other — maybe  to-morrow 


THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


Ill 


or  maybe  not  for  generations  to  come — go  to  the  wall, 
and  become  “hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water” 
for  their  more  highly  developed  brethren.  Not  all  the 
well-meaning  philanthropists  who  have  ever  awoke  the 
slumbering  echoes  of  Exeter  Hall  with  their  eloquence 
can  prevent  it. 

r  If,  however,  it  is  impossible  for  native  races .  to 
remain  for  all  time  the  supreme  overlords  of  vast 
tracts  of  country,  the  white  men  destined  to  super¬ 
sede  them  can  at  least  see  to  it  that  the  natives 
are  treated  with  kindness,  and  are  allowed  to  retain 
their  old  laws  and  customs  so  long  as  these  are  not 
of  a  harmful  or  demoralising  nature.  This,  we  say 
unhesitatingly,  has  been  Mr  Rhodes’  aim  throughout 
his  whole  career.  He  long  ago  recognised,  as  all 
who  come  into  contact  with  them  must  recognise, 
that  the  South  African  natives  are  not  fit  to  remain 
in  independence  and  unfettered,  and  he  has  at  times 
enunciated  this  view  with  a  clearness  and  vigour 
that  have  brought  him  into  conflict  with  that  blun¬ 
dering,  though  doubtless  well-meaning,  little  group 
of  persons  styling  themselves  “  The  Aborigines  Pro¬ 
tection  Society.”  But  it  cannot  be  said  that  Mr 
Rhodes  has  ever  treated  the  natives  under  his  con- 
tiol  otherwise  than  kindly,  gently,  and  fairly. 
Throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  Africa  there 
are  no  more  contented  natives  to  be  found  than 
those  occupying  the  compounds  at  Kimberley.  It 
was  Mr  Rhodes  who  engineered  through  the  Cape 
Parliament,  in  the  teeth  of  strenuous  opposition,  the 
Glen  Grey  Act,  by  which  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  to  natives  within  the  limits  of  Cape  Colony 
is  strictly  forbidden,  and  it  is  a  monument  to  Mr 
Rhodes’  desire  to  protect  the  natives  under  British 


112 


THE  NORTHERN  EXPANSION  COMMENCED. 


rule  against  the  vices  which  civilisation  brings  in 
its  wake. 

Early  in  1889  Mr  Rhodes  sailed  for  England  for 
the  purpose  of  placing  the  company  which  he  had 
formed  to  exploit  Matabeleland  on  a  firm  basis,  and 
to  obtain  a  charter  of  incorporation  from  the  Govern¬ 
ment.  In  both  these  tasks  he  was  successful.  At 
this  time  there  was  an  enlightened  perception  on 
the  part  of  the  Imperial  Government,  as  welcome 
as  it  was  rare,  which  enabled  it  to  appreciate  Mr 
Rhodes’  lucid  arguments  for  the  interior  of  South 
Africa  coming  under  British  rule ;  and  if  the  Col¬ 
onial  Office  was  not  disposed  to  undertake  any 
financial  risk  or  responsibility  in  the  matter,  it  at 
any  rate  refrained  from  throwing  any  obstacles  in 
the  way  of  Mr  Rhodes  obtaining  his  charter. 

The  directors  of  the  company,  as  at  first  selected 
by  Mr  Rhodes,  were  Mr  Alfred  Beit,  Mr  Rochefort 
Maguire,  Lord  Gifford,  Y.C.,  Mr  George  Cawson, 
and  himself.  At  the  suggestion  of  the  Government 
three  other  gentlemen,  unconnected  with  Mr  Rhodes 
and  his  work,  were  added  to  the  board  of  directors, 
in  order  to  give  some  guarantee  that  the  huge  powers 
about  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  company 
should  not  be  abused.  Mr  Rhodes  saw  at  once  the 
reasonableness  of  this  proceeding,  and  after  considera¬ 
tion  the  Duke  of  Abercorn,  the  Duke  of  Fife,  and 
Earl  Grey  became  directors  of  the  British  South 
Africa  Company,  as  the  new  corporation  was  christ¬ 
ened.  These  three  gentlemen  ranked  in  every  way 
as  equal  with  the  directors  originally  selected,  with 
the  important  reservation  that  they  did  not  retire 
from  the  board  in  rotation  as  was  the  case  with  the 
others.  They  were  in  many  respects  in  an  analogous 


THE  CHARTER  GRANTED. 


113 


position  to  the  life  governors  of  the  De  Beers  Con¬ 
solidated  Company. 

The  charter  was  ultimately  granted  on  October 
29,  1889,  just  twelve  months  after  the  original  con¬ 
cession  had  been  gained  from  Lobengula.  By  this 
charter  the  British  South  Africa  Company,  around 
which  such  heated  controversy  was  to  rage  in  the 
near  future,  came  into  being.  The  charter  is  a 
lengthy  document  composed  of  thirty -five  articles, 
and  is  much  too  important  to  be  treated  at  the 
end  of  a  chapter  as  lengthy  as  this  one  has  grown. 
It  may  be  mentioned  that,  despite  the  very  speculat¬ 
ive  undertaking  of  the  Chartered  Company  (to  give 
it  its  shorter  and  more  popular  name),  and  the 
possibility  that  no  minerals  might  be  found  in 
Matabeleland  in  quantities  sufficient  to  pay  for  the 
cost  of  working  them,  such  shares  as  were  actually 
offered  in  the  open  market  in  London  were  eagerly 
snapped  up. 


H 


114 


CHAPTER  IX. 

MR  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RULE  PARTY. 

Before  passing  on  to  the  discussion  of  the  charter 
which  was  granted  to  the  British  South  Africa  Com¬ 
pany,  and  the  founding  of  the  state  now  known  as 
Rhodesia,  it  is  necessary  to  pause  for  a  moment  in 
«order  to  discuss  an  incident  in  Mr  Rhodes’  life  which 
perhaps  has,  at  one  time  and  another,  excited  more ' 
attention  and  comment  than  it  deserved.  This  was 
the  gift  of  ,£10,000  to  the  funds  of  the  Irish  Home 
Rule  Party.  So  many  exaggerated  and  fictitious 
details  have  been  gradually  woven  into  this  story 
that  it  is  rather  hard  to  get  at  the  truth.  An 
authoritative  account  of  what  actually  passed  be¬ 
tween  Mr  Rhodes  and  Mr  Parnell  has  not  been 
published  up  to  the  present  time,  and  I  propose 
to  give  it  here. 

In  1887  Mr  Rhodes  paid  a  flying  visit  to  England 
on  purely  private  matters  of  no  particular  interest. 
On  his  return  to  the  Cape  towards  the  end  of  the 
year,  he  had  for  fellow-passenger  on  the  boat  Mr 
Swift  MacNeill,  M.P.,  a  prominent  supporter  of  Mr 
Parnell  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  then  on  his 
way  to  Africa  for  the  benefit  of  his  health.  Mr 
Rhodes  got  into  conversation  with  Mr  MacNeill,  and 


IMPERIAL  FEDERATION. 


115 


naturally  the  Home  Rule  Bill  of  1886  was  discussed 
by  them.  Mr  Rhodes,  it  should  be  said,  had  taken 
up  a  very  decided  attitude  on  this  question,  for  in 
the  scheme  to  give  Ireland  a  limited  measure  of  Home 
Ruie  he  saw,  or  fancied  that  he  saw,  the  germ  of 
Imperial  Federation,  by  which  at  some  future  time 
every  self-governing  colony  and  dependency  should 
be  represented  at  Westminster,  and  the  British 
Epicure  become  an  empire  in  deed  as  well  as  in  name. 

V  Mr  Rhodes’  dream  of  Imperial  Federation,  which 
I  he  may  still  live  to  see  come  into  being,  was  that 
every  colony  should  contribute  a  sum  in  proportion 
'  to  its  revenue  towards  the  cost  of  maintaining  and 
defending  the  Empire,  and  should  be  represented 

)in  the  Imperial  House  of  Commons  by  a  varying 
number  of  representatives  according  to  the  amount 
it  contributed.  In  the  granting  of  Home  Rule  to 
Ireland  he  perceived  an  excellent  opportunity  for 
mencing  this  other  and  larger  scheme. 


S/  According  to  this  scheme  of  Mr  Rhodes,  then,  every 
/I self-governing  colony  was  to  have  its  own  legislative 
assembly,  from  which  delegates,  varying  in  number, 
as  has  been  mentioned,  should  be  sent  to  the  Imperial 
Parliament  at  Westminster.  In  a  Parliament  thus 
constituted,  affairs  of  Imperial  concern  only  would 
be  dealt  with,  purely  local  matters  being  left  to  the 
consideration  of  the  local  assemblies.  Of  course  in 
this  scheme  no  place  is  found  for  the  House  of  Lords. 
Like  most  colonials,  he  fails  to  see  why  the  accident 
of  birth  should  give  a  man,  who  may  be  the  veriest 
blockhead  in  the  world,  the  right  to  legislate  on 
affairs  of  Empire  which  he  has  not  the  mental 
capacity  to  understand,  far  less  to  appreciate. 

Mr  Gladstone’s  bill,  however,  had  the  effect  of 


116 


MR  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RI  LE  TARTY. 


instantly  causing  Rhodes  to  withdraw  his  support 
from  the  measure,  for  the  reasons  which  have  been 
already  alluded  to  in  chapter  vi.  He  regarded  self- 
government  for  Ireland  as  a  means  of  drawing  the 
bonds  of  empire  closer  together,  but  the  clause  in 
the  bill  of  1886  which  proposed  to  exclude  the  Irish 
members  from  Westminster,  and  the  ready  assent 
with  which  the  Irish  members  under  Mr  Parnell 
accepted  this  condition,  roused  a  fear  in  his  mind, 
as  indeed  it  did  in  the  minds  of  most,  that  it  was 
not  a  limited  measure  of  Home  Rule  that  the  Irish 
members,  if  not  their  Radical  allies,  really  aimed  at, 
liut  absolute  separation  from  the  Empire.  Through¬ 
out  his  whole  political  career,  and  indeed  before 
it  commenced,  Mr  Rhodes  has  championed  the  right 
of  the  self-governing  colonies  to  manage  their  own 
affairs  without  interference  from  Downing  Street ; 
but  he  has  steadfastly  insisted  upon  ultimate  British 
supremacy.  It  may  be  pointed  out  that  it  was  this 
question  of  the  retention  of  the  Irish  members  at 
Westminster  that  led  Mr  Chamberlain  to  resign  his 
seat  in  Mr  Gladstone's  Cabinet,  and  to  withdraw 
from  the  ranks  of  the  Radical  party. 

Rhodes  expressed  his  views  as  outlined  above  very 
plainly  to  Mr  Swift  MacNeill,  who  was  pleased  to 
hud  such  a  prominent  colonial  politician  supporting 
the  Home  Rule  party,  even  though  he  differed  from 
it  on  matters  of  detail.  He  endeavoured  to  assure 
Mr  Rhodes  that  the  last  thing  the  Irish  members 
desired  or  would  assent  to  would  be  the  total  separa¬ 
tion  of  Ireland  from  the  British  Empire.  He  was 
not  altogether  successful  in  removing  the  doubts 
from  Mr  Rhodes’  mind,  though  the  latter  was  very 
pleased  to  hear  him  enunciate  these  views. 


MR  RHODES  AND  MR  MACNEILL. 


117 


Mr  Swift  MacNeill  remained  at  the  Cape  for  some 
months,  during  which  time  he  had  further  conversa¬ 
tions  with  Mr  Rhodes  on  this  subject.  In  one  of 
these  talks  Rhodes  expressed  his  willingness  to 
subscribe  handsomely  to  the  funds  of  the  Home  Rule 
party  if  he  could  be  authoritatively  assured  that  a 
proportion  of  the  Irish  members  would  be  retained 
at  Westminster,  and  that  there  was  no  intention  on 
the  part  of  Mr  Parnell  or  his  party  to  bring  about  the 
complete  detachment  of  Ireland  from  the  remainder  of 
the  Empire.  On  both  these  points  Mr  Swift  MacNeill 
gave  him  the  amplest  assurances,  and  he  promised  to 
lay  his  views  before  Mr  Parnell  on  his  return  to 
London. 

This  he  did  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  Mr 
Parnell  was  much  gratified  to  hear  of  Mr  Rhodes’ 
active  interest  in  the  Home  Rule  question,  and  of  his 
willingness  to  give  a  large  donation  to  the  party 
funds.\/Mr  Rhodes’  idea  of  using  the  measure  for  self- 
government  for  Ireland  as  a  stepping-stone  towards 
the  ultimate  federation  of  the  states  of  the  Empire 
was  entirely  new  to  the  Irish  leader,  as  indeed  it  was 
to  most  people  who  were  not  in  the  habit  of  looking  so 
far  into  the  future  as  the  great  African  statesman  was. 

It  was  on  the  question  of  the  retention  or  non¬ 
retention  of  the  Irish  members  at  Westminster  that 
Mr  Parnell  differed  most  strongly  from  Mr  Rhodes 
at  this  time.  The  Irish  leader  held  most  firmly  to  the 
belief  that,  if  Ireland  had  her  own  legislature,  she 
should  not  also  be  represented  in  the  British  Parlia¬ 
ment.  If,  however,  the  Irish  members  were  to  be 
retained  at  Westminster,  then  he  would  not  consent 
to  their  numbers  being  reduced  from  their  existing 
figure,  103,  to  34,  as  Mr  Rhodes  had  suggested.  This 


118  MR  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RULE  PARTY. 

latter  number  had  been  fixed  by  Mr  Rhodes  as  being 
in  direct  proportion  to  the  annual  revenue  to  be  paid 
by  Ireland  to  the  Imperial  Treasury.  Mr  Parnell  de¬ 
clared  that  it  must  be  either  all  or  nothing.  Either 
the  whole  of  the  Irish  members  were  to  retain  their 
seats  in  the  British  House  of  Commons  or  else  none 
of  them  was  to  do  so  :  he  would  not  admit  of  any 
reduction  in  the  number  of  his  followers. 

The  line  of  divergence  between  Rhodes  and  Parnell 
seemed  too  great  and  too  complete  for  them  ever  to 
agree,  but  Mr  Swift  MacNeill  set  about  the  task  of 
bringing  the  two  men  face  to  face  if  possible,  so 
that  by  amicable  discussion  they  might  arrive  at 
some  compromise  which  both  could  accept.  In  this 
he  was  successful.  When  Mr  Rhodes  came  to  London 
again  in  the  early  summer  of  1888,  he  was  visited 
by  Mr  Parnell  at  his  hotel.  This  meeting  is  pecul¬ 
iarly  interesting,  for  the  two  men  had  much  in  com¬ 
mon.  The  discussion  was  initiated  by  Mr  Rhodes, 
who  laid  down  the  conditions  on  which  he  was  pre¬ 
pared  to  give  his  support  to  the  Irish  party  in  its 
efforts  to  obtain  a  limited  measure  of  self-government 
for  Ireland.  To  these  conditions  Mr  Parnell  listened 
in  silence,  with  an  occasional  shake  of  the  head  when 
he  dissented  from  Mr  Rhodes’  words. 

The  conditions  which  Rhodes  suggested  were, 
briefly,  as  follows  VHome  Rule  for  Ireland  was  to 
be  regarded  as  the  first  step  towards  the  ultimate 
federation  of  the  various  component  parts  of  the 
Empire  to  form  a  Parliament  which  should  be  in 
the  truest  sense  of  the  word  Imperial.  With  this 
end  in  view,  a  limited  number  of  the  Irish  members, 
which  Mr  Rhodes  fixed  at  thirty-four  for  reasons 
before  mentioned,  should  retain  their  seats  at  West- 


RHODES  AND  PARNELL. 


119 


minster,  and  should  be  independent  of  the  Irish 
Legislature  in  Dublin.  Further,  he  urged,  a  clause 
should  be  inserted  in  any  future  Home  Rule  bill 
presented  to  the  House  of  Commons,  to  permit  any 
British  colony  to  claim  direct  representation  in  the 
British  Parliament  on  its  offering  to  bear  its  share 
in  providing  funds  for  Imperial  purposes.  This  last 
was  a  condition  on  which  Mr  Rhodes  laid  so  great 
stress  that  he  refused  to  accept  any  modification  of  it. 

When  Rhodes  had  finished  and  it  came  to  Mr 
Parnell  to  speak,  the  Irish  leader  stated  at  once 
that  though  he  had  up  till  that  time  been  much 
against  the  retention  of  the  Irish  members  at  West¬ 
minster,  he  had  been  brought  round  by  Mr  Rhodes’ 
arguments  to  see  that  it  would  be  for  the  best  that 
these  members  should  retain  their  seats.  With  re¬ 
gard,  however,  to  the  proposed  reduction  in  their 
numbers,  he  could  not  accept  it  on  any  considera¬ 
tion  whatever.  “  Until  I  have  got  all  I  want  from 
Mr  Gladstone,”  said  Mr  Parnell — “  and  this  includes 
the  full  control  of  the  Irish  police  and  judiciary — 
I  could  not  afford  to  assent  to  this  drastic  reduction 
in  my  strength.  After  that  time,”  he  went  on,  “  I 
should  be  quite  willing  that  the  question  of  the 
over-representation  of  Ireland  in  the  Imperial  Parlia¬ 
ment  should  be  debated.”  As  for  the  permissive 
clause  to  enable  any  self-governing  colony  to  send 
representatives  to  the  House  of  Commons,  he  would 
accept  that  condition  cheerfully. 

“Would  you  be  prepared  to  move  that  this  clause 
be  inserted  in  any  Home  Rule  bill  that  might  come 
before  the  House  of  Commons  ?  ”  asked  Mr  Rhodes. 

Mr  Parnell  hesitated  for  a  few  moments  before 
answering  this  question,  for  he  was  not  certain  how 


120  MR  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RULE  PARTY. 

a  section  of  his  followers  might  like  the  idea.  At 
length  he  said  that  while  he  would  not  be  prepared 
to  move  such  an  amendment  himself,  or  to  promise 
that  any  member  of  his  party  should  move  it,  yet 
if  such  a  clause  were  moved  from  some  other  part 
of  the  House,  he  and  his  party  would  not  raise  any 
objection  to  it,  even  if  they  did  not  give  it  their 
active  support. 

“On  what  basis,”  next  asked  Mr  Parnell,  “would  you 
suggest  that  the  large  colonies  should  be  permitted  to 
send  representatives  to  the  Imperial  Parliament  ?  ” 

“  On  the  basis  of  the  amount  of  their  annual  con¬ 
tribution  to  the  Imperial  Exchequer,”  answered  Mr 
Rhodes,  who,  while  holding  strongly  to  the  doctrine 
that  there  should  be  no  taxation  without  representa¬ 
tion,  believed  that  the  converse  of  this,  no  repre¬ 
sentation  without  taxation,  was  equally  to  be  desired. 

After  some  more  discussion  on  matters  of  minor 
importance,  the  interview  ended  with  the  under¬ 
standing  that  Mr  Rhodes  should  write  fully  to 
Parnell,  setting  forth  the  conditions  on  which  he  was 
prepared  to  subscribe  to  the  funds  of  the  Home  Rule 
party.  The  following  is  a  copy  of  Rhodes’  letter  as 
originally  written.  A  draft  of  this  letter  was  sub¬ 
mitted  to  the  Irish  leader  before  it  was  finally  de¬ 
livered  to  him,  and  at  Mr  Parnell’s  request  certain 
passages,  here  given  in  italics,  were  deleted  or 
amended  : — 

“  Westminster  Palace  Hotel, 

London,  S.W.,  June  19,  1888. 

“  C.  S.  Parnell,  Esq.,  M.P. 

“  Dear  Sir, — On  my  way  to  the  Cape  last  autumn 
I  had  the  opportunity  of  frequent  conversation  with 
Mr  Swift  MacNeill  upon  the  subject  of  Home  Rule 


RHODES  AND  IRISH  HOME  RULE. 


121 


for  Ireland.  I  then  told  him  that  I  had  long-  had  a 
sympathy  with  the  Irish  demand  for  self-government, 
but  that  there  were  certain  portions  of  Mr  Gladstone’s 
bill  which  appeared  open  to  the  gravest  objections. 
The  exclusion  of  the  Irish  members  from  Westminster 
seemed  rightly  to  be  considered,  both  in  England  and 
the  Colonies,  as  a  step  in  the  direction  of  pure  separa¬ 
tion,  while  the  tribute  clauses  were,  on  the  face  of  them, 
degrading  to  Ireland,  by  placing  it  in  the  position  of 
a  conquered  province,  and  were  opposed  to  the  first 
principle  of  constitutional  government,  by  sanctioning 
taxation  without  representation.  It  has  been  frequently 
stated  that  the  hearty  acquiescence  of  the  Irish 
members  in  these  proposals  gave  good  grounds  for 
believing  that  they  were  really  working  for  complete 
separation  from  England.  Mr  MacNeill  assures  me 
that  this  was  not  the  case  ;  that  naturally  the  first 
object  of  the  Irish  members  was  to  obtain  self-govern¬ 
ment  for  Ireland ;  and  that  when  this,  their  main 
object,  seemed  secure,  it  did  not  become  them  to 
criticise  or  cavil  at  the  terms  of  the  grant  made  to 
them.  Moreover,  he  said,  he  believed  that  the  Irish 
members  were  only  too  anxious  to  support  Irish 
representation  at  Westminster,  should  a  suitable 
scheme  containing  the  necessary  provisions  be  brought 
brward. 

“  ( Lord  Rosebery,  in  his  recent  speech  at  Inverness, 
'ias  suggested  a  possible  solution.  He  there  proposed 
t  reduced  Irish  representation  at  Westminster :  this 
representation  could  be  based  upon  the  amount  of  the 
Irish  contribution  to  the  Imperial  revenue. 

“  And  though  it  seems  illogical  that  Irish  members 
hould  vote  on  English  local  topics,  still,  taking  into 
'onsideration  the  large  indirect  contribution  that  Ire- 


122  MR  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RULE  PARTY. 

land  ivould  make  in  connection  with  trade  and  com¬ 
merce,  and  that  the  English  people  are  not  prepared 
at  present  to  accept  any  vital  change  of  their  Constitu¬ 
tion,  it  would  appear  more  ivorkable  that  this  reduced 
number  of  Irish  members  should  speak  and  vote,  even 
on  purely  English  local  topics,  than  that  at  doubtful 
intervals  they  should  be  called  upon  to  withdraw  into 
an  outside  lobby.) 

“  With  ( some  such )  safeguards — and  they  must  be 
effective  safeguards — for  the  maintenance  of  Imperial 
unity,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  Home  Rule  granted 
should  be  a  reality  and  not  a  sham. 

“If  the  Irish  are  to  be  conciliated  and  benefited  by 
the  grant  of  self-government,  they  should  be  trusted, 
and  trusted  entirely.  Otherwise  the  application  of 
popular  institutions  to  Ireland  must  be  deemed  im¬ 
practicable,  and  the  only  alternative  is  the  adminis¬ 
tration  of  the  country  as  a  Crown  colony,  which 
plan,  in  the  present  state  of  public  opinion,  is  totally 
impossible. 

“My  experience  in  the  Cape  Colony  leads  me  to 
believe  that  even  the  Ulster  question  is  one  which 
would  soon  settle  itself.  Since  the  Colonial  Office  has 
allowed  questions  at  the  Cape  to  be  settled  by  the 
Cape  Parliament,  not  only  has  the  attachment  to  the 
Imperial  tie  been  immensely  strengthened,  but  the 
Dutch,  who  form  the  majority  of  the  population,  have 
shown  a  greatly  increased  consideration  for  the  senti¬ 
ments  of  the  English  members  of  the  community.  It 
seems  only  reasonable  to  suppose  that  in  an  Irish  Par¬ 
liament  similar  consideration  would  be  given  to  the 
sentiments  of  that  portion  of  the  inhabitants  which 
is  at  present  out  of  sympathy  with  the  national 
movement. 


HOME  RULE  ALL  ROUND. 


123 


“  I  will  frankly  add  that  my  interest  in  the  Irish 
question  has  been  heightened  by  the  fact  that  in  it 
I  see  a  possibility  of  the  commencement  of  changes 
which  will  eventually  mould  and  weld  together  all 
parts  of  the  British  Empire. 

“  The  English  are  a  conservative  race,  and  like  to 
move  slowly  and,  as  it  were,  experimentally.  At 
present  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  time  of  Par¬ 
liament  is  overcrowded  with  the  discussion  of  trivial 
and  local  affairs. 

“Imperial  matters  have  to  stand  their  chance  of  a 
hearing  alongside  of  railway  and  tram  bills.  Evi¬ 
dently  it  must  be  a  function  of  modern  legislation  to 
delegate  an  enormous  number  of  questions  which  now 
occupy  the  time  of  Parliament  to  district  councils  or 
local  bodies. 

“  Mr  Chamberlain  recognised  this  fact  in  his  Radical 
programme  of  1885,  and  the  need  daily  grows  more 
urgent.  Now  the  removal  of  Irish  affairs  to  an  Irish 
Council  ( Legislature )  would  be  a  practical  experi¬ 
mental  step  in  the  direction  of  lessening  the  burden 
upon  the  central  deliberative  and  legislative  machine. 

“  But  side  by  side  with  the  tendency  of  decentral¬ 
isation  for  local  affairs,  there  is  growing  up  a  feeling 
for  the  necessity  of  greater  union  in  Imperial  matters. 
The  primary  tie  which  binds  our  Empire  together  is 
the  national  one  of  self-defence.  The  Colonies  are 
already  commencing  to  co-operate  with,  and  contrib¬ 
ute  to,  the  mother  country  for  this  purpose.  But  if 
they  are  to  contribute  permanently  and  beneficially, 
they  will  have  to  be  represented  in  the  Imperial  Par¬ 
liament,  where  the  disposition  of  their  contribution 
must  be  decided  upon. 

“  I  do  not  think  that  it  can  be  denied  that  the 


124  MR  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RULE  PARTY. 

presence  of  two  or  three  Australian  members  in  the 
House  would  in  recent  years  have  prevented  much 
misunderstanding  upon  such  questions  as  the  New 
Hebrides,  New  Guinea,  and  Chinese  immigration. 
Now  an  ( reduced )  Irish  representation  at  West¬ 
minster  ( with  numbers  proportionate  to  Ireland's 
Imperial  contribution )  would,  without  making  any 
vital  change  in  the  English  constitution,  furnish  a 
precedent  by  which  the  self-governing  colonies  could 
from  time  to  time,  as  they  expressed  a  desire  to  con¬ 
tribute  to  Imperial  expenditure,  be  incorporated  with 
the  Imperial  Legislature.  You  will  perhaps  say  that 
I  am  making  the  Irish  question  a  stalking-horse  for  a 
scheme  of  Imperial  Federation,  but  if  so,  I  am  at  least 
placing  Ireland  in  the  forefront  of  the  battle. 

“  The  question  is,  moreover,  one  in  which  I  take  a 
deep  interest,  and  I  shall  be  glad  if  you  can  assure 
(tell)  me  that  Mr  MacNeill  is  not  mistaken  in  the 
impression  he  conveyed  to  me,  and  that  you  and  your 
party  would  be  prepared  to  give  your  hearty  support 
and  approval  to  a  Home  Rule  Bill  containing  provi¬ 
sions  for  the  continuance  of  Irish  representation  at 
Westminster.  Such  a  declaration  would  afford  great 
satisfaction  to  myself  and  others,  and  would  enable  us 
to  give  our  full  and  active  support  to  your  cause  and 
your  party. 

“  (I  shall  be  happy  to  contribute  to  the  funds  of  the 
party  to  the  extent  of  £ 10,000 .  I  am  also,  under  the 
circumstances,  authorised  to  offer  you  a  further  sum  of 
£1000  from  Mr  John  Morrogh,  an  Irish  resident  of 
Kimberley,  South  Africa.) — Yours  faithfully, 

“  C.  J.  Rhodes.” 

To  this  letter,  as  softened  down  by  the  omission  of 


mr  parnell’s  reply. 


125 


the  words  and  sentences  given  in  italics,  Mr  Parnell 
returned  an  answer,  dated  June  23,  1888,  and  written 
from  the  House  of  Commons,  in  which  he  said  that 
he  was  much  obliged  for  Mr  Rhodes’  letter  of  the  1 9th 
inst.,  which  confirmed  the  very  interesting  account 
given  him  at  Avondale  some  time  before  by  Mr 
Swift  MacNeill  as  to  his  interviews  and  conver¬ 
sations  with  him  on  the  subject  of  Home  Rule  for 
Ireland. 

He  said  at  once  and  frankly  that  he  thought  Mr 
Rhodes  had  correctly  judged  the  exclusion  of  the  Irish 
members  from  Westminster  to  have  been  a  defect 
in  the  Home  Rule  measure  of  1886,  and  further, 
that  the  proposed  exclusion  might  have  given  some 
colour  to  the  accusations  so  freely  made  against  the 
bill,  that  it  had  a  separatist  tendency.  He  said  this 
while  strongly  asserting  and  believing  that  the 
measure  itself  was  accepted  by  the  Irish  people 
without  any  afterthought  of  the  kind,  and  with  an 
earnest  desire  to  work  it  out  in  the  same  spirit  in 
which  it  was  offered — a  spirit  of  cordial  goodwill  and 
trust,  a  desire  to  let  bygones  be  bygones,  and  a  de¬ 
termination  to  accept  it  as  a  final  and  satisfactory 
settlement  of  the  long-standing  dispute  and  trouble 
between  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

He  was  very  glad  to  find  that  Mr  Rhodes  con¬ 
sidered  the  measure  of  Home  Rule  to  be  granted  to 
Ireland  should  be  thoroughgoing,  and  should  give 
her  complete  control  over  her  own  affairs  without 
reservation,  and  he  cordially  agreed  with  his  opinion 
that  there  should  be  at  the  same  time  effective  safe¬ 
guards  for  the  maintenance  of  Imperial  unity. 

Mr  Rhodes’  conclusion  as  to  the  only  alternative 
for  Home  Rule  was  also  entirely  his  own,  for  he  had 


126  MR  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RULE  PARTY. 

long  felt  that  the  continuance  of  the  present  semi¬ 
constitutional  system  was  quite  impracticable. 

But  returning  to  the  question  of  the  retention  of 
the  Irish  members  at  Westminster,  Mr  Parnell’s  views 
upon  the  point,  the  probabilities  of  the  future,  and 
the  bearing  of  this  subject  upon  the  question  of 
Imperial  Federation.  His  own  feeling  upon  the  matter 
was  that  if  Mr  Gladstone  included  in  his  next  Home 
Rule  measure  provisions  for  such  retention,  the  Irish 
party  should  cheerfully  concur  in  them  and  accept 
them  with  goodwill  and  good  faith,  with  the  in¬ 
tention  of  taking  their  share  in  the  Imperial  partner¬ 
ship.  He  believed  also  that,  in  the  event  stated,  this 
would  be  the  case,  and  that  the  Irish  people  would 
cheerfully  accept  the  duties  and  responsibilities  as¬ 
signed  to  them,  and  would  justly  value  the  position 
given  them  in  the  Imperial  system. 

He  was  convinced  that  it  would  be  the  highest 
statesmanship  on  Mr  Gladstone’s  part  to  devise  a 
feasible  plan  for  the  continued  presence  of  the  Irish 
members  at  Westminster,  and  from  his  observation 
of  public  events  and  opinion  since  1885,  he  was  sure 
that  Mr  Gladstone  was  fully  alive  to  the  importance 
of  the  matter,  and  that  there  could  be  no  doubt  that 
the  next  measure  of  autonomy  for  Ireland  would 
contain  the  provisions  which  Mr  Rhodes  rightly 
deemed  of  such  moment.  It  did  not  come  so  much 
within  Mr  Parnell’s  province  to  express  a  full  opinion 
on  Imperial  Federation,  but  he  quite  agreed  with 
Rhodes  that  the  continued  Irish  representation  at 
Westminster  would  immensely  facilitate  such  a  step, 
to  which  the  contrary  provision  would  have  been  a 
bar.  Undoubtedly  this  was  a  matter  which  should 
be  dealt  with  in  accordance  with  the  opinion  of 


RHODES’  CONDITIONS  ACCEPTED. 


127 


the  Colonies  themselves,  and  if  they  should  desire 
to  share  in  the  cost  of  Imperial  matters,  as  cer¬ 
tainly  they  did  then  in  the  responsibilities,  and 
should  express  a  wish  for  representation  at  West¬ 
minster,  he  quite  thought  it  should  be  accorded  them, 
and  that  public  opinion  in  these  islands  would  unan¬ 
imously  concur  in  the  necessary  constitutional  modi¬ 
fications.  This  letter  made  it  clear  that  Mr  Rhodes’ 
views  regarding  Home  Rule,  both  for  Ireland  and  the 
other  portions  of  the  Empire,  were  shared  in  to  a 
large  extent  by  the  Irish  leader. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  summary  of  Mr 
Parnell’s  letter  that  he  quite  accepted  Mr  Rhodes’ 
conditions,  though  he  refrained  from  any  expressions 
committing  the  Irish  party  to  a  definite  line  of  action 
on  the  question  of  Imperial  Federation.  At  any  rate 
Mr  Rhodes  was  quite  satisfied  with  the  letter  of  the 
leader  of  the  Irish  party,  and  the  day  after  he  re¬ 
ceived  it  he  sent  the  following  answer  : — 

“  Westminster  Palace  Hotel, 

London,  S.W.,  24 th  June  1888. 

“  Dear  Mr  Parnell, — I  have  to  thank  you  for 
your  letter  of  the  23rd  inst.,  the  contents  of  which 
have  given  me  much  pleasure. 

“  I  feel  sure  that  your  cordial  approval  of  the 
retention  of  Irish  representation  at  Westminster 
will  gain  you  support  in  many  quarters  from  which 
it  has  hitherto  been  withheld. 

“  As  a  proof  of  my  deep  and  sincere  interest  in 
the  question,  and  as  I  believe  that  the  action  of 
the  Irish  party,  on  the  basis  which  you  have  stated, 
will  lead,  not  to  disintegration  but  really  to  a  closer 
union  of  the  Empire,  making  it  an  Empire  in  reality 


128  MR  RHODES  AND  THE  HOME  RULE  PARTY. 

and  not  in  name  only,  I  am  happy  to  offer  a  con¬ 
tribution  to  the  extent  of  £10,000  to  the  funds  of 
your  party.  I  am  also  authorised  to  offer  you  a 
further  sum  of  £1000  from  Mr  John  Morrogh,  an 
Irish  resident  in  Kimberley,  South  Africa. — Believe 
me,  yours  faithfully,  C.  J.  Rhodes.” 

These  letters  will  have  shown  clearly  Mr  Rhodes’ 
real  object  in  making  this  handsome  donation  to  the 
funds  of  the  Home  Rule  party.  Mt  was  because  he 
believed  that  this  measure  would  have  tended  to 
bring  Ireland  into  greater  sympathy  with  the  rest 
of  the  Empire,  and  in  order  to  further  his  idea  of 
Imperial  Federation,  that  he  took  this  step,  and  not, 
as  has  been  alleged,  to  gain  the  support  of  the  Irish 
party  towards  his  obtaining  a  charter  to  work  the 
goldfields  of  Lobengula’s  country.  Indeed  it  may  be 
said  without  fear  of  denial  that  the  question  of  using 
the  Irish  party  in  order  to  bring  about  this  end  never 
occurred  to  Mr  Rhodes.  For  one  thing,  at  the  time 
that  he  made  his  offer  he  had  not  taken  any  steps 
towards  the  realisation  of  his  northern  expansion 
schemes,  and  it  was  not  until  four  months  after  he 
handed  his  cheque  to  Mr  Parnell  that  the  Rhodes- 
Rudd  concession  was  obtained  from  the  Matabele 
king.  This  slander,  therefore,  is  disposed  of,  once 
and  for  all. 

At  different  times  there  have  been  rumours  that 
about  the  period  when  Mr  Rhodes  gave  this  money 
to  the  Irish  party  he  also  gave  a  sum  of  £5000  to 
the  Liberal  party  funds,  so  as  to  gain  their  support 
in  the  House  of  Commons  for  the  carrying  out  of  his 
projects  in  South  Africa.  This  subject  will  be  dealt 
with  fully  in  a  subsequent  chapter  of  this  book. 


IRISH  INGRATITUDE. 


129 


At  a  later  period,  in  March  1890,  Mr  Parnell 
wrote  to  Mr  Rhodes,  who  was  then  in  Cape  Town, 
telling  him  that  he  had  been  visiting  Mr  Gladstone 
at  Hawarden  Castle,  and  that  the  Liberal  leader  was 
then  engaged  in  drafting  his  second  Home  Rule  Bill 
in  case  of  the  victory  of  his  party  at  the  approaching 
general  election.  Included  in  this  measure,  said  Mr 
Parnell,  was  to  be  the  retention  of  a  reduced  number 
of  Irish  members  at  Westminster,  so  that  Rhodes  had 
gained  the  point  for  which  he  had  contended  so 
strongly. 

Before  passing  from  this  subject,  one  cannot  refrain 
from  commenting:  on  the  attitude  of  the  Irish  mem- 
bers  of  Parliament  towards  Mr  Rhodes,  especially  in 
recent  years.  One  would  have  thought  that,  having 
accepted  from  him  this  large  sum  of  money,  they 
would  at  least  have  refrained  from  biting  the  hand 
that  had  fed  them.  HSo  far  from  this  being  the  case, 
on  every  occasion  that  arises  the  Irish  party  goes  out 
of  its  way  to  vilify  Mr  Rhodes  and  his  works.  Such, 
it  is  to  be  presumed,  is  Irish  gratitude  for  assistance 
|  with  influence  and  purse  at  a  time  when  their  cause 
'sorely  needed  outside  aid. 


I 


130 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 

The  charter  granted  to  the  British  South  Africa  Com¬ 
pany  is  an  interesting  document,  but  by  no  means  a 
unique  one.  In  comparatively  recent  years  three 
other  such  charters  have  been  granted — those  of  the 
Borneo  Company,  the  British  East  Africa  Company, 
and  the  Royal  Niger  Company.  Of  these  three  the 
first  only  is  in  existence  at  the  present  time.  The  two 
others  have  been  revoked,  and  their  administrative 
jiowers  assumed  by  the  Imperial  Government. 

The  charter  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company 
will  be  found  in  extenso  at  the  end  of  this  volume,  but 
a  brief  examination  of  some  of  its  leading  clauses  and 
provisions  may  well  be  made  at  this  point. 

The  first  section  of  the  charter  is  at  once  interesting' 
and  instructive.  In  it  are  set  out  the  boundaries  over 
which  the  company  was  to  have  control.  The  terri¬ 
tory  in  question  is  defined  as  being  \$‘  the  region  of 
South  Africa  lying  immediately  to  the  north  of 
British  Bechuanaland,  and  to  the  north  and  west  of 
the  South  African  Republic,  and  to  the  west  of 
the  Portuguese  dominions.”  One  very  significant 
omission  is  to  be  noticed.  No  boundary  to  the 
north  is  assigned  to  the  territories  placed  under 


A  BOUNDARY  QUESTION. 


131 


the  control  of  the  Chartered  Company.  This  was 
a  point  for  which  Mr  Rhodes  had  a  very  stiff  fight 
with  Lord  Knutsford,  at  that  time  Colonial  Secretary. 
The  Imperial  Government  was  strongly  of  the  opinion 
that  the  sphere  of  influence  of  the  British  South 


Africa  Company  should  be  bounded  on  the  north  by 
the  Zambesi  river,  and  certain  of  those  working  with 
Mr  Rhodes  also  urged  upon  him  the  necessity  of 
accepting  this  condition ;  but  he  would  not  hear 


of  it. 


Although  the  territories  north  of  the  Zambesi  were 

cD 


almost  entirely  unknown  at  this  time,  the  reports  of 


explorers,  from  Livingstone  onwards,  seemed  to  show 
that  the  heart  of  Central  Africa  was  not  a  “  white 
man’s  country.”  Moreover,  it  was  highly  problematical 
whether  minerals  in  payable  quantities  would  be  found 
in  that  region.  Mr  Rhodes,  however,  maintained  his 
ground,  and  did  all  in  his  power  to  have  the  boundary 
to  the  north  left  undefined.  The  acquisition  of  the 
country  as  far  north  as  the  Zambesi  was  a  great 
step  forward  towards  the  accomplishment  of  the 
Rich  he  had  set  himself  some  years  pre- 


/  viously.  It  was  by  no  means  the  final  achievement 
of  it.  “  All  red  !  ”  he  had  said  that  day  in  Kimberley 


when  he  waved  his  hand  across  the  map  of  Africa 
from  south  to  north  ;  and  now  he  wanted  the  power 
to  push  on  in  the  future  through  the  countries  of 
Barotseland  and  Nyasaland,  beyond  the  eastern 
boundary  of  the  Congo  Free  State,  through  the 
kingdom  of  Uganda,  to  Upper  Egypt  and  the  head¬ 
waters  of  the  Nile.  Such  was  the  stupendous  dream 
of  Cecil  Rhodes  at  the  time  that  he  applied  for  the 
royal  charter  for  his  British  South  Africa  Company. 
/-Later  events  have  shown  that  this  “all-red” 


132 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 


V 


ribbon  of  territory  from  Cape  Colony  to  Egypt  was 
/  not  destined  to  be.  For  that  we  have  to  thank, 
chiefly,  the  supine  attitude  of  the  Colonial  and 
eign  Offices,  by  which  other  nations  were  per¬ 
mitted  to  step  in  before  us.  The  meeting  of  German 
/"East  Africa  and  the  Congo  Free  State  has  prevented 
this  “all-red”  route  from  south  to  north,  but  there  is 
'  |  a  grandeur  about  the  conception  of  such  a  scheme 
r  that  must  appeal  to  all  intelligent  people  of  the 
/  British  race  whose  eyes  are  not  blinded  by  prejudice 
V^and  spleen. 

/  With  this  future  expansion  beyond  the  Zambesi  in 
view,  Rhodes  about  this  time,  1889,  entered  into 
negotiations  with  a  company  which  virtually  con¬ 
trolled  the  region  then  known  as  Nyasaland,  and 
to-day  recognised  as  the  British  Central  Africa  Pro¬ 
tectorate.  This  company  was  the  African  Lakes  Cor¬ 
poration,  a  body  having  its  head  offices  at  Glasgow, 
possessing  large  powers  of  administration  over  this 
country  as  well  as  maintaining  an  extensive  trading 
connection  along  the  Zambesi  and  Shire  rivers. 

The  affairs  of  this  company  had  got  into  rather  a 
bad  way  financially  when  Rhodes  came  to  their  assist¬ 
ance.  In  return  for  a  guarantee  of  a  large  sum  for 
working  capital,  to  be  provided  by  the  Chartered  Com¬ 
pany,  he  obtained  the  promise  of  the  African  Lakes 
Corporation  to  hand  over  their  administrative  rights 
over  Nyasaland  to  the  British  South  Africa  Company. 
By  this  means  the  latter  company,  as  soon  as  it  re¬ 
ceived  its  charter,  would  become  the  controlling  power 
over  this  country,  and  the  African  Lakes  Corporation 
would  become  a  trading  company  pure  and  simple. 

In  the  end  Rhodes  was  successful  in  obtaining  his 
own  way  in  the  matter  of  the  northern  boundary  of 


133 


COMMENTS  ON  THE  CHARTER. 

) 

his  company’s  territories,  and  it  was  left  undefined  in 
the  charter.  ^ 

Passing  on  to  the  other  sections  of  the  charter, 
number  6  next  demands  notice.  This  provides  that 
the  company  shall  always  remain  British  in  character 
and  domicile,  and  shall  have  its  principal  offices  in 
Great  Britain,  while  the  directors  and  principal  officers 
in  South  Africa  shall  always  be  either  natural -born 
British  subjects  or  persons  who  have  been  naturalised 
as  such.  This  was,  of  course,  a  highly  necessary  and 
proper  condition  to  impose,  and  indeed  before  the 
charter  was  drafted  Rhodes  had  given  a  pledge  to 
this  effect  to  the  Colonial  Secretary. 

Another  of  Mr  Rhodes’  promises  is  to  be  seen  in 
clause  12,  which  stipulates  that  the  Chartered  Company 
shall  regulate  the  traffic  in  spirits  and  other  intoxicat¬ 
ing  liquors  for  sale  to  natives  within  its  dominions. 
Mr  Rhodes  has  always  held  very  strong  views  on  the 
question  of  the  sale  of  intoxicants  to  natives.  His 
Glen  Grey  Act  for  Cape  Colony  is  an  example  of  this. 
He  himself  is  a  temperate  man,  though  not  a  total 
abstainer,  and  the  cause  of  temperance  in  any  part  of 
the  world  has  always  found  a  staunch  supporter  in 
him.  He  has  seen  for  himself  the  terrible  effects 
which  the  unrestricted  sale  of  spirits  has  had  upon 
the  native  tribes  of  South  Africa,  and  has  ever  been 
of  the  firm  opinion  that  such  traffic  should  be  for¬ 
bidden  by  law.  He  had  considerable  difficulty,  how¬ 
ever,  in  impressing  his  views  upon  the  Cape  House  of 
Assembly  at  the  time  that  he  introduced  the  Glen 
Grey  Act,  which  has  been  the  saviour  of  the  native 
population  of  Cape  Colony.  Those  who  support  the 
Dutch  of  South  Africa  against  the  British  on  every 
occasion  will  be  interested  to  hear  that  it  was  the 


134 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 


Dutch  section  of  the  community  that  fought  tooth 
and  nail,  to  use  a  colloquialism,  against  the  Glen 
Grey  Act  becoming  law.  The  official  records  of  the 
period  amply  bear  out  this  statement. 

Clause  14  of  the  charter  is  in  many  ways  one  of  the 
most  important.  It  provides  that  the  administration 
of  justice  to  the  natives  of  the  country,  about  to  be 
placed  under  the  administration  of  the  British  South 
Africa  Company,  be  conducted  with  a  due  regard  for 
the  ancient  customs  and  laws  of  the  tribes  to  which 
the  parties  belong — so  far,  that  is,  as  the  said  customs 
and  laws  are  not  in  direct  antagonism  to  public  order 
or  morality.  This  is  a  most  necessary  proviso,  and 
one  that  has  always  to  be  borne  in  mind  when  dealing 
with  native  tribes.  There  was  a  tendency  a  few  years 
ago  among  colonial  governors  and  administrators  to 
bind  the  natives  under  their  control  to  every  legal 
regulation  which  was  applied  to  the  white  inhabitants 
of  the  district.  Pdiodes  was  one  of  the  first  to  recog¬ 
nise  that  this  was  the  wrong  way  to  govern  native 
races.  The  average  savage  manifests  an  intense  de¬ 
votion  to  the  laws  and  traditions  of  his  tribe  and 
country,  and  much  mischief  has  been  caused  from 
time  to  time  by  the  ill-advised  efforts  of  officials  in 
charge  of  semi -civilised  nations  to  abolish  at  one 
swoop  all  the  laws  and  traditions  and  to  substitute 
those  regulations  which  our  more  highly  developed 
civilisation  has  shown  us  to  be  necessary  for  the  well¬ 
being  and  proper  government  of  society. 

By  section  33  of  the  charter  the  existence  of  the 
company  as  an  administrative  and  governing  body 
was  limited  to  twenty -five  years  from  the  date  of 
signature.  At  the  end  of  this  period  the  Crown  has 
the  right  to  renew  it  for  a  further  period  of  ten  years, 


MR  SELOUS’S  VIEWS. 


135 


or  to  withdraw  the  charter,  as  seems  to  it  best.  If, 
however,  the  Imperial  Government  decides  to  take 
over  the  administration  of  the  country,  reasonable 
compensation  is  to  be  paid  to  the  shareholders  in 
the  British  South  Africa  Company. 

By  another  clause,  section  20,  nothing  in  the  nature 
of  a  monopoly  of  trade  is  to  be  permitted  within 
the  territories  covered  by  the  charter.  At  the  time 
of  the  Parliamentary  Committee’s  inquiry  into  the 
administration  of  Rhodesia,  as  will  be  explained  at  a 
later  stage,  it  was  alleged  that  this  clause  had  been 
violated. 

Long  before  the  charter  was  obtained— in  the  early 
part  of  1891,  in  fact — Mr  Rhodes,  with  characteristic 
restlessness  and  impatience,  had  returned  to  South 
Africa.  He  had  set  things  in  train  in  London  for 
the  successful  carrying  through  of  the  charter  and 
the  floating  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company, 
and  considered  himself  free  to  return  to  his  multi¬ 
farious  duties  at  Cape  Town. 

One  of  the  things  most  urgently  demanding  his 
attention  at  this  time  was  the  best  means  of  bringing 
about  the  effective  occupation  of  the  Matabele  country. 
During  his  stay  in  London  he  had  had  more  than 
one  conversation  on  this  subject  with  Mr  F.  C.  Selous, 
the  famous  hunter  and  explorer,  who  had  a  very 
extensive  knowledge  of  Lobengula’s  country.  Mr 
Selous  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  eastern  portion 
of  the  country — that  region  now  known  as  Mashona- 
land — should  be  the  first  to  be  colonised,  and  adduced 
several  weighty  arguments  in  favour  of  this.  Among 
these  was  the  fact  that  the  land  in  this  portion  of 
the  country  was  much  higher  than  farther  westward, 
and  that  the  climate  better  suited  Europeans,  while 


136 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 


the  soil  was  more  fertile  and  water  more  plentiful. 
In  addition,  by  keeping  well  to  the  east,  there  would 
be  less  chance  of  a  collision  with  Lobengula’s  impis 
of  young  warriors.  Rhodes  saw  the  force  of  these 
reasons,  and  decided  that  the  eastern  portion  of  the 
country  should  be  colonised  first. 

Another  important  consideration  in  favour  of  this 
was,  that  by  first  occupying  Mashonaland  connection 
with  the  East  Coast  by  a  line  of  railway  could  be  made 
at  less  cost  than  if  the  white  men  settled  farther 
westward.  At  this  time  the  idea  of  a  railway  from 
Cape  Town  and  Kimberley  to  pass  through  Bechuana- 
land  and  onwards  to  the  Zambesi  had  not  occurred 
to  Rhodes  ;  or,  if  it  had,  he  had  set  it  aside  as  im¬ 
practicable  in  the  immediate  future.  "At  this  time 
his  scheme  with  regard  to  the  railway  system  of 
South  Africa  was  that  the  main  line  from  Cape 
Town  to  the  north  should  pass  through  the  two 
Boer  republics ;  and  in  all  probability,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  obstructive  tactics  of  President  Kruger, 
the  Kimberley-Bulawayo  railway  would  not  have 
been  built  for  some  years  to  come,  perhaps  never, 
and  the  line  through  the  Orange  Free  State  and  the 
Transvaal  would  have  formed  the  first  portion  of  the 
trans-continental  railway  of  which  Rhodes  was  already 
thinking. 

He  was  convinced  that  the  best  way  to  open  up 
4  country  to  white  colonisation  was  by  means  of 
M-ailways  and  telegraphs,  and,  as  the  future  of  this 
Rhodesian  territory  depended  so  largely  on  the  quick 
development  of  its  mineral  wealth,  he  foresaw  that 
he  must  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  build  a  rail¬ 
way  from  some  point  or  other  on  the  East  Coast,  in 
Portuguese  territory,  into  the  heart  of  Mashonaland. 


PREMIER  OF  CAPE  COLONY. 


Rhodes,  however,  had  other  things  to  think  of 
at  this  time  besides  this  railway.  As  a  preliminary 
to  this  larger  scheme  he  had  decided  to  erect  a  tele¬ 
graph-wire  from  Cape  Town  to  the  twin  states  of 
Matabeleland  and  Mashonaland,  so  that  the  settlers 
here  should  not  be  cut  off  absolutely  from  all  contact 
with  civilisation.  In  addition  to  settling  these  things 
in  connection  with  his  northern  expansion  plans, 
Rhodes  found  himself  called  to  other  duties.  y  The 
Government  of  Cape  Colony,  headed  by  Sir  Gordon 
Sprigg,  suddenly  resigned,  and  it  was  some  little 
time  before  a  new  Cabinet  could  be  formed.  At 
length  the  High  Commissioner  sent  for  Rhodes  as 
the  only  man  enjoying  the  confidence  of  both  the 
British  and  the  Dutch  sections  of  the  population, 
and  intrusted  him  with  the  task  of  forming  a  ministry. 
It  was  a  commission  which  Rhodes  hesitated  to  accept. 
He  considered  that  he  had  quite  enough  on  his  hands 
in  the  development  of  the  territories  about  to  be 
placed  under  the  control  of  his  company,  without 
undertaking  any  fresh  responsibilities ;  and,  more¬ 
over,  he  was  not  sure  what  following  he  could  com¬ 
mand  if  he  did  consent  to  form  a  Cabinet. 

At  the  same  time  the  position  of  Premier  at  the 
Cape  was  not  altogether  displeasing  to  him,  and  in 
order  to  see  what  support  he  would  receive  if  he 
accepted  the  office,  he  asked  the  leaders  of  the  Bond 
to  meet  him  to  discuss  the  matter.  They  did  so, 
and  in  the  end  promised  to  support  him  on  certain 
conditions.  Some  little  time  previously  to  this,  Mr 
Hofmeyr  had  visited  Rhodes  and  offered  him  the 
Premiership  of  the  Colony  if  he  would  accept  it  as 
the  nominee  of  the  Bond, — for  this  office,  it  should 
be  pointed  out,  was  practically  in  the  gift  of  the 


138 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 


Bond  at  this  time,  and  no  one  could  hope  to  form 
a  government  if  opposed  by  the  Afrikander  party. 
Mr  Rhodes  curtly  refused  Hofmeyr’s  offer.  At  every 
stage  of  his  career  he  has  been  perfectly  willing  to 
work  with  the  Bond  for  the  closer  union  of  the  two 
races,  but  he  has  never  been  prepared  to  act  as  the 
tool  of  the  Afrikander  caucus. 

In  the  end  he  formed  his  ministry  and  took  up 
the  reins  of  office,  thus  becoming  the  Prime  Minister 
of  an  important  portion  of  the  British  Empire  at 
the  early  age  of  thirty -seven.  He  assumed  office 
with  the  firm  intention  of  welding  together  into  one 
solid  whole  the  two  races,  if  it  was  in  the  bounds 
of  human  ability  to  do  it.  Let  us  repeat,  to  bring 
the  Dutch  and  British  sections  of  the  South  African 
population  into  close  union  has  been  one  of  Rhodes’ 
greatest  ambitions ;  and  that  he  has  not  been  able 
to  do  this  has  not  been  his  fault,  although  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  foolish  and  wicked  Jameson 
Raid  did  a  great  deal  to  prevent  the  extinction  of  race 
hatred  in  South  Africa,  and,  moreover,  gave  those 
who  saw  with  dismay  Rhodes’  great  popularity  among 
the  Dutch  of  Cape  Colony  a  splendid  opportunity  to 
incite  this  section  of  the  community  against  him. 

At  this  time,  1890,  Rhodes  was,  without  doubt,  one 
of  the  hardest  worked  men  whom  it  would  be  possible 
to  find.  He  was  the  managing  director  of  the  newly 
established  Chartered  Company,  and  as  such  had  vir¬ 
tually  the  whole  responsibility  of  the  colonisation  and 
development  of  the  Matabele  country  on  his  shoulders. 
Added  to  this  now  were  the  duties  and  anxieties 
attendant  on  the  Premiership  of  Cape  Colony.  Only 
a  man  of  his  restless  and  untiring  disposition,  and 
ability  to  concentrate  the  whole  of  his  mental  and 


DIFFICULTIES  OF  A  DUAL  POSITION. 


139 


physical  faculties  on  any  one  object  to  the  exclusion 
of  all  the  rest,  until  such  time  as  it  was  carried  through 
to  a  definite  conclusion,  could  have  hoped  to  combine 
the  two  positions  with  anything  like  thoroughness. 

The  dual  position  of  Rhodes  proved  in  some  ways 
a  drawback  to  him  :  that  was  inevitable.  Both  the 
dwellers  in  Cape  Colony  and  the  settlers  in  Rhodesia 
feared  that  he  was  neglecting  their  particular  interests 
in  favour  of  the  others.  Colonists  in  Rhodesia,  indeed, 
openly  asserted  that  Rhodes  thought  more  of  the  pros¬ 
perity  of  the  Cape  than  he  did  of  the  development  of 
the  new  country  ;  while  the  people  of  the  Cape  thought 
and  said  exactly  the  reverse— that  they  were  being 
neglected  and  sacrificed  for  the  benefit  of  the  new 
colony  in  the  north.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Rhodes  was 
doing  all  in  his  power  to  promote  the  best  interests  of 
both  ;  but  probably  it  would  have  been  better  had 
not  the  two  offices  of  Prime  Minister  of  Cape  Colony 
and  managing  director  of  the  British  South  Africa 
Company  been  combined  in  one  man,  even  though 
that  man  had  the/great  capabilities  which  Mr  Rhodes 
has  displayed.  / 

Amid  his  many  duties  Rhodes  managed  to  find  time 
to  endeavour  to  push  his  scheme  for  a  united  South 
Africa  under  the  British  flag  a  little  further.  This  he 
hoped  to  bring  about  by  degrees  :  he  saw  that  it  was 
not  a  thing  that  could  be  accomplished  in  an  hour. 
Successive  steps  in  the  development  of  this  policy 
were  to  be  a  railway  union,  a  customs  union,  and  a 
united  policy  for  the  government  of  the  native  races. 
The  unceasing  opposition  of  the  Government  of  the 
Transvaal,  however,  was  against  Rhodes’  efforts, 
though  he  did  not  despair  of  his  ultimate  success, 
especially  as  affairs  in  the  Transvaal  seemed  to  be 


140 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 


shaping  themselves  into  a  more  favourable  attitude 
for  the  reception  of  these  schemes.  The  continued 
prosperity  of  the  gold  mines  around  Johannesburg 
had  the  effect  of  attracting  thousands  of  Europeans 
to  the  spot,  and  of  these  the  majority  were  of  British 
descent.  So  great  was  this  immigration  to  the  Wit- 
watersrand  that  it  seemed  as  though  in  a  year  or  two 
the  original  Burgher  population  of  the  Transvaal  would 
be  swamped,  and  that  the  aliens  in  the  country  would, 
by  sheer  weight  of  numbers,  gradually  bring  about  a 
form  of  government  more  in  keeping  with  modern 
principles  than  the  retrograde  and  antiquated  regime 
of  Kruger  and  his  supporters. 

Possibly,  had  it  not  been  for  the  Jameson  Raid,  this 
is  what  would  have  happened.  The  unification  of 
South  Africa,  it  may  be,  would  have  been  achieved 
by  peaceable  and  natural  means.  The  chances,  how¬ 
ever,  are  that  it  would  not.  Later  events  have  shown 
very  plainly  that  President  Kruger  was  not  disposed 
to  yield  one  jot  or  tittle  of  his  autocratic  rights  with¬ 
out  a  prolonged  and  bloody  struggle.  Be  this  as  it 
may,  in  1890  Rhodes  firmly  believed  that  the  con¬ 
federation  of  the  states  of  South  Africa  could  be 
arrived  at  in  a  peaceable  manner. 

It  was  towards  the  end  of  1889  that  steps  were 
taken  for  sending  up  the  first  batch  of  colonists  to  the 
new  colony.  Rhodes  had  remained  undecided  for  some 
time  as  to  how  this  could  best  be  done,  and  in  the  end 
he  accepted  the  offer  of  Mr  (or  Major)  Frank  Johnson 
to  raise  a  small  body  of  pioneers  in  England  and  Cape 
Colony  to  settle  in  Mashonaland.  In  return  for  this, 
Major  Johnson  was  to  receive  the  sum  of  £90,000  in 
cash,  and  liberal  grants  of  farms  and  mining  rights 
in  the  new  country  were  to  be  made  to  the  pioneers. 


THE  MASHONALAND  PIONEERS. 


141 


Details  having  been  settled,  early  in  1890  this  pioneer 
orce,  numbering  about  180  men,  assembled  at  Kim- 
)erley,  preparatory  to  commencing  its  march  into  the 
nterior. 

It  is  rather  curious  that  the  town  which  had  seen 
VIr  Rhodes  rise  from  an  unknown  miner  to  a  position 
)f  great  power  and  influence  should  have  been  the 
spot  where  the  corps  assembled  that  was  to  aid  in 
jo  large  a  measure  in  bringing  about  the  development 
)f  the  great  schemes  which  he  had  some  years  before 
jonceived  within  it.  Major  Johnson  was  in  chief 
jommand  of  the  Pioneer  Corps  until  it  reached  the 
8hashi  river,  the  boundary-line  which  divides  Ma¬ 
shonaland  from  Bechuanaland.  This  place  was  arrived 
it  on  July  1,  1890,  and  a  halt  was  called  until  the 
ittle  force  could  be  joined  by  three  troops  of  the 
lewly  raised  British  South  Africa  Company’s  Police, 
under  the  command  of  Sir  John  Willoughby.  These 
served  to  bring  up  the  total  strength  of  the  column  to 
learly  500  men.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pennefather  of 
she  Imperial  army  now  took  over  the  supreme  com- 
nand  of  the  force,  and  Mr  F.  C.  Selous  accompanied 
t  as  chief  of  the  intelligence  department,  a  position 
or  which  he  was  particularly  well  qualified. 

A  fort  was  built  at  Tuli,  and  a  small  garrison  of 
>olice  left  in  charge,  and  then  the  column  set  off  on 
ts  journey  of  some  400  miles  across  a  virtually  un¬ 
mown  country  to  Mount  Hampden,  in  Mashonaland, 
vhich  had  been  definitely  pitched  upon  as  the 
lestination  of  the  pioneers. 

The  attitude  of  Lobengula  had  changed  since  the 
[ays  when  he  granted  the  concession  to  the  three 
nvoys  of  Mr  Rhodes.  He  sent  several  messages  to 
he  pioneer  force  telling  them  to  turn  back  to  their 


142 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 


own  country,  or  else  to  proceed  to  their  destination 
via  Gu-Buluwajm,  so  that  he  might  see  them  and 
learn  their  intentions  from  their  own  lips.  Several 
of  his  impis  of  young  soldiers,  too,  gathered  in  the 
line  of  march  of  the  column  as  though  bent  on  opposing 
its  farther  progress,  and  it  needed  all  Rhodes’  tact  and 
diplomacy,  and  a  great  deal  of  watchfulness  and  for¬ 
bearance  on  the  part  of  those  in  charge  of  the  pioneer 
column,  to  avoid  a  collision  with  the  Matabele.  The 
spot  selected  for  the  erection  of  the  last  fort,  Fort 
Salisbury  as  it  was  named,  was  reached  on  Sep¬ 
tember  10,  1890,  without  any  fighting,  although  on 
more  than  one  occasion  it  had  seemed  as  though  a 

O 

collision  was  inevitable.  On  the  following  day  the 
British  flag  was  hoisted  and  the  country  formally 
taken  under  the  protection  of  Great  Britain.  In 
tipis  manner  a  new  colony  was  called  into  existence. 

/  Thus  Mr  Rhodes’  dream  of  a  British  Empire  stretch¬ 
ing  towards  the  heart  of  Africa  from  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  was  realised,  and  soon  there  were  many  parties 
of  adventurers  making  their  way  through  Bechuana- 
land  and  the  Transvaal  to  the  north,  to  enter  the 
new  country,  while  towns  round  the  police  forts  of 
Salisbury,  Victoria,  and  Charter  sprang  up  in  a 
manner  that  recalled  the  “mushroom  cities”  of 
Western  America. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  Rhodes  began  to  come 
into  really  prominent  public  notice  in  England,  and 
many  and  diverse  were  the  opinions  concerning  him. 
Probably  more  controversy  and  argument  has  raged 
round  his  character  than  round  that  of  any  other 
public  man,  save,  possibly,  Mr  Chamberlain.  By  some 
he  was  regarded  as  nothing  more  than  an  ambitious 
financier  of  considerable  ability  and  original  ideas, 


THE  NECESSITY  FOK  EXPANSION. 


143 


inclined  to  be  utterly  unscrupulous  in  his  methods  ; 
while  others  regarded  him  as  a  heaven-sent  statesman, 
who  was  destined  by  Providence  to  place  the  British 
Empire  on  a  pinnacle  of  glory  and  prosperity  higher 
than  had  ever  before  been  known.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  both  these  views  are  exaggerated.  /  To  call  Rhodes 
unscrupulous  is  hardly  fair,  yet  it  is  undeniable  that 
he  is  firmly  convinced  that  the  attainment  of  a  praise¬ 
worthy  end  justifies  the  employment  of  almost  any 
means.  On  the  other  hand,  to  assert  that  he  is  a 
statesman  of  unique  ability,  and  one  destined  to  play 
the  part  of  a  nineteenth-  or  twentieth -century  Oliver 
Cromwell  in  the  aggrandisement  of  Great  Britain,  is, 
to  say  the  least,  exaggerated  praise. 

J  /^Rhodes  has  always  believed  in  the  ultimate  triumph 
of  the  British  race,  and  has  recognised  the  necessity 
for  expanding  the  British  Empire.  vMoreover,  he  has 
regarded  himself  as  one  who  was  to  take  a  prominent 
share  in  bringing  these  things  about ;  and  while  his 
aims  have  been  lofty  enough,  they  have  always  been 
leavened  with  a  dash  of  common-sense.  \/He  believes 
in  the  development  and  expansion  of  the  British 
Empire,  but  he  believes  also  in  obtaining  a  tangible 
return  for  those  who  risk  their  money  in  order  to 
benefit  the  Empire.  As  he  once  remarked,  “  Pure 
philanthropy  is  all  very  well  in  its  way,  but  phil¬ 
anthropy  plus  5  per  cent  is  a  good  deal  better.”  l  He 
is  not  a  self-seeker  or  one  who  pants  for  the  praise  of 
the  multitude,  and  he  would  never,  for  the  sake  of 
gaining  popular  applause,  adopt  a  line  of  conduct  that 
his  better  judgment  told  him  was  wrong.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  is  not  by  any  means  of  a  retiring 
disposition,  nor  a  man  likely  to  hide  his  light  under 
a  bushel. 


144 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 


^  Unconsciously,  maybe,  he  is  an  egoist,  and  when 
we  look  round  and  see  the  changes  he  has  wrought 
in  South  African  politics,  and  the  vast  regions  he  has 
added  to  the  dominions  of  the  British  Crown,  we  can¬ 
not  be  surprised.  Of  recent  years  especially  Rhodes 
has  been  rather  disposed  to  emphasise  those  peculiar 
traits  in  his  character  which  have  excited  most  public 
comment,  so  that  what  were  originally  the  merely 
rugged  edges  of  his  powerful  mind  have  how  been 
cultivated  into  mannerisms. 

j  As  has  been  said,  Rhodes  is  a  bundle  of  inconsis¬ 
tencies,  and  the  more  one  tries  to  analyse  his  char¬ 
acter  the  more  baffled  one  becomes.  It  is  for  all 
the  world  like  walking  through  a  maze.  We  start 
off  with  the  conviction  that  we  know  all  about  it, 
that  we  have  got  the  key  to  the  mystery  safe  in 
our  memory,  and  that  the  whole  affair  is  absurdly 
simple.  After  advancing  a  little  way,  however,  we 
find  ourselves  quite  bewildered,  and  compelled  to 
wander  about  in  an  aimless  manner  like  a  ship  with¬ 
out  a  rudder,  trusting  to  good  fortune  to  show  us 
the  way  out,  and  all  the  knowledge  that  we  started 
with  is  driven  completely  out  of  our  minds  by  the 
twistings  and  windings  that  confront  us  whichsoever 
way  we  turn. 

x  -  To  proceed  with  our  narrative.  As  soon  as  the 
pioneer  force  was  disbanded,  things  in  the  new  terri¬ 
tory  of  Mashonaland  settled  down  quickly,  and  the 
settlers  spread  over  the  country  in  all  directions  seek¬ 
ing  for  payable  gold-reefs.  All  seemed  couleur  cle  rose. 
The  fact  is,  things  were  progressing  too^  rapidly.  The,| 
approaching  wet  season  was  to  bring, ,'havo^  and  ruin 
in  its  train.  Malaria  cast  its  baleful' ;  win^s  over  the 
country,  while  rinderpest  and  the  ’deadly  tsetse  fly 


HARD  TIMES  IN  MASHONALAND. 


145 


combined  to  kill  off  the  cattle,  trek-oxen,  and  horses 
of  the  settlers  in  large  numbers.  Further,  with  the 
rivers  in  flood  and  the  climate  so  deadly  both  for 
horses  and  cattle,  supplies  of  food -stuffs  from  the 
south  began  to  run  short,  and  the  unfortunate  settlers 
were  threatened  with  famine  added  to  their  other 
hardships.  It  was  the  reverse  of  the  medal,  and 
things  seemed  to  be  growing  gloomier  each  day. 
Many  persons  both  at  home  and  in  South  Africa  lost 
all  faith  in  the  country,  and  Rhodes  came  in  for  more 
than  his  share  of  the  blame  for  the  terrible  state  of 
things  which  prevailed.  Among  many  of  those  who 
had  gone  up  to  Mashonaland  themselves,  or  had  rela¬ 
tives  there,  there  was  a  disposition  to  “round”  on 
Rhodes  as  soon  as  the  hard  times  came,  and  to  say 
that  he  should  have  prevented  such  a  state  of  things, 
or  at  any  rate  foreseen  it.  This  was  ridiculous,  of 
course.  Even  when  things  were  at  their  blackest, 
however,  and  he  was  being  attacked  and  abused  on  all 
sides,  Rhodes  never  lost  heart,  and  he  devoted  himself 
with  great  energy  and  determination  to  remedying 
the  state  of  things  which  prevailed,  and  to  taking 
precautions  to  prevent  similar  disasters  in  the  future. 

In  order  to  learn  more  fully  the  real  truth,  Mr 
Rhodes  sent  Dr  Rutherfoord  Harris,  at  that  time 
the  secretary  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company 
in  South  Africa,  to  Salisbury  to  examine  and  advise 
as  to  what  was  best  to  be  done.  It  had  been  Rhodes’ 
intention  to  go  north  himself,  but  he  found  it  im¬ 
possible  to  leaveCape  Colony  at  this  juncture.  In 
fthe  summer  1 ,  therefore,  Dr  Harris  visited 

Salisbury,^  adff^^t  about  doing  all  that  lay  in  the 
power  of^flbe  Bartered  Company  to  improve  the 
condition  of  thSraBettlers  in  Mashonaland. 


146 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  A  NEW  COLONY. 


It  was  a  little  before  this  time  that  an  expedition 
under  Mr  A.  R.  Colquhoun  was  sent  eastwards  from 
Salisbury  to  the  small  independent  kingdom  of  Man- 
icaland,  situate  between  Mashonaland  and  Portuguese 
territory,  to  obtain  if  possible  a  concession  to  work 
the  minerals  from  Umtassa,  the  king  of  the  territory. 
It  was  in  this  region  that  the  forces  of  the  British 
South  Africa  Company  and  the  Portuguese  came  into 
collision,  and  for  some  months  a  state  of  great  tension 
was  created  between  the  two  countries.  It  was  only 
when  Lord  Salisbury  threatened  the  Government  at 
Lisbon  with  an  ultimatum  that  the  Portuguese  with¬ 
drew  their  claims  to  Manicaland,  which  they  acknow¬ 
ledged  to  be  outside  their  sphere  of  influence.  The 
settlement  was  not  reached  without  two  severe 
skirmishes  between  the  troops  of  the  contending 
parties  in  Manicaland,  in  both  of  which  the  Portu¬ 
guese  were  defeated  with  heavy  loss. 

The  Anglo -Portuguese  treaty  was  signed  in  June 
1891.  By  it  the  British  South  Africa  Company  was 
permitted  to  assume  sovereign  rights  in  Manicaland, 
and  each  Power  pledged  itself  to  respect  the  other’s 
territory.  An  important  clause  in  the  agreement 
was  that  which  provided  for  the  construction  of  a 
line  of  railway  from  the  Portuguese  port  of  Beira,  on 
the  East  Coast,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pungwe  river,  to 
Manicaland  and  Salisbury.  The  capital  for  the  build¬ 
ing  of  this  line  was  to  be  provided  jointly  by  the 
Chartered  Company  and  the  Mozambique  Company, 
which  had  the  control  of  the  town  and  port  of  Beira 
under  a  concession  from  the  Portuguese  Government. 


147 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 

A 

Cecil  Rhodes  and  ex  -  President  Kruger  may  be 
taken  as  typifying  respectively  the  two  divisions  of 
the  white  population  of  South  Africa,  and  the  two 
great  influences  which  have  been  at  work  in  that 
region  for  the  last  generation.  Rhodes  fittingly  rep¬ 
resents  the  progressive  aims  and  ambitions  of  the 
on-ahead  British  colonists,  who  have  desired  the  unifi- 
cation  and  better  government  of  South  Africa,  which, 
they  foresaw,  could  only  be  brought  about  by  the  un¬ 
disputed  supremacy  of  the  British  flag.  vKruger  as 
fittingly  stands  for  the  old  Boer  voortrehkers,  with 
their  inveterate  dislike  and  impatience  of  control  by 
their  fellow-men,  and  even  of  contact  with  them  ;  with 
whom  absolute  freedom  of  action  and  the  entire  absence 
of  restraint  had  become  a  fetish,  so  that  rather  than 
submit  to  even  the  nominal  control  of  Great  Britain, 
they  had  years  ago  quitted  Cape  Colony  and  plunged 
into  the  unknown  lands  to  the  north,  and  there  waged 
many  bloody  wars  with  the  fierce  native  tribes  before 
they  were  permitted  to  settle  peacefully  in  the  country 
that  they  coveted. 

^Freedom  is  the  birthright  of  every  man,  and  there 
is  no  stouter  upholder  of  this  doctrine  than  Cecil 


148 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


Rhodes  ;  but  it  must  be  freedom  of  a  rational  nature. 
That  the  whole  population  of  South  Africa — British, 
Dutch,  and  natives  alike — should  have  as  much  per¬ 
sonal  liberty  of  action  as  could  with  safety  be  given 
them  has  always  been  Rhodes’  contention,  and  no  one 
can  be  more  impatient  of  Government  control  than 
he  has  shown  himself.  But  he  has  sufficient  sense  to 
know  that  freedom  carried  to  extreme  limits  becomes 
anarchy  pure  and  simple,  and  that  solidity  and  uni¬ 
formity  of  government  must  exist,  else  chaos  will 
ensue. 

f~-~  The  Boers  have  always  resented  control,  even  by 
their  own  Raads.  Tax-paying  in  any  shape  or  form 
has  ever  been  detested  by  them,  and  avoided  by  any 
and  every  means  in  their  power.  It  was  in  vain  for 
Kruger  and  the  other  members  of  the  executive 
Government  of  the  Transvaal  to  point  out  how  neces¬ 
sary,  and  indeed  imperative,  it  was  for  the  Boer  farmers 
to  bear  their  share  of  the  cost  of  administering  and 
maintaining  the  state.  The  farmer  looked  around 
him  over  his  land  :  there  was  no  other  homestead  or 
sign  of  human  existence  to  be  descried  so  far  as  the 
eye  could  see,  and  he  relied  on  his  rifle  to  repel  any 
assault  by  the  natives  on  his  property  or  his  life. 
Why,  then,  he  argued,  should  he  be  taxed  to  support 
and  maintain  a  Government  in  far  -  away  Pretoria, 
which,  so  far  as  he  could  see,  was  not  of  the  slightest 
service  to  him,  and  without  which  he  could  get  along 
very  well  ?  Military  service  on  the  commando  system 
the  Boers  accepted  as  the  only  means  by  which  outside 
attacks  on  their  homes  and  liberties  could  be  repelled. 
Utterly  ignorant  as  the  typical  veldt  Boers  are,  and 
stubborn  with  a  stubbornness  which  exceeds  that  of  a 
Mexican  mule,  they  would  only  see  the  matter  in  their 


THE  DISCOVERY  OF  THE  RAND. 


149 


own  light.  It  was  vain  to  try  to  argue  them  out  of 
their  position. 

Kruger  was  shrewd  enough  to  see  that  the  only 
result  of  his  efforts  to  induce  the  Burghers  of  the 
Transvaal  to  submit  to  taxation  of  even  the  mildest 
form  would  be  to  decrease  his  popularity  among  his 
people.  This,  naturally,  he  was  anxious  to  avoid.  At 
the  same  time,  when  he  assumed  the  Presidency  the 
Transvaal  was  virtually  bankrupt,  and  he  was  at  his 
wits’  end  as  to  the  means  by  which  the  Treasury  was 
to  be  replenished.  It  was  then,  most  fortunately  and 
opportunely  for  him,  that  the  rich  gold  deposits  on 
the  Witwatersrand  were  discovered.  Here  was  the 
solution  of  all  the  difficulties  that  had  so  long  op¬ 
pressed  the  Transvaal  executive  !  Here  was  the  milch 
cow  which  was  not  only  to  provide  ample  funds  for 
the  government  of  the  state,  without  the  Burghers 
having  to  bear  any  part  of  the  burden,  but  provide 
as  well  handsome  surpluses  annually,  which  could  be 
hoarded  up  for  the  furtherance  of  that  scheme  of 
Dutch  predominance  in  South  Africa  which  was  fast 
becoming  the  ambition  of  Kruger  and  the  Hollander 
clique  that  had  assumed  the  entire  control  of  the 
Transvaal. 

At  this  point  we  must  consider  at  some  length  the 
position  of  the  Transvaal,  and  the  motives  by  which 
its  President  and  Government  were  actuated.  This 
is  necessary  if  we  are  to  arrive  at  a  full  knowledge  of 
the  causes  that  brought  about  the  long-drawn-out 
struggle  between  Kruger  and  Rhodes,  which  was  only 
to  terminate  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  former  from 
South  Africa. 

I  have  thought  it  better  to  bring  together  the 
various  incidents  of  the  duel  between  these  two  re- 


150 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


markable  men  into  connected  form  in  this  and  the 
following  chapter,  rather  than  to  adhere  to  their  strict 
chronological  order.  It  will  be  necessary,  of  course, 
to  refer  to  some  matters — the  Jameson  Raid,  for  in¬ 
stance — in  greater  detail  at  subsequent  stages  ;  but 
my  present  object  is  to  show  at  a  glance  the  whole 
history  of  the  conflict  between  the  two  high-priests 
of  the  rival  British  and  Dutch  causes  in  South  Africa. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  first  occasion  on  which  the 
two  came  into  collision  was  over  the  question  of  the 
pseudo-Boer  republics  that  had  been  set  up  in  Bechu- 
analand.  Here  the  victory  was  with  Rhodes.  By 
skilful  diplomacy  he  had  won  over  the  Boers  of  Stella - 
land  under  Van  Niekerk  to  his  side ;  and  for  the 
rest,  there  was  the  British  column  under  Sir  Charles 
Warren  behind  him  to  enforce  British  rights  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet  if  necessary.  Kruger  had  per¬ 
force  to  withdraw  his  demands  and  to  assume  that 
cloak  of  submissive  humility  which  he  knows  so  well 
how  to  wear. 

Baffled  and  defeated  in  his  efforts  to  shut  off  Cape 
Colony  from  free  access  to  the  interior,  the  Transvaal 
President,  retiring  from  the  conflict  with  the  best 
grace  possible,  was  filled,  it  may  be  presumed,  with 
a  new  -  born  respect  for  the  powers  of  the  young 
Englishman  who  had  checkmated  him.  Beaten  at 
one  point,  however,  he  at  once  concentrated  his 
energies  in  another  direction.  Gifted  by  nature  with 
a  power  of  analysing  and  divining  the  minds  of  his 
fellow-men  which  was  little  short  of  wonderful,  he 
could  gauge  correctly,  as  after-events  have  demon¬ 
strated,  the  impulses  and  desires  which  have  from 
time  to  time  swayed  the  British  Government  both 
at  Cape  Town  and  in  Downing  Street.  But  Cecil 


kruger’s  opinion  of  Rhodes. 


151 


Rhodes  was  an  enigma  to  him.  Kruger  quickly  re¬ 
cognised  his  ability,  however,  and  after  their  confer¬ 
ence  at  Fourteen  Streams  said  with  a  sigh  to  those 
around  them  :  “  That  young  man  will  cause  me  trouble 
if  he  does  not  leave  politics  alone  and  turn  to  some¬ 
thing  else.  Well,  the  racehorse  is  swifter  than  the 
ox,  but  the  ox  can  draw  the  greater  loads.  We  shall 
see.”  This,  read  in  the  light  of  after-events,  was  a 
remarkable  prophecy,  and  the  simile  by  which  the 
old  Dopper  President  compared  himself  to  a  patient, 
dogged  ox  and  Rhodes  to  a  swift  and  impetuous 
racehorse  was  as  apt  as  most  of  his  figures  of  speech 
are. 

If  Kruger  had  been  quick  to  recognise  Rhodes’ 
powers/  Rhodes,  on  his  part,  had  not  been  wanting 
in  penetration.  In  Kruger  he  saw  the  concentrated 
essence  of  Boer  obstinacy  and  conservatism,  and  was 
assured  that  he  would  have  to  combat  him  by  every 
means  in  his  power  if  he  was  to  carry  through  those 
schemes  of  expansion  and  federation  which  he  had 
mapped  out. 

The  next  occasion  on  which  Rhodes  and  Kruger 
found  themselves  opposed  was  over  the  vexed  question 
rtof  railways  through  the  Transvaal.  Rhodes  has 
rightly  dubbed  the  railway  and  the  electric  telegraph 
the  “  pioneers  of  civilisation,”  and  as  such  he  has 
always  stoutly  advocated  their  extension  throughout 
South  Africa.  As  usual  Kruger  supplied  the  antithesis 
to  Rhodes’  ideal.  To  the  ex-President  of  the  Trans¬ 
vaal,  railways  have  always  been  abhorrent.  For  many 
years  he  set  his  face  sternly  against  their  introduction 
into  his  state.  In  vain  Rhodes  exercised  his  powers 
of  persuasion  and  argument  on  the  adamantine  old 
Burgher.  The  latter  regarded  the  introduction  of 


152 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


railways  into  his  country  with  feelings  of  the  deepest 
aversion ;  and  it  is  doubtful  whether,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  discovery  of  the  Rand  goldfields,  he  would 
have  ever  assented  to  the  building  of  railway  tracks  in 
the  Transvaal.  Yet  he  himself  had  foreseen  that  some 
day  it  might  be  necessary  for  him  to  yield  on  this 
point,  and  he  debated  within  himself  as  to  how  he  was 
to  permit  the  construction  of  railways,  when  the  time 
came  that  their  advent  could  no  longer  be  resisted,  so 
as  to  offer  the  least  possible  benefit  to  British  colonists 
in  Cape  Colony  and  Natal.  For  with  Kruger,  even 
in  these  days,  hatred  of  the  British  was  the  keynote 
of  his  character  and  policy,  as  one  could  not  be  in 
his  company  for  long  without  discovering. 

He  perceived  that  if,  as  Rhodes  urged  him,  he 
assented  to  the  construction  of  the  line  through  his 
country  from  the  south  to  the  north,  the  greater  part 
of  the  receipts  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  British 
controlling  power,  that  is,  the  Cape  Government!  This 
he  was  determined  should  not  be.  Rather  than  let 
British  colonists  have  the  benefit  of  profits  earned  by 
a  railway  which  partly  ran  through  his  territory  —  for 
Kruger  by  this  time  regarded  the  Transvaal  as  being 
as  much  his  own  particular  birthright  as  though  he 
had  been  a  hereditary  monarch  instead  of  the  elected 
head  of  a  professedly  republican  state  —  he  would 
never  permit  a  railway  sleeper  to  be  laid  in  the 
Transvaal. 

It  was  the  discovery  of  the  Witwatersrand  goldfield 
that  led  to  his  giving  a  reluctant  consent  to  the  con¬ 
struction  of  a  railway  to  Pretoria.  Many  years  before 
this  time,  in  1873,  a  treaty  had  been  concluded  be¬ 
tween  the  South  African  Republic  and  Portugal  deal¬ 
ing  with  various  matters  of  concern  to  the  two  con- 

O 


KRUGER  CONCEDES  A  POINT. 


153 


tracting  part  ies,  and  one  of  the  clauses  of  this  document 
provided  for  the  construction  at  some  undefined  time 
in  the  future  of  a  railway  line  from  Delagoa  Bay  to 
the  Transvaal  capital.  Moreover,  by  the  terms  of  the 
award,  which  gave  the  control  of  Delagoa  Bay  to 
Portugal,  it  was  expressly  stipulated  that  the  Trans¬ 
vaal  was  to  be  permitted  to  have  free  and  unfettered 
access  to  the  sea  at  this  point. 

For  some  years  this  question  of  a  railway  between 
Lorengo  Marques  and  Pretoria  was  allowed  to  rest, 
but  in  1887  a  concession  was  granted  to  Colonel 
McMurdo,  an  American  engineer,  to  build  a  railway 
line  between  Delagoa  Bay  and  Komati  Poort,  on  the 
Transvaal  frontier. 

As  this  section  of  the  railway  approached  the 
Transvaal,  emissaries  of  Colonel  McMurdo  visited 
Pretoria  in  the  hope  of  getting  Kruger  to  agree  to  a 
concession  being  granted  them  to  continue  the  line 
onward  to  Pretoria.  This  was  refused  by  the  Presi¬ 
dent,  who,  however,  showed  himself  to  be  much  more 
pliable  in  his  attitude  towards  the  introduction  of 
railways  into  the  country  than  had  hitherto  been  the 
case.  In  the  end,  after  some  amount  of  discussion 
and  negotiation,  he  granted  a  concession  to  continue 
the  railway  from  Komati  Poort  onwards  to  the  Nether¬ 
lands  South  African  Railway  Company,  a  corporation 
to  which  he  had,  in  return  for  a  very  substantial  per¬ 
sonal  subsidy,  granted  a  monopoly  of  all  the  railways 
to  be  constructed  in  the  Transvaal  at  any  time  in 
the  future. 

This  favourable  attitude  of  Kruger  induced  Rhodes 
to  make  another  effort  to  extend  the  Cape  railway 
system  northwards  through  the  Orange  Free  State 
and  the  Transvaal.  Rhodes  was  in  a  fair  way  for 


154 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


obtaining  the  extension  of  the  line  through  Free  State 
territory,  the  Government  of  which  was  greatly  more 
enlightened  and  progressive  than  the  oligarchy  at 
Pretoria ;  and,  despite  Kruger’s  intrigues  to  prevent 
this  railway  extension  into  the  sister  republic,  the 
Free  State  Government  in  1889  definitely  agreed  to 
accept  Rhodes’  terms,  and  a  railway  convention  was 
forthwith  signed  by  the  Cape  Colony  and  the  Orange 
Free  State.  By  this  document  the  Cape  Government 
was  to  extend  its  main  line  over  the  Orange  river, 
through  Bloemfontein,  and  then  northwards  towards 
the  boundary  of  the  South  African  Republic.  In 
return,  the  Orange  Free  State  was  to  get  its  main 
line  of  railway  built  at  the  expense  of  the  Cape  Gov¬ 
ernment,  and  was  to  receive  half  the  net  profits  of  the 
working  of  the  line.  In  addition,  the  Free  State 
Government  had  the  power  to  purchase  the  section  of 
the  line  running  through  its  territory  at  the  actual 
price  of  construction,  at  any  time  that  it  chose  to 
do  so. 

Kruger  was  now  compelled  to  capitulate.  The 
population  of  the  Rand  had  increased  enormously,  and 
the  danger  of  a  famine  in  the  country  through  food- 
supplies  not  being  brought  up  quickly  enough  by 
ox-waggons  was  very  real.  The  more  progressive 
members  of  the  Raad  placed  the  case  for  the  introduc¬ 
tion  of  railways  into  the  country  so  forcibly  before 
Kruger,  that  he  saw  that  unless  he  acceded  to  their 
demands  his  position  as  President  would  be  seriously 
threatened.  He  withdrew  his  opposition,  therefore, 
though,  it  must  be  confessed,  with  a  very  ill  grace. 

At  the  beginning  of  1890  the  line  from  Delagoa  Bay 
entered  Transvaal  territory,  and  its  progress  towards 
Pretoria,  though  sure,  was  very  slow,  for  the  Transvaal 


A  RAILWAY  FROM  THE  SOUTH. 


155 


capital  was  not  reached  until  five  years  later.  Kruger 
had  hoped  that  this  line  would  satisfy  the  demands  of 
the  mining  community,  but  here  he  was  mistaken.  It 
was  not  enough  that  they  should  be  in  quick  communi¬ 
cation  with  the  sea  at  Delagoa  Bay  ;  they  wished,  in 
addition,  the  accomplishment  of  Rhodes’  scheme  for  a 
railway  to  unite  Cape  Town,  the  natural  centre  of  the 
trade  of  South  Africa,  with  Johannesburg.  They 
accepted  the  Delagoa  Bay-Pretoria  line  as  a  promise 
of  the  coming  railway  development  of  the  country,  but 
they  were  not  prepared  to  accept  this  line  as  a  full 
discharge  of  the  Government’s  liabilities  in  this  direc¬ 
tion.  It  was  as  though  the  British  Government  had 
built  a  railway  line  to  connect  Manchester  with  the  sea 
at  Liverpool,  and  yet  refused  permission  for  another 
line  from  Manchester  to  London.  In  the  end,  Kruger 
yielded  to  the  force  that  was  brought  against  him ;  and 
soon  after  he  had  consented  to  the  line  from  Komati 
Poort  being  continued,  he  gave  the  necessary  per¬ 
mission  for  this  extension  of  the  Cape  railway  system 
into  the  Transvaal,  on  the  understanding  that  the 
Netherlands  Railway  Company  was  to  control  the 
Transvaal  section  of  the  line  when  built. 

Rhodes  had  long  foreseen  that  a  line  of  railway  from 
Cape  Town  northwards  to  the  goldfields  of  the  Rand 
was  imperative,  and  indeed  inevitable,  and  he  was 
fortunate  enough  to  receive  not 'only  the  support  of  the 
Cape  Parliament,  but  that  of  the  Orange  Free  State 
Government  and  the  vast  majority  of  the  Uitlander 
population  of  the  Transvaal,  and  of  the  Progress¬ 
ive  Boers  as  well.  Kruger  was  compelled  to  yield  to 
the  overwhelming  pressure  that  was  brought  to  bear 
against  him.  In  1891  the  railway  line  crossed  the 
Yaal  river  near  Viljoen’s  Drift,  and  was  carried  for- 


156 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


ward  so  quickly  that  in  September  of  the  following 
year  it  had  reached  Johannesburg,  beating  its  rival 
from  the  east  coast  by  nearly  three  years. 

Thus  it  came  about  that  Mr  Rhodes,  after  many 
years  of  negotiation  and  persuasion,  managed  to  carry 
out  the  first  part  of  his  scheme  for  the  closer  union  of 
the  various  states  of  South  Africa  by  means  of  a 
common  railway  interest.  The  first  portion  of  the 
struggle  over  the  railway  question  between  Rhodes 
and  Kruger  may  be  said  to  have  come  to  an  end 
with  the  arrival  of  the  line  at  Johannesburg.  Mr 
Rhodes  had  had  distinctly  the  best  of  the  contest. 

The  second  act  of  this  railway  war  between  the  two 
most  prominent  men  in  South  Africa  was  still  to  come, 
and  was  opened  by  President  Kruger  as  soon  as  the 
Delagoa  Bay  line  reached  Pretoria.  It  had  always 
been  the  pet  argument  of  Kruger  and  his  supporters 
that,  so  soon  as  this  latter  line  was  open,  there  would 
be  no  scope  for  the  other  railway  to  Cape  Town,  as  all 
traffic  to  and  from  the  goldfields  would,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  pass  over  the  east -coast  route,  owing  to  the 
much  shorter  distance  it  would  have  to  traverse. 
Rhodes,  however,  knew  that  this  argument,  seemingly 
faultless  in  theory,  would  not  be  upheld  by  the  actual 
facts.  He  believed,  and  subsequent  events  proved 
him  to  be  correct,  that  owing  to  his  railway  from  Cape 
Town  to  Johannesburg  being  so  much  better  managed, 
and  working,  as  he  was  convinced  it  would,  so  much 
more  smoothly  and  regularly  than  the  Delagoa  Bay 
line  with  its  dual  control  of  Boers  and  Portuguese,  it 
would  attract  by  far  the  greater  proportion  of  the 
goldfields  traffic,  which  was  the  most  important  stake 
that  the  railways  in  Africa  could  play  for. 

The  fact,  too,  that  Cape  Town  was  the  natural 


kruger’s  next  move. 


157 


entrepot  for  South  Africa  was  a  great  point  in  his 
favour,  as  was  the  other  that,  as  his  line  had  been  in 
existence  nearly  three  years  before  its  rival,  when  the 
east-coast  line  was  passing  through  those  difficulties 
which  are  inseparable  from  a  newly  established  rail¬ 
way,  the  traffic  to  the  south  was  being  conducted  with 
precision  and  expedition.  It  came  about,  therefore, 
that  the  traffic  which  went  over  the  Delagoa  Bay  line 
was  infinitesimal  compared  with  that  which  flowed 
southwards. 

This  state  of  things  was  not  at  all  to  the  liking  of 
President  Kruger,  who,  in  his  hati'ed  of  everything 
British,  was  dismayed  to  see  practically  the  whole  of 
the  traffic  of  the  Transvaal  passing  through  British 
territory  to  and  from  the  coast.  Consequently  he 
arrayed  his  forces  for  another  tilt  with  the  British 
railway  pioneers  of  South  Africa  headed  by  Mr 
Rhodes. 

Exercising,  as  President  Kruger  did,  a  considerable 
influence  in  the  councils  of  the  Netherlands  South 
African  Railway  Company,  he  soon  was  able  to 
organise  his  plan  of  campaign.  The  forty  miles  of 
railway  between  the  Rand  and  Viljoen’s  Drift  on  the 
Yaal  belonged,  as  has  already  been  explained,  to  the 
Netherlands  Company,  which  was,  of  course,  able  to 
charge  whatever  rates  it  chose  for  the  conveyance  of 
goods  and  passengers  over  this  section  of  the  railway. 
With  the  object  of  compelling  merchants  to  send  and 
obtain  their  goods  via  Delagoa  Bay,  the  Netherlands 
Company  gradually  raised  its  rates  for  the  Cape 
section  under  its  control,  until  at  last  it  cost  more 
to  send  goods  this  forty  miles  than  it  did  to  send 
them  the  whole  distance  from  the  Rand  to  Lorenco 
Marques.  Further  than  this,  by  artfully  keeping 


158 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


the  line  blocked  with  strings  of  empty  trucks  at 
Viljoen’s  Drift,  the  company  was  able  to  occasion 
much  delay  and  inconvenience  to  the  commercial  com¬ 
munity  of  Johannesburg, — a  delay  which,  of  course, 
was  carefully  avoided  on  the  east-coast  route. 

This  raising  of  the  rates  in  a  great  measure  had 
its  desired  effect.  The  merchants  could  not  afford  to 
send  their  goods  via  Cape  Town,  owing  to  the  pro¬ 
hibitive  charges,  while  the  delays  at  Viljoen’s  Drift 
gradually  became  greater  and  greater.  Rhodes  there¬ 
fore  was  faced  with  a  serious  problem,  and  for  a  time 
it  seemed  as  though  Kruger  had  completely  triumphed 
over  his  rival.  Rhodes,  however,  though  he  was  re¬ 
pulsed  for  a  time,  was  by  no  means  defeated.  He  had 
not  the  slightest  idea  of  withdrawing  from  the  contest, 
though  it  must  be  admitted  that  he  had  not  foreseen 
this  possible  move  on  the  part  of  Mr  Kruger  and  the 
Netherlands  Railway  Company. 

His  first  effort  was  to  reduce  the  rates  over  the 
Cape  Colony  and  Orange  Free  State  sections  of  the 
line  so  as  to  counteract  the  additional  sums  charged  on 
the  Transvaal  section.  This,  however,  he  could  only 
do  to  a  certain  point ;  and  when  he  had  cut  down 
rates  to  the  lowest  limits  at  which  the  line  could  he 
supported  and  pay  a  small  profit,  he  found  that  the 
charges  were  still  considerably  higher  than  the 
merchants  in  the  Transvaal  could  afford  to  pay.  The 
Netherlands  Company,  on  their  part,  had  only  to  keep 
raising  their  rates  as  he  lowered  them  on  the  other 
portions  of  the  line  to  maintain  the  balance.  The 
result  of  all  this  was,  of  course,  to  divert  more  and 
more  of  the  Johannesburg  traffic  to  the  Delagoa  Bay 
line. 

It  was  necessary  now  for  Mr  Rhodes  and  those 


RHODES  OUTWITS  KRUGER. 


159 


working  with  him  to  adopt  other  methods,  and 
he  was  able  to  induce  the  Governments  of  Cape 
Colony  and  the  Orange  Free  State  to  lodge  strong 
protests  at  Pfetoria  against  the  excessive  rates 
charged  by  the  Netherlands  Company,  and  the  irri¬ 
tating  and  deliberate  delays  at  Viljoen’s  Drift. 
Needless  to  say,  these  protests  were  quietly  ignored 
by  President  Kruger.  The  Netherlands  Company 
proceeded  on  its  way  without  the  least  restraint 
from  Pretoria. 

Seeing  that  these  protests  had  no  effect,  Rhodes 
quickly  formulated  a  scheme  for  the  outwitting  of  the 
Netherlands  Company  and  the  master-hand  behind  it ; 
and  having  the  support  of  practically  the  whole  of  the 
merchants  of  Johannesburg  in  his  efforts  to  obtain 
cheaper  transport  rates  between  that  town  and  Cape 
Town,  he  was  able  to  put  it  into  immediate  execution. 
Moreover,  he  found  a  very  willing  ally  in  the  Govern¬ 
ment  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  who  naturally  were 
incensed  at  the  policy  of  the  Transvaal,  which 
threatened  ruin  to  their  section  of  the  line  just  as 
much  as  it  did  to  that  portion  which  ran  through 
British  territory. 

This  scheme  of  Mr  Rhodes  was  to  set  up  a  fast 
and  regular  service  of  ox-waggons  between  Johannes¬ 
burg  and  the  Free  State  bank  of  the  Yaal  at  Viljoen’s 
Drift.  By  this  method  goods  would  be  conveyed 
to  and  from  the  railway  much  cheaper  and  quicker 
than  could  be  done  by  the  railway  company  with 
its  prohibitive  rates  and  vexatious  delays.  This  was 
done,  and  as  a  result  the  trade  of  the  Rand,  which 
had  been  diverted  to  the  east-coast  line,  now  returned 
to  the  Cape  line. 

The  laugh  was  now  on  the  other  side,  for  the 


160 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


Netherlands  Company  was  completely  ignored  and 
outwitted,  and  not  only  did  the  merchants  withdraw 
their  trade  from  the  Delagoa  Bay  line,  but,  entering 
into  the  struggle  with  heart  and  soul,  and  feeling  that 
they  were  being  treated  with  great  harshness  by  the 
Netherlands  Company,  they  did  it  with  more  thorough¬ 
ness  than  they  would  otherwise  have  displayed.  In 
addition,  the  railway  company  did  not  receive  a  penny 
from  the  increasing  traffic  to  the  south  owing  to  this 
service  of  ox-waggons,  which  conveyed  the  goods  to 
a  point  on  the  railway  beyond  their  control.  Rhodes 
had  turned  the  tables  on  his  rival  with  a  vengeance, 
and  the  Transvaal  President  was  furious  when  he  saw 
how  neatly  he  had  been  outmanoeuvred.  Having  very 
unwisely  lost  his  temper,  Kruger  was  now  provoked 
to  a  step  which  his  cooler  judgment  would  have  told 
him  was  bound  to  recoil  upon  his  own  head.  This 
was  the  famous  “closing  of  the  drifts”  in  1895,  which 
so  nearly  brought  about  a  war  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  Transvaal.  By  this  step  the  Transvaal  Presi¬ 
dent  forbade  all  goods  from  the  south  passing  over  the 
fords  of  the  Yaal  river,  so  that  no  imports  could  reach 
the  Transvaal  save  by  the  railway.  In  doing  this  the 
President  clearly  overreached  himself.  As  soon  as  this 
edict  was  published  there  was  an  immediate  outcry 
against  this  flagrant  violation  of  the  London  Conven¬ 
tion,  by  the  Cape  Government,  which  was  supported 
in  its  action  by  the  Orange  Free  State  Government. 
Kruger,  indeed,  found  that  he  had  brought  a  hornet’s 
nest  about  his  ears,  for  the  Dutch  and  British  in¬ 
habitants  of  Cape  Colony,  the  Boers  of  the  Free 
State,  and  the  colonists  of  Natal  all  banded  them¬ 
selves  together  in  a  protest  against  this  outrageous 
action  on  the  part  of  the  Transvaal  Government, 


A  UNIQUE  ALLIANCE. 


161 


which  stood  completely  isolated,  confronting  an  alli¬ 
ance  such  as  had  never  previously  been  known  in 
South  Africa. 

British  and  Afrikander  alike  stood  resolute  in  their 
determination  to  teach  President  Kruger  and  his  satel- 
lites  the  much-needed  lesson  that  they  could  not  be 
permitted  to  carry  their  fanatical  hatred  of  all  things 
British  to  the  extent  of  paralysing  the  whole  of  the 
trade  of  South  Africa.  Even  within  the  boundaries  of 
the  Transvaal  there  was  no  solid  support  of  Kruger  in 
the  position  he  had  taken  up.  The  Uitlander  popula¬ 
tion,  of  course,  were  against  the  closing  of  the  drifts 
to  a  man,  and  even  among  the  Burghers  there  was  an 
important  section  that  saw  with  feelings  of  dismay 
that  by  his  obstinate  and  retrogressive  policy  Kruger 
was  threatening  the  country  with  a  war  from  which  it 
could  not  possibly  hope  to  emerge  save  with  crushing 
defeat  if  not  absolute  ruin. 

Not  content  with  these  protests  to  Pretoria,  which 
were,  of  course,  passed  over  in  silence,  the  intervention 
of  the  High  Commissioner,  Sir  Hercules  Bobinson,  was 
called  for,  and  he  at  once  placed  the  state  of  affairs 
before  the  Colonial  Office,  and  asked  for  immediate 
instructions  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued  in  the 
event  of  Kruger  persisting  in  his  determination  to 
keep  the  drifts  closed.  Mr  Chamberlain  had  just 
become  Colonial  Secretary,  and  he  promptly  grappled 
with  the  problem  in  the  energetic  and  businesslike 
method  for  which  he  is  noted.  His  reply  to  the  High 
Commissioner  was  terse  and  strictly  to  the  point. 
“  The  action  of  the  Transvaal  Government,”  he  said, 
“  in  thus  closing  the  drifts  to  traffic  is  indubitably  a 
breach  of  the  ‘  most  favoured  nation  ’  clause  and  the 
1  free  admission  ’  clause  of  the  London  Convention.” 

L 


162 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


Further,  he  inquired  whether,  in  the  event  of  a  war 
being  provoked  by  this  attitude  of  the  Transvaal 
Government,  the  Cape  Government  would  bear  half 
the  cost  and  grant  the  Imperial  troops  free  transport 
through  the  colonju  Mr  Rhodes,  who  was  the  Premier 
of  the  Cape  at  this  time,  at  once  consulted  his  attorney- 
general,  Mr  W.  P.  Schreiner,  one  of  the  leading  pillars 
of  the  Afrikander  Bond,  and  having  ascertained  from 
him  that  the  Dutch  population  of  the  Cape  would 
assent  to  Mr  Chamberlain’s  proposals  in  the  event  of 
war,  cabled  to  the  Colonial  Secretary  to  say  that  his 
terms  would  be  accepted  without  hesitation  by  the 
Cape. 

Mr  Chamberlain  thereupon  wasted  no  further  time 
in  fruitless  negotiation  with  Kruger,  but  politely, 
though  none  the  less  firmly,  informed  him  that  the 
continued  closure  of  the  drifts  on  the  Yaal  river  after 
the  15th  November  1895  would  be  taken  by  Great 
Britain  as  an  act  of  war. 

This  direct  method  of  dealing  on  the  part  of  the 
Colonial  Office  came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  Mr 
Kruger,  who  had  hitherto  been  accustomed  to  shilly¬ 
shallying  and  hesitation  on  the  part  of  Downing 
Street.  He  was  taken  completely  aback  by  this 
demonstration  of  the  “  new  diplomacy.”  He  saw  per¬ 
fectly  well  that  he  could  not  hope  to  fight  the  com¬ 
bined  forces  which  were  arrayed  against  him,  and 
therefore  withdrew  from  his  untenable  position,  and 
permitted  the  drifts  to  be  once  more  thrown  open  to 
traffic.  The  incident  then  came  to  an  end. 

Mr  Rhodes  had  therefore  secured  the  entire  victory 
over  the  railway  question,  and  one  cannot  be  sur¬ 
prised  that,  after  the  many  times  Kruger  has  been 
humiliated  and  thwarted  by  the  young  British  states- 


kruger’s  hatred  of  Rhodes. 


163 


man,  a  feeling  of  hatred  of  Rhodes  found  a  place  in 
his  heart. 

In  the  following  chapter  it  will  be  necessary  to 
discuss  the  relations  which  have  existed  between 
Kruger  and  Cecil  Rhodes  since  the  drifts  incident  was 
disposed  of  by  the  issue  of  a  British  ultimatum. 


164 


CHAPTER  XII. 

the  great  duel  :  Rhodes  v.  kruger — continued. 

The  efforts  of  the  Transvaal  Government  to  obtain 
a  foothold  across  the  Limpopo  river  in  the  dominions 
of  Lobengula,  and  the  manner  in  which  these  efforts 
were  frustrated  by  Rhodes,  have  already  been  referred 
to.  The  incident,  however,  which  brought  the  Trans¬ 
vaal  Burghers  and  the  semi-military  forces  of  the 
British  South  African  Company  to  the  brink  of  a 
conflict  on  the  banks  of  the  Limpopo  may  be  de¬ 
scribed  in  greater  detail. 

For  long  Rhodes  had  foreseen  that  a  trek  on  a 
large  scale  by  the  Burghers  of  the  Northern  Trans¬ 
vaal  into  Matabeleland  was  contemplated.  For  many 
years  previously  it  had  been  the  cherished  ambition 
of  the  South  African  Republic  to  establish  a  new 
state  north  of  the  Limpopo,  where,  as  one  of  the 
spokesmen  of  this  movement  put  it,  “a  genuine 
Afrikander  nationality  might  be  developed.”  The 
creation  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  had,  of 
course,  the  immediate  effect  of  preventing  any  trek 
on  a  scale  large  enough  to  receive  the  support  of  the 
Transvaal  Government ;  so  President  Kruger  and  those 
with  him  set  about  finding  another  method  of  gaining 
a  foothold  in  the  fertile  country  of  Matabeleland. 


A  NEW  REPUBLIC  THREATENED. 


165 


Long  experience  had  shown  Kruger  that  while  it 
was  worse  than  useless  for  him  to  defy  Great  Britain 
openly  by  the  deliberate  breaking  of  a  treaty  and 
by  refusing  to  be  longer  bound  by  it,  yet  if  he 
studiously  ignored  its  existence  and  provisions,  and 
set  about  gaining  the  object  on  which  he  had  deter¬ 
mined  as  though  totally  oblivious  of  his  infringement 
of  British  rights,  he  generally  got  some  portion  of 
what  he  wanted.  It  is  a  delightfully  simple  method 
of  procedure  :  to  steal  a  loaf  of  bread  belonging  to 
your  neighbour  in  the  hope  that  he  will  permit  you 
to  retain  one  half  of  it  on  your  handing  him  back 
the  other  half. 

In  the  early  part  of  1891  it  was  openly  announced 
in  the  Transvaal  that  a  great  trek  of  the  Burghers 
of  the  Lydenburg  district  to  the  north  of  the  Lim¬ 
popo  was  about  to  take  place,  and  that  on  June  1 
of  that  year  the  new  Boer  republic  of  Banjailand 
would  be  formally  called  into  existence.  With  this 
movement,  of  course,  the  Transvaal  Government  had, 
on  the  surface,  nothing  whatever  to  do  ;  but  under¬ 
neath  the  whole  affair  was  to  be  descried  the  con¬ 
trolling  influence  of  Kruger  and  Joubert.  Immedi¬ 
ately,  protests  against  this  forthcoming  trek  were 
lodged  at  Pretoria  by  Mr  Rhodes  in  his  capacity 
as  managing  director  of  the  Chartered  Company, 
and  by  the  High  Commissioner  on  behalf  of  the 
British  Government,  whose  aid  in  the  matter  was 
invoked  by  the  British  South  Africa  Company. 
Following  his  accustomed  policy,  President  Kruger 
absolutely  ignored  these  protests,  and  as  preparations 
for  the  incursion  into  the  dominions  of  the  Chartered 
Company  went  on  with  increasing  vigour,  the  situa¬ 
tion  rapidly  became  grave. 


16(5 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


Kruger  relied,  doubtless,  on  the  complex  machinery 
by  which  the  British  Empire  is  governed  to  give 
him  the  time  he  needed  for  the  carrying  out  of  his 
project.  He  knew  that  no  arrival  of  troops  on  a 
really  formidable  scale  could  take  place  for  at  least 
several  weeks,  before  which  time  the  new  republic 
would  have  been  successfully  set  up,  when,  following 
his  usual  line  of  conduct,  he  would  demand  hand¬ 
some  compensation  before  consenting  to  withdraw 
his  Burghers  from  a  spot  where  they  had  not  the 
least  right  to  be. 

Fortunately  for  the  speedy  defeat  of  these  schemes, 
President  Kruger  had  opposed  to  him  a  man  whose 
contempt  for  red  tape  is  carried  at  times  to  the 
extremest  limits.  While  Sir  Henry  Loch,  at  that 
time  the  High  Commissioner  at  the  Cape,  was  com¬ 
municating  with  the  Colonial  Office  and  awaiting 
the  instructions  of  the  Cabinet  regarding  this  matter, 
Rhodes  quickly  moved  down  all  the  B.  S.  A.  Co. 
police  he  could  muster  to  the  drifts  on  the  Limpopo, 
where  they  were  joined  by  hastily  enrolled  bodies 
of  settlers,  who,  by  the  terms  on  which  they  were 
allowed  to  enter  the  country,  were  liable  for  military 
service  in  times  of  need. 

Thus  it  came  about  that  when  the  Boer  trekkers 
reached  the  fords  across  the  river,  they  found  strong 
bodies  of  armed  men  awaiting  their  approach  and 
wearing  a  decidedly  menacing  appearance.  A  halt 
of  the  trekkers  was  immediately  called,  and  while  a 
few  of  the  younger  and  more  impetuous  Boers  favoured 
the  crossing  of  the  drifts,  by  armed  force  if  necessary, 
they  were  overruled,  and  communications  were  opened 
up  with  the  leaders  of  the  defending  force,  asking 
for  the  reason  of  the  opposition  to  the  trek.  The 


THE  TREK  FRUSTRATED. 


167 


answer  of  Mr  Rhodes’  lieutenants  was  brief  and 
pointed.  No  Boers,  they  explained,  would  be  per¬ 
mitted  to  cross  the  river  for  the  purpose  of  setting 
up  a  new  republic  on  soil  that  had  some  time 
before  passed  under  British  control :  the  trekkers 
must  either  return  to  their  former  homes  or,  if  they 
still  desired  to  enter  Matabeleland,  must  do  so  as 
British  subjects  under  the  control  of  the  Chartered 
Company  and  on  precisely  the  same  terms  as  those 
accepted  by  the  original  settlers  in  Rhodesia.  On 
these  terms  they  would  be  welcome ;  on  no  others 
would  they  be  permitted  to  cross  the  river. 

Rhodes’  policy  in  this  respect  was  identical  with 
that  which  he  had  pursued  seven  years  before  with 
the  Boers  of  Stellaland.  He  was  prepared  to  wel¬ 
come  the  Boers  in  Rhodesia,  and  to  grant  them  every 
right  and  privilege  that  was  accorded  to  the  British 
colonists  ;  but  they  on  their  part  must  acknowledge 
the  ultimate  supremacy  of  Great  Britain,  and  must 
cast  oft1  all  thoughts  of  forming  pseudo-republics  that 
were  to  be  incorporated  with  the  Transvaal  as  soon 
as  the  time  for  doing  so  was  ripe. 

Thus  the  efforts  of  the  Boers  to  extend  the 
borders  of  the  Transvaal  northwards  were  frus¬ 
trated  by  the  energetic  measures  of  Mr  Rhodes ; 
and  President  Kruger,  with  mixed  feelings  of  anger 
and  dismay,  saw  that  the  Transvaal  was  being  slowly 
but  surely  encircled  with  a  zone  of  British  territory, 
and  that  all  his  efforts  to  prevent  this  were  in  vain. 
Whichever  way  the  Transvaal  President  turned,  he 
was  confronted  by  the  masterful  figure  of  Cecil 
Rhodes,  who  made  no  secret  of  his  purpose  to  con¬ 
fine  the  Transvaal  to  its  original  boundaries.  Re¬ 
ferring  to  this  in  a  speech  he  made  at  Cape  Town, 


168 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


Rhodes  said  in  the  plainest  and  most  unmistakable 
language  that  “  there  would  be  no  more  Boer  re¬ 
publics  permitted  to  be  set  up  in  South  Africa.”  It 
was  just  about  the  time  of  this  speech  that  Kruger 
began  really  to  realise  the  calibre  of  the  man  whom 
he  had  opposed  to  him. 

While  from  this  time  onward  President  Kruger 
imported  into  his  constant  disputes  and  contentions 
with  Mr  Rhodes  considerable  personal  animosity, 
Rhodes  on  his  part  never  retaliated  by  manifesting 
any  personal  dislike  for  the  Transvaal  President.  Im¬ 
patient  with  Kruger’s  hole-and-corner,  retrogressive, 
and  obstinate  system  of  governing  a  valuable  portion 
of  South  Africa  Rhodes  undoubtedly  was,  and  in  fact, 
with  his  ideas  and  ambitions  of  a  nature  so  near  akin 
and  yet  so  diametrically  opposed  to  those  of  President 
Kruger,  it  could  scarcely  be  otherwise ;  but  he  never 
showed  the  least  unfriendly  feeling  towards  Kruger 
the  man  as  distinct  from  Kruger  the  politician.  On 
the  contrary,  he  was  prepared  at  any  time,  both  before 
the  Raid  and  after,  to  extend  the  hand  of  friendship 
to  the  President  of  the  Transvaal,  and  to  work  in 
amity  with  him  for  the  welfare  of  both  Dutch  and 
British  in  South  Africa.  So  far,  however,  from 
Kruger  consenting  to  meet  Rhodes  half  way  in  these 
advances  for  a  better  understanding  between  them, 
the  old  Dopper  withdrew  still  farther  into  his  shell, 
and  refused  to  relent  in  even  the  slightest  degree 
towards  the  man  who  had  on  so  many  occasions 
thwarted  and  outwitted  him. 

We  now  approach  that  most  complex,  and  in  some 
respects  most  momentous,  chapter  in  Mr  Rhodes’ 
life,  the  Jameson  Raid,  its  causes  and  its  conse¬ 
quences  ;  and  here  the  biographer  of  Mr  Rhodes 


THE  JOHANNESBURG  AGITATION. 


169 


feels  himself  to  be  stepping  on  delicate  ground, 
inasmuch  as,  however  he  strives  to  be  impartial  in 
his  deductions  and  correct  in  his  statement  of  facts, 
he  is  bound  to  be  assailed  with  a  storm  of  criticism 
and  abuse  from  one  section  or  another  of  those  who 
find  themselves  in  opposition  to  him. 

To  arrive  at  the  commencement  of  the  events  which 
led  up  to  the  invasion  of  the  Transvaal  by  Dr  Jame¬ 
son’s  force,  it  is  necessary  to  revert  to  the  middle  of 
the  year  1895.  The  condition  of  the  Uitlander  popu¬ 
lation  of  Johannesburg  had  gradually  been  growing 
worse  and  worse.  It  was  not  quite  so  bad,  perhaps, 
as  some  of  the  members  of  the  Reform  Committee 
have  since  tried  to  make  us  believe,  but  certainly 
the  restrictions  and  burdens  which  were  imposed  upon 
that  section  of  the  community  (which,  after  all,  paid 
practically  the  whole  of  the  taxes  of  the  country, 
and  had  brought  it  from  the  verge  of  bankruptcy 
to  the  position  of  a  rich  and  flourishing  state)  were 
galling  in  the  extreme  to  men  accustomed  in  their 

own  countries  to  free  and  enlightened  institutions. 

© 

Even  in  such  a  minor  question  as  the  control  of  the 
Johannesburg  waterworks  the  Uitlander  population 
of  that  town,  virtually  the  whole  of  the  inhabitants, 
were  not  allowed  a  voice,  and  no  one  can  be  surprised 
that  a  movement  was  set  on  foot  for  obtaining  con¬ 
cessions  of  better  government  from  the  executive  at 
Pretoria.  It  was  for  this  purpose  that  the  since 
famous  Reform  Committee  was  founded. 

It  has  often  been  said  that  the  whole  of  this  Re¬ 
form  movement  was  artificial,  stimulated  solely  by 
the  great  capitalists  of  the  Rand  for  their  own  ends. 
It  is  not  the  present  writer’s  province  in  a  book  of 
this  nature  to  argue  for  or  against  this  view  ;  but  he 


170 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


may  at  least  point  out  that  it  was  the  capitalists  who 
had  the  most  to  lose  in  the  event  of  a  collision  with 
the  authorities,  and  that  therefore  it  would  appear 
somewhat  strange  that  they  should  have  run  the  risks 
they  did  for  the  attainment  of  ends  which  would  in 
all  probability  avail  them  little  or  not  at  all. 

How  Rhodes  first  came  into  sympathy  with  this 
v  movement  is  easy  to  explain.  His  interest  in  the 
gold  mines  of  the  Rand  was  very  large,  and  when  the 
Reform  Committee  was  established  he  was  naturally 
invited  either  to  become  a  member  or  to  appoint  a 
representative.  His  name,  moreover,  was  one  to  con¬ 
jure  with,  not  only  in  Johannesburg  but  throughout 
the  whole  of  South  Africa.  When  this  invitation 
was  sent  to  him  he  appointed  his  brother,  Captain 
Ernest  Rhodes,  who  was  then  in  Johannesburg  as 
his  representative  on  the  local  directorate  of  the 
Consolidated  Goldfields  of  South  Africa,  Limited,  to 
act  on  his  behalf  on  the  Reform  Committee.  At  this 
time  Rhodes,  apart  from  the  magic  of  his  name,  was 
regarded  by  those  at  the  head  of  the  Reform  move¬ 
ment  in  Johannesburg  as  simply  one  of  their  number, 
no  more  and  no  less.  He  stood  for  the  interest  of 
the  Consolidated  Goldfields,  just  as  Mr  Lionel  Phillips 
represented  the  Wernher-Beit  interest  and  Mr  George 
Farrar  represented  the  interest  of  the  family  and  firm 
of  that  name. 

Captain  Ernest  Rhodes  did  not  remain  at  Johan¬ 
nesburg  very  long  after  the  formation  of  the  Reform 
Committee,  and  when  he  quitted  that  town  on  his 
return  to  England  another  brother  of  Mr  Rhodes, 
Colonel  Francis  William  Rhodes,  took  his  place  in 
the  offices  of  the  Consolidated  Goldfields  and  on  the 
Reform  Committee. 


From  a  photo  by  Fassano,  London 


Col.  F.  W.  RHODES,  D.S.O. 


COLONEL  RHODES,  D.S.O. 


171 


Colonel  Frank  Rhodes,  to  use  the  name  by  which 
he  is  more  generally  recognised,  is  perhaps  the  best- 
known  member  of  the  Rhodes  family  after  Cecil. 
Educated  as  a  soldier  from  his  youth,  he  has  at 
one  time  or  another  seen  a  considerable  amount  of 
active  service  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  On 
leaving  Sandhurst  he  was  gazetted  to  the  1st  Royal 
Dragoons,  and  remained  in  the  army  for  about  twenty- 
three  years  in  all.  He  was  through  the  Soudan  cam¬ 
paign,  and  accompanied  the  Nile  expedition  to  Khar¬ 
toum  in  the  abortive  effort  to  relieve  General  Gordon, 
and  was  present  at  the  battles  of  El  Teb  and  Tamai. 

At  the  hot  fight  round  the  wells  of  Abu  Klea 
Colonel  Rhodes  specially  distinguished  himself,  and 
had  several  horses  shot  under  him  in  the  course  of 
the  engagement.  He  was  many  times  mentioned  in 
despatches,  and  was  awarded  several  medals  and 
clasps,  while  some  years  later  the  Distinguished  Ser¬ 
vice  Order  was  given  him.  At  various  times  he  has 
filled  several  staff  appointments,  accompanying  Sir 
Gerald  Portal  to  Uganda,  and  being  one  of  the  lead¬ 
ing  members  of  Lord  Harris’s  entourage  when  that 
nobleman  was  Governor  of  Bombay.  For  a  short 
period  he  was  administrator  of  Mashonaland,  where 
he  was  highly  popular ;  and  since  the  Raid  he  has 
acted  as  special  correspondent  for  the  ‘  Times  ’  in 
Lord  Kitchener’s  Soudan  campaign,  which  culminated 
with  the  battle  of  Omdurman,  where  he  was  wounded. 
At  the  present  time  he  is  the  managing  director  of 
the  African  Trans-Continental  Telegraph  Company. 
While  in  the  army  he  was  one  of  the  most  popular 
officers  it  would  have  been  possible  to  find,  and  all 
who  have  ever  met  him  have  appreciated  his  kindly 
and  genial  temperament,  for  many  of  the  rugged  traits 


172 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


which  render  his  more  famous  brother  rather  un¬ 
popular  in  some  circles  are  absent  in  him.  He  has 
on  many  occasions  shown  himself  to  be  a  highly 
capable  military  strategist  and  leader  of  men  in  the 
field,  but  it  must  be  confessed  that  he  does  not  shine 
as  a  politician  or  a  diplomatist. 

So  soon,  then,  as  Colonel  Rhodes  arrived  at  Johan¬ 
nesburg  he  became  a  member  of  the  Reform  Com¬ 
mittee,  and  he  devoted  himself  strenuously  to  obtain¬ 
ing  a  better  and  more  liberal  system  of  government 
for  the  Uitlander  population  of  the  Transvaal.  It  is 
necessary  to  set  out  here  exactly  what  the  aims  of 
the  Reform  Committee  were  at  the  time  it  came  into 
existence.  The  object  of  this  body,  which  comprised 
representatives  of  every  important  interest  and  class 
in  Johannesburg,  was  to  bring  about  the  better  gov¬ 
ernment  of  the  state  by  strictly  constitutional  means. 
Nothing  was  further  from  the  thoughts  of  those  form¬ 
ing  the  Reform  Committee  than  an  appeal  to  armed 
force  or  any  organised  attempt  to  overthrow  the  exist¬ 
ing  Government  of  the  South  African  Republic.  All 
the  committee  desired  and  asked  for — and  it  was  not 
an  unreasonable  request,  surely — was  for  fairer  gov¬ 
ernment,  and  for  some  voice,  however  small,  in  the 
spending  of  those  vast  sums  of  money  which  they 
were  actually  the  means  of  providing.  Unfortunately 
President  Kruger  and  his  advisers  maintained  a  stiff¬ 
necked  attitude  towards  the  petitions  and  appeals  of 
the  Reform  Committee,  and  refused  to  make  even  the 
least  tangible  concessions.  “  Yes,”  President  Kruger 
is  reported  to  have  said  with  a  scornful  ring  in  his 
voice  as  he  tore  up  a  petition  signed  by  the  popula¬ 
tion  of  Johannesburg,  “you  will  get  your  ‘rights’ — 
over  my  dead  body  !  ”  Had  the  Transvaal  President 


GROWING  UITLANDER  DISCONTENT. 


173 


made  the  least  advance  towards  meeting  the  desires 
of  the  Reform  Committee  in  1895  it  is  certain  that 
the  Raid  would  never  have  taken  place,  and  it  is 
possible  that  the  present  devastating  war  would  have 
been  averted. 

When  it  was  seen,  however,  that  Kruger  was 
obdurate,  and  was  steadfast  in  his  determination  to 
keep  the  Uitlanders  from  gaining  the  least  scrap 
of  political  freedom,  murmurs  of  discontent  and  anger 
in  Johannesburg  began  to  grow  in  volume,  and  it 
was  at  this  time  that  an  appeal  to  arms,  if  every 
other  means  failed,  was  first  thought  of.  Rhodes 
had  long  been  convinced  that  nothing  in  the  way 
of  real  concessions  would  ever  be  wrung  from  the 
Transvaal  Government  by  the  Uitlanders,  and  the 
position  that  Kruger  and  his  advisers  took  up  showed 
that  he  was  right...  It  was  about  this  time,  too^. 
that  the  paths  of  the  Reform  Committee  and  Mr 
Rhodes  began  to  diverge,  and  that  the  latter  set 
about  the  development  of  a  hastily  sketched  plan 
of  campaign  which  ultimately  terminated  in  the 
disastrous  Raid.  Arms  and  ammunition  were,  with 
Rhodes’  active  advice  and  assistance,  smuggled  into 
Johannesburg,  while  large  reserves  were  stored  in 
the  De  Beers  mines  at  Kimberley  ;  and  those  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  Reform  Committee  who  were  at  first 
disposed  to  question  the  necessity  for  these  warlike 
preparations  salved  their  consciences  with  the  thought 
that 

“  Who  would  be  free,  themselves  must  strike  the  blow.” 

It  must  in  fairness  be  pointed  out  that  Rhodes, 
who  was  the  moving  spirit  in  these  preparations  for 
an  armed  conflict  if  necessary,  was  not  in  the  least 


174 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


actuated  by  the  motives  of  a  common  filibuster.  All 
the  spleen  and  anger  with  which  his  antagonists 
have  assailed  him  has  failed  to  show  that  he  hoped 
or  expected  to  reap  the  slightest  personal  gain  from 
the  revolution  in  Johannesburg.  The  whole  weight 
of  evidence  points  clearly  in  the  other  direction.  He 
perceived,  and  indeed  this  fact  was  now  obvious  to 
all,  that  Kruger  would  not  grant  one  jot  or  tittle  of 
the  demands,  by  no  means  outrageous,  of  the  Uit- 
landers ;  therefore,  he  reasoned,  all  that  was  left 
to  them  was  an  appeal  to  arms.  It  seemed  to  hirq 
that  while  they  remained  passive,  Kruger  would  turn 
a  deaf  ear  to  the  reasoning  and  petitions  of  the 
Reform  Committee,  but  that  the  moment  the  whole 
white  male  population  of  the  Rand  flew  to  arms  and 
suddenly  menaced  the  capital,  the  Transvaal  Govern¬ 
ment  would  prove  amenable  to  reason,  and  substan¬ 
tial  concessions  would  be  forced  from  the  executive. 
Especially  did  he  think  so,  because  Great  Britain 
would  be  at  once  on  the  alert  to  know  the  true 
inwardness  of  this  rising,  and  to  see  that  her  subjects 
were  not  punished  in  a  manner  disproportionate  to 
their  offences. 

Such  was  the  idea  of  Rhodes  in  November  1895, 
and  his  scheme  for  carrying  out  the  plan  of  action 
he  had  formed  met  with  the  full  approval  of  the 
Reform  Committee,  who,  however,  showed  a  very 
commendable  desire  to  exhaust  all  peaceable  methods 
of  obtaining  what  they,  rightly  or  wrongly,  conceived 
to  be  justice  before  adopting  the  extreme  step  of 
an  armed  revolution. 

There  was  another  factor  in  the  situation  that 
Mr  Rhodes  and  the  Reform  Committee  had  to  con¬ 
sider  before  the  question  of  an  appeal  to  bnite  force 


A  MILITARY  FORCE  REQUIRED. 


175 


could  be  contemplated  with  any  feeling  of  reasonable 
success  :  that  was,  the  part  which  would  be  played 
by  the  only  organised  military  force  in  the  Transvaal 
— the  Staats  Artillerie.  This  tolerably  well-trained 
and  disciplined  force,  with  its  batteries  of  modern 
quickfiring  weapons,  would,  it  was  obvious,  be  more 
than  a  match  for  the  hastily  armed  and  untrained 
levies  of  the  Rand,  who,  of  course,  were  without 
artillery.  If  Kruger,  as  was  probable,  turned  his 
wrath  on  Johannesburg,  the  artillery  would  be  able 
to  reduce  the  town  to  a  heap  of  ruins  without  any 
fear  of  reprisals. 

What  was  wanted  was  another  well  -  organised  . 
military  or  semi-military  body,  armed  with  field-guns 
of  a  calibre  to  keep  the  Staats  Artillerie  in  check, 
which  should  step  in  between  the  raw  volunteers 
from  Johannesburg  and  the  guns  of  the  Transvaal 
Government.  “Was  there  time,”  the  Reform  Com¬ 
mittee  asked  themselves,  “  to  organise  such  a  body 
and  to  equip  it  with  field-guns,  and  could  such  an 
undertaking  be  carried  through  without  the  President 
becoming  aware  of  it  ?  ” — for,  as  after-events  showed, 
Johannesburg  was  at  that  time,  and  indeed  always 
has  been,  overrun  with  Government  spies.  The 
answer  to  this  question  was  in  the  negative,  and 
therefore  a  solution  of  the  difficulty  had  to  be  found 
elsewhere. 

The  Reform  Committee  looked  to  Rhodes  to  find 
a  satisfactory  answer  to  this  problem  as  to  where 
the  men  and  the  guns  were  to  come  from  to  compel 
the  Staats  Artillerie  to  remain  quiet,  or  successfully 
to  oppose  them  if  the  necessity  arose.  In  his  dilemma 
Rhodes  turned  his  eyes  longingly  to  the  B.  S.  A.  Co. 
police  in  Rhodesia.  Here  was  an  immediate  solution 


176 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


to  his  difficulties.  The  men  were  a  hard-bitten  lot, 
inured  to  hardships,  and  all  of  them  good  riders  and 
shots,  and  possessed  of  guns  to  enable  them  to  attack 
the  Staats  Artillerie  with  confidence  if  the  need 
for  so  doing  arose.  Rhodes,  of  course,  saw  that  he 
was  laying  himself  open  to  very  serious  consequences 
if  his  plan  miscarried,  but  he  had  seen  sufficient  of 
the  world  to  know  that,  whether  he  was  infringing 
the  laws  of  nations  or  not,  if  he  was  successful  he 
would  be  applauded  and  upheld  on  all  hands. 

To  tell  the  truth,  Rhodes  never  seems  to  have 
realised  fully  the  real  gravity  of  his  offence  in  leading 
an  armed  force  into  the  territory  of  an  independent, 
or  rather  a  semi-independent,  state.  His  idea,  which 
he  at  once  set  about  carrying  into  effect,  was  to  move 
the  police  down  to  the  little  village  of  Pitsani  on  the 
Transvaal  border,  in  the  strip  of  Bechuanaland  which 
had  recently  been  transferred  from  the  control  of 
the  Colonial  Office  to  that  of  the  Chartered  Com¬ 
pany,  and  to  hold  them  there  until  it  was  clearly 
seen  that  the  Staats  Artillerie  intended  to  assault 
Johannesburg,  when  they  would  have  been  at  once 
moved  over  the  border  to  prevent  this.  It  is  safe 
to  say  that  Rhodes  had  only  one  idea  in  his  mind 
at  this  time  with  regard  to  the  movement  of  the 
forces  he  was  placing  on  the  Transvaal  frontier,  and 
that  was  to  hold  them  there  in  readiness  to  advance 
to  Johannesburg  so  soon  as  it  was  seen  that  the 
Boers  were  getting  the  upper  hand,  when  the  force 
would  be  able  to  restore  order  until  such  time  as 
the  High  Commissioner  could  be  summoned  from 
Cape  Town  to  arbitrate  between  the  contending 
factions. 

This  was  the  real  reason  for  Rhodes  placing  the 


177 


THE  “  FLAG  INCIDENT.” 

troops  on  the  border  ;  and  while  it  must  be  admitted 
that,  speaking  from  a  strictly  legal  point  of  view, 
no  state  of  things,  however  grave,  could  justify  a 
private  or  semi-private  individual  organising  an  armed 
force  to  invade  a  friendly  state,  yet  from  Rhodes’ 
point  of  view  there  was  some  justification  for  the 
step,  especially  as  he  believed  that  the  “  moral  effect,” 
as  he  phrased  it,  of  this  force  would  have  a  restrain¬ 
ing  influence  on  President  Kruger,  and  would  in  all 
probability  prevent  him  from  taking  that  vengeance 
on  the  people  of  Johannesburg  that  he  might  other¬ 
wise  be  tempted  to  do  when  he  found  that  he  had 
that  town,  so  to  speak,  under  his  heel. 

Supposing  things  had  gone  as  Rhodes  had  imagined 
they  would,  and  the  people  of  the  Rand  had  taken 
up  arms  to  enforce  their  demands  for  some  share  in 
the  government  of  the  state,  few  people  either  in 
South  Africa  or  in  Great  Britain  would  have  blamed 
Rhodes  for  employing  the  B.  S.  A.  Co.  police  to  pro¬ 
tect  non-combatants,  and  to  restore  order  at  Johan¬ 
nesburg  until  such  time  as  the  High  Commissioner 
could  reach  that  spot  and  discuss  the  matter  with 
President  Kruger.  It  was  that,  and  nothing  more 
than  that,  which  was  in  the  mind  of  Mr  Rhodes  at 
the  time  that  he  moved  the  police  down  to  Pitsani. 

The  “  flag  incident,”  as  it  was  called,  was  a  small 
matter  in  itself ;  but  it  led  to  great  results,  inasmuch 
as  it  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  difference  between 
Rhodes  and  the  Reform  Committee  becoming  so  pro¬ 
nounced  as  it  did,  and  ultimately  led  to  the  fiasco  of 
the  Raid  and  the  triumph  of  Kruger.  The  committee, 
not  vuthout  reason  it  must  be  admitted,  held  that  as 
the  ^hole  agitation  was  a  purely  internal  one,  and 
was  intended  to  amend  the  government  of  the  Trans¬ 
it 


178 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER, 


vaal  and  not  to  replace  it,  the  flag  that  the  insurgents 
should  fight  under  ought  to  be  that  of  the  South 
African  Republic,  especially  as  there  were  so  many 
members  of  the  movement  who  were  not  British  sub¬ 
jects,  and  had  no  desire  to  become  so.  To  this  course 
Rhodes  was  strongly  opposed,  and  it  must  be  said  at 
once  that  the  attitude  he  adopted  was  absolutely  in¬ 
defensible.  He  held  that  the  Uitlanders  should  at 
once  hoist  the  union-jack  and  appeal  for  protection 
to  Great  Britain.  The  Committee  maintained  its 
position,  and  refused  to  assent  to  Rhodes’  proposal ; 
and  as  neither  side  would  give  way,  a  deadlock  ensued 
for  some  weeks,  during  which  time  news  of  the  intended 
revolution  filtered  through  to  Pretoria  and  put  Kruger 
and  his  advisers  on  their  guard. 

Meanwhile  the  men  under  Dr  Jameson  and  Sir  John 
Willoughby  chafed  increasingly  at  what  seemed  to 
them  to  be  a  purposeless  delay,  and  it  was  then  that 
Jameson  with  his  officers  embarked  upon  that  wild 
scheme  which  it  is  safe  to  say  astounded  Cecil  Rhodes 
just  as  much  as  it  did  the  world  at  large.  Jameson 
“  took  the  bit  between  his  teeth,”  to  adopt  Rhodes’ 
picturesque  phrase,  and  invaded  the  Transvaal  with¬ 
out  the  least  warning,  with  a  result  that  is  too  well 
known  to  need  recapitulation. 

The  immediate  effect  of  the  Raid  was  to  place 
President  Kruger  in  the  right  in  the  view  of  the 
whole  world,  and  to  condemn  Rhodes  as  a  criminal, 
and,  what  was  much  worse,  as  a  bungler.  By  this 
time,  however,  the  mists  have  cleared  away  a  little, 
and  it  is  possible  to  form  a  better  judgment,  and  to  see 
that  while  Kruger  was  not  the  injured  martyr  he  so 
loudly  proclaimed  himself,  Rhodes  was  not  a  feather- 
headed  filibuster  who  set  500  men  with  eleven  pieces 


THE  CULMINATION  OF  THE  DUEL. 


179 


of  comparatively  light  ordnance  to  seize  a  country 
which  for  two  years  has  defied  the  whole  armed 
strength  of  the  British  Empire. 

It  does  not  need  much  penetration  to  perceive  that,, 
had  Rhodes  contemplated  an  attack  on  the  Transvaal 
Government  and  the  conquest  of  the  country,  he  would 
have  organised  a  far  larger  force  than  he  did,  and  that 
he  would  have  carried  out  the  whole  of  his  prepara¬ 
tions  on  a  much  vaster  scale  than  actually  was  the 
case.  The  very  fact  that  Dr  Jameson’s  force  was  so 
small  and  so  comparatively  impotent  should  be  suffi¬ 
cient  to  convince  the  impartial  observer  that,  whatever 
may  have  been  the  idea  that  Cecil  Rhodes  had  in 
his  mind  in  placing  this  force  on  the  boundary  of 
the  Transvaal,  it  certainly  was  not  that  of  seizing  the 
country  by  force  of  arms. 

It  was  thus  that  the  lengthy  duel  between  Rhodes 
and  Kruger  culminated  with  all  the  honours  going  to 
the  latter.  After  being  defeated  and  baffled  on  every 
occasion  on  which  they  had  come  into  collision,  Kruger 
had,  through  one  false  move  on  the  part  of  his  opponent, 
snatched  the  final  victory  ;  and  while  he  was  able  to 
appear  before  the  world  as  a  somewhat  pathetic  figure 
whose  country  had  been  assailed  and  rights  trampled 
underfoot  by  a  jealous  rival,  Cecil  Rhodes  was,  for  a 
time  at  any  rate,  utterly  discredited  as  one  who  not 
only  had  conspired  against  the  peace  of  a  small  but 
friendly  state,  but  had  at  the  same  time  misled  and 
deceived  those  who  were  nominally  his  allies. 

This  was  undoubtedly  the  greatest  opportunity  of 
Kruger’s  whole  career.  He  had  the  sympathies  of 
practically  the  whole  world  with  him  ;  for,  at  least 
until  the  publication  of  the  ill  -  advised  telegram  of 
the  German  Emperor  caused  a  revulsion,  even  in 


180 


THE  GREAT  DUEL  :  RHODES  V.  KRUGER. 


England  there  was  a  considerable  amount  of  feeling 
in  his  favour,  and  the  only  man  who  at  all  rivalled 
him  in  South  Africa  was,  as  it  seemed,  absolutely 
ruined. 

A  wiser  and  more  gifted  statesman  than  the  ex- 
President  of  the  South  African  Republic  has  proved 
himself  would  have  grasped  this  opportunity  with 
eagerness.  By  a  reasonable  and  conciliatory  attitude 
towards  the  Uitlanders  in  his  country,  and  by  strict 
justice,  tinctured,  however,  with  some  show  of  mercy 
towards  the  Reform  leaders,  he  could  have  totally 
abolished  the  whole  of  Rhodes’  power  at  one  blow, 
and  stood  out  alone  as  the  one  prominent  man  in 
South  Africa.  Instead  of  this,  he  frittered  away  his 
opportunity,  and  by  an  overweening  belief  in  his  own 
powers  involved  his  country  in  a  terrible  war,  which 
brought  about  the  necessity  for  his  slinking  away  like 
a  thief  in  the  night,  carrying  with  him  millions  of 
money  to  which  he  had  not  the  slightest  right,  to 
end  his  days  in  exile  with  the  painful  knowledge  that 
he  had  brought  his  country,  his  family,  and  himself  to 
absolute  misery  and  utter  ruin.  It  is  a  pitiful  picture 
of  the  deliberate  flinging  away  of  an  otherwise  great 
career  for  the  want  of  the  saving  grace  of  a  little 
common-sense. 

As  for  Rhodes,  while  it  seemed  to  all  that  his  career 
as  a  public  man  in  South  Africa  was  completely  at  an 
end,  he  himself  knew  better.  He  retired  for  a  time 
from  public  life,  and  contented  himself  with  remaining 
in  the  background  and  moulding  bullets  for  other,  and 
less  capable,  men  to  shoot.  The  few  months  immedi¬ 
ately  succeeding  the  Jameson  Raid  were  the  darkest 
portion  of  his  life,  and  that  he  ever  emerged  from  it 
to  build  up  a  new  reputation  on  the  ashes  of  the 


Rhodes’  magnetic  power. 


181 


old  is  the  strongest  evidence  that  can  be  produced 
of  his  inherent  power  to  sway  the  minds  of  his 
fellow-men. 

At  a  subsequent  stage  in  this  biography  it  will  be 
necessary  to  refer  in  greater  detail  to  the  course  of 
events  immediately  preceding  and  succeeding  the 
Jameson  Raid. 


182 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 

It  was  early  in  the  year  1891  that  Rhodes  found 
himself  able  to  pay  his  first  visit  to  Mashonaland. 
Accompanying  him  was  a  small  party  of  personal 
friends,  including  Dr  Jameson.  Dr  Jameson,  it  had 
been  decided,  was  to  succeed  Mr  A.  R.  Colquhoun  as 
the  administrator  of  the  country,  while  Mr  Colqu¬ 
houn  was  to  proceed  eastwards  to  negotiate  with 
Umtassa,  the  chief  of  Manicaland,  for  a  concession  to 
work  the  minerals  in  his  country  with  results  that 
have  already  been  related. 

Hitherto  Rhodes  had  been  compelled  to  depend 
entirely  on  the  reports  of  travellers  and  hunters  for 
information  regarding  the  real  resources  of  the  country 
which  he  had  been  the  means  of  adding  to  the  British 
Empire :  now  at  last  he  was  able  to  see  the  land 
for  himself,  and  to  gauge  more  accurately  than  had 
previously  been  possible  the  prospects  of  Mashonaland. 

In  the  words  of  one  who  accompanied  him,  “  Rhodes 
simply  revelled  in  the  tour,”  which  he  regarded  in  the 
light  of  a  well-earned  holiday.  So  soon  as  Mashona¬ 
land  was  entered,  the  whole  weight  of  his  responsi¬ 
bility  as  Premier  of  Cape  Colony,  the  head  of  the 
gigantic  diamond  industry,  and  the  managing  director 


RHODES  VISITS  MASHONALAND. 


183 


of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  seemed  to  fall 
like  a  burden  from  his  shoulders,  and  he  became 
buoyant  and  as  gay  as  a  schoolboy  during  the  vaca¬ 
tion,  as  the  little  party  moved  northwards  over  the 
fertile  plains  of  the  rich  Mashona  country. 

The  objective  of  Mr  Rhodes  was  Salisbury,  where 
there  were  already  several  little  points  of  difference 
between  settlers  around  that  town  and  the  Chartered 
Company  which  called  for  his  personal  attention.  He 
did  not  hurry  forward  to  the  capital,  however,  but 
made  it  his  business  to  examine  closely  everything 
on  the  way  that  presented  itself  to  his  sight.  He 
turned  aside  from  his  direct  path  to  see  the  gold-reefs 
in  the  Hartley  Hill  district,  where  some  years  previ¬ 
ously  Lobengula  had  erected  a  small  and  primitive 
crushing-mill  for  the  treatment  of  the  ores.  - _ s 

Nothing,  apparently,  was  too  small  or  too  trivial 
to  call  for  Rhodes’  attention.  By  long  conversations 
with  such  settlers  on  the  land  as  he  met  on  his  way 
to  Salisbury  he  made  himself  personally  acquainted 
with  all  their  hopes  and  fears,  and  gained  a  great  deal 
of  information  which  proved  of  service  to  him  later, 
when  the  rapid  growth  of  the  white  population  made 
it  necessary  for  him  to  organise  the  government  and 
administration  of  the  country  on  a  much  larger  and 
more  complete  scale  than  had  at  first  been  needed. 

Rhodes  has  never  lost  that  keen  love  of  farming 
and  out-of-door  life  generally  which  his  early  bringing- 
up  in  the  heart  of  rural  England  had  implanted  in  his 
nature.  As  he  himself  has  told  us — and  those  who 
know  the  man  best  will  best  realise  how  true  it  is — 
there  was  nothing  in  1891  he  would  have  liked  better 
than  to  have  cast  behind  him  the  whole  of  his  wealth 
and  political  fame  and  power,  and  to  have  settled 


184 


BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 


down  to  cultivate  a  Rhodesian  farm  and  spend  the 
remainder  of  his  life  in  placid  calm,  tending  his  cattle 
and  sheep  and  sowing  and  garnering  his  crops  in 
happy  ignorance  of  all  that  was  transpiring  in  the 
outside  world.  With  longing  eyes  he  would  sit  on 
his  horse  and  watch  in  silence  the  hardy  young 
settlers  in  Mashonaland  bustling  about  their  newly 
acquired  farms,  building  houses  and  huts,  or  clearing 
and  preparing  the  ground  for  the  reception  of  the 
seed  or  the  feeding  of  their  flocks. 

Then  after  a  time  Rhodes  would  turn  away  with  a 
quick  jerk  of  the  reins  and  a  tightening  around  the 
corners  of  his  mouth,  and  his  eyebrows  would  be 
contracted  once  more,  and  the  customary  cold  gleam 
come  into  his  eyes,  as  he  thought  of  the  many  and 
great  political  aims  that  yet  remained  for  him  to 
accomplish  before  he  could  tell  himself  that  his  life- 
work  was  completed,  and  that  he  could  thereafter  live 
in  ease  and  quietness  far  away  from  the  toil  and  bustle 
of  the  world. 

Besides  profiting  directly  by  thus  coming  into  con¬ 
tact  with  the  settlers  in  Mashonaland,  Rhodes  also 
reaped  an  indirect  advantage  by  increasing  the 
colonists’  faith  in  him  through  the  personal  inter¬ 
course  they  were  able  to  have  with  him.  From  the 
first  day  that  the  pioneer  column  entered  Mashona¬ 
land  one  and  all  regarded  Cecil  Rhodes  as  the  head  of 
the  country,  and  the  man  who  would  mean  the  differ¬ 
ence  between  the  success  and  the  failure  of  the  newly 
created  colony.  To  these  settlers  the  British  South 
Africa  Company  was  a  name  and  nothing  more  —  a 
body  of  gentlemen  dwelling  in  far-away  London,  and 
apparently  without  any  connection  whatever  with  the 
country  they  were  supposed  to  control.  On  the  other 


HERO-WORSHIP  BY  THE  SETTLERS. 


185 


hand,  Rhodes  was  at  this  time  the  dominating-  influ¬ 
ence  of  South  Africa.  VLt  was  he  who  had  brought 
the  Kimberley  diamond  mines  from  a  state  of  in¬ 
significance  and  penury  to  be  the  richest  industry 
in  the  world,  with  a  regular  export  of  diamonds  of 
upwards  of  four  millions  sterling  per  annum.  It  was 
he  who,  as  chairman  of  the  Consolidated  Goldfields, 
Ltd.,  was  one  of  the  leading  figures  on  the  Wit- 
watersrand.  It  was  he  who,  as  the  head  of  the 
Government  of  Cape  Colony,  was  its  principal  spokes¬ 
man  on  all  matters  of  dispute  between  the  colony  and 
the  mother  country.  Lastly,  it  was  he  who  was 
going  to  bring  the  virgin  country  of  Mashonaland 
into  line  with  the  ^ethev  flourishing  colonies  of  the 
British  Empire.  ^ 

i  Probably  these  settlers  were  wrong  in  this  hero- 
worship  :  indeed  they  have  been  told  so  often  enough 
and  in  pretty  forcible  language  by  those  to  whom  the 
name  of  Cecil  Rhodes  is  anathema ;  but  they  clung  to 
their  opinions  with  great  tenacity.  One  and  all  in 
Mashonaland  in  these  early  days  looked  up  to  Rhodes 
as  the  ruling  influence  to  whom  they  could  carry  their 
wrongs — actual  or  imaginary — with  the  knowledge 
that  at  least  they  would  be  assured  of  a  patient  hear¬ 
ing,  and  that  he  would  do  what  he  could  to  assist 
them  and  to  improve  their  condition,  'j 

When  Rhodes  arrived  at  Salisbury' ne  found  that 
quite  a  considerable  town  had  sprung  up  round  the 
original  police  fort,  and  with  the  valuable  assistance 
of  Dr  Rutherfoorcl  Harris  and  Dr  Jameson  he  at  once 
set  about  doing  all  that  he  could  to  improve  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  those  who  had  taken  up  their  abode  in  it.  He 
was  at  this  time  in  negotiation  with  the  Portuguese 
Government  respecting  the  construction  of  a  light 


186 


BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 


railway  from  the  little  port  of  Beira,  on  the  East  Coast 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Pungwe  river,  to  Salisbury,  by 
which  step  he  expected  to  inaugurate  an  era  of  great 
prosperity,  not  in  the  town  of  Salisbury  only,  but 
throughout  the  whole  of  Mashonaland.  His  scheme 
for  a  telegraph-wire  to  link  Cape  Town  with  the  Nile 
and  the  Mediterranean  was  even  then  in  his  mind  ; 
and  the  first  section  of  this  wire,  from  Cape  Town  as 
far  north  as  Salisbury,  was  at  that  very  time  being 
pushed  forward  as  quickly  as  possible. 

He  had  not  been  in  Salisbury  long  before  a  deputa¬ 
tion  of  the  settlers  visited  him  in  order  to  lay  before 
him  some  grievances  under  which  they  considered 
themselves  to  be  suffering,  and  to  ask  for  their  im¬ 
mediate  redress.  Prominent  among  these  hardships, 
they  stated,  was  that  clause  in  the  charter  by  which 
the  British  South  Africa  Company  had  the  right  to 
50  per  cent  of  all  minerals  found  in  the  country. 
This  the  prospectors  held  to  be  very  unfair,  for,  as 
they  pointed  out,  a  man  might  spend  months  of  his 
time  and  nearly  the  whole  of  his  capital  searching 
for  a  payable  gold-reef  in  the  country,  and  then,  so 
soon  as  he  was  lucky  enough  to  come  across  a  rich 
strike,  the  Chartered  Company  came  down  upon  him 
with  a  demand  for  one-half  of  the  total  earnings  of  the 
mine. 

In  the  short  speech  in  which  Bhodes  answered  the 
deputation  he  told  them  frankly  that  he  quite  realised 
and  sympathised  with  their  dislike  for  this  clause. 
Personally,  he  was  not  in  favour  of  it.  The  settlers, 
however,  must  not  forget  that  the  Chartered  Com¬ 
pany  had  already  spent  a  huge  sum  of  money,  some¬ 
where  about  half  a  million  sterling,  in  the  country, 
and  this  50-per-cent  clause  was  the  only  way  in  which 


187 


THE  “  50-PER-CENT  CLAUSE.” 

they  could  hope,  not  absolutely  to  recoup  themselves 
for  their  outlay,  but  to  make  the  revenue  of  the 
country  approach  the  amount  of  the  expenditure. 
In  addition  to  this  tax  the  only  sources  of  revenue 
the  company  had  at  this  time  were  the  sales  of 
“  town  stands  ”  in  Salisbury  and  other  settlements, 
the  post-office,  and  prospecting  and  mining  licences. 
All  of  these  combined  only  provided  a  comparatively 
small  sum  annually,  and  it  was  imperative  for  the 
continued  existence  of  the  British  South  Africa  Com- 
pancy  that  this  “  50  -  per  -  cent  clause  ”  should  be 
retained. 

He  was  quite  willing,  however,  to  give  the  deputa¬ 
tion  a  pledge  that,  unless  something  utterly  unforeseen 
arose  that  should  send  the  expenses  of  administering 
the  country  very  much  higher  than  they  were  at  that 
moment,  the  full  amount  of  50  per  cent  of  the  earnings 
of  any  mine  in  the  country  should  never  be  claimed. 
It  may  be  added  that  this  full  amount  has  never  yet 
been  enforced,  the  company  in  most  cases  having  been 
content  to  accept  30  per  cent,  and  even  less,  of  a 
mine’s  earnings,  while  a  system  has  been  introduced 
whereby  the  various  mining  companies  in  Rhodesia 
have  been  able  to  compound  with  the  Chartered  Com¬ 
pany  for  all  future  claims  under  this  clause  by  the 
payment  of  a  lump  sum  down  or  a  suitable  allotment 
of  fully  paid  shares. 

Various  improvements  of  a  minor  nature  were  pro¬ 
mised,  and  the  deputation  withdrew,  smoothed,  per¬ 
haps,  by  Mr  Rhodes’  persuasive  eloquence,  but  by  no 
means  convinced  that  they  were  not  being  victimised 
for  the  benefit  of  the  London  and  other  shareholders 
in  the  British  South  Africa  Company. 

Rhodes  was  not  able  to  remain  so  long  in  the 


188 


BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 


country  as  he  would  have  liked,  for  his  official  posi¬ 
tion  as  Prime  Minister  of  Cape  Colony  rendered  it 
necessary  that  he  should  return  to  the  south  without 
further  loss  of  time.  Arrived  at  Cape  Town,  and 
well  satisfied  with  the  results  of  his  tour  through 
Mashonaland  and  the  things  he  had  seen  and  done, 
he  found  time  now  to  devote  himself  to  his  other 
great  scheme  for  bringing  all  the  states  of  South 
Africa  into  closer  union.  Both  in  the  seclusion  of 
Groot  Schuur  and  in  the  private  room  of  the  Premier 
in  the  Cape  House  of  Parliament  he  gave  the  whole  of 
his  spare  time  to  the  furtherance  of  this  object. 

That  he  had  spare  time  at  all  is  a  thing  to  marvel 
at  when  one  considers  his  multifarious  and  arduous 
duties.  As  has  been  mentioned,  he  occupied  at  this 
time  four  positions,  each  one  of  which  would  have 
been  sufficient  to  provide  a  man  of  ordinary  powers 
with  ample  work.  His  friends  often  wondered  how 
he  managed  to  discharge  at  once  the  duties  of  these 
four  positions,  for,  to  all  outward  seeming  at  any  rate, 
none  of  the  positions  suffered  anything  from  their  all 
being  combined  in  one  individual.  The  answer  to  this 
question  is  simple.  Rhodes  has  always  been  able  to 
get  through  the  vast  amount  of  work  with  which  he 
has  been  confronted  each  day  by  reason,  first,  of  the 
perfect  system  he  organised,  by  which  he  was  able 
to  transact  the  maximum  of  business  in  the  minimum 
of  time  ;  and,  second,  because  of  the  very  able  lieu¬ 
tenants  he  had  at  his  side,  men  able  to  relieve  him 
of  a  great  deal  of  the  purely  routine  and  detail  duties 
of  his  offices.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  assistance  of 
his  brothers,  and  men  like  Mr  Beit,  Dr  Jameson,  and 
Dr  Rutherfoord  Harris,  Rhodes  would  have  found  it 
impossible  to  get  through  his  work. 


RHODES  AND  THE  BOND. 


189 


Again,  his  capacity  for  taking  up  and  laying  down 
a  subject  at  will  with  the  knowledge  that  he  could, 
when  next  he  required  to  turn  to  the  matter,  instantly 
call  to  mind  its  whole  minutiae,  and  his  tireless  energy, 
stood  him  in  good  stead.  Cecil  Rhodes  can  stand, 
it  is  safe  to  say,  a  greater  amount  of  fatigue  and 
mental  worry,  and  can  work  at  high  pressure  for 
longer  periods  together,  than  the  vast  majority  of 
his  fellow-men.  If  the  duties  with  which  he  had  to 
cope  at  this  time  were  stupendous,  so,  it  must  be 
admitted,  was  the  intellect  and  power  of  the  man  who 
grappled  with  them. 

So  soon  as  he  returned  to  Cape  Town  Rhodes  wrote 
one  of  the  very  few  long  letters  that  he  has  ever 
penned — for  he  is  one  of  the  worst  correspondents 
that  it  would  be  possible  to  find,  and  will  go  to  any 
amount  of  trouble  rather  than  write  a  letter.  This 
communication  was  addressed  to  the  secretary  of 
the  Cape  Town  branch  of  the  Afrikander  Bond,  and 
dealt  with  the  threatened  trek  of  the  Transvaal  Boers 
into  the  dominions  of  the  Chartered  Company,  to 
which  reference  was  made  in  the  previous  chapter. 
It  also  contained  some  interesting  statements  regard¬ 
ing  Rhodes’  intentions  respecting  the  mining  regula¬ 
tions  of  Mashonaland,  and  the  conditions  under  which 
farms  would  be  granted  to  settlers  in  the  country. 

The  opening  paragraphs  of  this  letter,  referring  to 
Rhodes’  ideas  for  the  settlement  of  the  territory  under 
the  control  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company,  are 
of  great  interest,  as  showing  his  opinion  of  the  manner 
in  which  a  new  colony  should  be  developed  and  the 
terms  on  which  settlers  should  be  permitted  to  acquire 
land  for  cultivation  and  stock-raising  purposes.  No 
apology  is  needed  for  their  inclusion  here.  “  The 


190 


BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 


regulations,”  he  wrote,  “  regarding  mining,  which,  as 
you  are  aware,  have  already  been  published,  provide, 
inter  alia,  for  the  security  of  tenure  by  the  individual 
miner  of  his  claims  and  to  render  ‘jumping’ — which 
was  so  fruitful  a  source  of  trouble  in  other  countries — 
impossible.  ‘  Deep  levels  ’  likewise  are  unknown,  the 
claim -holder  following  the  reef  through  all  its  dips 
and  variations.  These  mining  regulations  have  been 
accepted  generally  as  liberal  and  satisfactory.  As 
regards  the  land,  I  think  that  so  soon  as  a  settlement 
becomes  possible,  farmers  accustomed  to  practical  farm¬ 
ing  should  be  invited  into  the  new  country  in  order 
to  occupy  personally  and  work  farms  whose  size  will 
naturally  vary  according  to  their  suitability  for  pas¬ 
toral  or  agricultural  purposes.  The  manner  in  which 
the  farms  would  be  given  out  is  a  subject  for  future 
consideration,  depending  in  a  great  measure  upon  the 
number  of  applicants.  Should  the  applications,  exceed 
in  number  the  farms  available,  I  would  then  suggest 
that  a  committee  of  representative  men  (from  amongst 
the  applicants)  should  be  appointed  for  the  purpose 
of  selecting  and  sending  in  the  names  of  those  whom 
they  consider  to  be  the  most  suitable  farmers  for  the 
occupation  and  working  of  a  new  country.” 

Here  we  see  very  clearly  Mr  Rhodes’  ideas  with 
regard  to  the  land  settlement  of  Mashonaland  at 
this  time.  His  aim  was  to  give  farms  out  to 
suitable  applicants  at  a  nominal  quit-rent  (ultimately 
fixed  at  £3  per  annum),  so  that  none  of  the  farmers 
should  be  handicapped  at  the  outset  by  being  called 
upon  to  pay  a  capital  amount  upon  his  land.  By 
these  means  such  capital  as  the  farmer  might  possess 
would  be  wholly  available  for  the  stocking  and  de¬ 
velopment  of  his  property. 


HIS  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  THE  BOERS. 


191 


There  is  another  paragraph  in  this  letter  which  is 
worthy  of  notice,  for  it  sets  forth  in  a  concise  manner 
he  true  attitude  of  Rhodes  at  this  time  towards  the 
3oers  of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State.  He 
writes  :  ‘^Although  an  arrangement  has  already  been 
ciade  for  the  admission  of  over  one  hundred  farmers 
rom  the  Transvaal,  and  although  there  will  be  no 
bjection  when  opportunity  offers  for  the  admission  of 
thers  from  the  Transvaal,  the  Free  State,  and  other 
iouth  African  communities,  still  I  can  give  you  the 
.ssurance  that  in  the  final  settlement  of  the  country 
-with  the  consent  of  the  High  Commissioner — no 
ndue  preference  will  be  shown  to  them  over  her 
fajesty’s  subjects  who  may  desire  to  proceed  from 
his  colony  or  from  elsewhere.  A 

This  letter,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  was  written 
efore  the  trek  from  the  Transvaal  to  Mashonaland 
/as  commenced,  though  Rhodes  had  this  movement 
,1  his  mind  at  the  time  that  he  wrote  this  letter ;  for 
1  a  subsequent  paragraph  he  says  :  “  Every  intending 
inner  will  be  required  to  sign  a  declaration  that  on 
ntering  the  territory  he  will  be  under  the  flag  and 
mform  to  the  law^s  of  the  Chartered  Company,  which 
all  be  based  in  principle  on  those  of  the  Cape  Colony, 
ith  the  right  of  appeal  from  the  local  courts  to  the 
upreme  Court  at  Cape  Town.” 

“  I  should  greatly  value,”  he  continued,  “  any  prac- 
cal  suggestions  which  your  [Afrikander  Bond]  mem- 
srs  might  have  to  make  on  this  question  of  a  land 
ittlement  in  a  new  country,  but{  I  must  tell  you  now' 
oat  the  Chartered  Company  cannot  permit  any  other 
lan  those  who  are  willing  to  place  themselves  under 
s  jurisdiction  to  enter  the  territory.!”  Nothing  could 
J  plainer  or  more  emphatic  than  this  statement,  of 


192 


BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 


which  President  Kruger  must  have  been  perfectl’ 
aware  at  the  time  that  he  permitted  the  trek  to  gi 
forward  without  let  or  hindrance. 

In  concluding  this  letter,  Rhodes  stated  explicit! 
that  should  it  become  patent  at  any  time  that  hi 
continued  occupation  of  the  dual  positions  of  Prim 
Minister  of  Cape  Colony  and  managing  director  o 
the  British  South  Africa  Company  was  detrimenta 
to  the  new  settlement,  he  would  at  once  resign  th 
former  post  and  devote  himself  thereafter  exclusive! 
to  the  development  of  those  interior  regions  of  Afric: 
that  he  had  been  the  means  of  opening  up  to  whit' 
colonisation. 

During  this  year  Mr  Rhodes  revisited  England  ii 
order  to  lay  before  the  Imperial  Government  severa 
important  points  with  regard  to  the  settlement  o 
Mashonaland.  He  was,  as  he  afterwards  stated 
“  well  received  by  every  portion  of  the  House  o 
Commons,”  where  a  growing  interest  in  his  polic; 
and  ambitions  was  being  manifested ;  and  during  hi 
short  stay  in  the  country  he  was  honoured  with  i 
command  to  dine  with  her  late  Majesty,  who  had  oi 
several  occasions  expressed  interest  in  Rhodes’  work 
and  strongly  desired  to  meet  the  man  wTho  at  tha 
moment  absolutely  dominated  South  Africa. 

Rhodes  retained  very  pleasant  memories  of  the  wa; 
in  which  Queen  Victoria  received  him,  and  of  the  keei 
interest  she  showed  in  the  development  of  Mashona 
land  under  the  British  flag.  He  was  much  surprise! 
to  find  how  much  the  Queen  knew  of  South  Africa: 
politics,  and  at  the  clear  and  statesmanlike  manne 
in  which  she  referred  to  the  future  prospects  of  tha 
region.  Another  subject  in  which  the  Queen  wa 
greatly  interested  was  the  diamond  mines  of  Kim 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  RHODES. 


193 


berley,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  stones  were 
obtained  and  prepared  for  the  market. 

When  Rhodes  quitted  the  royal  palace  he  had  a 
greatly  increased  admiration  for  the  Queen’s  remark¬ 
able  abilities ;  and  though  he  has  not,  on  the  whole,  a 
very  high  opinion  of  women’s  abilities  and  their  fitness 
for  political  life,  he  was  bound  to  confess  that  Queen 
Victoria  was  intellectually  the  equal  of  any  statesman 
with  whom  he  had  ever  come  into  contact. 

On  his  return  to  South  Africa  Rhodes  was  at  once 
invited  to  be  present  at  the  annual  Congress  of  the 
Afrikander  Bond,  which  was  held  at  Kimberley  that 
year.  This  invitation  he  accepted,  and  he  made  a  very 
important  speech  to  this  gathering,  which  is  worthy 
■of  extended  notice  here,  if  only  for  the  light  it  sheds 
on  his  earnest  desire  to  bring  about  the  complete 
reconciliation  of  the  two  white  races  in  South  Africa, 
which  he  has  cherished  throughout  the  whole  of  his 
political  life. 

This  speech  is  also  interesting  from  another  point 
of  view.  It  contains  the  first  public  reference  to 
Rhodes’  long  -  cherished  scheme  for  the  foundation 
and  endowment  of  a  teaching  university  at  Cape 
Town,  where  the  young  men  of  each  and  all  of  the 
South  African  states  might  mingle  together  in  common 
fellowship,  and  so,  by  establishing  a  better  under¬ 
standing  between  British  and  Dutch,  indirectly  bring 
about  a  greater  sympathy  between  the  tw7o  races  as 
the  younger  generation  grew  up. 

His  idea  was  to  erect  a  building1  somewhere  on 
:he  outskirts  of  Cape  Town,  which  should  be,  so  far 
is  outward  appearance  went,  an  exact  replica  of 
driel  College,  Oxford.  He  hoped,  so  soon  as  this 
building  was  finished,  to  be  able  to  induce  the  Cape 

N 


194 


BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 


Government  to  endow  it  suitably.  With  this  end 
in  view  he  had  elaborate  plans  of  Oriel  College 
drawn  and  forwarded  to  him  ;  but  at  the  eleventh 
hour  he  had,  for  a  time  at  any  rate,  to  abandon 
this  scheme,  because  the  Dutch  community  of  Cape 
Colony,  under  the  leadership  of  Mr  Hofmeyr,  just 
then  opened  a  training-college  somewhere  up  country, 
and  Rhodes  feared  that  his  plan,  if  carried  into 
effect,  might  militate  against  the  success  of  this  Dutch 
institution  and  so  give  offence  to  its  founders.  As 
he  was  particularly  anxious  at  this  time  to  conciliate 
the  Dutch  section  of  the  population  of  Cape  Colony 
by  every  means  in  his  power,  he  at  once  stopped 
his  preparations  for  the  building  of  this  teaching 
university,  and  left  the  matter  in  abeyance  until  a 
more  suitable  moment  arrived. 

The  immediate  effect  of  this  speech  at  Kimberley, 
it  may  be  mentioned,  was  to  bring  down  on  Rhodes’ 
head  an  amount  of  vigorous  denunciation  from 
extremists  of  both  the  British  and  the  Dutch  parties. 
The  ‘  Times  ’  in  a  leading  article  severely  chastised 
him  for  being  too  Afrikander  in  sentiment  and  ambi¬ 
tion,  while  the  ‘  Free  State  Express’  gave  him  what 
he  afterwards  described  as  “a  fearful  slating”  for 
being  too  much  of  an  Englishman.  Between  the 
two  stools  of  British  jingoism  and  Afrikander  ambition 
Rhodes  came  heavily  to  the  ground,  for  by  ingeniously 
taking  extracts  from  his  speech,  and  presenting  them 
without  reference  to  the  context,  each  side  was  able  to 
make  out  a  fir  case  against  him.  However,  news-) 
paper  criticism,  if  it  never  does  any  good,  never  does 
much  harm  ;  so  Rhodes  continued  along  the  path  that 
he  saw  was  best  for  himself  and  the  country  he  aspired 
to  serve  without  much  concern,  confident  that  he  was 


RHODES  AND  EMPIRE. 


195 


doing  what  was  best  for  his  adopted  country  despite 
what  others,  who  lacked  the  full  information  which  he 
possessed,  might  say  or  think. 

He  prefaced  his  speech  by  saying  that  he  was 
present  on  that  occasion  because  he  wished  to  show 
that  there  was  nothing  antagonistic  between  the 
aspirations  of  the  people  of  Cape  Colony  and  their 
kindred  in  the  mother  country,  “  provided  always,” 
he  was  careful  to  add,  “  that  the  old  country  recog¬ 
nises  that  the  whole  idea  of  the  colonies  and  of 
the  colonial  people  is  that  the  principle  of  self-govern¬ 
ment  must  be  observed  and  acted  upon  to  the  full, 
and  that  the  capacity  of  the  Cape  Colony  must  be 
admitted  to  deal  with  every  internal  matter  that  may 
arise.  The  principle  must  be  recognised  in  the  old 
country,  that  the  people  born  and  bred  in  this  colony, 
ind  descended  from  those  who  existed  in  this  country 
many  generations  ago,  are  much  better  capable  of 
lealing  with  the  various  matters  that  arise  than  people 
vho  have  to  dictate  7000  miles  away.” 

There,  in  a  sentence,  is  the  whole  of  Rhodes’  opinion 
>f  the  position  that  the  large,  self-governing  colonies 
hould  occupy  towards  the  mother  country  ;  and  when 
•ne  examines  the  reasonableness  of  his  views,  it 
ppears  strange  in  the  extreme  that  any  one  should 
ie  found  who  differs  from  them.  The  only  way  in 
/hich  England  can  maintain  her  hold  on  her  colonial 
ossessions  is,  according  to  Mr  Rhodes,  by  the  grant- 
ig  of  full  and  complete  measures  of  autonomy  so  far 
s  internal  affairs  are  concerned.  The  right  of  the 
mperial  Government  to  maintain  in  each  possession 

representative  in  whom  shall  be  lodged  the  final 
ppeal  on  any  subject  Rhodes  cheerfully  accepts  ;  but 
oat  official — call  him  High  Commissioner,  Lieutenant- 


196 


BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 


Governor,  Viceroy,  what  you  will — must  never  set  his 
authority  in  direct  opposition  to  the  declared  will  of 
the  colonists  on  any  matter  of  purely  internal  concern. 

As  regards  the  relations  between  colony  and  colony, 
and  colony  and  foreign  Power,  the  right  of  supervision 
and  control  by  the  mother  country  is  cheerfully 
admitted  by  Mr  Rhodes,  for  on  this  bed  -  rock  the 
whole  fabric  of  the  Empire  rests. 

In  the  course  of  this  speech  at  Kimberley  Rhodes 
dealt  at  considerable  length  with  the  objects  and 
principles  of  the  Bond,  which  he  may  be  said  to  have 
agreed  with  on  broad  lines  but  differed  from  on  matters 
of  detail.  During  his  remarks  on  this  head  he 
expressed  his  conviction  that  in  reality  there  was 
no  difference  between  the  policy  of  the  Afrikander 
Bond  and  the  policy  of  Sir  Bartle  Frere.  In  this 
statement  we  see  that  daring  form  of  speech  in  which 
Mr  Rhodes  delights;  but  those  who  heard  him  accepted 
this  rather  startling  statement  almost  as  an  axiom 

iand  it  was  only  in  England  that  any  comment  was 
occasioned  by  it. 

^  Referring  to  his  northern  expansion  scheme,  ht 
emphasised  that  close  relationship  which  in  his  opinior 
should  continue  to  exist  between  Cape  Colony  and  the! 
newly  gained  territory  in  the  north. 

\  Rhodes  next  dealt  with  the  question  of  his  pro 
posed  teaching  university  at  Cape  Town.  In  this 
connection  he  said  :  “I  saw  at  Bloemfontein  the  othei 
day  the  immense  feeling  of  friendship  that  all  thi 
members  had  for  the  Grey  Institute,  where  they  hat 
been  educated  and  from  which  they  had  gone  out  inti 
the  world.  I  said  to  myself,  ‘  If  we  could  only  get  j 
teaching  university  founded  in  Cape  Colony,  taking  th< 
people  from  Bloemfontein,  Pretoria,  and  Natal,  having 


THE  NEED  FOE  A  UNIVERSITY. 


197 


the  young  men  going  in  there  from  the  ages  of  eighteen 
to  twenty-one,  they  will  go  back  to  the  Free  State,  to 
the  Transvaal,  and  to  Natal — let  me  even  say  they 
will  go  back  to  Mashonaland— tied  to  one  another  by 
the  strongest  feelings  that  can  be  created,  because  the 
period  in  your  life  when  you  indulge  in  friendships 
that  are  seldom  broken  is  from  the  age  of  eighteen  to 
twenty-one.’  Therefore,  if  we  had  a  teaching  resi¬ 
dential  university,  these  young  men  would  go  forth 
into  all  parts  of  South  Africa  prepared  to  make  the 
future  of  the  country,  and  in  their  hands  this  great7 
question  of  union  could  safely  be  left.” 

To  those  who  are  fond  of  picturing  Mr  Rhodes  as  a 
grasping  and  unscrupulous  money-grabber,  actuated 
by  no  worthy  impulses  or  motives,  I  would  commend 
the  above  extract,  for  a  careful  perusal  of  it  should  go 
far  to  convince  all  whom  envy  and  hatred  of  the  man 
md  his  works  have  not  combined  to  render  blind 
;hat  even  Cecil  Rhodes  is  not  so  black  as  he  is  some¬ 
times  painted. 

During  1891  the  discontent  in  Cape  Colony  against 
me  man  combining  the  two  offices  of  Prime  Minister 
>f  the  colony  and  managing  director  of  the  British 
muth  Africa  Company  reached  its  height ;  but  it  soon 
ubsided  on  Mr  Rhodes  putting  the  plain  question 
tefore  the  malcontents  as  to  whether  they  considered 
t  was  better  that  he  should  withdraw  altogether  from 
•olitical  life  at  the  Cape  and  devote  himself  exclu- 
ively  to  the  development  of  Mashonaland,  or  whether 
ie  should  continue  at  the  head  of  the  Cape  Govern¬ 
ment.  For  his  own  part,  he  would  not  have  greatly 
egretted  being  able  to  devote  the  whole  of  his  time 
nd  energies  to  the  colonisation  of  Mashonaland,  but 
vhen  they  were  confronted  with  the  only  alternative, 


198 


BEFORE  THE  MATABELE  WAR. 


those  who  had  been  loudest  in  their  clamour  agains 
Rhodes’  dual  position  withdrew  their  protests,  anc 
nothing  further  was  heard  of  the  “impossibility”  o  i 
one  man  filling  two  offices  which,  from  the  poin 
of  view  of  the  opposition,  were  so  diametrical^ 
opposed. 


199 


CHAPTER  XIY. 

AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 

Early  in  November  1892  Rhodes  sailed  for  England 
in  order  to  address  the  second  annual  meeting  of  the 
British  South  Africa  Company.  In  the  course  of  this 
speech  he  explained  in  detail  the  reasons  which  had  led 
him,  in  conjunction  with  the  directors  of  the  Chartered 
Company,  to  introduce  the  “  50-per-cent  clause  ”  into 
the  mining  laws  of  Mashonaland.  As  has  previously 
been  explained,  it  was  from  this  source  alone  that 
Rhodes  hoped  to  gain  a  dividend  for  the  shareholders 
in  the  company.  He  was  strongly  of  the  opinion  that 
a  chartered  company  should  not  be  at  liberty  to  tax  a 
country  for  the  profit  of  its  shareholders,  any  more 
than  a  Crown  colony  or  an  elected  government  should 
be  permitted  to  impose  taxes  for  the  sake  of  amassing 
a  handsome  surplus  annually.  His  idea  was  so  to 
arrange  things  that  the  receipts  from  mining  licences, 
post-offices  and  telegraphs,  customs,  sales  of  land,  &c., 
in  Mashonaland  balanced  the  annual  expenditure.  As 
soon  as  this  was  done,  he  would  hold  his  hand  and 
refrain  from  imposing  any  further  burdens. 

There  was,  however,  that  great  body  of  people  who 
had  entrusted  their  money  to  him.  How  was  he  to 
repay  them  ?  That  was  the  question  Rhodes  asked 


200 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


himself,  and  the  only  answer  he  could  hit  upon  was  the 
50 -per- cent  clause.  He  had  been  struck  when  a 
young  man  at  Kimberley,  just  embarking  upon  politi¬ 
cal  life,  with  the  enormous  benefit  which  would  have 
accrued  to  the  Government  of  Cape  Colony  if,  when 
they  were  granting  licences  to  prospectors  to  peg  out 
claims  on  the  diamond  -  fields,  instead  of  limiting 
each  man  to  one  claim,  as  was  the  custom,  they  had 
granted  him  tive  claims,  being  two  and  a- half  to  be 
worked  for  his  own  personal  profit  and  two  and  a-half 
to  be  worked  for  the  benefit  of  the  Government ;  or, 
in  other  words,  when  he  floated  his  claims  as  a 
company,  as  he  would  be  almost  bound  to  do  sooner  or 
later,  one-half  of  the  vendor  scrip  was  to  be  handed 
over  to  the  Government  of  the  colony. 

Rhodes  saw  that  if  this  had  been  done,  the  financial 
difficulties  which  hung  over  the  colony  for  so  long  a 
period  would  have  been  avoided,  and  the  Government 
would  have  had  sufficient  money  in  its  coffers  for 
nearly  any  undertaking.  The  same  reasoning  applied 
to  the  Witwatersrand  goldfields.  Rhodes  was  sur¬ 
prised  that  the  Transvaal  executive,  instead  of  limiting 
each  prospector  to  a  single  claim  and  allowing  him 
only  to  work  that  to  a  certain  level,  did  not  grant 
each  individual  a  block  of  ten  claims,  of  which  five 
were  to  be  worked  in  the  interests  of  the  state. 

This  scheme,  whereby  50  per  cent  of  the  vendor 
scrip  became  the  property  of  the  Government  of  a 
country,  was  entirely  new,  but  Rhodes  was  determined 
to  give  it  a  trial.  When,  therefore,  the  regulations 
under  which  gold  and  other  mining  in  Mashonaland 
was  to  be  permitted  were  promulgated,  he  introduced 
this  clause,  which,  even  if  it  has  not  done  all  that 
Rhodes  hoped  it  would,  and  enabled  him  to  pay  a 


RHODES’  OPTIMISM. 


201 


dividend  to  the  shareholders  in  the  Chartered  Com¬ 
pany,  has  on  the  whole  worked  very  satisfactorily. 

This  speech  to  the  shareholders  of  the  Chartered 
Company  in  November  1892  is  noteworthy  for  one 
passage  which,  read  in  the  light  of  after-events,  seems 
strange,  and  to  point  to  the  fact  that  Cecil  Rhodes 
does  not  always  possess  that  great  amount  of  penetra¬ 
tion  and  far-sightedness  with  which  he  is  usually 
credited.  Speaking  of  the  development  of  Mashona- 
land,  he  said  :  “  Our  relations  are  friendly  all  round. 
I  am  on  the  best  of  terms  with  President  Kruger. 
Our  differences  with  the  Portuguese  are  over,  and  we 
are  on  the  most  friendly  terms  with  Lobengula.  The 
latter  receives  a  globular  sum  of  £100  a -month  in 
sovereigns,  and  he  looks  forward  with  great  satisfaction 
to  the  day  of  the  month  when  he  will  receive  it. 
I  have  not  the  least  fear  of  any  trouble  in  the  future 
from  Lobengula In  about  six  months  afterwards 
Lobengula  and  the  white  settlers  in  Mashonaland 
were  at  open  war. 

More  than  once  Rhodes  has  been  twitted  with  this 
optimistic  speech  on  the  eve  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
Matabele  war  by  those  who — since  the  event,  and 
always  according  to  themselves — had  all  along  been 
able  to  foresee  that  sooner  or  later  the  fierce  and 
warlike  Matabele  tribe  would  rise  against  the  rule  of 
the  white  man  who  had  overrun  Mashonaland  to  the 
serious  curtailment  of  their  privileges.  As  those  who 
read  the  daily  and  weekly  press  will  have  observed, 
it  is  so  very  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event  ! 

It  was  in  this  year,  1892,  that  the  affairs  of  the 
British  South  Africa  Company  were  at  their  lowest 
ebb.  It  really  seemed  as  though  Rhodes,  in  attempt¬ 
ing  to  colonise  with  Europeans  the  vast  country  to  the 


202 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


north  of  the  Limpopo,  had  undertaken  a  task  beyond 
even  his  powers.  In  every  way  the  outlook  was 
black.  The  settlers  in  Mashonaland  were  in  a  state  of 
simmering  discontent.  Many  of  them  who  had  hastily 
quitted  England,  eager  to  amass  rapid  fortunes  in  the 
new  El  Dorado,  were  tremendously  disappointed  to 
find  that  the  winning  of  wealth  by  gold-mining  was  by 
no  means  so  easy  as  they  had  imagined,  and  that 
months  of  arduous  toil  were  required  before  any  profits 
could  be  earned.  Hence  with  this  disillusionment 
came  long  and  bitter  wails  and  savage  attacks  on  the 
country  and  all  belonging  to  it  by  those  who  in  reality 
had  only  their  own  absurd  optimism  to  blame  for  the 
straits  in  which  they  found  themselves. 

Financially,  too,  the  state  of  things  was  about  as 
bad  as  it  well  could  be.  The  shares  of  the  Chartered 
Company  were  only  worth  about  10s.  or  12s.,  and  a 
general  distrust  in  Mashonaland  and  its  prospects  was 
beginning  to  be  manifested,  while  the  capital  of  the 
company  was  almost  entirely  expended.  Rhodes 
perceived  that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  make  a 
supreme  effort  if  he  was  to  retain  his  grip  on  the 
country.  In  his  difficulties  he  turned  to  Dr  Jameson, 
and  begged  him  to  go  up  to  Mashonaland  as  adminis¬ 
trator,  and  to  do  what  he  could  towards  bringing 
about  the  dawn  of  brighter  times  and  to  make  the 
revenue  of  the  country  approach  the  annual  ex¬ 
penditure. 

Dr  Jameson  at  this  time  was  only  just  recovering 
from  a  severe  attack  of  malarial  fever,  but  he  thrust 
his  physical  weakness  in  the  background  and  declared 
himself  quite  prepared  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  his 
old  friend.  He  set  off  almost  at  once  for  Salisbury, 
while  Rhodes  on  his  part  remained  behind  at  Cape 


A  DISMAL  OUTLOOK. 


203 


Town  to  do  all  that  lay  in  his  power  to  improve 
the  prospects  of  Mashonaland.  It  should  be  pointed 
out  that  he  had  never  for  a  moment  lost  faith  in 
the  country  or  imagined  that  his  great  scheme  was 
doomed  to  end  in  utter  failure  and  ruin.  Cecil 
Rhodes,  whatever  else  he  may  be,  is  not  a  fool, 
and  had  he  been  convinced  that  the  country  he  had 
been  the  means  of  adding  to  the  Empire  was  not 
worth  holding,  he  would  not  have  hesitated  long 
before  withdrawing  his  support  from  it  and  winding 
up  his  company.  He  knew,  however,  that  the 
potential  resources  of  the  land  were  very  great,  and 
that  if  the  ugly  corner  which  then  confronted  him 
could  be  turned  in  safety,  all  would  afterwards  be 
comparatively  plain  sailing. 

When  Dr  Jameson  took  up  the  control  of  Mashona¬ 
land  he  found  things  in  a  parlous  state  financially. 
There  was  a  white  population  of  about  1500  persons 
in  the  country  in  a  state  of  latent  discontent.  The 
upkeep  of  an  excessively  large  police  force  was  costing 
annually  a  huge  sum  that  was  out  of  all  proportion  to 
the  revenue  of  the  country,  and  in  addition  to  the  pay 
of  this  large  and  almost  useless  body  of  men  there  w’as 
the  question  of  feeding  them, — for  the  importation  of 
provisions  into  the  country  at  this  time  cost  the  high 
figure  of  £70  per  ton,  every  ounce  of  food  having  to 
be  transported  by  ox -waggon  over  1700  miles  of 
country.  So  soon,  howTever,  as  Jameson  had  time  to 
look  about  him  he  thought  he  sawr  his  way  towards 
greatly  reducing  the  expenditure  in  nearly  every 
direction,  and  he  arranged  to  meet  Rhodes  in  order  to 
talk  the  matter  over  with  him.  “Give  me  £3000  a- 
month,”  said  Jameson  at  this  conference,  “and  I  can 
pull  through.”  Rhodes  was  rather  dubious  about  the 


204 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


possibility  of  the  country  being  administered  for  so 
small  a  sum,  but  the  confident  tone  of  his  lieutenant 
removed  his  doubts,  so  he  made  arrangements  to 
supply  Jameson  with  the  monthly  sum  asked  for,  and 
the  latter  set  about  his  task. 

Jameson’s  first  step  was,  to  put  it  mildly,  extremely 
hazardous.  It  was  nothing  less  than  the  reduction  of 
the  police  force  from  700  men  to  40,  and  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  a  volunteer  force  at  Salisbury  in  order  in  some 
measure  to  counterbalance  this  reduction.  By  so 
doing  he  saved  a  large  sum  annually,  it  is  true ;  but 
to  leave  the  country  practically  without  a  disciplined 
force  on  which  to  rely  in  times  of  need,  while  at  the 
same  time  the  Matabele  impis  of  young  and  impetuous 
soldiers  collected  on  the  boundary  between  their 
country  and  Mashonaland  in  a  manner  that  can  only 
be  described  as  threatening,  was,  to  say  the  least,  an 
extremely  risky  thing  to  do.  Dr  Jameson  justified 
his  policy  by  pointing  to  tbe  volunteer  force  he  had 
established  in  Salisbury,  and  to  the  fact  that  under 
the  conditions  on  which  they  were  permitted  to  settle 
in  the  country  every  able-bodied  man  was  liable  for 
military  service  if  the  need  arose.  Further,  as 
Rhodes  had  foreshadowed  in  his  speech  to  the 
members  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  pre¬ 
viously  referred  to,  there  were  no  indications  at  this 
time  that  Lobengula  would  be  unable  to  control  his 
young  soldiers,  or  would  fail  to  observe  his  obligations 
under  the  Rudd-Maguire  concession. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  the  war  with  the  Matabele  fol¬ 
lowed  with  significant  suddenness  on  the  disbandment 
of  the  police  ;  and  few  can  doubt  that  if  events  in  the 
war  had  gone  differently  and  less  fortunately  than 
they  did,  and  the  Matabele  had  gained  the  upper 


A  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


205 


hand,  Dr  Jameson  would  have  been  very  severely 
censured  for  this  sudden  disbandment  of  the  Mashona- 
land  police.  There  can  be  no  question  that  the 
country  could  not  afford  to  maintain  this  large  force 
of  police,  but  it  would  have  been  far  better  policy  to 
have  gradually  withdrawn  them,  say,  by  squads  of 
fifty  at  a  time,  spread  over  a  period  of  about  two 
years.  In  various  other  and  safer  ways  Dr  Jameson 
effected  economies  until  he  had  finally  managed  to 
reduce  the  expenditure  from  a  quarter  of  a  million 
a-year  to  £30,000. 

So  soon  as  this  was  done,  Rhodes  was  free  to  turn 
his  attention  to  other  matters,  for  now  that  the  ex¬ 
penditure  in  Mashonaland  about  balanced  the  income, 
a  great  load  was  lifted  from  his  mind.  Chief  among 
these  was  a  railway  to  Mashonaland  from  the  East 
Coast.  By  this  step  he  hoped  to  reduce  the  cost  of 
importing  food-stuffs  into  the  country  from  £70  per  ton 
,  to  £10,  which  was  about  the  same  amount  that  it  cost 
to  get  provisions  up  to  Johannesburg.  He  found  it  a 
very  difficult  task  to  obtain  the  money  for  the  construc¬ 
tion  of  this  line,  for  the  outside  public  in  England  re¬ 
fused  almost  unanimously  to  have  anything  to  do  with 
it.  This  being  so,  he  was  forced  to  rely  upon  the  gener¬ 
osity  of  his  friends,  who,  it  should  be  stated,  responded 
liberally  to  his  appeal.  Lord  Rothschild,  for  instance, 
though  he  had  always  been  very  sceptical  as  to  the 
Chartered  Company  ever  justifying  its  existence  or 
paying  its  way,  subscribed  £25,000  towards  the  build¬ 
ing  of  this  railway  line  between  Beira  and  Salisbury. 
Despite  this  assistance,  however,  Rhodes  had  to  pro¬ 
vide  fully  five-sixths  of  the  necessary  capital  for  the 
line  out  of  his  own  pocket. 

Hence  when  the  attitude  of  the  Matabele  towards 


206 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


the  settlers  became  more  and  more  threatening  as 
1893  drew  on,  Rhodes  was  at  his  wits’  end  as  to  what 
he  should  do  in  the  event  of  an  outbreak  of  hostilities. 
On  the  one  hand  he  saw  that  the  cost  of  a  successful 
campaign  against  the  Matabele  would  probably  result 
in  the  bankruptcy  of  the  British  South  Africa  Com¬ 
pany,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  settlers  openly 
declared  their  intention  to  trek  from  the  country  if 
something  was  not  quickly  done  to  check  the  raids  of 
Lobengula’s  braves,  which  daily  grew  in  daring. 

Remonstrances  were  addressed  to  the  Matabele  king, 
but  none  had  any  tangible  result ;  for  the  wily  old 
savage  blandly  apologised  for  the  misdeeds  of  his 
young  men,  and  promised  that  they  should  not  offend 
in  the  future,  and  then,  apparently,  washed  his  hands 
of  the  whole  affair  and  let  his  impis  carry  on  just  as 
they  chose  without  any  interference. 

This  being  the  case,  it  was  not  surprising  to  find 
that  matters  rapidly  approached  a  crisis.  “  Tem¬ 
porise  !  temporise  !  ”  was  Rhodes’  constant  cry  to 
Jameson  when  the  latter  reported  to  him  the  growing 
indignation  of  the  dwellers  in  Mashonaland  at  the 
Matabele  raiders  being  permitted  to  go  unpunished, 
and  long  and  hitter  complaints  were  made  as  to  the 
supineness  of  the  Chartered  Company.  The  Mata¬ 
bele,  too,  grew  bolder  and  bolder  when  they  saw  that 
the  white  men  did  not  attempt  to  prevent  their  inroads 
into  Mashonaland  or  repel  their  attacks  on  the  less 
warlike  tribes  which  inhabited  that  region. 

At  length  the  climax  came.  Lobengula  threw  off 
the  mask  he  had  worn  so  long  and  announced  his 
intention  to  march  his  impis  into  Mashonaland  to 
assert  his  rights,  to  dispose  of  “his  slaves”  the 
Mashonas  in  any  way  he  chose,  and  to  avenge  several 


MATABELE  OUTRAGE. 


207 


fancied  slights.  The  white  men,  announced  the  Mata- 
bele  king,  would  be  quite  safe  from  attack  so  long  as 
they  remained  neutral  and  did  not  attempt  to  protect 
the  Mashonas,  for  he  had  no  quarrel  with  them. 
Needless  to  say,  neither  Dr  Jameson  nor  the  settlers 
in  the  country  had  the  slightest  intention  of  meekly 
sitting  down  and  watching  the  bloodthirsty  Matabele 
wreak  their  fiendish  vengeance  on  the  weaker  tribes 
of  Mashonaland. 

However,  before  the  Chartered  Company  could  take 
any  adequate  precaution,  a  large  force  of  Matabele  had 
crossed  the  border  and  made  straight  for  Victoria, 
where  the  greater  portion  of  the  Mashona  tribe  had 
collected.  Message  after  message  was  despatched  by 
Dr  Jameson  to  Lobengula  demanding  the  instant  re¬ 
call  of  his  impis,  but  without  avail ;  so  the  adminis¬ 
trator  took  the  only  other  course  which  was  left 
open  to  him,  and  moved  down  the  police  under 
Captain  Lendy  to  afford  some  small  measure  of  pro¬ 
tection  to  the  Mashonas.  Before  this  little  force 
could  reach  Victoria,  however,  the  Matabele  had 
arrived  there  and  were  massacring  and  burning  in 
all  directions. 

(Naturally  the  white  people  in  Victoria  were  greatly 
angered  by  the  terrible  scenes  which  were  being  en¬ 
acted  before  their  eyes.  Dr  Jameson  lost  no  time  in 
hurrying  to  the  spot,  and,  arrived  there,  in  im¬ 
mediately  summoning  the  principal  Matabele  indunas 
to  an  indaba.  At  this  meeting  he  told  the  assembled 
chiefs  in  plain  terms  that  they  must  forthwith  return 
to  their  own  country  under  penalty  of  instant  execu¬ 
tion.  This  forcible  language  had  its  effect.  With 
difficulty  the  indunas  managed  to  restrain  their 
warriors  from  further  rapine.  The  incident  seemed 


203 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


to  be  at  an  end,  when  a  small  section  of  the  Mata- 
bele  soldiers  declined  to  return  without  a  further 
attack  on  the  Mashonas,  and  continued  to  harry  the 
panic-stricken  tribes  in  open  defiance  of  the  white 
police,  who  were  spectators  of  the  scene.  Anxious  to 
do  all  that  was  possible  to  prevent  an  open  rupture 
between  the  white  people  and  the  Matabele,  Dr  Jame¬ 
son  gave  the  latter  until  sunset  to  withdraw  and  set 
off  for  their  own  country ;  but  this  had  no  effect. 
As  the  limit  which  the  administrator  had  fixed  drew 
near,  and  the  Matabele  still  persisted  in  attacking  the 
tribes,  Captain  Lendy  decided  to  move  up  his  police 
closer  to  the  scene,  hoping  that  such  a  step  would 
either  drive  the  Matabele  away  or  would  enable  him 
to  place  some  of  the  ringleaders  under  arrest. 

Maddened  with  the  lust  of  blood  as  the  Matabele 
were  at  this  time,  and  recking  little  of  the  conse¬ 
quences,  they  opened  fire  on  the  white  police.  The 
white  men,  furious  at  the  dreadful  scenes  they  had 
been  compelled  passively  to  witness,  were  nothing 
loath  to  retaliate.  They  fired  one  or  two  volleys  into 
the  ranks  of  the  Matabele,  and  then  rode  straight  at 
them  in  a  wild  charge,  with  the  result  that  the  Mata¬ 
bele  turned  and  fled  in  all  directions. 

Thus  the  first  act  of  the  war  with  the  Matabele 
was  embarked  upon,  and  Cecil  Rhodes  was  confronted 
with  the  task  of  finding  the  money  for  what  promised 
to  be  a  very  long  and  costly  struggle  at  the  time  that 
the  finances  of  the  Chartered  Company  were  ill  fitted 
to  stand  such  a  strain,  and  when  his  own  private 
capital  was  almost  entirely  locked  up  in  the  telegraph 
scheme  from  Cape  Town  to  the  north  and  the  railway 
from  Beira  to  Salisbury. 

It  was  clear,  however,  that  the  Matabele  would 


PREPARING  FOR  WAR. 


209 


have  to  be  taught  a  severe  lesson,  and  that  the  recent 
outrages  could  not  be  passed  over  unnoticed  by  the 
white  government  of  Mashonaland.  When  Dr  Jame¬ 
son  sent  a  full  account  of  what  had  taken  place  around 
Victoria,  Rhodes  replied  by  telegraphing  the  laconic 
and  enigmatic  message,  “Read  Luke  xiv.  31.”  Jame¬ 
son  took  the  hint,  and  turning  to  the  verse  in  question, 
saw  that  it  ran  as  follows  :  “Or  what  king,  going  to 
make  war  against  another  king,  sitteth  not  down  first, 
and  consulteth  whether  he  be  able  with  ten  thousand 
to  meet  him  that  cometh  against  him  with  twenty 
thousand  ?  ” 

This  meant,  of  course,  Could  Jameson,  with  the 
small  force  at  his  disposal,  which  would  probably 
not  number  more  than  a  thousand  white  men,  hope 
to  wage  a  successful  war  against  the  Matabele  hordes, 
whose  prestige  in  war  at  this  time  was  only  slightly 
less  than  that  of  the  Zulu  tribe  in  the  days  of 
Cetewayo  ? 

After  considering  the  matter  for  a  short  time,  and 
consulting  with  those  about  him,  Dr  Jameson  thought 
that  he  could  conduct  such  a  campaign  with  success, 
and  therefore  telegraphed  to  Rhodes  at  Cape  Town : 
“All  right.  Have  read  Luke  xiv.  31.” 

Jameson  saw  that  if  he  was  to  open  a  campaign 
against  the  Matabele,  he  must  do  so  without  a 
moment’s  loss  of  time.  .  Only  thus  would  he  be  in 
a  position  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  before  the 
approach  of  the  rainy  season  rendered  hostilities 
almost  a  matter  of  impossibility.  Therefore  he 
hurriedly  called  for  volunteers,  who  quickly  offered 
themselves  and  were  as  quickly  enrolled  and  organised. 
Their  principal  need  was  for  horses,  of  which  the 
supply  was  very  short ;  but  Rhodes  managed  to 

o 


210 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


procure  900  in  a  very  short  time,  and  these  were 
at  once  sent  up  to  Salisbury. 

During  this  time  Rhodes  was  faced  by  another 
difficulty  besides  that  of  providing  money  and  horses 
for  the  campaign,  and  this  was  the  Colonial  Office. 
The  Marquis  of  Ripon,  at  this  time  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  the  Colonies,  embarked  on  a  cautious 
and  hesitating  policy  that  proved  very  irritating  to 
the  impulsive  and  petulant  character  of  Rhodes.  Sir 
Henry  Loch,  in  his  capacity  as  High  Commissioner 
of  the  Cape,  had  laid  the  facts  of  the  case  for  and 
against  the  Matebele  very  clearly  and  concisely  before 
the  home  authorities.  In  the  end,  after  much  cogita¬ 
tion  and  endless  letter-writing  and  discussion  of  pre¬ 
cedents,  Downing  Street  woke  up  sufficiently  to 
write  to  the  High  Commissioner  ordering  him  to 
inform  the  British  South  Africa  Company  and  Mr 
Rhodes  “that  unless  they”  (i.e.,  the  white  forces  of 
the  Chartered  Company)  “were  attacked,  no  aggres¬ 
sive  movement  was  to  be  made  without  the  previous 
knowledge  and  sanction  of  the  High  Commissioner.” 
This  was,  of  course,  quite  correct,  but  hardly  neces¬ 
sary,  for  with  an  empty  treasury  the  very  last  thing 
either  Rhodes  or  the  company  desired  was  a  war 
with  the  Matabele. 

The  next  portion  of  the  telegram,  however,  was 
most  extraordinary,  and  after  reading  it  few  people 
wall  be  surprised  at  the  amused  contempt  that  Cecil 
Rhodes  feels  towards  Downing  Street  and  all  its 
works.  “  If  your  sanction  for  an  offensive  movement 
is  asked,”  continued  Lord  Ripon  to  Sir  Henry  Loch, 
“  you  will  communicate  with  me  before  replying.” 
In  other  words,  the  opinions  of  Dr  Jameson  at 
Salisbury,  and  of  Cecil  Rhodes  and  Sir  Henry  Loch 


MATABELELAND  ENTERED. 


211 


at  Cape  Town,  were  to  be  examined,  and  possibly 
overruled,  by  Lord  Ripon  and  bis  assistants  at  Down¬ 
ing  Street,  7000  miles  away,  not  one  of  whom  could 
probably  have  stated  offhand  with  any  degree  of 
accuracy  where  Mashonaland  was,  what  was  its  area, 
or  how  the  Matabele  tribe  came  to  have  anything  to 
do  with  it.  This  delay  meant  that  weeks,  or  even 
months,  would  have  to  elapse  before  Dr  Jameson  was 
able  to  take  advantage  of  any  victory  he  might 
have  gained.  It  is  only  after  reading  of  such  follies 
as  these  that  one  is  able  to  understand  fully  the 
reasons  which  led  the  American  colonists  to  sever 
their  connection  with  the  mother  country. 

In  the  end  the  consent  of  the  Colonial  Office  was 
obtained,  and  Jameson  at  once  crossed  the  Shangani 
river  and  entered  Matabeleland  with  a  force  that  at 
no  time  exceeded  900  men.  At  the  same  time  that 
this  movement  was  undertaken,  Major  Goold-Aclams, 
the  commandant  of  the  Bechuanaland  Border  Police, 
acting  under  instructions  from  the  High  Commissioner, 
moved  towards  Matabeleland  from  the  south  with 
some  200  men.  The  object  of  this  move  was  to 
compel  Lobengula  to  detach  a  portion  of  his  force 
from  opposing  Dr  Jameson  on  the  east  to  watch  the 
drifts  on  the  south-west.  By  so  doing,  Jameson’s 
task  was  rendered  very  much  easier  than  otherwise 
it  would  have  been. 

It  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  book  to  deal  in  detail 
with  the  events  of  the  Matabele  war,  save  so  far  as 
they  directly  concern  Mr  Rhodes,  and  I  can  only  refer 
those  who  desire  a  fuller  account  of  this  campaign 
to  my  ‘  History  of  Rhodesia.’  Suffice  it  to  say  here 
that  two  pitched  battles  were  fought,  the  first  near 
the  Shangani  river  and  the  second  on  the  banks  of  the 


212 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


Imbembesi  stream,  and  that  in  both  of  these  the 
Matabele,  though  outnumbering  the  whites  by  fully 
ten  to  one,  were  totally  defeated  with  very  heavy  loss, 
and  their  power  as  an  organised  force  was  completely 
broken. 

These  successive  defeats,  and  the  inability  of  his 
soldiers  to  make  any  stand  against  the  white  columns 
which  were  converging  on  his  capital,  led  Lobengula 
hastily  to  abandon  his  principal  kraal  of  Gu-Buluwayo, 
and  to  trek  to  the  north-west  with  Major  Forbes  and 
a  strong  white  force  hot  on  his  heels.  It  was  this 
portion  of  the  campaign  which  led  up  to  the  saddest, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  most  dramatic,  episode  of 
the  war — the  heroic  deaths  of  Major  Alan  Wilson  and 
his  companions,  who  refused  to  abandon  their  wounded 
comrades  when  without  them  they  might  have  got 
away  in  safety. 

Such  a  gallant  deed  as  this  strongly  appealed  to 
Rhodes,  who,  so  soon  as  he  was  able,  visited  the  spot 
where  the  devoted  band  died,  and  immediately  com¬ 
missioned  Mr  John  Tweed,  the  well-known  sculptor, 
to  prepare  four  huge  bronze  bas-reliefs  representing 
various  phases  of  the  Matabele  war,  to  form  part  of  a 
large  monument  which,  at  his  own  cost,  he  has  since 
raised  on  the  spot  to  the  memory  of  Major  Wilson  and 
his  men. 

So  soon  as  he  could  possibly  escape  from  his  political 
duties  at  Cape  Town,  rendered  doubly  irksome  to  him 
by  the  stirring  news  from  the  north,  Rhodes  hurried 
up  to  Matabeleland,  and  was  in  time  to  set  off 
towards  the  Shangani  with  the  column  that  Dr 
Jameson  was  sending  off  to  bring  in  Major  Forbes’ 
force,  which  was  reported  to  be  short  of  both  food  and 
ammunition,  and  to  be  followed  by  a  large  body  of 


DEATH  OF  LOBENGULA. 


213 


Matabele,  who  gained  heart  when  they  saw  the  white 
men  giving  way  before  them. 

With  the  return  of  Major  Forbes’  column  to  Dr 
Jameson’s  base  camp,  near  the  abandoned  and  half- 
ruined  kraal  of  Buluwayo,  which  Lobengula  had 
attempted  to  wreck  with  gunpowder  prior  to  his 
quitting  it,  the  war  may  be  said  to  have  come  to  an 
end.  Contrary  to  all  expectations,  the  campaign  had 
been  very  short,  and  the  whole  cost  of  it  was  only 
about  <£100,000 — a  small  amount,  indeed,  when  the 
expense  of  such  a  war  as  that  waged  by  the  Imperial 
Government  against  the  Zulus  is  considered. 

Sapient  people  at  home,  who  could  not  have  dis¬ 
tinguished  a  Matabele  from  a  Batalpin  had  their 
lives  depended  on  it,  had  attacked  Rhodes  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  for  thinking  to  carry  out  a 
successful  war  against  the  Matabele  with  less  than 
a  thousand  white  men,  all  of  whom  were  untrained 
volunteers,  when  they  themselves  had  fully  made  up 
their  minds  that  at  least  ten  times  that  number  of 
Imperial  troops  would  be  required,  and  that  even  then 
it  would  take  quite  a  year  and  a  million  of  money 
before  Lobengula’s  power  could  be  broken. 

The  white  force  had  no  sooner  collected  once  more 
at  Buluwayo  than  the  news  reached  them  that  Loben¬ 
gula  had  died  of  smallpox;  and  with  this  announcement 
came  the  complete  submission  of  the  Matabele  nation. 
The  country  was  at  once  thrown  open  to  white  colon¬ 
isation.  The  volunteers,  who  had  formed  the  bulk  of 
Dr  Jameson’s  force,  were  immediately  disbanded,  and 
proceeded  to  scour  the  country  in  all  directions  in 
search  of  payable  gold  -  reefs  and  other  mineral  de¬ 
posits.  In  disbanding  the  force  Mr  Rhodes  made  a 
short  speech,  some  extracts  from  which  may  be  fittingly 


214 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


given  here.  After  referring  to  the  excellent  way  in 
which  the  little  body  of  men  had  carried  out  the  work 
of  conquering  the  Matabele  in  such  a  short  space  of 
time,  he  spoke  in  bitter  but  fully  warranted  terms  of 
the  cruel  slanders  which  a  small  but  extremely  noisy 
and  self-assertive  minority  at  home  had  seen  fit  to 
utter  against  far  better  men  than  themselves.  He 
said :  “  In  England  a  certain  section  thought  the 
usual  consequence  was  sure  to  ensue,  and  require 
like  action,  as  in  other  colonial  wars.  An  appeal 
would  be  made  to  her  Majesty’s  Government  for 
assistance,  they  said ;  but  no !  we  relied  on  the 
brave  efforts  of  our  own  men,  and  they  have  done 
the  work.” 

“You  would  have  thought,”  he  went  on,  “that  the 
English  would  have  been  satisfied.  On  the  contrary, 
you  have  been  called  freebooting  marauders,  blood¬ 
thirsty  murderers,  and  so  forth.  But  I  know  this 
has  not  been  by  the  people  of  England  as  a  whole, 
but  only  by  a  section  of  them.  I  am  as  loyal  an 
Englishman  as  any  one  possibly  can  be,  but  I  can¬ 
not  help  saying  that  it  is  such  conduct  as  this  that 
alienates  colonists  from  the  mother  country.  We  ask 
for  nothing,  for  neither  men  nor  money,  and  still  a 
certain  portion  vilify  us.  There  are  no  people  more 
loyal  than  the  colonists  in  Africa,  but  continued 
misrepresentation  will  alienate  the  most  loyal.” 

Apparently  the  separation  of  the  large  self-govern¬ 
ing  colonies  from  the  Empire  was,  and  is,  exactly 
what  these  slanderous  and  venomous  nonentities  de¬ 
sire  above  all  things  ;  and  if  so,  they  are  certainly 
going  the  right  way  to  work  to  bring  such  a  state 
of  things  about. 

Turning  his  attention  more  particularly  to  the 


A  NEW  COLONY  FOUNDED. 


215 


fitting  reward  of  those  men  who  had  done  the  work 
and  had  broken  the  Matabele  power,  Mr  Rhodes 
promised  that  before  any  other  consideration  regard¬ 
ing  the  settlement  of  the  country  was  discussed,  he 
would  examine  their  claims.  At  the  time  that  the 
force  was  raised  certain  promises  of  grants  of  land 
and  mining  rights  in  Matabeleland,  to  be  allotted 
to  each  man  so  soon  as  Matabeleland  was  opened 
for  white  settlement,  were  made,  and  Rhodes  now 
confirmed  these,  though  he  was  careful  to  add  that 
everything  he  did  or  said  was  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  High  Commissioner,  whom  he  intended  immedi¬ 
ately  to  consult  on  the  subject. 

With  a  keen  eye  to  the  fitness  of  things,  and  a 
certain  fondness  for  theatrical  effect  that  is  so  often 
to  be  noticed  in  his  character,  Rhodes  gave  instruc¬ 
tions  before  he  left  Matabeleland  for  Cape  Town  that 
the  future  capital  of  the  country  was  to  be  laid  out  on 
the  site  of  the  old  kraal  of  Gu-Buluwayo,  and  that 
this  town  was  to  bear  the  name  of  Buluwayo — or 
Bulawayo,  as  it  is  now  officially  called.  It  was  his 
intention  that  Government  House,  the  future  official 
'•esidence  of  the  administrator  of  Matabeleland,  should 
be  built  on  the  exact  spot  formerly  occupied  by  the 
’oyal  hut.  When,  however,  the  surveyors  came  to 
ay  out  the  future  town,  they  were  unanimously  of 
;he  opinion  that  such  a  position  was  quite  unsuited 
or  that  purpose  ;  so  that  the  present  towm  stands  some 
:wo  miles  to  the  north-west  of  the  old  kraal,  and  close 
,;o  a  small  stream,  which  yields  a  good  supply  of  water 
or  all  purposes. 

The  next  question,  which,  perhaps,  was  only  one  of 
ninor  importance,  was  the  name  under  which  the 
vhole  country  was  to  be  known  in  the  future.  The 


216 


AT  WAR  WITH  THE  MATABELE. 


two  provinces  of  Mashonaland  and  Matabeleland  were 
easy  enough  to  designate,  but  what  was  wanted  was 
some  title  by  which  to  describe  the  whole  country 
under  the  dominion  of  the  British  South  Africa 
Company.  With  this  end  in  view  many  names 
were  suggested,  but  all  were  more  or  less  unsuit¬ 
able.  “British  Central  Africa”  would  have  been 
the  ideal  name  for  the  country,  but  it  had  been 
already  appropriated  for  the  little  strip  of  territory 
along  the  western  shore  of  Lake  Nyasa,  under  the 
administration  of  the  Foreign  Office.  “  British  South 
Africa  ”  was  quite  out  of  the  question,  as  the  assump¬ 
tion  of  such  a  title  would  have  rightly  produced 
vigorous  protests  from  the  far  older  possessions  of 
Cape  Colony  and  Natal.  In  the  end  it  was  decided 
to  embody  in  some  form  or  another  the  name  of  the 
man  who  had,  almost  unaided,  founded  the  state ; 
and  after  “  Rhodesland,”  and  the  more  fanciful 
“  Cecilia,”  had  been  proposed  and  rejected,  the  word 
“  Rhodesia  ”  was  finally  coined,  and  at  once  passed 
into  the  geography  of  the  world. 


217 


CHAPTER  XV. 

RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  discuss  the  ethical  question 
whether  white  men  are  justified  in  occupying  a  country 
inhabited  by  native  races  and  in  reducing  those  natives 
to  a  position  of  semi-serfdom,  or  at  any  rate  in  en¬ 
forcing  their  laws  and  customs  on  such  native  inhabi¬ 
tants.  I  will  content  myself  with  facts  as  they  are, 
and  look  at  this  question  from  the  standpoint  taken 
up  by  Cecil  Rffiodes.  f  As  has  been  seen,  Mr  Rhodes’ 
aim  throughout  the  whole  of  his  career  has  been  to 
bring'  about  a  reconciliation  between  the  Dutch  and 
the  British  in  South  Africa.  Second  only  in  import¬ 
ance  to  that  great  work  has  been  his  continuous 
effort  to  secure  the  good  and  just  government  of  the 
native  races  in  the  sub-continent^  None  realises  more 
clearly  than  he  that  in  South '  Africa  the  spread  of 
white  colonisation  and  white  civilisation  is  bound  to 
be,  under  any  circumstances,  one  of  particular  diffi¬ 
culty,  and  fraught  with  hardships  for  the  natives ; 
but  it  cannot  be  denied  that  he  has  striven  for 
many  years  with  all  the  might  of  his  forceful  nature 
to  mitigate  these  difficulties  and  hardships  as  much 
as  possible,  and  on  the  whole  with  a  fair  amount  of 
success. 


*218 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


It  was  on  the  Native  question  that  the  first  line  of 
cleavage  between  Rhodes  and  the  members  of  the 
Afrikander  Bond,  who  were  numbered  at  this  time 
among  his  supporters  and  allies,  began  to  show  itself. 
The  “  flag  ”  difficulty,  which  was  introduced  into  the 
ideal  of  a  United  South  Africa  shared  by  both  Rhodes 
and  the  Afrikanders,  was  one  which  might  easily  have 
been  surmounted  by  a  little  negotiation  and  discussion 
between  Rhodes  and  those  who  fought  beneath  the 
banner  of  Mr  Hofmeyr  ;  but  Rhodes’  experience  with 
regard  to  the  Glen  Grey  Act  showed  him  that  a  more 
thorny  subject  would  have  to  be  overcome  with  regard 
to  the  Native  question.  His  is  not  the  nature,  how¬ 
ever,  to  meet  difficulties  half-way,  and  having  made 
up  his  mind  on  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  this  question, 
he  took  up  his  stand  resolutely  for  what  he  believed 
to  be  the  wisest  and  only  just  line  of  conduct,  and  was 
deaf  to  all  pleas  and  demands  to  abandon  or  modify 
his  attitude. 

His  first  real  step  towards  the  carrying  out  of  his 
scheme  for  the  government  and  improvement  of  the 
native  races  of  South  Africa  was  in  1894,  at  the  time 
he  was  the  Secretary  for  Native  Affairs  as  well  as 
Prime  Minister  at  the  Cape.  In  July  of  that  year  he 
moved  the  second  reading  of  his  bill  which  dealt  with 
the  condition  of  the  natives  in  Cape  Colony,  since 
generally  known  as  the  Glen  Grey  Act,  and  in  a  speech 
of  great  power  and  width  of  thought  set  forth  his 
ideas  on  this  question  very  clearly.  The  bill  was 
primarily  intended  to  secure  a  re-survey  of  the  Kafir 
reservations,  the  land  being  for  the  purpose  of  the 
bill  divided  into  allotments  of  eight  acres  each,  and  it 
was  his  intention  to  give  an  individual  title  to  each  of 
these  allotments,  with  the  right  of  descent  from  father 


THE  GLEN  GREY  ACT. 


219 


to  eldest  son  by  the  chief  wife,  by  the  operation  of  the 
law  of  entail. 

s/A.  simple  system  of  local  self-government  for  the 
natives,  to  be  improved  and  extended  as  time  went  on 
and  the  natives  proved  themselves  fit  for  it,  was  also 
included.  This  local  self-government  was  to  consist  in 
the  first  place  of  village  and  district  councils,  on  which 
a  proportion  of  natives  would  sit  side  by  side  with  the 
white  members.  It  was  his  idea  further  to  encourage 
the  natives  to  improve  themselves  by  providing,  as  I 
shall  explain  later,  educational  facilities,  and  by  in¬ 
trusting  to  them  various  public  works,  such  as  the 
making  of  roads  and  the  building  of  bridges,  of  course 
under  white  supervision  and  direction.  In  this  manner 
he  hoped  to  prevent  the  overcrowding  of  the  native 
locations — at  that  time  a  pressing  question — and  to 
turn  the  idle  male  native  population  of  Cape  Colony 
into  industrious  and  useful  citizens,  to  whom  the  fran¬ 
chise  would,  with  suitable  safeguards,  be  given. 

The  scheme  was  by  no  means  perfect — few  human 
schemes  are  perfect ;  but  it  was  undoubtedly  a  states¬ 
manlike  effort  to  grapple  with  a  problem  that  yielded 
to  none  in  magnitude  and  complexity.  This  great 
effort  of  Rhodes  in  endeavouring  to  smooth  the  path  of 
the  native  population  of  South  Africa  is  often  over¬ 
looked  and  discounted  by  reason  of  his  other,  and 
perhaps  more  dazzling,  works  ;  but  this  alone  was 
sufficient  to  stamp  him  as  a  man  of  undoubted  ability, 
and  one  possessing  the  courage  of  his  convictions.^  -- 

It  should  be  said  that  the  right  of  the  educated  and 
semi-civilised  portion  of  the  black  population  of  Cape 
Colony  to  a  limited  form  of  the  franchise  had  always 
been  admitted  in  theory  by  the  Cape  Dutch,  and  in 
the  eyes  of  the  law  of  that  colony  blacks  and  whites 


220 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


were  on  a  precisely  equal  footing.  The  natives  had, 
practically  speaking,  the  same  civil  rights  as  the 
whites  possessed,  though  there  were,  of  course,  some 
special  police  regulations  which  were  rendered  neces¬ 
sary  by  the  conditions  which  then  prevailed  in  the 
various  native  locations.  With  the  establishment  of 
self-government  at  the  Cape,  the  granting  of  politi¬ 
cal  rights  to  the  blacks  had  been  carried  out ;  and 
in  this  particular  Cape  Colony  differed  from  its  sister 
state  of  Natal,  where  it  is  a  standing  reproach  to 
this  day  that  no  coloured  persons,  not  even  the  highly 
educated  and  perfectly  civilised  immigrant  British 
Indian  merchants  and  planters,  are  allowed  the  right 
to  a  vote. 

It  was,  I  believe  I  am  right  in  saying,  in  the  year 
1892  that  Rhodes  first  decided  on  his  line  of  conduct 
with  regard  to  the  native  question,  though,  as  has  just 
been  said,  it  was  not  until  two  years  later  that  he 
found  himself  in  a  position  to  move  in  the  matter.  He 
fixed  a  moderately  high  property  qualification  for  the 
natives,  the  ownership  of  a  house  of  the  value  of  £75, 
or  in  default  the  receipt  of  an  annual  wage  of  £50, 
with  the  reasonable  proviso  that  before  any  native 
should  be  allowed  to  take  any  part  in  the  government 
of  his  district  he  should  be  able  to  sign  his  name 
together  with  his  address  and  his  occupation.  This  is 
the  same  law  as  is  applied  for  the  white  population  of 
Cape  Colony,  and  was  fixed  upon  in  order  to  debar 
from  the  franchise  those  natives  who  are  still  in  a  state 
of  barbarism,  and  are  living  together  in  what  may  be 
termed  a  debased  form  of  communal  tenure.  At  first 
this  Act  of  Rhodes  was  only  intended  to  apply  to 
Glen  Grey  district  of  Cape  Colony — hence  the  popular 
name  of  the  measure  ;  but  it  was  his  intention  to 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVES. 


221 


extend  it  to  the  other  districts  so  soon  as  the  natives 
demonstrated  their  fitness  for  the  franchise. 

Rhodes  had  gained  his  wide  knowledge  of  natives 
and  their  characters  principally  from  close  study  of 
them  as  they  were  assembled  in  the  compounds  of 
Kimberley,  where  he  spent  many  hours  at  a  stretch, 
mingling  with  them  and  studying  them  from  every 
point.  He  enjoyed  the  society  of  natives,  regarding 
it  as  affording  him  a  unique  psychological  opportunity, 
and  he  has  not  a  trace  of  that  distaste  for  blacks  and 
their  ways  which  unfortunately  is  carried  to  such 
extreme  lengths  by  the  vast  majority  of  whites — Afri¬ 
kanders  and  British  alike — resident  in  South  Africa. 
His  servants  at  Groot  Schuur  are  almost  exclusively 
aatives,  being  drawn  from  nearly  every  different  tribe 
ind  race  to  be  found  in  Africa  between  the  Cape  of 
dood  Hope  and  Lake  Tanganyika,  and  by  one  and 
ill  of  these  he  is,  as  I  have  remarked  in  an  earlier 
chapter,  simply  worshipped. 

A  most  important  element  in  the  Glen  Grey  Act 
,vas  its  regulations  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors 
,o  the  natives.  Rhodes’  idea  in  this  direction  was  to 
;rant  a  form  of  local  option,  and  the  result  of  this 
nust  have  come  as  a  surprise  even  to  Rhodes  himself. 
Aior  to  the  passing  of  this  Act  the  jail  at  Glen  Grey 
vas  always  crowded  with  native  prisoners,  nine-tenths 
■f  whom  were  there  through  offences  directly  traceable 
o  the  free  traffic  in  drink,  which  up  to  the  passing  of 
his  Act  prevailed  in  Cape  Colony.  Six  months  after 
he  passing  of  the  bill  the  jail  was  found  to  be  abso- 
ately  empty,  and  investigation  proved  that  crime  was 
lmost  a  thing  unknown  in  that  district  when  the  sale 
f  liquor  to  the  natives  had  been  put  a  stop  to. 
advocates  of  the  adoption  of  the  principles  of  local 


0  0  0 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


option  in  this  country  should  find  the  results  ol 
the  Glen  Grey  Act  among  the  ignorant  but  drink- 
loving  natives  of  Cape  Colony  one  of  their  most 
powerful  arguments. 

Naturally  this  diminution  of  the  sale  of  drink  was 
not  at  all  to  the  taste  of  the  Dutch  wine-growers  at 
the  Cape.  They  violently  attacked  Rhodes,  for  they 
saw  their  profits  falling  off  day  by  day  and  week  by 
week  in  what  must  have  appeared  to  them  a  very 
exasperating  fashion.  Had  it  not  been  that  one 
clause  of  the  bill,  which  insisted  on  a  native 
following  some  regular  employment  before  the  fran¬ 
chise  was  granted  him,  was  much  to  the  liking  ol 
the  large  employers  of  labour  in  the  colony,  it  is 
likely  that  ultimately  Rhodes  would  have  been  de¬ 
feated  by  the  Afrikander  party  in  his  elforts  to  keej: 
the  drink  away  from  the  natives.  As  it  was,  these 
employers  found  that  labour  was  more  plentiful,  and 
that  the  workmen  were  more  reliable  and  trustworthy 
than  they  had  ever  been  before  ;  so  they  rallied  tc 
Rhodes’  support  in  large  numbers,  and  he  was  thereby 
enabled  to  confront  with  success  the  savage  attacks 
of  the  wine-growers  of  the  midland  districts  of  Caps 
Colony. 

When  the  British  South  Africa  Company  took  ovei 
the  control  of  Rhodesia,  Mr  Rhodes  at  once  decidec 
that  the  provisions  of  the  Glen  Grey  Act  should  bt 
included  in  the  charter,  and  this  was  done,  as  wil 
be  seen  by  a  reference  to  clause  12  of  that  docu 
ment,  which  runs  as  follows  :  “  The  company  shal 
regulate  the  traffic  in  spirits  and  other  intoxicat 
ing  liquors  within  the  territories  aforesaid  [i.e.,  th< 
whole  country  to  be  placed  under  the  dominion  o 
the  company],  so  as,  as  far  as  is  practicable,  to  pre 


THE  LIQUOIt  QUESTION. 


223 


vent  the  sale  of  spirits  or  other  intoxicating  liquors 
to  any  natives.” 

This  obligation  the  company  loyally  observed,  and 
so  soon  as  the  country,  with  its  native  population, 
estimated  at  one  million,  came  under  its  adminis¬ 
tration,  it  passed  very  severe  laws  against  the 
supplying  of  any  form  of  intoxicating  liquors  to 
natives.  As  has  proved  to  be  the  case  in  North 
America,  and  still  more  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa, 
there  are  always  plenty  of  white  adventurers  eager  to 
rush  into  a  new  country  which  possesses  a  large  native 
population,  and  amass  rapid  fortunes  by  selling  the 
vilest  and  cheapest  brands  of  “  trade  spirits  ”  to  the 
natives,  regardless  of  the  mischief  and  ruin  they  are 
causing  by  so  doing.  Rhodesia  proved  to  be  no 
exception  to  this  rule,  for  on  the  opening  of  both 
Mashonaland  and  Matabeleland  to  white  colonisation 
men  rushed  in  from  all  directions  and  commenced 
selling  spirits  to  the  natives.  The  stern,  repressive 
measures  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  soon 
put  a  stop  to  this,  however,  and  a  great  evil  was 
thereby  nipped  in  the  bud. 

Rhodes’  policy  towards  the  natives  with  regal'd  to 
this  liquor  question  has  been  aptly  described  as  being 
exactly  similar  to  that  we  are  in  the  habit  of  employ  - 
ng  when  dealing  with  young  children — giving  them 
ust  what  our  riper  and  more  mature  judgment  tells 
is  is  good  for  them,  and  putting  out  of  their  reach 
ill  those  things  which  we  feel  would  do  them  harm. 
vVhile,  however,  providing  that  this  Act  should  be 
argely  of  a  protective  nature,  Rhodes  did  not  lose 
ight  of  the  fact  that  it  should  be  educative  as  well, 
n  his  speech  on  the  second  reading  of  the  Glen  Grey 
^ct  on  July  30,  1894,  to  which  allusion  has  pre- 


224 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


viously  been  made  in  this  chapter,  Rhodes  prefaced 
his  remarks  by  protesting  against  the  idea  that  the 
natives  were  a  source  of  trouble  and  loss  to  the 
colony, — a  very  favourite  doctrine  with  certain  poli¬ 
ticians  in  Cape  Town  at  that  time.  Passing  to  the 
question  of  the  provisions  of  the  bill,  Mr  Rhodes  said 
that  what  faced  him  when  he  took  up  the  portfolio  of 
Secretary  for  Native  Affairs  was  the  enormous  extent 
and  ramifications  of  the  native  problem.  What,  he 
was  forced  to  ask  himself,  as  many  thoughtful  men  in 
South  Africa  had  been  forced  to  ask  themselves  before 
him — what  was  the  present  state  of  the  natives,  and 
how  could  it  best  be  improved  ?  By  the  wise  govern¬ 
ment  of  the  white  men,  the  old  diminution  of  the 
numbers  of  the  natives  by  war  and  pestilence  no 
longer  occurred.  The  good  and  stable  administration 
of  the  colony  prevented  the  blacks  from  fighting,  and 
the  result,  therefore,  was  an  enormous  increase  in 
their  numbers,  and  their  locations  were  rapidly  be-' 
coming  too  small  for  all  those  who  had  to  find  shelter 
therein. 

The  question  before  the  Legislature,  as  Rhodes  put 
it,  was,  What  was  to  become  of  these  natives ?  “At 
present,”  he  remarked,  in  that  terse,  downright  manner 
to  which  he  is  so  greatly  addicted,  “  we  give  them 
nothing  to  do,  because  we  have  taken  away  then 
power  of  making  war — an  excellent  pursuit  in  its  way,’ 
he  added,  with  a  touch  of  that  cynicism  and  love  oi 
perplexing  his  auditors  which  he  so  often  displays— 
“  which  once  employed  their  minds.  The  man  whc 
has  nothing  to  do,”  he  continued,  “  turns  to  the 
canteen.” 

On  the  whole,  he  was  not  in  favour  of  giving  th( 
natives  any  share  in  the  government  of  the  country 


THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


225 


for  he  considered  that  they  were  intellectually  unfitted 
to  undertake  such  a  task  ;  but  he  proposed  to  give 
them  some  voice  in  the  local  administration  of  their 
own  districts.  The  native  knew  absolutely  nothing 
about  the  politics  of  the  country,  or  the  many  ques¬ 
tions  affecting  its  government,  and  probably  cared 
even  less.  “  Leave  us  alone,”  a  native  chief  had 
said  some  years  previously  to  Rhodes  when  the  latter 
was  speaking  to  him  on  the  subject  of  native  legislation, 
“but  let  us  try  and  deal  with  some  of  our  own  little 
local  questions.” 

Speaking  of  the  Native  question,  which  was  then 
nearly  as  burning  a  topic  in  Cape  Colony  as  it  is  in 
Rhodesia  at  the  present  time,  Mr  Rhodes  pointed  out 
that  if  the  agriculture  of  the  country  was  to  prosper, 
as  it  was  necessary  for  the  wellbeing  of  the  colony 
that  it  should  prosper,  it  was  imperative  that  some 
scheme  should  be  devised  to  induce  the  natives  to 
work  in  greater  numbers  than  was  the  case  at  that 
time,  and  by  so  doing  to  tend  to  reduce  the  wages, 
which  then  were  absurdly  high.  As  Mr  Rhodes  in 
the  course  of  his  speech  pointed  out,  the  wmge  of  the 
agricultural  labourer  in  England  is  about  12s.  a- week, 
and  few  will  be  disposed  to  dispute  the  fact  that  these 
iabourers  certainly  live  at  a  higher  standard  of  civilisa¬ 
tion  than  the  Kafirs  of  Cape  Colony  ;  yet  these  Kafirs 
tvere  then  actually  receiving  50  per  cent  more  wages 
Ran  the  English  labourers  at  home. 

In  explaining  his  view  to  the  House  of  Assembly, 
Rhodes  was  very  careful  to  emphasise  the  fact  that 
ie  was  strongly  opposed  to  what  may  perhaps  be 
-ermed  the  extreme  humanitarian  view.  He  did  not 
)elieve,  and  few  sensible  people  will  be  found  to 
)elieve,  that  all  the  laws  and  privileges  which  are 

p 


226 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


enjoyed  by  the  white  colonist  should  suddenly  and 
without  any  preparatory  training  be  granted  to  the 
natives.  In  a  phrase  which  illustrated  his  view  oj 
this  subject  with  great  clearness,  he  compared  the 
natives  of  Cape  Colony  at  the  present  time  to  the 
fellow -tribesmen  of  the  Druids  of  ancient  Britair 
who  had  come  to  life  after  a  lapse  of  two  thousanc 
years  since  their  prior  existence,  and  he  expressed 
the  opinion  that  those  who  advocated  the  granting  oi 
full  political  rights  to  the  natives  were  anxious  to  gel 
rid  of  the  two  thousand  years  of  civilisation  whict 
lie  between  the  white  population  of  South  Africa  anc 
the  natives. 

After  dealing  in  his  speech  at  considerable  lengtl 
and  with  great  lucidity  with  the  question  of  th( 
principle  of  primogeniture  as  applied  to  the  lane 
titles  of  the  native  locations,  Mr  Rhodes  passed  or 
to  the  question  of  the  labour  tax,  which  it  was  his 
purpose  to  introduce  as  a  necessary  preliminary  t< 
the  granting  of  the  franchise.  Many  young  and  able 
bodied  men,  he  pointed  out,  living  in  the  nativf 
locations,  were,  as  he  put  it,  like  younger  sons  a 
home  or  like  young  men  about  town.  What  hi 
meant  by  this  happy  simile  was  that  these  youn^ 
natives  dwelt  in  the  locations  of  their  tribes  witl 
their  parents,  and  never  dreamt  of  doing  one  strok 
of  work.  “  Their  present  life,”  Rhodes  continued 
pursuing  the  comparison  he  had  just  drawn,  “  is  ver 
similar  to  that  of  a  young  man  about  town  wh( 
lounges  about  a  club  during  the  day,  dresses  himsel 
up  for  tea-party  in  the  afternoon,  and  in  the  evening 
drinks  too  much,  and  probably  finishes  up  witl 
immorality.” 

From  the  foregoing  remark  it  will  be  gathered  tha 


NO  LOVER  OF  THE  IDLER. 


227 


Cecil  Rhodes  is  no  lover  of  the  idler,  be  his  colour 
black  or  white.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  sight  of 
the  many  pale-faced,  weak-kneed  dandies  who  throng 
Piccadilly  and  Bond  Street  in  the  season  rouses  the 
whole  of  his  cynicism  and  the  scorn  of  his  volcanic 
nature,  and  he  is  apt  at  such  times  to  give  expression 
to  very  bitter  and  scathing  remarks  against  a  society 
which  can  produce  and  encourage  such  brainless 
creatures.  Rhodes  can  forgive  much  in  a  man  or 
woman — no  one  is  more  conscious  of  his  own  short¬ 
comings  than  he,  and  possibly  this  is  the  reason  of 
his  tolerance  for  the  failures  of  others ;  but  idleness 
and  aimlessness  of  life  in  his  eyes  are  unpardonable 
sins. 

Advocating  the  imposition  of  an  annual  tax  of 
10s.  on  all  able-bodied  male  natives  in  the  colony, 
Rhodes  pointed  out  that  by  so  doing  they  would  get 
hold  of  these  “gilded  youths”  of  the  tribes  and  make 
them  go  out  to  work.  As  they  were  then  living, 
these  young  natives  were  entirely  destitute  of  any 
object  in  life.  They  had  no  cows,  and  therefore  no 
chance  of  obtaining  a  wife. 

So  soon  as  a  native  could  produce  evidence  of  being 
in  regular  employment  he  was  to  be  exempt  from  this 
labour  tax,  and  Rhodes  proposed  to  devote  the  money 
which  accrued  from  the  tax  to  the  purpose  of  erecting 
native  schools  in  each  district,  to  be  carried  on  under 
direct  Government  supervision,  where  the  natives 
should  be  taught  all  things  that  were  necessary  for 
them  to  know  in  order  to  become  of  use  to  themselves, 
their  tribes,  and  their  country.  At  this  stage  Rhodes 
paused  to  enter  a  badly  needed  protest  against  the 
methods  of  the  missionary  schools  which  had  been 
established  throughout  the  colony.  Referring  more 


228 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


especially  to  the  Transkei  district,  he  said  that  he 
had  in  his  tours  through  this  portion  of  the  colony 
found  some  excellent  institutions  where  natives  were 
being  taught  Latin  and  Greek.  These  schools  were 
turning  out  native  parsons  by  the  score,  but  the  thing, 
in  his  opinion,  was  being  overdone.  Native  parsons, 
he  did  not  hesitate  to  say,  were  becoming  more 
plentiful  than  congregations.  Thus  a  dangerous  class 
was  being  evolved.  These  native  preachers  were 
excellent  so  long  as  their  number  was  limited,  but 
at  that  time  the  supply  was  out  of  all  proportion 
to  the  demand.  The  parsons,  after  the  education 
they  had  received,  felt  it  undignified  for  them  to 
return  to  manual  labour ;  consequently  the  country 
was  gradually  becoming  infested  with  unemployed 
men  of  good  education,  and  in  many  cases  of  con¬ 
siderable  ability,  who  would  in  the  end  develop  into 
agitators  of  the  most  pernicious  kind.  He  held  that 
the  Government  should  have  the  control  of  these 
schools. 

Passing  from  this  subject,  he  devoted  himself  next 
to  the  question  of  the  sale  of  liquor  to  natives.  His 
plan  was,  as  has  already  been  mentioned,  a  system  of 
local  option,  but  with  compensation  for  such  canteen- 
owners  as  had  had  their  licences  withdrawn ;  for,  as 
he  pointed  out,  these  owners  of  canteens  had  for  some 
years  been  encouraged  to  extend  and  improve  their 
buildings,  and  therefore  it  would  be  manifestly  unfair 
to  veer  round  suddenly  and  close  these  establishments 
without  any  compensation.  To  the  credit  of  the  Cape 
Legislature  it  should  be  said  that  it  at  once  saw  the 
reasonableness  of  this  view  and  assented  to  it. 

In  this  bill  Rhodes  had  wisely  inserted  a  clause 
providing  that  no  native  in  the  possession  of  one  of 


NATIVE  ALLOTMENTS. 


229 


these  eight-acre  allotments  which  it  was  proposed  to 
set  up  should  be  allowed  to  dispose  of  it,  in  any  way 
other  than  through  the  regular  descent  from  father  to 
eldest  son  by  the  chief  wife,  without  the  previous 
knowledge  and  consent  of  the  Government.  Without 
such  a  clause,  Rhodes’  keen  foresight  told  him,  un¬ 
scrupulous  white  men  would  quickly  overreach  and 
cozen  the  natives  out  of  their  land,  and  by  so  doing 
speedily  gain  control  of  large  tracts  of  country — a 
very  undesirable  state  of  things,  and  one  which  would 
totally  defeat  the  objects  for  which  the  bill  was 
framed. 

It  was  also  provided  that  the  native  allotments 
should  not  be  sublet,  but  that,  in  case  any  native 
declined  to  cultivate  or  take  any  interest  in  his  land, 
bhe  Government  had  the  right  to  resume  possession 
if  it  and  reallot  as  seemed  best  to  them.  Among 
other  things,  the  Act  provided  for  the  establishment 
of  a  labour  bureau,  where  the  natives  should  register 
hemselves  in  order  to  be  provided  with  work.  If 
hey  failed  to  do  this,  and  could  not  show  that  they 
vere  in  settled  employment  obtained  in  other  ways, 
hey  would  have  to  pay  the  labour  tax  of  10s.  before 
eferred  to. 

Rhodes  wound  up  this  sterling  speech,  in  some  re- 
pects  the  most  interesting  and  important  that  he 
ias  delivered  in  the  whole  course  of  his  public  career, 
vith  the  following  striking  phrase  :  “  The  natives  are 
hildren,  and  we  ought  to  do  something  for  the  minds 
nd  the  brains  that  the  Almighty  has  given  them. 

do  not  believe  that  they  are  different  from  our- 
slves.”  There,  in  one  sentence,  is  the  standpoint 
'om  which  Rhodes  views  the  Native  question  of  South 
Trica,  and  it  is  to  be  imagined  that  there  are  few 


230 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


who  differ  from  him  among  those  who  have  studies 
carefully  this  complex  question. 

Though  Rhodes’  transparent  honesty  of  purpose  iif  j 
regard  to  this  question  is  manifest  to  all  whose  eye 
are  not  blinded  by  prejudice,  yet  on  more  than  on 
occasion  he  has  been  charged  with  hypocrisy,  ant 
plainly  told  that  his  sole  object  in  endeavouring  t 
inculcate  the  doctrine  of  the  dignity  of  labour  int 
the  minds  of  the  South  African  natives  was  to  pro 
vide  a  plentiful  supply  of  black  workmen  for  the  got 
and  diamond  mines  of  South  Africa.  It  is  hopeles 
to  argue  with  such  people.  I  content  myself  there 
fore  with  stating  Rhodes’  actions,  and  leaving  th 
public,  weighing  the  matter  carefully,  to  draw  thei 
own  conclusions. 

In  the  end,  of  course,  Rhodes  carried  his  bill,  thoug] 
he  had  to  fight  some  very  strong  antagonism  before  b 
triumphed.  Triumph,  however,  he  did  in  the  end 
that  is  Cecil  Rhodes’  way.  When  he  has  set  his  mint 
on  the  attainment  of  any  object  he  achieves  his  pur 
pose  sooner  or  later. 

In  his  dealings  with  the  large  native  population  o 
Rhodesia,  Rhodes  has  followed  much  the  same  line; 
which  he  found  to  work  so  successfully  in  Cap* 
Colony ;  but  it  has  been  beyond  even  his  powers  t< 
make  the  vast  majority  of  the  natives  under  the  rut 
of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  settle  dowi 
to  work,  especially  in  the  mines.  The  Matabeh 
and  neighbouring  tribes  view  with  positive  horro: 
and  superstitious  awe  the  notion  of  spending  thei) 
days  working  deep  down  in  a  gold  mine,  some  dis 
tance  away  from  even  the  tiniest  ray  of  daylight 
Even  the  smallest  and  most  insignificant  noise  in  one 
of  these  mines  echoes  and  reverberates  in  strange 


A  CONSTANT  MENACE. 


231 


ashion ;  and  while  a  white  man  takes  absolutely  no 
lotice  of  such  a  thing,  the  ignorant  natives,  mere 
rrown-up  babies  when  it  comes  to  a  matter  of  nerves, 
urn  nearly  green  with  fright,  and  the  slightest  thing 
vill  send  them  stampeding  to  the  foot  of  the  shaft 
.error-stricken  and  clamouring  to  be  set  on  the  face 
if  the  earth  in  the  bright  sunshine  once  more. 

It  is  impossible  to  do  otherwise  than  sympathise 
vith  the  natives  in  this  matter  ;  nevertheless,  it  is 
it  constant  menace  to  the  safety  and  security  of  the 
vhite  dwellers  in  Rhodesia  that  there  should  be  in 
heir  midst  a  large,  able  -  bodied  native  population 
iving  in  absolute  idleness.  The  old  maxim,  that 

“  Satan  finds  some  mischief  still 
For  idle  hands  to  do,” 

s  perhaps  even  more  than  usually  true  when  applied 
o  the  native  races  of  South  Africa.  The  Aborigines 
Protection  Society  and  the  sentimental  school  will 
dost  likely  hold  up  their  hands  in  pious  horror  at 
he  statement ;  but  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying 
hat  the  Rhodesian  natives,  as  much  for  their  own 
pod  as  for  that  of  the  white  colonists,  should  be 
ompelled  to  take  up  settled  labour  of  some  kind  or 
nother.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  at  some  period  in 
he  very  near  future  Mr  Rhodes  will  resolutely  wrestle 
vith  this  problem  until  he  has  succeeded  in  evolving 
ome  way  of  rendering  labour  compulsory  among  the 
latives  of  that  great  country  to  which  he  has  given 
iis  name.  I  am  as  much  opposed  as  any  one  to  the 
latives  being  compelled  to  work  in  the  mines,  for  that 
3  a  form  of  employment  for  which  they  are  unfitted 
>y  nature  ;  but  it  ought  not  to  be  hard  to  find  some 
arm  of  work  that  shall  be  congenial  to  them. 


232 


RHODES  AND  THE  NATIVE  QUESTION. 


In  addition  to  the  occasions  on  which  Rhodes  has 
been  brought  prominently  into  connection  with  the 
Native  question  of  South  Africa  to  which  allusions 
have  already  been  made  in  these  pages,  there  was 
one  other  in  which  he  was  called  upon  to  address 
the  Cape  House  of  Assembly  concerning  his  views 
on  this  subject.  That  was  at  the  time  of  the  annex¬ 
ation  of  Pondoland  by  Cape  Colony  in  1894.  Pondo- 
land  is  a  tract  of  country  containing  a  large  native 
population,  which  acted  as  a  sort  of  “buffer  state” 
between  the  two  British  colonies  of  the  Cape  and 
Natal.  The  natives  in  this  country  were  always  at 
war  among  themselves,  until  at  length  Cape  Colony 
intervened  to  restore  order.  To  put  an  end  to  the 
bloodshed  and  rapine  which  had  so  long  prevailed, 
it  was  decided,  after  much  correspondence  between 
the  Imperial  Government  and  the  Colonial  Govern¬ 
ments  of  Natal  and  Cape  Colony,  that  the  latter  state 
should  take  over  the  administration  of  Pondoland,  and 
it  fell  to  the  lot  of  Mr  Rhodes  to  move  the  annexation 
of  Pondoland  in  the  Cape  House  of  Assembly.  In 
doing  so  he  fully  explained  the  reasons  that  had  led 
to  the  proposal. 

He  was  reproached  in  more  than  one  quarter  for 
permitting  the  natives  to  retain  their  guns,  just  as  he 
had  been  reproached  some  years  previously  when  he 
followed  out  a  similar  policy  in  Basutoland.  In 
defending  his  action  in  this  matter  he  said  that  he 
found  it  difficult  to  discover  any  justification  for  dis¬ 
arming  the  natives.  They  had  submitted  quietly  to 
the  occupation  of  their  country  by  Major  Elliott  and 
the  column  of  Cape  Mounted  Police  which  had  been 
sent  from  Cape  Town  into  Pondoland,  and  Rhodes 
did  not  think  that  under  those  circumstances  the 


NATIVES  AND  THEIR  GUNS. 


233 


Cape  Government  would  have  had  the  slightest 
excuse  for  demanding  the  surrender  of  their  guns, 
especially  as,  he  was  careful  to  point  out,  the  guns 
were  wretched  weapons  and  about  as  harmless  as  guns 
well  can  be.  If  the  natives  had  been  compensated 
with  money  —  as  they  must  have  been  had  the 
surrender  of  the  guns  been  insisted  upon  —  they 
would  in  all  probability  have  spent  such  money  in 
buying  more  modern  weapons. 

There  will  be  many  who  disagree  in  toto  with  Mr 
Rhodes  on  this  question.  It  seems  only  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  if  he  and  the  British  South  Africa 
Company  had  insisted  on  the  Matabele  delivering 
up  their  guns  at  the  conclusion  of  the  first  war  in  that 
country,  we  should  have  been  spared  many  of  the 
horrors  which  accompanied  the  Matabele  rebellion  of 
1896-97.  However,  this  policy  of  permitting  the 
natives  to  retain  possession  of  their  guns  acted  very 
well  in  Basutoland,  and  later  events  showed  that  it 
acted  equally  well  in  Pondoland  ;  so  that  Rhodes  is 
hardly  to  be  blamed  because  his  policy  failed  when 
tried  in  connection  with  the  Matabele.  It  shows, 
however,  that  it  is  not  always  wise  to  employ  the 
same  policy  when  dealing  with  different  tribes  of 
South  African  natives,  and  that  even  Rhodes,  with  his 
great  knowledge  of  the  natives  and  their  ways,  was  in 
error  when  he  first  came  into  contact  with  the  warlike 
Matabele,  otherwise  he  would  have  made  the  handing 
in  of  every  gun  possessed  by  the  followers  of  Loben- 
gula  an  imperative  condition  before  he  permitted  the 
white  columns  to  be  disbanded. 


234 


CHAPTER  XVI.  J 

THE  RAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 

I  have  already  described  in  detail  the  causes  which 
led  Mr  Rhodes  to  identify  himself  with  the  Reform 
movement  at  Johannesburg,  and  the  course  of  events 
which  ultimately  led  up  to  the  unfortunate  Jameson 
Raid ;  so  that  there  is  no  need  for  me  to  repeat 
myself  here,  save  so  far  as  to  insist  upon  the  differ¬ 
ence  between  the  conditions  which  Rhodes  had  decided 
would  justify  him  in  moving  the  Rhodesian  police 
force  across  the  frontier  into  the  Transvaal  to  restore 
order  in  Johannesburg  and  to  stand  between  the 
Uitlander  population  of  the  Rand  and  the  wrath  of 
President  Kruger,  and  the  conditions  under  which 
Jameson’s  foolhardy  and  criminal  enterprise  was 
entered  upon — conditions  which  it  was  next  to  im¬ 
possible  for  Rhodes  to  foresee  and  absolutely  impossible 
for  him  to  prevent.  Having  done  this,  it  only  remains 
for  me  to  describe  events  as  they  concerned  Mr  Rhodes 
during  the  march  of  Dr  Jameson  and  his  men,  and 
directly  after  the  failure  of  the  Raid  and  up  to  and 
during  the  sittings  of  the .  Committees  which  were 
appointed  to  go  into  the  whole  affair  in  Cape  Town 
and  in  London. 

The  first  intimation  to  reach  Cape  Town — where 


TWO  MOMENTOUS  TELEGRAMS. 


235 


Rhodes  was  in  residence  at  the  time — that  Jameson 
had  crossed  the  border  and  was  marching  towards 
Johannesburg  came  about  nine  o’clock  on  the  morning 
of  Sunday,  December  29,  1895,  when  the  telegraph 
office  in  that  city  was  opened,  and  the  operators  found 
two  telegrams  from  Dr  Jameson  to  Mr  Rhodes  in  a 
private  cipher.  One  of  these  had  been  despatched  on 
the  evening  of  the  28th,  the  other  early  on  the  follow¬ 
ing  morning.  A  messenger  from  the  British  South 
Africa  Company  called  at  the  telegraph  office  in  the 
usual  course  during  the  morning,  and  the  two  messages 
were  handed  to  him  and  conveyed  at  once  to  Mr 
Stevens,  the  manager  of  the  Cape  Town  branch  of 
the  Chartered  Company,  who  enjoyed  a  large  measure 
of  Mr  Rhodes’  confidence.  This  gentleman  at  once 
proceeded  to  decode  the  telegrams,  little  dreaming 
what  they  were  to  reveal.  Naturally  he  dealt  with 
the  earlier  one  first.  It  ran,  “  Unless  I  hear  definitely 
to  the  contrary,  shall  leave  to-morrow  evening.”  The 
second  one  was  as  follows  :  “  Shall  leave  to-night  for 
Transvaal.”  Mr  Stevens  gazed  at  the  flimsy  pieces  of 
paper  in  front  of  him  in  amazement,  and  after  another 
hurried  glance  at  the  code  to  see  that  there  was  no 
possibility  of  error  in  the  deciphering  of  the  messages, 
at  once  dashed  off  as  fast  as  a  cab  could  convey  him  to 
find  Mr  Rhodes  at  Groot  Schuur. 

At  this  time  Mr  Rhodes  was  entertaining  a  party  at 
his  house,  which  included  among  others  Mr  Charles 
Leonard,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Reform  movement 
in  Johannesburg,  and  they  were  at  luncheon  when  Mr 
Stevens  arrived.  So  soon  as  the  fateful  telegrams 
were  laid  before  Rhodes,  and  he  realised  to  the  full 
their  significance,  urgent  messages  'were  sent  off  to  the 
post-offices  to  “keep  Mafeking  open,”  as  Mr  Rhodes 


236 


THE  RAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 


would  shortly  have  a  very  important  telegram  to 
send  up.  The  operators,  accordingly,  tried  to  get 
into  communication  with  the  frontier  town.  But  in 
vain.  The  wires  were  cut.  Dr  Jameson  had  burned 
his  boats  behind  him. 

The  message  Rhodes  was  endeavouring  unsuccess¬ 
fully  to  get  through  was  couched  as  follows  :  “  Things 
in  Johannesburg  I  yet  hope  to  see  amicably  settled. 

.  .  .  On  no  account  whatever  must  you  move.  I  most 
strongly  object  to  such  a  course.”  This  telegram  was 
handed  in  at  the  Cape  Town  telegraph  office  at  twelve 
noon  on  December  29,  but,  as  has  been  said,  it  was 
impossible  to  transmit  it. 

When  he  had  despatched  his  telegram,  and  had 
been  told  that  it  could  not  be  forwarded,  Rhodes  paced 
the  floor  of  the  library  at  Groot  Schuur  like  a  caged 
lion,  and  seemed  totally  unable  to  collect  his  scattered 
wits.  All  he  could  do  was  to  run  his  fingers  nervously 
through  his  hair,  and  murmur  distractedly  to  himself, 
“Now  just  be  cool.  Now  just  be  cool.  Let  us  think 
this  thing  out.”  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  for  a 
brief  period  the  receipt  of  Jameson’s  two  abrupt 
messages  absolutely  deranged  Rhodes’  mental  capac¬ 
ity,  and  his  mind  vacillated  in  what  was  for  him  a 
very  strange  fashion.  He  was  confronted  with  a 
problem  such  as  a  man  is  rarely  called  upon  to  grapple 
with,  and  for  a  time  he  groped  in  the  dark,  as  it  were, 
vainly  feeling  for  some  object  that  he  might  lay  hold 
of  to  enable  him  to  rally  his  faculties.  At  the  first 
rush  of  these  conflicting  emotions  there  was  on  the 
part  of  Rhodes  an  impulse  to  blame  Jameson  for 
breaking  away  as  he  had  done  without  any  previous 
warning ;  but  to  this  succeeded  a  great  confidence  in 
his  old  friend,  and  an  optimistic  belief  that  he  and  his 


SCHREINER  VISITS  RHODES. 


237 


men  would  get  through  to  Johannesburg  all  right,  and 
that  things  would  not  turn  out  to  be  so  bad  as  they 
threatened. 

As  soon  as  he  was  able  to  think  coherently  Rhodes 
set  himself  down  to  fight  with  the  complex  problem 
in  front  of  him  in  thoroughly  characteristic  fashion. 
As  the  day  wore  on  strange  rumours  of  what  was 
transpiring  in  the  Transvaal  began  to  run  through 
Cape  Town  and  soon  reached  those  in  authority, 
though  those  who  were  in  the  confidence  of  Cecil 
Rhodes  closed  their  lips  tightly  and  suffered  no  word 
to  escape  them  concerning  the  serious  crisis  which  had 
arisen.  In  the  evening  some  of  these  rumours  reached 
the  ears  of  Mr  Rhodes’  parliamentary  ally  and  near 
neighbour  at  Groot  Schuur,  the  Hon.  W.  P.  Schreiner, 
who  at  once  set  off  across  the  grounds  which  separated 
lis  house  from  that  of  Mr  Rhodes  to  ascertain  what 
was  really  going  forward,  and  what  part  Rhodes  was 
olaying  in  the  drama. 

Schreiner  was  only  able  to  see  Rhodes  for  a  few 
ninutes.  “Have  you  seen  Charles  Leonard?”  he 
isked  the  Cape  Premier  when  he  found  that  the  latter 
vas  resolutely  silent  as  to  what  was  going  forward. 

‘  Yes,”  was  Rhodes’  reply  in  a  tone  of  studied  indifter- 
mce,  “  I  have  seen  him.”  Then  as  Schreiner  took  his 
eave  he  said  to  Rhodes  in  a  tone  of  great  earnestness, 

'  For  goodness’  sake  keep  yourself  clear  from  that 
ntanglement  in  Johannesburg”  (meaning  the  growing 
gitation  of  the  Reform  Committee),  “  for  if  there  is 
ny  disturbance  there  they  are  sure  to  try  and  drag 
ou  into  it.” 

In  reply  to  this  Rhodes  merely  shrugged  his 
houlders  with  an  assumption  of  indifference  which  in 
eality  he  must  have  been  far  from  feeling,  and  said, 


238 


THE  RAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 


“  Oh,  that  is  all  right.  Good  night,”  and  so  the  tw 
men  parted.  Mr  Schreiner  does  not  seem  at  th 
period  to  have  had  the  least  suspicion  of  the  re: 
gravity  of  the  case,  or  that  Jameson  had  actuall 
invaded  the  Transvaal.  Indeed,  who  that  had  nc 
seen  the  telegrams  would  have  imagined  that  thin^ 
had  gone  so  far  ?  But  he  was  obviously  actuate 
with  a  sincere  desire  to  serve  Rhodes  and  to  protec 
him,  if  possible,  from  the  follies  of  others,  and  possibl 
from  those  of  himself,  and  it  was  none  of  Mr  Schreiner 
fault  that  he  was  unable  to  be  of  any  assistance  to  h: 
parliamentary  chief  and  old  personal  friend. 

On  the  Monday  morning,  December  30,  the  nev 
of  Jameson’s  march  was  known  all  over  Cape  Towi 
and  the  newspaper  offices  were  besieged  by  crowd 
anxious  to  have  confirmation  of  this  and  to  lear 
further  details.  So  soon  as  the  High  Commission! 
at  the  Cape,  Sir  Hercules  Robinson,  was  apprised  c 
events,  he  instructed  the  Imperial  Secretary,  Si 
Graham  Bowyer,  to  call  on  Rhodes,  and  to  see  hoi 
far  the  latter  was  implicated.  Rhodes,  however,  wa 
not  to  be  found  at  any  of  his  offices  in  Cape  Town,  o 
at  the  British  South  Africa  Company,  or  at  the  D 
Beers  Company  ;  while  the  attendants  at  the  Hous 
of  Assembly  informed  Sir  Graham  Bowyer  that  th 
Premier  had  not  been  there  that  day.  After  thes 
ineffectual  efforts  to  find  his  man,  Sir  Graham  wa 
forced  to  have  recourse  to  pen  and  ink,  and  forwardei 
a  letter  to  Groot  Schuur,  couched  in  terms  of  grea 
coolness  and  formality,  in  which  the  following  was  th' 
principal  sentence  : — 

“  I  have  called  several  times  at  your  offices  thi 
morning  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  to  you  hi 
Excellency’s  instructions  for  the  immediate  recall  o 


jameson’s  recall  demanded. 


239 


Dr  Jameson,  but  you  have  not,  so  far  as  is  known, 
been  at  any  of  the  public  offices,  or  at  the  offices  of  the 
British  South  Africa  Company.  I  therefore  send  this 
note  by  special  messenger  to  your  private  address.” 

When  this  missive  reached  Groot  Schuur  Rhodes 
was  not  at  home.  Early  that  morning — soon  after 
dawn,  in  fact — he  had  left  the  house  on  his  favourite 
pony  and  ridden  off  in  the  direction  of  the  lower  slopes 
of  Table  Mountain,  and  there  he  passed  the  day, 
taking  neither  food  nor  drink,  communing  in  solitude 
with  the  forces  of  nature  as  set  out  around  him,  and 
endeavouring  to  find  some  way  out  of  the  impasse  into 
which  his  interference  in  the  affairs  of  an  alien  state, 
no  less  than  the  recklessness  of  his  lieutenant,  had 
landed  him.  It  is  impossible  to  refrain  from  apportion¬ 
ing  grave  blame  to  Dr  Jameson  for  taking  the  step  he 
did  without  the  prior  knowledge  and  consent  of 
Rhodes  ;  but  it  has  always  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
if  Rhodes  had  not  placed  the  power  to  do  mischief 
in  Jameson’s  grasp  it  would  have  been  impossible  for 
the  latter  to  have  done  the  harm  he  did. 

Receiving  no  reply  to  his  letter,  Sir  Graham  Bowyer 
sent  another  note  to  Rhodes  on  the  matter,  and  these 
two  letters  were  handed  Rhodes  when  he  returned 
from  his  ride  in  the  evening.  Glancing  over  them 
dmost  mechanically,  Rhodes  sighed  wearily  and  then 
aimed  on  his  heel  and  entered  his  library  to  indite 
he  following  abrupt  reply,  which  he  forwarded  un- 
iated  to  the  Imperial  Secretary  : — 

“  My  dear  Bowyer, — Jameson  has  gone  in  without 
ny  authority.  I  hope  our  message  may  have  stopped 
lim.  Very  sorry  to  have  missed  you. — Yours, 

“  C.  J.  Rhodes.” 


240 


THE  RAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 


There  is  in  this  brief  epistle  a  slight  discrepancy  to 
be  noted,  to  which  Sir  William  Harcourt  among  others 
afterwards  called  attention  during  the  sittings  of  the 
Parliamentary  Committee.  As  has  previously  been 
said,  Rhodes  was  informed  that  the  wires  to  Mafeking 
were  cut  on  the  Sunday  afternoon.  This  being  so, 
how  does  it  come  that  on  the  Monday  evening  he 
writes  to  Sir  Graham  Bow^yer  saying  that  he  hopes 
the  messages  stopping  Jameson  have  got  through  ? 
To  this  there  are  two  explanations  which  suggest 
themselves,  though  possibly  neither  is  quite  satis¬ 
factory.  In  the  first  place,  Rhodes  at  this  time  had 
no  means  of  knowing  that  Dr  Jameson  had  deliberately 
severed  the  telegraph-wires  to  prevent  any  messages 
recalling  him  getting  through,  and  he  may  have 
supposed  that  the  interruption  was  merely  due  to 
local  and  easily  remediable  causes.  Telegraph-wires 
in  South  Africa  are  frequently  “  dowm  ”  for  a  few 
hours,  and  then  restarted  in  full  working  order  once 
more.  In  the  second  place,  the  tumult  in  Rhodes’ 
mind  had  not  yet  had  time  to  subside,  so  that  he  may 
be  forgiven  if  some  of  the  details  of  all  that  had 
transpired  during  the  twenty-four  hours  immediately 
preceding  the  writing  of  this  letter  had  escaped  him. 

On  the  Monday  afternoon  Mr  W.  Schreiner  again 
called  at  Groot  Schuur  to  see  Mr  Rhodes,  but  the 
latter  had  not  returned,  so  he  left  an  urgent  request 
that  Rhodes  would  see  him  in  the  evening.  Com¬ 
plying  with  this  request  after  he  had  had  supper,  Mr 
Rhodes  sent  his  body-servant  over  to  Mr  Schreiner’s 
house  to  tell  him  he  would  see  him  if  he  would  come 
round.  Mr  Schreiner  did  so,  and  on  his  arrival  was 
shocked  to  see  what  a  change  the  twenty-four  hours 
had  produced  in  Rhodes.  His  face  was  pale  and 


A  PROTRACTED  INTERVIEW. 


241 


haggard.  There  was  a  light  of  fever  in  his  eyes,  and 
the  dark  rings  beneath  them  told  of  the  severity  of 
the  mental  struggle  through  which  he  had  so  lately 
passed,  while  his  hair  was  perceptibly  more  tinged 
with  grey  than  it  had  hitherto  been. 

For  three  hours  or  more  Rhodes  and  Schreiner  sat 
3loseted  together  in  the  cosy,  teak-lined  library  at 
Groot  Schuur.  Here,  among  other  things,  the  pros 
ind  cons  for  Rhodes’  resignation  of  his  position  as 
Prime  Minister  of  Cape  Colony  were  discussed.  Mr 
Schreiner’s  position  was  very  difficult.  On  the  one 
land  the  whole  of  his  Afrikander  sympathies  were 
with  the  Transvaal  and  bitterly  opposed  to  Jameson  ; 
md  on  the  other  hand  was  his  long'-standing  friend- 
;hip  with  Rhodes,  and  the  strong  effect  which  the 
jersonality  of  the  great  figure  of  South  African 
jolitics  had  upon  him  made  him  strive  against  his 
>etter  judgment  to  find  some  excuse  for  him. 

At  the  end  of  the  protracted  interview  it  was  deter- 
ained  that  Rhodes  should  place  his  resignation  of  the 
iremiership  in  the  hands  of  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  the 
■ext  morning,  to  be  forwarded  to  the  Colonial  Secre- 
ary  in  London.  This,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  did  ; 
ut  both  Mr  Chamberlain  and  Sir  Hercules  Robinson 
eclined  to  accept  it  so  long  as  there  was  any  possi- 
ility  of  him  being  able  to  use  his  official  position  to 
xall  Dr  Jameson.  When  it  was  seen  that  this  pos- 
bility  no  longer  existed,  and  it  became  known  that 
ie  Boer  Commandant  Cronje  had  compelled  Jameson 
ad  his  followers  to  lay  down  their  arms  and  surrender 
lemselves  prisoners  at  Doornkop,  this  resignation 
as  at  once  accepted,  and  an  emergency  Ministry 
istily  formed  with  Sir  Gordon  Sprigg  as  Premier. 
It  was  of  course  obvious  to  all  who  had  followed 


Q 


242 


THE  RAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 


events  closely  and  had  managed  to  keep  their  heads 
sufficiently  clear  to  see  the  course  which  they  would 
inevitably  take,  that  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  must  in¬ 
stantly  vindicate  the  position  of  the  British  Empire  in 
the  business,  and  by  outlawing  Jameson  and  those 
who  had  followed  him,  disclaim  any  further  respon¬ 
sibility  for  his  actions,  or  any  concern  as  to  whai 
happened  to  him. 

Despite  the  tremendous  excitement  of  the  time 
Sir  Hercules  Robinson  maintained  his  presence  o: 
mind  remarkably  well,  and  when  he  learned  from  Si) 
Graham  Bowyer  that  it  was  impossible  to  reach  Rhodes 
either  personally  or  by  letter,  he  despatched  an  urgent 
message,  so  soon  as  the  telegraph-wires  were  reopened 
to  Mr  F.  J.  Newton,  the  resident  commissioner  in  th< 
Bechuanaland  Protectorate,  ordering  him  to  do  al 
that  lay  in  his  power  to  prevent  Jameson’s  farthei 
progress,  and  to  ensure  his  immediate  return  to  Britisl 
territory.  It  is  only  due  to  Mr  Newton  to  say  tha 
he  loyally  endeavoured  to  carry  out  these  instructions 
despatching  a  messenger  on  the  fleetest  horse  that  h< 
could  lay  his  hands  on.  What  the  result  of  thi, 
message  of  recall  was  will  be  seen  later. 

It  did  not  seem  to  occur  to  Rhodes  at  first  tha 
Jameson  and  his  men  were  liable  to  be  proclaimed 
outlaws  through  their  act,  and  that  the  Britisl 
Government,  for  its  own  credit’s  sake,  would  be  com 
pelled  to  refrain  from  affording  them  any  assistanc 
or  protection  ;  but  as  soon  as  he  realised  this  he  mad 
desperate  efforts  to  induce  the  High  Commissioner  t 
withhold  his  proclamation  so  long  as  there  seemei 
a  chance  of  Jameson  getting  into  Johannesburg  i 
safety.  Fortunately,  however,  for  the  honour  of  th 
Empire,  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  declined  to  postpor 


EFFORTS  TO  STOP  THE  RAIDERS. 


243 


iis  official  repudiation  of  Jameson  and  his  actions, 
vhich  was  therefore  issued  on  December  31.  Indeed, 
he  conduct  of  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  all  through  was 
he  one  commendable  thing  in  an  otherwise  sordid 
>usiness.  This  proclamation  called  upon  all  British 
ubjects  to  abstain  from  aiding  or  abetting  Dr  Jameson 
nd  those  with  him  in  their  armed  violation  of  the 
erritory  of  a  friendly  state. 

In  addition  to  the  messenger  which,  as  before- 
lentioned,  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  ordered  Mr  Newton 
o  send  after  Jameson  from  Mafeking,  another  was 
espatched  from  Pretoria  to  intercept  the  raiders, 
nd  to  deliver  imperative  orders  for  their  immediate 
iturn  to  British  soil,  and  their  surrender  to  the 
uthorities  as  soon  as  they  arrived  there.  The  man 
■om  Mafeking  caught  Jameson  up  on  the  night  of 
•ecember  31,  two  days,  be  it  remembered,  before  the 
dlision  with  the  Boers  under  Cronje  took  place,  and 
inded  the  order  to  Dr  Jameson,  while  the  one  from 
retoria  handed  in  another  message,  couched  in  almost 
.entical  terms  with  the  first,  between  ten  and  eleven 
clock  in  the  forenoon  of  January  1.  Both  these 
essages  Jameson  treated  with  contempt,  and  point- 
ank  refused  to  obey.  He  had  been,  as  he  stated, 
f  mmoned  by  a  letter  from  the  principal  residents  of 
1  e  Rand  “  to  come  to  their  assistance  in  their  ex- 
t amity,”  and  this,  despite  all  remonstrances  and 
(ders  to  the  contrary,  he  intended  to  do. 

This,  of  course,  was  a  reference  to  the  notorious 
‘  vomen  and  ehildren  ”  letter,  of  which  more  will  be 
£  id  at  a  later  stage  ;  and,  while  desiring  to  treat  Di¬ 
li  meson  with  justice,  and  even  with  leniency,  in  his 
at  of  madness,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  at  the 
tae  he  returned  this  answer  to  the  orders  of  the 


244 


THE  RAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 


High  Commissioner  he  was  perfectly  aware  of  the 
circumstances  under  which  this  letter  had  been  ob¬ 
tained,  and  the  length  of  time  that  had  elapsed  since 
it  was  penned  and  handed  to  him  for  employment 
when  the  proper  time  arose. 

Speaking  with  one  of  Jameson’s  followers,  during 
the  time  that  the  Parliamentary  Committee  wat 
sitting,  respecting  these  messages  of  Sir  Hercules 
Robinson,  and  the  answer  that  Jameson  returned  tc 
them,  I  was  given  rather  a  surprising  explanatior 
of  the  affair,  which  I  append  here,  neither  accepting 
it  nor  scouting  it,  but  setting  it  down  as  nearly  as 
I  can  remember  in  the  man’s  own  words.  “  You  see,’ 
he  said,  “  all  we  men  were  led  to  believe  that  tht 
High  Commissioner  knew  all  that  was  going  on,  anc 
I  am  convinced  that  Dr  Jim  thought  the  same.  There 
fore,  when  these  letters  came  in,  we  all,  from  Jamesoi 
and  Willoughby  downwards,  regarded  them  as  men 
‘  bluff,’  done  for  the  purpose  of  saving  Sir  Hercules 
Robinson  and  the  Colonial  Office  in  the  eyes  of  tb 
foreign  nations.  We  thought  that  the  High  Commis 
sioner  was  then  moving  up  with  all  speed  to  Pretori 
to  tackle  Kruger,  and  that  the  letters  were  sent  to  u 
as  a  blind,  and  were  never  intended  to  be  acted  upor 
If  I  had  thought  otherwise,  I  for  one  should  hay 
declined  to  go  any  farther,  and  have  at  once  returne 
to  Pitsani.” 

Possibly  there  is  something  in  this,  and  the  ran 
and  file  of  the  raiders  did  actually  believe  it ;  but  : 
is  difficult  to  accept  the  view  that  Jameson  and  h 
officers  were  not  better  informed,  or  did  not  know  S 
Hercules  Robinson  better  than  to  suppose  that  1 
could  act  such  a  double  part  as  that  outlined  abov 
This  statement  further  throws  considerable  light  c 


EXCITEMENT  IN  CAPE  TOWN. 


245 


the  low  code  of  political  morals  which  seems  to  have 
oervaded  all  classes  in  South  Africa  at  this  time. 

For  some  days  after  he  was  first  informed  of  the 
Raid,  Rhodes  absolutely  declined  to  move  a  finger  to 
irrest  the  march  of  Jameson,  or  to  repudiate  him 
ind  his  actions  in  any  shape  or  form.  Many  press- 
ng  letters  were  sent  him  by  the  Colonial  Secretary, 
.■h  rough  Sir  Hercules  Robinson,  calling  upon  him  to 
lissociate  himself  publicly  from  the  Raid,  and  his 
fiends  urged  him  most  strongly  to  take  the  same 
ourse— but  he  was  adamant  ;  neither  the  commands 
f  the  High  Commissioner  nor  the  pleadings  of 
hose  around  him  could  induce  Rhodes  to  cast  off 
iis  friend  and  lieutenant,  though  the  latter  had, 
o  all  appearances,  ruined  him  completely  as  a 
ublic  man. 

On  January  1,  however,  he  so  far  modified  his 
fcubborn  attitude  as  to  consent,  at  the  behest  of 
be  High  Commissioner,  to  telegraph  to  Colonel 
preckley  at  Bulawayo,  telling  him  that  on  no 
3count  was  he  to  move  the  volunteer  force  in  that 
)wn  (which  was  known  as  the  Rhodesia  Horse) 
>ward  the  Transvaal  border,  or  to  make  any  other 
;tempt,  to  assist  Jameson.  Shortly  after  this  mess- 
had  been  despatched  news  began  to  reach  Cape 
own  of  a  large  Boer  force  being  massed,  under  the 
:e-eating  Commandant  Cronje,  to  oppose  the  raiders, 
ad  on  January  2  it  was  rumoured  that  Jameson  was 
ghting  his  way  into  Johannesburg  and  sweeping  all 
oposition  on  one  side.  Cape  Town  then  became  in  a 
j'rfect  ferment,  and  the  excitement,  which  had  been 
oily  growing  since  Jameson  first  entered  the  Trans- 
val,  now  reached  fever-heat,  and  huge  crowds  col¬ 
lated  in  the  streets  awaiting  further  news.  These 


^46  THE  RAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 

crowds,  carried  away  as  they  were  by  the  passions  < 
the  moment,  did  not  pause  to  consider  the  rights  an 
wrongs  of  the  question  ;  indeed  it  is  doubtful  whethe 
one  person  out  of  every  ten  understood  them.  A 
they  knew  or  cared  about  was  that  a  British  force  we 
engaged  in  fighting  against  vastly  superior  numbers  < 
Boers,  and  this  appealed  to  them  very  forcibly. 

The  sentiment  of  these  crowds  was  aggressivel 
pro-British,  and  on  all  sides  were  heard  optimist 
prophecies  to  the  effect  that  Jameson  wras  “  boun 
to  come  out  on  top,”  and  would  reach  the  “  gold-ret 
city  ”  without  much  delay.  What  he  would  do  whe 
he  got  there  no  one  had  the  least  idea,  or  too 
the  trouble  to  ask  ;  for  that  was  a  detail  which  di 
not  concern  the  crowd  in  the  least,  though  an  assau 
on  Pretoria  was  confidently  predicted.  When  s 
length  it  was  announced  that  Jameson  had  been  oui 
witted  and  defeated  by  the  wily  Cronje,  and  con 
pelled  to  surrender  with  the  whole  of  his  force  affi 
suffering  severe  loss,  there  was  a  scene  of  gener; 
stupefaction.  At  first  this  statement  was  absolute! 
scouted  as  wildly  impossible ;  but  when  the  messag 
was  confirmed,  and  there  was  no  longer  any  possibilit 
of  doubt,  Cape  Town  almost  to  a  man  turned  on  tl 
Uitlander  population  of  Johannesburg,  and  revile 
them  as  a  set  of  miserable  cowards  who  had  sat  stij 
and  allowed  Jameson  and  his  men  to  be  take 
prisoners  almost  before  their  eyes,  without  makin 
the  least  effort  to  render  him  any  assistance. 

Such  a  view  was  manifestly  unjust,  and  Rhode 
was  almost  alone  in  recognising  this  when  told  whE 
the  popular  feeling  towards  the  Uitlanders  was.  I 
reply  he  shrugged  his  shoulders  contemptuous!; 
and  said,  “  The  Uitlanders  were  no  cowards  ;  the 


A  CROWNING  BLOW. 


247 


were  rushed.”  This  is  without  doubt  the  true  ver¬ 
sion  of  the  affair.  By  means  of  that  “bluff”  at 
which  he  was  such  an  adept,  Mr  Kruger  had  over¬ 
awed  the  raw,  untrained  reformers  of  Johannesburg, 
and  compelled  them  to  remain  quiet ;  while  the  threat 
of  outlawry  which  the  High  Commissioner  had  launched 
at  the  heads  of  those  who  made  the  slightest  effort  to 
assist  Jameson  also  had  a  restraining  influence.  Men 
of  the  stamp  of  Colonel  Frank  Rhodes  are  not  cowards  ; 
but  they  can  see  when  to  strike  a  blow,  and  when  it  is 
better  to  hold  their  hands. 

As  events  have  since  proved,  the  best  thing  that 
;ould  have  happened  was  that  Dr  Jameson  should 
lave  been  defeated  and  taken  prisoner,  and  none  now 
probably  realise  this  more  clearly  than  does  Dr  Jame- 
)on  himself.  It  was  the  best  thing  that  could  have 
happened  for  all  concerned  that  the  raiders  were 
lefeated.  There  is  no  doubt  about  it  that  if  the 
>attle  had  gone  the  other  way  and  the  Boers  had 
>een  repulsed,  war  must  have  ensued  between  the 
Iransvaal  and  Great  Britain,  and  Germany  would 
lave  actively  intervened  in  support  of  the  Transvaal, 
dth  the  result  that  a  very  grave  crisis  would  have 
risen  besides  which  what  really  did  occur  was  a  mere 
rop  in  the  ocean. 

The  news  that  Jameson  was  taken  prisoner,  and 
hat  he  and  his  fellow-officers  had  been  sentenced  to 
eath  by  the  Transvaal  president,  acted  as  a  crowning 
low  to  Rhodes.  Not  that  he  for  a  moment  believed 
hat  Kruger  would  dare  to  carry  his  threat  into  execu- 
ion.  He  knew  that  this  was  only  a  characteristic 
iece  of  bounce  on  the  part  of  the  Transvaal  presi- 
ent ;  but  with  this  inglorious  termination  to  an  in- 
lorious  affair,  his  career  as  a  public  man  in  South 


248 


THE  EAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 


Africa  appeared  to  be  completely  at  an  end.  It  ws 
said  openly  in  Cape  Town  that  Cecil  Rhodes  woul 
henceforward  be  but  a  memory  and  nothing  more,  an 
that  he  could  never  by  any  chance  play  a  prominer 
part  again  in  the  politics  of  the  sub-continent.  Sucl 
indeed,  seemed  to  be  the  only  conclusion  that  it  wa 
possible  to  arrive  at. 

In  the  hour  of  his  deep  tribulation  Rhodes  turne 
his  thoughts  towards  the  town  which  had  seen  hii 
come  to  the  front  in  politics,  and  decided  to  retur 
without  delay  to  Kimberley.  It  is  a  striking  fact  tha 
whenever  any  crisis  has  arisen  in  Rhodes’  life  it  ha 
always  been  to  the  “  city  of  diamonds  ”  that  he  ha 
turned  for  solace  and  sympathy  ;  and,  let  it  be  adder 
he  has  never  done  so  in  vain.  In  Kimberley,  at  an 
rate,  Rhodes  is  not  only  appreciated  but  looked  u 
to  almost  as  a  demigod  by  the  whole  population 
It  was  his  earnest  desire  that  his  removal  from  Cap 
Town  to  the  north  should  be  kept  as  secret  as  pos 
sible,  but  this  was  not  to  be,  for  at  every  statioi 
through  which  his  train  had  to  pass  large  crowd 
gathered  and  cheered  him  to  the  echo,  while  on  severa 
occasions  he  was  compelled  to  make  short  speeches  0) 
the  situation. 

Rhodes  has  often  been  taunted  by  his  enemies  fo 
his  want  of  good  taste  in  thus  submitting  to  be  fete< 
at  the  time  when  the  responsibility  for  the  Raid  sat  s- 
heavily  on  his  shoulders,  but  had  he  had  his  way  h 
would,  as  all  who  really  know  the  man  will  admit 
far  rather  have  been  permitted  for  a  time  to  pasi 
into  complete  oblivion.  His  fellow-colonists  woul< 
not  for  a  moment  permit  this,  however.  The; 
recognised  that  he  had  made  a  grave-  blunder,  t 
put  the  matter  no  more  strongly,  in  so  prominent! 


RHODES  AND  THE  CAPE  DUTCH. 


249 


identifying  himself  with  the  revolutionary  movement 
in  Johannesburg;  but  they  further  recognised  that 
he  was  the  one  man  that  South  Africa  needed  for 
its  future  prosperity,  and  they  were  determined  that 
his  services  should  not  be  lost  to  them  if  they  could 
prevent  it.  Mr  Labouchere  was,  of  course,  greatly 
shocked  at  the  whole  proceedings ;  but  that  gentle- 
man’s  opinions  are  of  no  interest  or  value  to  any  one 
beyond  himself.  It  is  worthy  of  mention  that  during 
this  journey,  and  again  later,  when  he  returned  from 
Kimberley  to  Cape  Town,  preparatory  to  sailing  for 
England,  Mr  Rhodes  received  his  warmest  and  most 
hearty  greetings  in  the  Dutch  strongholds  of  Cape 
Colony  through  which  he  passed.  And  yet  there  are 
to-day  ignorant  persons  who  will  tell  us  that  Mr 
Rhodes  is,  and  always  has  been,  cordially  hated  by 
the  Cape  Dutch  ! 

In  the  speeches  he  was  compelled  to  make,  Rhodes 
gave  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  warm  support  he 
had  received  from  his  fellow-colonists  was  already 
having  a  revivifying  effect  upon  him ;  and  in  one  of 
them  he  declared,  with  a  touch  of  his  old  breeziness 
and  ardour  of  manner  which  was  very  gratifying  to  his 
supporters  to  observe,  that  “  though  his  friends  had 
told  him  that  his  political  life  at  the  Cape  was  at  an 
end,  and  that  he  would  never  again  be  able  to  enter 
public  life,  he' himself  was  of  the  opinion  that  instead 
of  his  career  being  terminated  it  was,  in  reality,  only 
just  beginning. 

He  had,  however,  two  very  trying  ordeals  still  to 
face.  The  Cape  Government  was  already  making 
preparations  for  holding  a  searching  inquiry  into 
the  circumstances  leading  up  to  the  Raid,  with  the 
object  of  clearing  itself  from  any  complicity  in  the 


250 


THE  KAID  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES. 


matter ;  and  it  was  daily  becoming  increasingly  clear 
that  the  Imperial  Government  would  be  compelled  to 
adopt  a  similar  course  to  vindicate  its  own  position  in 
the  eyes  of  the  world.  Rhodes  perceived  that  it  was 
imperative  that  he  should  appear  before  both  of  these 
bodies  and  give  evidence,  and  it  was  easy  for  him  to 
see  that  he  wrnuld  have  to  undergo  a  severe  cross¬ 
questioning  as  to  his  connection  with  the  affair. 
As  he  remarked,  however,  in  an  expressive  phrase, 
he  was  quite  prepared  to  “  face  the  music,”  and  to 
take  his  castigation  like  a  man. 

With  a  view  to  seeing  how  matters  really  stood  in 
England,  and  how  the  British  South  Africa  Company 
would  be  affected  by  the  abuse  of  the  powers  intrusted 
to  it  under  the  charter,  he  sailed  from  South  Africa 
for  England  in  January  1896. 


251 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 

• 

On  his  arrival  in  England  in  the  spring  of  1896  Mr 
Rhodes  immediately  placed  himself  in  communication 
with  the  Colonial  Office  regarding  the  future  govern¬ 
ment  of  Rhodesia,  and  the  modifications  which,  it 
was  obvious,  the  Government,  on  account  of  the 
Raid,  would  be  compelled  to  make  in  the  original 
charter.  On  February  6  he  had  a  most  momentous 
interview  with  Mr  Chamberlain  on  this  subject.  The 
first  point  on  which  he  addressed  himself  to  the 
Colonial  Secretary  was  regarding  the  attitude  of 
the  Government  towards  the  entire  revocation  of  the 
charter,  and  the  future  administration  of  Rhodesia  as 
a  Crown  colony,  as  was  at  this  time  being  so  largely 
advocated  by  certain  sections  of  public  opinion  in 
England. 

Mr  Rhodes  was  relieved  to  find  that  such  a  step 
did  not  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  Cabinet. 
There  was  a  heavy  annual  deficit  at  this  time  in 
the  cost  of  the  administration  of  Rhodesia,  and  her 
Majesty’s  Government  was  not  in  the  least  anxious  to 
saddle  the  British  taxpayer  with  this.  Mr  Rhodes, 
however,  unreservedly  placed  the  question  of  the 
future  control  of  the  police  of  Rhodesia  in  the 


252 


RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 


hands  of  Mr  Chamberlain,  and  indeed  offered  to 
raise  no  opposition  to  this  force — in  addition  to  any 
other  of  a  military  or  semi-military  character  which 
might  at  any  future  time  be  formed  in  the  country 
— being  placed  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Im¬ 
perial  Government,  the  Chartered  Company,  of  course, 
still  continuing  to  provide  the  money  for  their  main¬ 
tenance.  Possibly  this  was  only  making  a  virtue  of 
a  necessity,  for  it  was  an  open  secret  that  the  Gov¬ 
ernment  contemplated  taking  this  highly  desirable 
step  ;  but  it  is  at  least  worthy  of  being  placed  on 
record  that  it  was  Mr  Rhodes  who  first  made  a 
definite  proposal  to  this  end. 

He  urged,  however,  with  great  earnestness,  that 
it  should  still  be  left  to  the  British  South  Africa 
Company,  as  heretofore,  to  appoint  the  magisterial, 
judicial,  and  civil  officials  of  Rhodesia.  To  this  Mr 
Chamberlain  assented,  subject,  of  course,  to  the  right 
of  the  final  sanction  for  the  appointment  of  any  such 
official  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  Colonial  Office. 
It  was  only  fair  that  such  an  arrangement  should 
have  been  come  to  ;  for  as  every  one  of  these  officials 
had  to  be  paid  out  of  the  funds  of  the  company,  and 
as  the  company  was  naturally  in  a  far  better  position 
to  judge  of  the  fitness  of  an  individual  for  a  particular 
post  than  the  authorities  in  Downing  Street  could 
possibly  be,  it  would  have  been  manifestly  unfair, 
and  indeed  rather  absurd,  for  the  Imperial  Govern¬ 
ment  to  have  claimed  the  right  to  nominate  and 
appoint  these  officers. 

Mr  Chamberlain,  in  assenting  to  the  appointment 
of  these  officials  remaining  on  the  same  basis  as 
formerly,  was  careful  to  point  out,  with  his  customary 
directness  of  speech,  that  in  future  it  would  be  an 


AN  INTERVIEW  WITH  MR  CHAMBERLAIN. 


253 


Imperial  officer  who  would  have  the  command  of  the 
military  and  police  forces  in  Rhodesia,  and  would  be 
the  “  border  authority,”  so  that  the  power  of  the 
company,  or  of  any  of  its  members,  to  make  another 
armed  incursion  into  alien  territory  would  no  longer 
exist. 

The  next  question  to  which  Mr  Rhodes  devoted 
himself  was  that  of  the  proposed  establishment  of 
a  British  Resident  in  Rhodesia,  with  duties  and 
powers  similar  in  a  great  measure  to  those  enjoyed 
by  British  Residents  at  some  of  the  courts  of  the 
semi-independent  states  of  India.  Mr  Rhodes  bluntly 
declared  that  there  was  no  necessity  whatever  for 
such  a  step.  As  he  pointed  out,  the  High  Commis¬ 
sioner  at  the  Cape  had  always  had,  under  the  terms 
of  the  charter,  the  power  to  sanction,  revise,  annul, 
or  veto  any  law  or  regulation  that  the  company 
might  formulate  for  the  government  of  Rhodesia 
and  its  settlers  and  native  inhabitants.  Mr  Cham¬ 
berlain  turned  this  over  in  his  mind  for  a  minute  or 
two,  and  then  agreed  that  the  necessity  for  the  ap¬ 
pointment  of  such  a  Resident  did  not  in  reality  exist. 

Coming  by  degrees  to  more  debatable  ground,  Mr 
Rhodes  urged  with  all  the  powers  at  his  command 
that  there  might  be  no  need  for  the  proposed  parlia¬ 
mentary  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  under  which 
Dr  Jameson’s  Raid  took  place,  especially  having  regard 
to  the  fact  that  it  had  already  been  determined 
that  that  gentleman  and  his  fellow-officers  should  be 
tried  at  the  bar  for  their  violations  of  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act,  and  that  in  all  probability  sufficient 
light  would  be  sbed  on  the  whole  affair  at  this  trial, 
so  that  a  Parliamentary  Committee  would  be  rather 
in  the  nature  of  a  redundancy.  . 


254 


RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 


Here  the  Colonial  Secretary  found  himself  in  a 
quandary.  For  his  own  part,  and  speaking  quite 
unofficially,  he  admitted  that  he  could  not  see  any  real 
need  for  such  a  committee,  but,  as  he  told  Mr  Rhodes, 
he  was  bound  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  wishes 
of  the  House  of  Commons  in  this  matter.  If  they 
desired,  as  seemed  probable,  that  a  separate  inquiry 
into  the  Raid  by  a  committee  appointed  by  themselves 
should  be  held,  then  he  could  not  oppose  such  a  desire, 
for  fear  that  his  action  in  so  doing  would  be  misin¬ 
terpreted.  Mr  Chamberlain  was  strengthened  in  this 
view  by  the  fact  that  several  insinuations  had  been 
made  to  the  effect  that  the  Colonial  Office  was  impli¬ 
cated  in  the  Raid,  and  knew  all  about  it  long  before 
it  took  place.  He  was  willing,  however,  to  meet  the 
company  on  this  subject  so  far  as  to  invite  it  to 
consider  whether  a  statutory  commission  or  a  Parlia¬ 
mentary  Committee  would  be  preferable  from  its  point 
of  view.  If  a  man  has  to  be  hanged,  it  is  some  conso¬ 
lation  to  be  allowed  to  choose  his  own  executioner. 
After  some  minor  details  had  been  discussed  the  inter¬ 
view  terminated. 

On  the  following  day,  February  7,  Mr  Rhodes 
attended  a  meeting  of  the  directors  of  the  British 
South  Africa  Company,  and  briefly  recounted  what 
had  passed  between  the  Colonial  Secretary  and  him¬ 
self  ;  and  on  the  next  day  he  sailed  for  the  Cape  once 
more,  as  he  found  there  was  little  or  nothing  to  be  done 
in  England  until  the  House  of  Commons  had  deter¬ 
mined  whether  it  would  hold  this  inquiry  into  the  Raid. 
He  was  led  to  return  to  South  Africa  at  this  junc¬ 
ture  by  reason  also  of  the  fact  that  there  were  already 
signs  of  coming  trouble  with  the  natives  in  Rhodesia. 

Soon  after  he  arrived  in  South  Africa  the  rebellion 


THE  PARLIAMENTARY  COMMITTEE. 


255 


ff  the  Matabele  blazed  out  in  earnest,  and  Rhodes 
found  his  hands  full  in  coping  with  this  new  crisis. 
Incidentally  this  sudden  rising  of  the  native  popula¬ 
tion  of  Rhodesia  had  a  beneficial  effect  on  Rhodes,  in- 
ismuch  as  it  served  to  withdraw  his  thoughts  from 
bis  own  personal  troubles,  and  to  prevent  him  from 
brooding  over  the  storm-clouds  which  were  then  col- 
lecting  over  his  head  and  threatening  to  burst  at  any 
moment.  For  the  present,  however,  the  events  of  the 
Matabele  rebellion  and  the  part  Rhodes  played  in  the 
ipielling  of  the  insurrection  must  be  left  on  one  side, 
to  be  dealt  with  in  detail  in  the  succeeding  chapter  ; 
and  I  will  now  pass  on  to  the  proceedings  of  the  Select 
Committee  of  the  House  of  Commons,  which  was 
appointed  to  inquire  into  the  origin  and  circumstances 
of  the  Jameson  Raid  and  also  to  go  into  the  question 
of  the  administration  of  Rhodesia,  and  to  report  to  the 
House  what  alterations,  if  any,  were  desirable  in  the 
charter  and  the  privileges  granted  to  the  British  South 
Africa  Company. 

It  was  on  January  27,  1897,  that  a  committee  was 
appointed,  and  the  following  gentlemen  were  selected 
to  serve  on  it :  Sir  Richard  Webster  (at  that  time  the 
Attorney-General,  and  now  Lord  Alverstone,  the  Lord 
Chief- Justice  of  England),  Mr  Bigham,  Mr  Blake, 
Mr  Sydney  Buxton,  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman, 
Mr  Chamberlain,  Sir  Michael  Hicks-Beach,  Mr  Cripps, 
Sir  William  Hart  Dyke,  Mr  John  Ellis,  Sir  William 
Harcourt,  Mr  W.  L.  Jackson,  Mr  Labouchere,  Mr 
Wharton,  and  Mr  George  Wyndham.  The  first 
meeting  of  the  Committee  took  place  on  February  5, 
when  Mr  Jackson  was  elected  chairman  and  the  pre¬ 
liminaries  of  the  future  proceedings  were  arranged. 
Among  other  things,  leave  for  the  British  South 


256 


RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 


Africa  Company,  Mr  Rhodes,  Dr  Jameson,  Mr  Alfred 
Beit,  Mr  Lionel  Phillips,  and  Dr  Rutherfoord  Harris 
to  be  represented  before  the  committee  by  counsel  was 
granted. 

Here,  perhaps,  it  is  necessary  to  halt  a  little  to 
recall  briefly  what  had  occurred  between  the  time  that 
Rhodes  had  returned  to  the  Cape  in  February  1896  and 
the  date  of  the  first  sitting  of  the  committee.  It  was 
clear  to  all,  as  soon  as  the  Raid  happened,  that  it  would 
be  absolutely  necessary  for  Mr  Rhodes  to  resign  his 
position  as  the  managing  director  of  the  British  South 
Africa  Company  ;  and  when  events  so  shaped  them¬ 
selves  as  to  show  that  Mr  Beit  was  almost  as  much 
implicated  in  the  affair  as  Rhodes  himself,  it  was 
equally  clear  that  he  too  would  have  to  resign  his 
position  as  a  member  of  the  board  of  directors.  During 
the  last  year  or  two,  when  the  whole  question  of  the 
Raid  has  been  reopened  by  reason  of  the  war  in  South 
Africa,  it  has  been  many  times  stated  by  those  who 
uphold  the  Boer  cause  that  Messrs  Rhodes  and  Beit 
only  retired  from  the  British  South  Africa  Company 
when  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  them  by  the 
Colonial  Office,  and  it  was  seen  that  if  they  did  not 
so  retire  the  charter  was  in  danger  of  being  with¬ 
drawn.  As  a  matter  of  fact  this  is  quite  incorrect,  as 
I  think  I  shall  be  able  to  demonstrate  in  a  very  few 
lines. 

The  whole  contention  of  those  who  believe  that  the 
two  gentlemen  in  question  only  quitted  the  board  of 
the  British  South  Africa  Company  on  being  called 
upon  to  do  so  by  the  Colonial  Office  is  based  upon  a 
letter  from  Mr  Fairfield,  one  of  Mr  Chamberlain’s 
lieutenants  at  the  Colonial  Office,  and  now  deceased, 
to  Mr  Hawkesley,  the  solicitor  to  the  Chartered 


RESIGNATION  OF  RHODES  AND  BEIT. 


257 


Company  and  also  to  Mr  Rhodes,  dated  May  7,  1896. 
In  this  letter  Mr  Fairfield  clearly  hinted  that  it  would 
be  better  if  Mr  Rhodes  and  Mr  Beit  immediately 
proffered  their  resignations  to  their  fellow-directors  ; 
but  I  think  a  perusal  of  this  letter  will  make  it  quite 
obvious  that  in  saying  this  the  writer  was  in  no  sense 
speaking  officially  on  behalf  of  the  Colonial  Office. 

It  was  not  until  six  or  seven  weeks  after  this  that 
the  resignations  of  Messrs  Rhodes  and  Beit  were 
offered  to  the  board  of  the  Chartered  Company,  this 
step  being  taken  on  June  26,  to  be  precise.  Of  course 
they  were  at  once  accepted.  At  this  time  there  was 
absolutely  no  pressure  whatever  being  exercised  by 
the  Colonial  Office  on  this  matter,  and  when  on  the 
evening  of  this  day  Mr  Chamberlain  was  unofficially 
informed  of  the  resignations,  he  immediately  remarked 
that  the  question  of  Messrs  Rhodes  and  Beit  resign¬ 
ing  their  seats  on  the  Chartered  Company  was  one 
which  concerned  themselves  and  the  company  alone, 
and  that  the  Colonial  Office  was  not  interested  in  the 
matter  in  the  least.  He  gave  it  as  his  personal 
opinion,  however,  that  had  he  been  in  the  same  posi¬ 
tion  as  these  two  gentlemen  found  themselves  in,  he 
would  have  adopted  precisely  the  same  line  of  con¬ 
duct.  This  should  show  quite  clearly  that  the  seces¬ 
sion  of  Mr  Rhodes  and  Mr  Beit  from  the  Chartered 
Company  was  entirely  voluntary  on  their  part,  and 
that  there  is  not  the  least  foundation  in  fact  for  the 
oft-repeated  statement  that  the  step  in  question  was 
only  taken  at  the  express  command  of  the  Colonial 
Office. 

Dr  Jameson,  who  in  July  1896  had  been  sentenced 
to  fifteen  months’  imprisonment  for  the  part  he  played 
in  the  Raid,  had  been  released  in  the  December  of  that 

R 


258 


RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 


year,  owing  to  the  very  serious  condition  of  his  health, 
so  that  he  was  quite  free  to  appear  as  a  witness  before 
the  Committee. 

It  was  obvious  that  Mr  Rhodes  would  be  the  prin¬ 
cipal  witness  to  appear  before  the  Committee,  especially 
as  he  had  taken  the  whole  blame  for  the  affair  upon 
his  own  shoulders,  and  therefore  it  was  not  surprising 
that  he  should  be  called  upon  as  one  of  the  first  to 
give  evidence.  His  appearance  before  the  Committee 
was  awaited  with  great  interest  by  the  general  public, 
and  when  at  length,  on  February  16,  he  took  his  seat 
in  the  chair  which  served  the  purpose  of  a  witness- 
box  in  the  hastily  equipped  committee-room  in  West¬ 
minster  Hall,  his  attitude  produced  totally  different 
effects  on  those  who  have  placed  their  impressions  oi 
the  scene  on  paper. 

By  some  he  is  described  as  having  been  petulant 
and  overbearing  in  his  manner  towards  the  Committee, 
wdiile  a  few  writers,  whose  judgment  was  probably 
warped  by  the  bias  of  their  political  views,  have  gone 
so  far  as  to  describe  him  as  underbred,  and  even  at 
times  offensive.  This  is,  of  course,  absurd.  What¬ 
ever  Mr  Rhodes’  faults  may  be, — and  it  would  be 
flattery  of  a  very  gross  description  to  deny  that  he 
has  faults  in  abundance, — Mr  Rhodes  is  at  least  a) 
gentleman,  and  it  would  be  as  impossible  for  him  tc 
be  underbred  and  offensive  as  it  would  be  for  him  tc; 
be  a  pickpocket  or  a  garroter. 

Other,  and  more  sane,  critics  have  described  him 
as  appearing  to  be  perfectly  calm,  dignified,  collected 
and  even  statesmanlike  in  his  bearing.  As  a  matte* 
of  fact,  I  should  hesitate  to  accept  either  of  these 
views.  Petulant  and  overbearing  he  most  decidedl) 
was  not,  or  at  any  rate  he  did  not  strike  me  as  bein£ 


BEFORE  THE  COMMITTEE. 


259 


o,  though  I  observed  his  actions  and  his  words  very 
larrowly ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  by  no 
neans  cool  and  collected,  especially  on  the  first  day. 
n  fact,  as  he  read  the  statement  concerning  his  con- 
lection  with  the  Raid  which  he  had  drawn  up,  and 
iad  sought  the  permission  of  the  Committee  to  read 
,s  “  covering  practically  his  whole  case,”  he  was 
istinctly  nervous  and  halting  in  his  manner ;  but 
s  the  days  wore  on  and  he  became  accustomed  to 
is  surroundings  he  grew  more  and  more  at  his  ease, 
ntil  when,  near  the  conclusion  of  his  lengthy  cross- 
xamination,  Mr  Labouchere  proceeded  to  question 
im,  the  member  for  Northampton  found  that  he 
ad  as  steady  and  as  clear  an  intellect  as  his  own 
j  deal  with,  and  in  the  end  was  compelled  to  beat 
hasty  and  somewhat  undignified  retreat. 

The  statement  which  Mr  Rhodes  presented  to  the 
Committee  as  showing  his  position  with  regard  to  the 
Laid  was  of  so  important  a  character  that  I  cannot  do 
etter  than  give  it  here  in  extenso.  He  said  : — 

“  From  the  date  of  the  establishment  of  the  gold 
idustry  on  a  large  scale  at  Johannesburg  much  dis- 
intent  has  been  caused  by  the  restrictions  and  im- 
ositions  placed  upon  it  by  the  Transvaal  Government, 
y  the  corrupt  administration  of  that  Government, 
ad  by  the  denial  of  civil  rights  to  the  rapidly 
rowing  Uitlander  population.  This  discontent  has 
radually  but  steadily  increased,  and  a  considerable 
me  ago  I  learnt  from  my  intercourse  with  many  of 
le  leading  persons  in  Johannesburg  that  the  position 
’  affairs  there  had  become  intolerable.  After  long 
forts  they  despaired  of  obtaining  redress  by  con- 
itutional  means,  and  were  resolved  to  seek  by  extra- 
mstitutional  means  such  a  change  in  the  Government 


260 


RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 


of  the  South  African  Republic  as  should  give  to  th< 
majority  of  the  population,  possessing  more  than  hal 
the  land,  nine-tenths  of  the  wealth,  and  paying  nine' 
teen -twentieths  of  the  taxes  in  the  country,  a  dut 
share  in  its  administration. 

“  I  sympathised  with,  and  as  one  largely  interested 
in  the  Transvaal  shared  in,  these  grievances  ;  and 
further,  as  a  citizen  of  the  Cape  Colony  I  felt  thar 
the  persistently  unfriendly  attitude  of  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  South  African  Republic  towards  tht 
colony  was  the  great  obstacle  to  common  action  few 
practical  purposes  among  the  various  states  of  Soutl 
Africa.  Under  these  circumstances  I  assisted  the 
movement  in  Johannesburg  with  my  purse  and  in 
fluence.  Further,  acting  within  my  rights,  in  the 
autumn  of  1895  I  placed  on  territory  under  tht 
administration  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company 
upon  the  borders  of  the  Transvaal,  a  body  of  troops 
under  Dr  Jameson,  prepared  to  act  in  the  Transvaa 
in  certain  eventualities.  I  did  not  communicate  these 
views  to  the  board  of  directors  of  the  British  Soutl 
Africa  Company. 

“  With  reference  to  the  Jameson  Raid,  I  may  state 
that  Dr  Jameson  went  in  without  my  authority 
Having  said  this,  I  desire  to  add  that  I  am  willing: 
generally,  to  accept  the  finding  as  to  facts  containec 
in  the  report  of  the  Committee  of  the  Cape  Parliament 
I  must  admit  that  in  all  my  actions  I  was  greatl) 
influenced  by  my  belief  that  the  policy  of  the  presenl 
Government  of  the  South  African  Republic  was  tc 
introduce  the  influence  of  another  foreign  power  into 
the  already  complicated  system  of  South  Africa,  anc 
thereby  render  more  difficult  in  the  future  the  close] 
union  of  the  different  states.” 


A  SEVERE  CROSS-EXAMINATION. 


261 


Having  read  the  above  statement,  Mr  Rhodes  then 
>repared  himself  for  the  severe  ordeal  of  the  cross- 
examination.  Sir  William  Harcourt  was  the  first  to 
ake  Mr  Rhodes  in  hand.  At  the  commencement  he 
onfined  himself  to  endeavouring  to  find  out  from  Mr 
thodes  exactly  how  far  the  latter  had  applied  the 
unds  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  to  fin- 
,ncing  the  Reform  Committee  in  Johannesburg.  As 
Jr  Rhodes  was  able  to  show,  while  it  was  undeniable 
hat  he  had  drawn  cheques  on  the  company  for  this 
turpose,  yet  the  company  was  often  in  his  debt  to  a 
onsiderable  amount,  and  it  was  his  practice  to  bal- 
,nce  accounts  with  it  at  periodic  intervals,  so  that 
n  the  end  no  money  whatever  of  the  Chartered 
Company  was  directly  employed  for  the  financing  of 
he  Jameson  Raid. 

More  important,  after  this  lapse  of  time,  was  the 
oint  raised  by  Sir  William  Harcourt  with  regard 
©  the  phrase  in  Mr  Rhodes’  statement  just  quoted, 
nd  which  runs,  “  Acting  within  my  rights,  in  the 
utumn  of  1895  I  placed  .  .  .  upon  the  borders  of 
tie  Transvaal  a  body  of  troops  under  Dr  Jameson, 
repared  to  act  in  the  Transvaal  in  certain  eventu- 
lities.”  Very  pertinently  Sir  William  Harcourt 
ressed  Mr  Rhodes  as  to  what  “  his  rights  ”  were 
hich  enabled  him  to  place  a  body  of  armed  men 
a  the  borders  of  a  friendly  state  with  the  ultimate 
bject  of  invading  that  state  in  “  certain  eventu- 
tities.”  Ultimately  Mr  Rhodes  was  forced  to  admit 
lat  what  he  meant  by  “  his  rights  ”  was  in  virtue 
f  his  position  as  managing  director  of  the  Chartered 
ompany, —  probably  one  of  the  weakest  and  least 
inclusive  arguments  he  has  ever  employed  in  the 
hole  course  of  his  career.  It  was  as  clear  as  day- 


262 


RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 


light  that  he  had  no  right — and  could  not  possibly 
have  any  right  —  whatever  to  place  troops  on  the 
Transvaal  border  in  the  manner  he  did,  and  it  wae 
a  mistake  on  his  part  to  employ  the  language  he  did, 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  statement 
which  Mr  Rhodes  read  greatly  influenced  the  Com¬ 
mittee  in  his  favour,  and  the  impression  which  il 
created  in  the  country  was  undeniably  favourable  t( 
him.  That  he  had  acted  wrongly  in  taking  such  e 
prominent  share  in  the  proceedings  which  in  the  enc 
led  up  to  the  Raid  was  obvious,  but  as  his  cross- 
examination  went  on  it  became  increasingly  clear  that 
he  was  not  cognisant  of  Jameson’s  intention  to  mow 
in  the  manner  he  did.  It  was  also  clearly  seen  thal 
the  Uitlanders  on  the  Rand  were  suffering  great  im¬ 
positions,  and  had  considerable  grievances  against  the 
Transvaal  Government ;  and  in  view  of  very  large 
interests  which  Rhodes  had  in  the  goldfields,  there 
were  few  people  who  denied  his  right  to  take  a  leading 
part  in  the  Reform  movement  in  Johannesburg. 

So  long  as  that  Reform  agitation  was  confined  te 
strictly  constitutional  matters,  no  one  could  have 
objected  to  Mr  Rhodes  being  connected  with  it 
though,  seeing  that  he  was  at  this  time  the  head  o] 
the  Government  of  the  neighbouring  state  of  Cape 
Colony,  it  might  have  been  in  better  taste  had  he 
refrained  from  mixing  himself  up  so  openly  with  the 
condition  of  unrest  which  prevailed  on  the  Rand. 

The  Committee  sat  only  two  days  each  week,  and  il 
was  not  until  March  5  that  Rhodes’  examination  was 
concluded.  Various  members  of  the  Committee 
questioned  and  re-questioned  him  on  various  points, 
and  to  all  of  these  he  returned  perfectly  frank  and 
open  answers. 


THE  ENQUIRY  OVER. 


263 


After  Mr  Rhodes  had  given  his  evidence,  and 
without  awaiting  the  verdict  of  the  Committee,  he  at 
once  returned  to  South  Africa,  and  began  to  work 
hard  at  the  question  of  the  pacification  of  Rhodesia 
and  its  future  administration.  Many  other  witnesses 
appeared  before  the  Committee,  which  continued  sitting 
until  July  1897,  and  gave  evidence  respecting  the 
various  parts  they  had  played  in  the  Raid  ;  but  this 
is  not  material  to  the  present  book,  which  concerns 
Rhodes  and  Rhodes  alone.  One  thing  was  made 
clear  :  with  the  exception  of  Mr  Beit,  none  of  the 
directors  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  had 
been  in  Mr  Rhodes’  confidence  respecting  the  action 
he  was  taking  in  placing  the  police  on  the  Transvaal 
border.  A  rather  surprising  feature  to  many  people 
in  the  evidence  given  by  the  various  members  of 
the  Board  of  the  Chartered  Company  was  the  very  free 
hand  they  had  allowed  Mr  Rhodes  in  dealing  with 
the  affairs  of  Rhodesia  and  the  company  generally. 
It  is  difficult,  however,  to  see  how  they  could  have 
done  otherwise.  Rhodes  was  really  the  founder  of 
the  company,  and  he  knew  more  about  the  conditions 
and  requirements  of  Rhodesia,  probably,  than  all  the 
ather  directors  put  together. 

At  length  the  evidence  of  various  witnesses  came  to 
an  end,  and  the  Committee  decided  that,  as  the  session 
was  already  far  spent,  it  would  be  better  to  present 
a  report  at  once,  on  the  first  part  of  their  inquiry, 
vvhich  related  to  the  causes  of  the  Raid,  and  to  post¬ 
pone  the  question  of  the  future  government  of 
Rhodesia  until  a  more  opportune  season.  As  events 
aimed  out,  the  second  part  of  this  inquiry  was  never 
proceeded  with,  and  this  is  a  matter  for  regret  by 
Rose  who  uphold  the  Chartered  Company  as  much 


264 


RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 


as  by  those  who  can  only  see  evil  in  the  company  and 
its  ways.  There  are  many  points  connected  with  the 
company  and  the  methods  it  employed  in  the  adminis¬ 
tration  of  Rhodesia  which  it  was  desirable  that  the 
Committee  should  have  investigated,  and  I  have 
authority  for  saying  that  none  regretted  the  abandon¬ 
ment  of  this  part  of  the  inquiry  more  keenly  than 
did  the  directors  and  the  officials  of  the  British  South 
Africa  Company. 

When  the  report  of  the  Committee  was  submitted 
it  was  seen  that  it  had  arrived  at  the  following 
conclusions  : — 

“  I.  Great  discontent  had  for  some  time  previous  to 
the  incursion  existed  in  Johannesburg,  arising  from  the 
grievances  of  the  Uitlanders. 

“  II.  Mr  Rhodes  occupied  a  great  position  in  South 
Africa :  he  was  Prime  Minister  of  the  Cape  Colony,  and, 
beyond  all  other  persons,  should  have  been  careful  to 
abstain  from  such  a  course  of  action  as  that  which  he 
adopted.  As  managing  director  of  the  British  South 
Africa  Company,  as  director  of  the  He  Beers  Con¬ 
solidated  Mines,  and  goldfields  of  South  Africa,  Mr 
Rhodes  controlled  a  great  combination  of  interests  :  he 
used  his  position  and  those  interests  to  promote  and 
assist  his  policy. 

“  Whatever  justification  there  might  have  been  for 
action  on  the  part  of  the  people  of  Johannesburg, 
there  was  none  for  the  conduct  of  a  person  in  Mr 
Rhodes’  position,  in  subsidising,  organising,  and 
stimulating  an  armed  insurrection  against  the  Govern¬ 
ment  of  the  South  African  Republic,  and  employing 
the  forces  and  resources  of  the  Chartered  Company 
to  support  such  a  revolution.  He  seriously  embar¬ 
rassed  both  the  Imperial  and  Colonial  Governments, 


THE  REPORT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE. 


265 


and  his  proceedings  resulted  in  the  invasion  of  the 
territory  of  a  state  which  was  in  friendly  relations 
with  her  Majesty,  in  breach  of  the  obligation  to 
respect  the  right  to  self-government  of  the  South 
African  Republic  under  the  conventions  between  her 
Majesty  and  that  state.  Although  Dr  Jameson  ‘went 
in  ’  without  Mr  Rhodes’  authority,  it  was  always  part 
of  the  plan  that  these  forces  should  be  used  in  the 
Transvaal  in  support  of  an  insurrection.  Nothing 
could  justify  such  a  use  of  such 1  a  force,  and  Mr 
Rhodes’  heavy  responsibility  remains,  although  Dr 
Jameson  at  the  last  moment  invaded  the  Transvaal 
without  his  direct  sanction. 

“  III.  Such  a  policy  once  embarked  upon  inevitably 
involved  Mr  Rhodes  in  grave  breaches  of  duty  to 
those  whom  he  owed  allegiance.  He  deceived  the 
High  Commissioner  representing  the  Imperial  Govern¬ 
ment,  he  concealed  his  views  from  his  colleagues  in 
the  Colonial  Ministry  and  from  the  board  of  the 
British  South  Africa  Company,  and  led  his  sub¬ 
ordinates  to  believe  that  his  plans  were  approved  by 
his  superiors. 

“  IV.  Your  committee  have  heard  the  evidence  of 
ill  the  directors  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company 
with  the  exception  of  Lord  Grey.  Of  those  who  were 
oxamined,  Mr  Beit  and  Mr  Maguire  alone  had 
oognisance  of  Mr  Rhodes’  plans.  Mr  Beit  played  a 
orominent  part  in  the  negotiations  with  the  Reform 
Union ;  he  contributed  large  sums  of  money  to  the 
'evolutionary  movement,  and  must  share  full  responsi- 
oility  for  the  consequences. 

“  Y.  There  is  not  the  slightest  evidence  that  the 
ate  High  Commissioner  in  South  Africa,  Lord 
rlosinead,  was  made  acquainted  with  Mr  Rhodes’ 


266 


RHODES  BEFORE  THE  RAID  COMMITTEE. 


plans.  The  evidence,  on  the  contrary,  shows  tha 
there  was  a  conspiracy  to  keep  all  information  on  th< 
subject  from  him.  The  Committee  must,  however 
express  a  strong  opinion  upon  the  conduct  of  Sii 
Graham  Bowyer,  who  was  guilty  of  a  grave  derelictioi 
of  duty  in  not  communicating  to  the  High  Com¬ 
missioner  the  information  which  had  come  to  hie 
knowledge.  Mr  Newton  failed  in  his  duty  in  a  like 
manner. 

“  VI.  Neither  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies 
nor  any  of  the  officials  of  the  Colonial  Office  received 
any  information  which  made  them,  or  should  have 
made  them  or  any  of  them,  aware  of  the  plot  during 
its  development. 

“VII.  F  inally,  your  Committee  desire  to  put  on 
record  an  absolute  and  unqualified  condemnation  oi 
the  Raid  and  of  the  plans  which  made  it  possible. 
The  result  caused  for  the  time  being  grave  injury  to 
British  influence  in  South  Africa.  Public  confidence 
was  shaken,  race  feeling  was  imbittered,  and  serious 
difficulties  were  created  with  neighbouring  states.” 

It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  Committee  could  have 
arrived  at  any  other  conclusions  than  those  given 
above,  but  it  has  since  been  accused  of  “whitewashing” 
Mr  Rhodes  and  every  one  else  concerned  in  the  Raid. 
Mr  Labouchere,  of  course,  found  it  incumbent  upon 
him  to  vote  against  the  otherwise  unanimous  finding 
of  the  Committee,  and  to  prepare  an  elaborate 
“  minority  report,”  which  was  very  properly  ignored 
by  both  the  House  of  Commons  and  the  country 
generally. 

There  was  a  somewhat  acrimonious  debate  in  the 
House  of  Commons  when  the  report  of  the  Committee 
was  presented,  but  with  the  Front  Opposition  Bench 


THE  REPORT  ADOPTED. 


267 


supporting,  as  it  was  bound  to  do,  the  adoption  of 
the  report,  which  certain  of  its  own  members  had 
helped  to  frame,  what  little  opposition  there  was 
speedily  flickered  out,  though  no  little  surprise  was 
occasioned  by  the  remark  of  Mr  Chamberlain  during 
his  speech,  that  however  much  Mr  Rhodes  might  have 
failed  in  his  duties  as  a  public  man,  there  was  nothing 
in  the  whole  affair  which  rebounded  to  his  private 
dishonour.  Certain  small  and  unimportant  sections 
professed  astonishment  at  this  statement.  It  is  so 
easy  to  astonish  some  people. 


268 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

RHODES  AND  THE  MATABELE  REBELLION. 

The  outburst  of  the  Matabele  against  the  rule  of  the 
Chartered  Company  and  the  increasing  encroachments 
of  the  white  settlers  in  their  midst  came  about  with 
remarkable  suddenness.  For  some  time  there  had 
been  a  growing  feeling  of  discontent  amongst  the  war¬ 
like  Matabele  (whose  power,  be  it  remembered,  had 
not  been  really  broken,  as  it  ought  to  have  been, 
in  the  first  Matabele  war),  and  the  withdrawal  of  the 
white  police  from  Rhodesia  to  accompany  Dr  Jameson 
on  his  raid  into  the  Transvaal  provided  them  with  a 
peculiarly  opportune  moment  for  rising. 

The  insurrection  began  with  a  series  of  isolated  and 
apparently  disconnected  murders  of  white  settlers  in 
various  outlying  districts,  and  it  was  some  little  time 
before  the  colonists  of  the  Chartered  Company  really 
recognised  that  they  were  face  to  face  with  a  very 
grave  crisis.  So  soon,  however,  as  it  was  seen  that  a 
general  rebellion  of  the  Matabele  and  the  neighbour¬ 
ing  tribes  was  in  progress,  the  company  and  Mr 
Rhodes  took  every  measure  possible  to  quell  the 
disturbances  and  to  restore  order  in  the  country, 
though  it  was  too  late,  as  Mr  Rhodes  was  quick  to 
realise,  to  put  the  rising  down  otherwise  than  by  hard 


FIGHTING  THE  MATABELE. 


269 


fighting.  He  immediately  set  about  buying  horses 
and  rifles  for  the  troops  he  saw  it  would  be  necessary 
to  raise,  the  settlers  in  the  country  being  too  weak 
numerically  to  oppose  the  rebellious  tribesmen  with 
success. 

So  soon  as  the  work  of  organisation  for  the  struggle 
with  the  Matabele  was  in  a  sufficiently  forward  condi¬ 
tion,  Rhodes  quitted  Cape  Town  for  the  seat  of  action, 
and  travelling  up  to  Salisbury,  attached  himself  to  the 
column  of  the  recently  established  Rhodesia  Horse, 
which,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  -  Colonel 
Robert  Beal,  was  preparing  to  set  out  from  that  town 
for  Bulawayo.  Bulawayo — at  that  time  the  centre 
of  the  disturbed  district — was,  in  fact,  in  an  absolute 
state  of  siege,  the  white  inhabitants  of  the  town  and 
district  being  confined  in  a  laager  which  had  been  set 
up  in  the  market-place  of  the  town,  while  the  tribes¬ 
men  raided  and  burnt  almost  up  to  the  suburbs. 

The  first  movement  of  the  column,  usually  known 
as  the  Salisbury  column,  which  Rhodes  had  joined, 
was  to  the  Hanyani  river,  some  twelve  or  fifteen  miles 
from  Salisbury,  where  a  halt  was  called  while  trans¬ 
port  arrangements  were  concluded.  This  question  of 
transport  was^one  of  the  most  difficult  with  which 
Rhodes  was  called  upon  to  grapple.  Mules  were  very 
scarce  in  the  country  at  this  time,  and  though  he  had 
purchased  large  numbers  of  these  animals  in  the 
Southern  States  of  America  and  elsewhere,  yet  some 
time  had  necessarily  to  elapse  before  they  could  be 
landed.  Trek-oxen  died  in  all  directions  from  rin¬ 
derpest  and  the  ravages  of  the  tsetse-fly,  so  that  it 
became  a  matter  of  no  little  complexity  to  provide 
sufficient  transport  for  the  troops. 

After  a  little'  while  this  difficulty  was  surmounted, 


270  RHODES  AND  THE  MATABELE  REBELLION. 

and  on  April  18,  1896,  the  column  was  able  to  make  a 
move  towards  the  disturbed  districts  of  Matabeleland. 
At  this  time,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  there  was 
absolutely  no  sign  that  the  natives  of  Mashonaland, 
who  were  altogether  of  a  more  peaceful  disposition 
than  the  warlike  Matabele,  would  join  in  the  rising; 
in  fact,  seeing  that  the  advent  of  the  white  man  had 
rescued  them  from  the  slavery,  rapine,  and  massacre 
that  had  been  their  experience  ever  since  the  Matabele 
had  trekked  northwards  across  the  Limpopo  river,  it 
was  confidently  expected  that  they  would  render  the 
white  dwellers  every  assistance  in  their  power  in  their 
campaign  against  the  rebel  Matabele.  That  they  did 
not  do  so,  but  preferred  to  join  in  the  rising,  is  now, 
of  course,  a  matter  of  history. 

As  the  column  moved  forward  an  interesting  episode 
took  place  at  the  little  town  of  Enkeldoorn,  situate 
close  to  the  border  of  Matabeleland,  which  forms  the 
centre  of  a  farming  community  chiefly  composed  of 
trek-Boers  from  the  Transvaal.  Here,  on  account  of 
the  massacres  of  the  settlers  by  the  rebels  which  had 
taken  place  in  the  district,  the  colonists  had  formed  a 
strong  laager  in  the  centre  of  the  town,  and  when  it 
became  known  among  the  inhabitants  that  Rhodes 
was  with  the  column  they  gave  him  quite  an  ovation, 
firing  salutes  in  his  honour  and  receiving  him  more  as 
a  victorious  general  returning  to  his  native  land  than 
as  the  man  who  had  just  previously  played  a  leading 
part  in  engineering  an  armed  raid  against  the  race 
from  which  they  had  descended. 

A  “reception  committee”  was  hastily  formed,  and 
an  address  of  welcome  was  presented  to  Rhodes.  In 
this  document,  which  he  still  treasures  as  one  of  his 
most  cherished  possessions,  the  committee,  Boers  from 


A  DUTCH  PETITION. 


271 


the  Transvaal  to  a  man,  begged  him  to  act  towards 
them  as  a  “father”  :  “even  as,”  the  address  went  on, 
“Oom  Paul  Kruger  has  acted  in  the  light  of  a  father 
to  the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal,  so  we  would  request  you 
to  act  as  a  father  to  those  Boers  who  have  made  their 
home  in  Rhodesia.”  And  even  after  this  to  repeat, 
there  are  people  who  declare  that  “  Cecil  Rhodes  is 
hated  and  loathed  by  the  Dutch  of  South  Africa,  and 
always  has  been  ”  !  To  say  that  Rhodes  is  hated  most 
cordially  by  the  corrupt  Hollander  clique  which  ex- 
President  Kruger  had  gathered  around  him  would  be 
correct,  and  it  may  be  added  that  the  feeling  is 
heartily  reciprocated ;  but  to  say  that  Rhodes  is 
hated  to-day,  or  ever  has  been  hated  in  the  past,  by 
the  vast  majority  of  the  Dutch  in  South  Africa,  is 
merely  a  display  of  ignorance  on  the  part  of  those 
making  the  statement. 

Rhodes’  response  to  this  address  was  prompt  and 
practical.  He  immediately  subscribed  a  large  sum  out 
of  his  private  purse  towards  indemnifying  the  Boers  of 
Enkeldoorn  for  the  losses  they  had  sustained  through 
the  rising  of  the  Matabele,  and  the  almost  total 
destruction  of  their  cattle  by  the  deadly  rinderpest, 
while  he  further  bought  from  them  every  “  salted  ” 
horse  they  could  spare  him  for  the  better  equipment  of 
the  column. 

It  was  not  until  the  force  reached  Makalaka  Kop 
that  the  first  collision  with  the  rebels  occurred.  The 
attitude  of  the  Matabele  on  this  occasion  showed  that 
they  were  not  disposed  to  yield  without  a  severe 
struggle.  A  sharp  skirmish  ensued,  and  then  the 
rebels  fell  back,  and,  as  the  night  was  fast  closing  in, 
the  white  force  was  compelled  to  abandon  any  idea  of 
following  them  up.  From  this  point  until  the  force 


272  RHODES  AND  THE  MATABELE  REBELLION. 

arrived  at  the  town  of  Gwelo,  about  a  hundred  miles 
to  the  north-east  of  Bulawayo,  the  objective  of  th( 
column,  a  running  fight  was  kept  up  with  the  rebels 
for  nearly  the  whole  of  the  way. 

On  May  9,  in  the  Mavin  district,  the  first  pitched 
battle  between  the  Salisbury  column  and  the  Matabelt 
was  fought,  and  for  the  first  time  Rhodes  found  him¬ 
self  really  under  fire.  His  attitude  at  this  juncture 
was  characteristic.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  rebeh 
were  in  very  strong  force — from  1000  to  2000 — and 
were  adopting  the  customary  Zulu  tactics  of  fierce 
rushes  in  the  hope  of  overwhelming  the  handful  of 
white  men  by  sheer  weight  of  numbers  and  massacring 
them  with  the  short,  stabbing  assegai  with  which  they 
were  so  expert,  he  calmly  rode  up  and  down  the 
position  entirely  unarmed,  and  accompanied  only  by 
Sir  Charles  Metcalfe,  seemingly  quite  unconscious  ol 
the  Matabele  bullets  which  were  falling  around  him. 
Something  of  this  unconcern  was  probably  assumed,' 
for  there  is  a  strong  liking  for  theatrical  effect  in 
Rhodes’  character ;  but  all  who  have  ever  seen  him 
under  fire  will  admit  that  he  scarcely  seems  to  know 
what  fear  is.  A  striking  instance  of  his  intrepidity 
was  given  a  short  time  later  by  his  unarmed  expedi¬ 
tion  to  the  Matoppo  Hills,  then  the  great  stronghold 
of  the  rebels,  to  discuss  with  them  terms  of  peace. 

After  the  rebels  had  been  beaten  off,  the  column 
returned  to  Gwelo,  and  a  few  days  later  set  off  once 
more  towards  Bulawayo.  When  they  reached  the 
banks  of  the  Shangani  river,  a  strong  white  force  from 
Bulawayo  joined  them,  and  the  combined  columns, 
still  accompanied  by  Mr  Rhodes,  commenced  a  ten 
days’  campaign  against  the  rebels  in  the  deserted 
Insiza  district. 


GENERAL  CARRINGTON  IN  COMMAND. 


273 


Almost  as  soon  as  Rhodes  reached  Bulawayo  the 
announcement  was  made  that,  as  it  was  daily  be¬ 
coming  increasingly  clear  that  the  settlers  were  quite 
unable  to  crush  the  rebellion  out  by  their  own  unaided 
efforts,  the  Imperial  Government  had  determined  to 
send  up  regular  troops,  and  that  Sir  Frederick 
Carrington  had  been  appointed  to  the  supreme  com¬ 
mand.  General  Carrington  speedily  arrived  at  Bula¬ 
wayo  accompanied  or  followed  by  various  other 
Imperial  officers,  including  Major  R.  S.  S.  Baden- 
Powell,  destined  in  a  few  years  to  gain  a  world-wide 
fame  as  the  hero  of  Mafeking  ;  Colonel  Plumer  of 
the  York  and  Lancaster  Regiment,  another  famous 
figure  of  the  Transvaal  war  ;  Prince  Alexander  of 
feck,  and  Major  Yyvyan ;  while  Colonel  Alderson 
noved  eastwards  from  Beira  with  a  strong  force  of 
,’egular  mounted  infantry. 

In  the  energetic  hands  of  General  Carrington,  an 
officer  with  a  long  experience  of  native  warfare  in 
iouth  Africa,  the  campaign  speedily  assumed  a  new 
ispect,  and  inch  by  inch  the  rebels  were  driven  back 
>n  to  their  mountain  fastnesses  in  the  Matoppo  Hills, 
lere  they  were  enabled  to  offer  a  prolonged  resistance 
o  the  efforts  to  force  them  to  fight  a  decisive  battle 
u  the  open  which  should  finally  end  the  war.  So 
low  was  the  progress  made  at  this  stage  of  the  war 
hat  with  the  approach  of  the  rainy  season  General 
Barrington  announced  his  intention  to  withdraw  his 
roops  into  winter  quarters,  and  to  await  the  arrival 
f  spring  before  entering  upon  any  further  operations. 

This  announcement,  and  the  preparations  which  Sir 
'rederick  Carrington  made  for  carrying  it  into  effect, 
:ruck  consternation  into  the  souls  of  Mr  Rhodes  and 
le  British  South  Africa  Company.  Though  the  Imperial 

s 


274  RHODES  AND  THE  MATABELE  REBELLION. 

Government  had  assumed  the  control  of  the  operations 
yet  it  was  the  Chartered  Company  which  was  provid 
ing  the  money  for  the  conduct  of  the  campaign,  anc 
a  great  drain  had  already  been  made  upon  its  funds 
While  the  British  commander  was  abundantly  justifiec 
from  a  military  point  of  view  in  suspending  operations 
until  the  rainy  season  had  passed,  yet  this  step,  witl 
the  subsequent  resumption  of  the  campaign  in  the 
spring,  would  have  added  fully  four  or  five  millior 
pounds  sterling  to  the  cost  of  the  war,  and  this  simpl} 
spelt  absolute  bankruptcy  for  the  British  South  Africa 
Company. 

Rhodes  was  once  more  confronted  with  a  very  grave 
problem  which  it  was  imperative  that  he  should  dea. 
with  at  once  ;  but  for  a  time  he  could  see  no  way  oul 
of  the  difficulty,  and  had  he  been  of  a  less  resolute 
and  dogged  nature  he  might  well  have  given  up  the 
task  in  despair,  and  let  matters  take  their  course, 
The  funds  of  the  Chartered  Company  were,  as  hae 
just  been  said,  sadly  depleted,  and  the  bulk  of  hie 
private  fortune  was  fully  locked  up,  principally  in  hie 
trans  -  continental  telegraph  and  railway  schemes 
besides,  not  even  one  of  his  great  wealth  could  con¬ 
template  the  prospect  of  being  called  upon  to  provide 
the  sum  of  four  or  five  millions  sterling  with  any 
degree  of  equanimity.  True,  his  credit  was  good  foi 
any  amount  practically,  and  he  could  have  raised  the 
sum  required  on  loan  without  much  difficulty ;  bul 
this  could  only  have  been  done  at  ruinously  high  rates] 
and  would  seriously  have  crippled  his  resources  anc 
his  freedom  of  action  in  the  future,  a  thing  which  he 
was  very  anxious  to  avoid. 

At  length  he  evolved  the  daring  scheme  of  going 
into  the  heart  of  the  rebel  country  in  the  gloomy  re- 


A  DARING  SCHEME. 


275 


cesses  of  the  Matoppo  Hills,  and  there  seeing  whether 
he  did  not  still  possess  sufficient  influence  over  the 
indunas,  or  chiefs,  of  the  Matabele  tribe,  to  induce 
them  to  lay  down  their  arms,  and  to  submit  to  the 
future  domination  of  the  white  man. 

To  think  with  Rhodes  is  to  act.  No  sooner  had  he 
mapped  out  this  scheme  and  sketched  in  a  few  of  the 
details  than  he  made  his  way  to  Sir  Frederick  Car¬ 
rington’s  headquarters  in  Bulawayo,  and  laid  his  plans 
for  the  ending  of  the  war  before  the  commander-in¬ 
chief  of  the  Matabel eland  Field  Force.  At  first  General 
Carrington  was  dubious  of  the  success  of  the  scheme, 
and  rather  disposed  to  regard  it  as  a  foolhardy  one 
which  was  bound  to  result  in  failure,  and  in  all  proba¬ 
bility  in  the  massacre  of  Rhodes  and  all  those  who 
accompanied  him.  In  the  end,  however,  Rhodes 
managed  to  extract  a  promise  from  the  British  general 
that  he  would  refrain  from  moving  his  troops  into 
winter  quarters  until  he  had  had  an  opportunity  of 
giving  his  scheme  a  trial.  In  giving  his  consent  to 
the  scheme  being  tried,  General  Carrington  was  careful 
to  stipulate  that  no  responsibility  was  to  attach  to 
him  in  the  event  of  the  failure  of  the  mission  and  the 
massacre  of  Rhodes  and  his  followers. 

So  soon  as  Rhodes  had  got  this  permission  he  selected 
his  companions  for  his  peculiar  undertaking,  and  the 
most  dramatic  and  thrilling  event  in  the  whole  of 
Rhodes’  far  from  uneventful  career  was  embarked 
lpon.  The  men  he  selected  to  accompany  him  were 
Dr  Hans  Sauer,  Mr  Johann  Colenbrander,  an  old 
lunter  in  the  country  who  had  great  influence  with 
;he  Matabele  and  spoke  their  language  fluently,  and 
.vho  was  to  act  as  interpreter,  and  Captain  Stent,  a 
‘correspondent  to  the  ‘  Cape  Times,’  to  whose  record 


276 


RHODES  AND  THE  MATABELE  REBELLION. 


we  are  really  indebted  for  all  we  know  took  place 
during  the  mission.  Rhodes  himself  absolutely  de¬ 
clines  to  talk  about  bis  own  achievements  either  in 
public  or  in  private  life.  There  were  only  three  white 
men  with  Rhodes,  and  the  little  party  was  completed 
by  the  inclusion  of  two  friendly  natives  to  act  as 
guides. 

Rhodes  was  steadfast  in  his  refusal  to  allow  any 
rifles  or  other  weapons  of  warfare  to  be  taken  with  the 
mission,  and,  though  he  raised  no  objection  to  his 
three  white  comrades  having  loaded  revolvers,  person¬ 
ally  he  carried  nothing  more  deadly  than  a  small 
riding  -  whip  —  conduct  reminiscent  of  the  friend  of 
his  early  life  in  Bechuanaland,  Colonel  Charles 
Gordon.  He  likewise  resolutely  declined  to  avail 
himself  of  the  offer  of  an  armed  escort  which  Sir 
Frederick  Carrington  urged  upon  him,  judging  it  best 
to  make  no  outward  show  of  force  whatever,  but  to 
appeal  to  the  chivalrous  instincts  of  the  Matabele  by 
approaching  them  in  an  entirely  peaceful  manner.  As 
events  turned  out,  he  was  fully  justified  in  following 
this  line  of  policy  ;  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  it 
was  hazardous  in  the  extreme,  and  one  false  step  on 
the  part  of  himself  or  his  companions  might  have 
easily  proved  fatal  to  them  all. 

Having  pitched  his  camp  near  to  the  Matoppos, 
Rhodes  sent  forward  one  of  his  native  guides  to  ascer¬ 
tain  the  exact  position  of  the  Matabele  chiefs,  and 
their  attitude  towards  the  question  of  peace.  The 
guide  found  the  indunas  holding  an  indaba,  and  at 
once,  with  a  boldness  and  an  absence  of  fear  which 
was  as  commendable  as  it  was  uncommon  in  one  of 
his  race,  approached  the  circle  of  chiefs  and  told  them 
of  Rhodes’  nearness  to  them  and  his  earnest  desire  to 


A  STRIKING  SCENE. 


277 


put  an  end  to  the  conflict.  The  indunas  listened  in 
silence,  and  some  ominous  murmurings  took  place 
among  the  younger  chiefs  ;  but  the  elder  men  present 
speedily  silenced  this,  and  turning  to  the  guide  told 
him  to  tell  their  old  friend  “  Johann  ”  (Mr  Colen- 
brander)  that  they  would  like  to  see  him.  They  said 
they  would  like  to  see  Mr  Rhodes  also,  but  did  not 
dare  to  hope  that  he  would  visit  them.  If  he  would 
come  to  them,  however,  he  would  be  very  welcome, 
and  neither  he  nor  his  companions  would  be  molested 
or  harmed  in  any  way. 

When  the  guide  returned  to  the  camp  with  this 
message,  Rhodes,  overjoyed  to  find  that  his  plans 
were  going  so  smoothly,  at  once  made  preparations 
for  moving  forward  to  the  spot  which  the  indunas 
had  selected  for  the  meeting. 

This  place  was  a  natural  amphitheatre  among  the 
hills,  with  beetling  walls  of  frowning  granite  rising  on 
every  side  of  it  to  a  height  of  fully  200  feet,  while  the 
place  was  further  commanded  by  a  large  kopje.  When 
Rhodes  and  his  small  band  approached  the  spot  they 
found  both  the  kopje  and  the  surrounding  cliffs  literally 
covered  with  natives,  and  this  proved  to  be  the  most 
nervous  moment  for  the  little  band  of  white  men. 
Even  if  they  relied  implicitly  on  the  promise  of  the 
indunas,  what  guarantee  had  they  that  the  chiefs 
would  be  able  to  restrain  the  younger  and  more  im¬ 
petuous  members  of  the  tribe  ?  The  least  sign  of 
faltering  would  have  meant  instant  death,  however  ; 
so  they  moved  briskly  forward,  and  waited  for  the 
next  act  in  the  drama. 

They  had  not  long  to  wait,  for  a  hastily  improvised 
white  flag  was  hoisted  by  the  rebels  on  the  kopje,  and 
at  the  same  moment  a  long  procession  of  indunas 


27S  RHODES  AND  THE  MATABELE  REBELLION. 

moved  towards  them  in  single  file.  These  native 
chiefs,  comprising  all  the  leading  men  of  the  Mata- 
bele  tribe,  quickly  formed  a  semicircle  around  Rhodes 
and  his  three  companions,  squatting  down  on  the 
ground,  and  the  indaba  or  palaver  was  begun. 

The  scene  was  striking.  The  four  white  men,  to 
all  appearance  entirely  unarmed,  surrounded  by  the 
hordes  of  rebel  Matabele,  whose  dark  skins  gleamed 
in  the  sunlight  like  so  much  polished  ebon}^,  and  on 
whose  hands  the  blood  of  so  many  cruelly  butchered 
white  men,  women,  and  children  was  scarcely  dry ; 
while  enclosing  them  on  every  side  were  the  sheer 
walls  of  dark  granite,  and  above  the  bright  dazzling 
blue  of  the  tropical  sky.  It  was  a  study  for  a 
painter. 

The  proceedings  opened  with  elaborate  greetings 
between  Mr  Rhodes  and  the  indunas ;  and  Rhodes 
then,  through  Mr  Colenbrander,  wTho  throughout  the 
meeting  stood  at  his  side  and  acted  as  interpreter, 
asked  the  Matabele  what  they  desired,  while  Mr 
Colenbrander  on  his  part  urged  the  chiefs  “  to  tell 
their  troubles  to  Rhodes,  their  father,  who  had  come 
among  them  with  peace  in  his  heart.”  Thus  urged, 
the  indunas  recounted  all  the  evils  and  fancied  evils 
which  the  advent  of  the  white  man  and  the  rule  of 
the  Chartered  Company  had  imposed  upon  them. 
They  had  many  real  grievances  to  ventilate  without 
doubt,  and  Rhodes  listened  to  all  they  said  with  great 
attention,  and  when  the  indunas  had  finished  he  was 
able  to  pacify  them  wonderfully.  No  more  native 
police,  he  promised,  should  be  set  in  authority  over 
them  ;  and  as  regarded  the  question  of  the  seizing  of 
their  cattle,  he  pointed  out  that  it  had  all  along  been 
his  wish,  and  also  that  of  the  British  South  Africa 


THE  INDUNAS  COWED. 


279 


Company,  that  only  such  cattle  as  had  actually  been 
the  property  of  the  late  king  Lobengula  should  be 
taken.  But  he  admitted  that  this  had  been  very 
difficult  to  accomplish,  and  that  the  Native  Com¬ 
missioners  had  been  at  times  sorely  puzzled  to  de¬ 
cide  which  were  the  king’s  cattle  and  which  were  not. 
However,  as  the  rinderpest  had  carried  off  practically 
the  whole  of  the  cattle  in  the  country,  it  was  not 
much  good  discussing  this  topic. 

After  he  had  spoken  on  other  subjects  of  minor 
interest  at  some  length,  Rhodes  embarked  upon  a 
line  of  conduct  which  absolutely  amazed  his  com¬ 
panions,  and  caused  them  to  feel  seriously  alarmed 
for  his — and  their — safety.  His  eyes  blazing  with 
anger,  and  with  trembling  lips,  he  turned  on  the 
indunas  at  his  feet  and  attacked  them,  through  the 
medium  of  Mr  Colenbrander,  who  at  first  hesitated 
to  translate  his  leader’s  remarks,  for  the  cruel  mass¬ 
acres  they  had  committed.  “  I  do  not  upbraid  you,” 
he  said,  “  for  making  war  on  the  white  men  ;  but  why 
did  you  kill  our  women  and  children  ?  For  that  you 
deserve  no  mercy  !  ”  The  indunas  made  no  reply  to 
this  accusation,  but  bowed  their  heads  before  the  im¬ 
perious  white  man  in  meek  submission.  Rhodes  had 
tamed  the  rebellious  Matabele  as  completely  as  any 
lion-tamer  ever  subjugated  the  “  king  of  beasts.” 

“  The  past  is  past  and  done  with,”  Rhodes  con¬ 
tinued  after  an  impressive  pause.  “  But  what  of 
the  future?  Is  it  to  be  peace  or  war?”  Would  the 
natives  prefer  to  go  on  fighting  the  white  man, 
whose  numbers  were  increasing  daily,  or  should  the 
struggle  come  to  an  end  ?  This  was  the  question  on 
which  everything  hung,  and  Rhodes  and  his  com¬ 
panions  awaited  the  Matabele  reply  with  an  im- 


280  RHODES  AND  THE  MATA  BULK  REBELLION. 

patience  that  they  could  hardly  conceal.  The  reply 
vc as  given  by  one  of  the  oldest  indunas  present,  whc 
rose  from  his  position  in  the  semicircle,  raised  a  light 
wand  or  stick  above  his  head,  and  advanced  towards 
Rhodes,  saying,  “  See,  this  is  my  rifle, — I  cast  it  at 
your  feet."  Repeating  the  movement,  he  cried. 
“  And  this  is  my  spear,  which  I  likewise  cast  at 
your  feet."  As  he  retired  to  his  place  once  more 
all  the  chiefs  around  set  up  a  loud  cry  of  assent,  and 
the  Matabele  rebellion  was  at  an  end. 

Rhodes  could  scarcely  conceal  a  smile  of  triumph 
as  he  turned  to  his  companions  prior  to  addressing  the 
chiefs  before  the  indaba  broke  up.  In  this  speech  he 
placed  before  the  indunas,  in  terse  and  simple  lan¬ 
guage  which  they  could  easily  understand,  how  it 
would  be  necessary  for  them  all  to  work  together 
to  remedy  the  ravages  which  the  war  had  brought 
about,  and  to  prevent  the  famine  with  which  the 
country  was  threatened  owing  to  no  crops  having 
been  sown  that  year  and  the  killing  of  the  cattle  hy 
the  rinderpest.  He  would  remain  at  Bulawayo,  he 
told  them,  so  that  they  might  come  to  him  and  con¬ 
sult  him  on  any  difliculties  which  might  arise.  When 
he  had  finished,  the  indunas  on  their  part  assured  him 
that  neither  he  nor  the  white  people  had  anything 
further  to  fear  :  the  war  was  finally  at  an  end,  and 
they  promised  not  to  fight  again. 

Rhodes  and  his  comrades  then  took  their  leave,  and 
prepared  to  return  to  their  camp  amid  the  noisy  salu¬ 
tations  of  the  Matabele  warriors  who  clustered  around 
them.  Just  before  they  rode  away  Rhodes  turned  his 
face  towards  the  amphitheatre  once  more,  and  re¬ 
marked  to  Dr  Sauer,  “  It  is  such  scenes  as  this  which 
make  life  really  worth  living,”  and  he  then  relapsed 


THE  REBELLION  AT  AN  END. 


281 


into  a  silence,  lost  in  the  tumult  of  his  own  thoughts, 
which  lasted  the  whole  of  the  journey. 

Arrived  at  his  camp,  he  remained  there  for  some 
days  longer,  during  which  time  the  Matabele  chiefs 
came  and  went  exactly  as  they  pleased,  and  the 
younger  warriors  purloined  his  blankets  and  other 
impedimenta  in  the  most  friendly  manner  imaginable. 
At  length  he  prepared  to  return  to  Bulawayo,  where 
the  colonists  were  waiting  to  fete  him  right  royally. 
He  now  felt  more  at  his  ease  than  he  had  done  for 
long.  He  had  succeeded  in  bringing  the  rebellion  to 
an  end  and  in  rescuing  the  British  South  Africa  Com- 
pany  from  utter  ruin  ;  but  over  all  his  gladness  hung 
the  dark  shadow  of  the  coming  Parliamentary  In¬ 
quiry  into  the  Jameson  Raid,  when  he  knew  that  not 
even  the  great  personal  bravery  and  self-abnegation 
he  had  displayed  on  his  venturesome  expedition  into 
the  rebel  stronghold  could  avert  or  mitigate  the  severe 
censure  he  would  have  to  endure.  He  knew  the  char¬ 
acters  of  his  personal  enemies  too  well  to  imagine  that, 
now  they  had  him  to  some  extent  in  their  power,  they 
would  forego  one  jot  or  tittle  of  their  attacks  on  him, 
and  that  anything  he  might  say  or  do  would  not  weigh 
in  his  favour  to  the  extent  of  one  poor  scruple. 

However,  there  the  thing  was,  and  it  had  to  be 
faced,  and  he  was  never  the  one  to  meet  troubles  half¬ 
way.  He  devoted  himself  to  the  task  of  completing 
the  pacification  of  Rhodesia  and  repairing  the  damages 
which  the  combination  of  war  and  rinderpest  had 
wrought  in  the  land,  without  giving  much  heed  to 
what  the  future  might  have  in  store. 

O 


282 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION. 

When  Rhodes  came  to  survey  the  twin  provinces  o 
Mashonaland  and  Matabeleland,  he  found  them  prac 
tically  wrecked  and  devastated  from  end  to  end.  Th( 
mines  had  been  either  maliciously  damaged  by  th( 
rebels  or  had  been  ruined  by  being  left  uncared  for 
shafts  were  full  of  water,  timbers  were  rotted,  anc 
the  passages  so  laboriously  hewed  in  the  solid  rock 
had  collapsed  and  become  blocked  with  earth.  Agri¬ 
culture,  too,  had  been  absolutely  neglected,  and  where 
previously  to  the  rising  of  the  natives  had  been  flour¬ 
ishing  farms  and  homesteads,  there  were  now  wilder¬ 
nesses,  deserted  and  overrun  with  weeds.  The  white 
settlers  of  the  country  were  collected  in  the  towns  of 
Salisbury  and  Bulawayo  ;  and  even  after  peace  had 
been  proclaimed  those  who,  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
rebellion,  had  dwelt  in  the  outlying  district  far  removed 
from  their  fellow-Europeans,  were  nervous  of  returning 
to  their  farms  and  mines,  as,  so  far  as  they  could  see, 
there  was  no  guarantee  that  so  soon  as  the  troops  had 
been  withdrawn  from  the  country  the  natives  would 
not  rise  again  to  massacre. 

In  addition  to  the  ravages  of  the  war  there  was 
the  damage  done  by  the  rinderpest,  which  had  killed 


A  COLOSSAL  TASK. 


283 


off  practically  the  whole  of  the  cattle  in  the  country. 
To  a  dweller  in  South  Africa  loss  of  cattle  is  a  far 
more  serious  matter  than  persons  in  this  country  can 
realise.  All  the  transport  in  Rhodesia  at  this  time 
was  done,  speaking  generally,  by  means  of  trek-oxen, 
so  that  with  the  death  of  the  cattle  the  country  was 
deprived  of  what  was  really  its  only  source  of  obtain¬ 
ing  provisions  and  other  necessities. 

The  task  which  confronted  Rhodes  at  this  juncture 
was  colossal,  and  one,  moreover,  which  demanded  many 
hours  of  anxious  thought  on  his  part.  The  first  thing 
to  be  done,  he  foresaw,  was  to  extend  the  line  of 
railway  which  ran  northwards  from  Cape  Town 
through  Kimberley  to  British  Bechuanaland,  from 
its  terminus  at  Mafeking  northwards  to  Bulawayo, 
with  as  little  delay  as  possible.  He  had  also  given 
a,  promise  some  time  previously  to  the  inhabitants  of 
Salisbury  that  he  would  push  forward  the  building  of 
i  railway  to  connect  that  town  with  the  East  Coast  at 
Beira  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  By  the  building 
)f  these  two  lines,  he  perceived,  the  spectre  of  famine 
which  then  hung  over  the  country  would  be  effectively 
ibolished  in  the  future. 

Another  factor  on  which  he  relied  for  the  better 
uvilisation  of  the  country  to  which  he  had  given  his 
lame,  and  to  lessen  the  chance  of  any  future  rebellion 
>f  the  natives,  was  the  trans-continental  telegraph, 
vhich  he  was  then  hurrying  forward  from  the  south 
wards  Salisbury  and  Bulawayo.  In  his  mind’s  eye 
le  already  saw  it  stretching  across  the  Dark  Con- 
inent  from  Cape  Town  in  the  south  to  Alexandria 
n  the  north,  or,  as  the  public,  with  its  love  of 
II iteration  has  come  to  term  it,  “  from  the  Cape  to 


2S4 


EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION. 


The  realisation  of  these  vast  schemes  took  time,  an 
also  money ;  but,  as  regards  the  latter,  .Rhodes  ha 
very  little  to  fear,  for  the  new  issue  of  shares  in  th 
British  South  Africa  Company,  which  was  made  i 
order  to  replenish  its  treasury  after  the  extravaganc 
of  the  war,  was  eagerly  taken  up  in  London,  thoug 
it  was  obvious  that  for  many  years  to  come  ther 
would  be  no  return  from  the  country  for  the  mone 
which  was  sunk  in  it.  The  general  public,  howevei 
had  a  faith  in  the  future  prosperity  of  the  countr 
which  nothing  could  shake,  and  an  even  stronge 
faith,  perhaps,  in  Cecil  Rhodes.  Indeed,  the  persona 
magnetism  which  Rhodes  exercises  over  all  with  whor 
he  comes  into  contact  is  most  remarkable. 

When  it  became  clear  that  the  natives  had  real); 
had  enough  fighting,  and  were  disposed  to  settle  dowi 
on  their  land  and  dwell  in  amity  with  the  white  men 
the  confidence  of  the  white  settlers  began  to  return 
and  once  more  agriculturists  and  mineral  prospector 
spread  themselves  over  Rhodesia,  and  white  imrni 
gration  into  the  country  commenced.  A  striking 
feature  of  this  immigration,  and  one  which  Rhode; 
was  particularly  glad  to  see,  was  the  number  of  Boer; 
from  the  Transvaal  who  entered  Rhodesia — and  this 
despite  the  efforts  of  Kruger  and  Joubert  to  preveni 
the  Burghers  trekking  northwards  into  the  new  colony 
The  government  at  Pretoria,  as  was  perhaps  onl} 
natural,  viewed  with  alarm  the  constant  stream  o; 
Boers  crossing  the  Limpopo  and  taking  up  their 
abode  in  Rhodesia,  and  Rhodes  was  correspondingly 
elated.  “  I  have  got  2000  of  Mr  Kruger’s  Burghers,’ 
he  declared  in  a  speech  which  he  delivered  about  this 
time,  “  and  if  he  does  not  look  out  I  shall  have  them 
all.  The  Boers  will  not  be  content  to  stay  on  the 


A  “BOOM”  IN  RHODESIA.  285 

,our  veldt  of  the  Transvaal  when  they  learn  that  there 
s  sweet  veldt  in  Rhodesia.” 

Despite  the  many  drawbacks  from  which  Rhodesia 
tad  suffered  in  the  past,  it  now  began  to  make  great 
lead  way,  and  signs  of  a  “  boom  ”  were  to  be  found  on 
ivery  hand.  With  this  flourishing  state  of  affairs  in 
ixistence,  Rhodes  was  free  to  turn  his  attention  to 
•ther  matters  that  were  urgently  demanding  his 
ftention.  Prominent  among  these  was  the  im- 
lending  general  election  at  the  Cape  in  1898.  After 
i is  return  to  South  Africa  in  1897,  at  the  conclusion 
>f  his  evidence  before  the  Parliamentary  Committee, 
le  went  straight  up  to  Rhodesia,  and  for  a  time 
tevoted  himself  entirely  to  the  regeneration  of  the 
ountry  and  to  mingling  freely  with  the  colonists, 
o  as  to  find  out  the  better  what  were  their  wants 
nd  their  aspirations.  In  fact,  released  for  a  time 
rom  any  official  connection  with  the  British  South 
tfrica  Company,  and  wfith  the  responsibility  of  the 
iremiership  of  Cape  Colony  no  longer  on  his  shoulders, 
■,e  became  a  colonist  of  Rhodesia  pure  and  simple. 

The  course  which  politics  at  the  Cape  was  taking, 
owever,  soon  compelled  him  to  come  forward  from 
is  obscurity  once  more,  and  to  set  about  girding  on 
is  armour  for  the  coming  fight.  With  characteristic 
etermination  he  declined  to  obey  the  mandate  of  Mr 
an  Hofmeyr  and  the  Afrikander  Bond,  and  to  efface 
imself  from  public  life  because  of  the  fiasco  of  the 
ameson  Raid  ;  for  he  knew  that  the  task  which  he 
ad  imposed  on  himself  when  he  first  took  his  seat  in 
he  Cape  Parliament,  the  extension  and  consolidation 
f  the  British  Empire  in  South  Africa,  wras  not  yet 
ccomplished,  and  it  was  not  in  his  nature  to  with- 
raw  his  hand  from  the  plough  in  the  middle  of  a 


286 


EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION. 


furrow.  When  the  time  for  a  general  election  came 
round  in  1898,  therefore,  he  once  more  stood  as  a 
candidate  for  his  old  constituency  of  Barkly  West. 

This  election  bade  fair  to  be  the  fiercest  which  had 
ever  been  fought  in  Cape  Colony,  and  it  needed  no 
little  amount  of  courage  on  the  part  of  Mr  Rhodes  to 
come  forward,  for  the  amount  of  vituperation  and 
scurrility  with  which  he  was  assailed  was  unexampled 
in  the  annals  of  South  African  politics.  No  allegation 
was  deemed  too  base  or  too  unfounded  in  fact  to  be 
brought  against  him  :  the  character  assigned  to  him 
by  his  enemies  would  have  been  a  trifle  exaggerated 
if  given  to  the  Father  of  Lies  himself. 

The  Afrikander  Bond  had  selected  Mr  W.  Schreiner 
as  its  nominal  figurehead  and  the  future  Premier  of 
the  Cape.  Mr  Hofmeyr,  of  course,  was  the  prime 
wirepuller  of  this  anti  -  Rhodes  and  anti  -  British 
organisation,  but  he  declined  to  take  the  open 
leadership  of  the  party  and  to  emerge  into  the 
light  of  day,  preferring  to  push  Mr  Schreiner, 
certainly  one  of  the  ablest  and  broadest -minded 
of  the  Afrikander  party  at  the  Cape,  into  the  fore¬ 
ground,  and  to  proceed  with  his  scheming  and 
intriguing  under  the  surface.  Jan  Hofmeyr  has 
not  received  the  nickname  of  “The  Mole”  for 
nothing. 

Working  hand  in  glove  with  the  Bond  in  its  efforts 
to  discredit  Rhodes  and  to  reduce  him  and  the  British 
Progressive  party  at  the  Cape  to  a  state  of  political 
impotence  were  President  Kruger  and  the  Hollander 
clique  at  Pretoria.  The  vast  resources  of  the  Trans¬ 
vaal  secret  service  fund  were  drawn  upon  to  an 
enormous  extent,  and  no  stone  was  left  unturned 
to  drive  Rhodes  and  his  party  from  the  field. 


A  FIERCE  ELECTION  CAMPAIGN. 


287 


Rhodes  met  these  personal  assaults  with  scorn  and 
contempt,  but  he  would  have  been  more  than  human 
had  he  not  on  occasions  been  stung  to  retort.  Hence 
it  comes  that  in  the  many  election  speeches  he  made 
at  this  time  there  is  now  and  again  a  strongly  per¬ 
sonal  vein  to  be  found.  For  the  most  part,  however, 
he  refrained  from  descending  to  the  methods  of  his 
adversaries,  and  was  content  to  urge  upon  the 
electors  the  desirability  of  adopting  the  programme 
for  legislative  and  administrative  purposes  he  had 
mapped  out.  The  chief  points  in  this  programme  were 
the  removal  of  the  duty  on  butcher’s-meat  which  was 
in  existence  in  the  colony,  the  reduction  of  the  wheat 
tax,  the  introduction  of  a  duty  on  brandy,  and  fresh 
regulations  to  forbid  the  sale  of  liquor  to  natives. 
The  question  of  a  subsidy  from  Cape  Colony  towards 
the  support  of  the  British  navy  also  figured  in  his  pro¬ 
gramme.  These  were  very  progressive  views  to  set 
before  the  electors,  and  some  were  not  at  all  popular 
with  certain  sections.  The  proposed  tax  on  brandy, 
for  example,  was  very  obnoxious  to  the  Dutch  brandy 
manufacturers  of  the  Cape,  as  was  the  threatened 
further  restriction  upon  the  sale  of  liquor  to  natives  ; 
for  it  was  obvious  that  if  Rhodes  were  returned  to 
power  and  he  carried  this  bill,  the  sale  of  spirits,  especi¬ 
ally  of  the  commoner  and  cheaper  forms,  would  at 
once  be  immensely  decreased.  It  was  the  story  of  the 
Glen  Grey  Act  over  again. 

Prominent  among  the  many  reforms  which  Rhodes 
now  urged  upon  the  electors  was  the  question 
of  the  amendment  of  the  educational  laws  of  the 
colony,  which  were  at  that  time  in  a  very  unsatis¬ 
factory  condition.  His  scheme  was  to  create  a  com¬ 
pulsory  form  of  education,  of  a  kind  similar  to  that  in 


2SS 


EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION. 


vogue  in  most  of  the  other  self-governing'  branches  c 
the  Empire,  with  certain  permissive  clauses  in  il 
This  did  not  commend  itself  in  the  least  to  the  ma 
jority  of  the  highly  conservative  old  Dutch  farmers  o 
the  colony,  who,  having  managed  to  rub  along  them 
selves  very  well  without  any  education  save  of  the  mos 
rudimentary  and  fragmentary  kind,  failed  to  see  wha 
need  there  was  for  their  children  to  acquire  learning 
Taken  in  its  entirety,  it  has  to  be  said  that  Rhodes 
programme  did  not  meet  with  the  general  acceptanc* 
of  the  Dutch  portion  of  the  voters ;  but  the  Britisl 
and  European  voters  generally  rallied  round  him  en 
thusiastically. 

The  violence  of  his  adversaries,  too,  served  to  gair 
for  Rhodes  support  which  he  would  otherwise  have 
lacked,  for  by  the  very  rancour  and  personal  hatrec 
which  they  displayed,  many  sober-minded  men  of  the 
Dutch  party  were  driven  to  take  up  the  cudgels  on 
Rhodes'  behalf  and  to  support  him  though  they  might 
differ  from  him  on  matters  of  detail.  On  the  question 
of  a  contribution  by  the  Cape  to  the  cost  of  the 
British  navy  all  parties  were  practically  agreed, 
though  there  was  some  difference  of  opinion  as  tc 
what  form  this  contribution  should  take.  The  pro¬ 
posal  originally  had  arisen  about  the  time  of  the 
Diamond  Jubilee  of  the  late  Queen,  when  the  dele¬ 
gates  from  Cape  Colon}7  to  Great  Britain  on  that 
occasion  were  empowered  to  make  the  offer  to  the 
Imperial  Government.  At  first  the  proposal  was  that 
an  annual  sum  of  money,  tentatively  fixed  at  £30,000, 
should  be  set  aside  by  the  Cape  Government  for  this 
purpose  ;  but  ultimately  this  made  way  in  favour  of 
one  for  building  a  battleship  or  a  first-class  cruiser, — 
whichever  seemed  best  in  the  opinion  of  the  Lords  of 


THE  CAPE’S  GIFT  TO  THE  EMPIRE. 


289 


the  Admiralty — the  expense  of  which  was  to  be  borne 
entirely  by  the  colony. 

This  was  the  shape  which  the  gift  eventually  took, 
and  HALS.  Africa  was  the  result.  It  is  only  fair  to 
mention  here  that  at  the  time  the  necessary  vote  for 
this  purpose  was  carried  through  the  Cape  Legisla¬ 
ture  an  Afrikander  majority  was  in  power. 

Needless  to  say,  Rhodes  was  an  ardent  supporter  of 
this  scheme,  for  anything  which  tended  to  denote  in  a 
tangible  and  practical  manner  the  bond  of  common  in¬ 
terest  which  exists  between  the  colonies  and  the 
Motherland  —  the  Imperial  tie,  as  it  has  been  aptly 
termed  —  found  great  favour  with  him.  Personally, 
however,  he  was  in  favour  of  the  annual  vote  of 
a  sum  of  money  —  to  be  applied  as  the  naval 
authorities  thought  best ;  for,  as  he  put  it  in  one  of 
his  speeches  on  the  subject,  “  a  ship  might  con¬ 
ceivably  go  down,  and  then  the  factor  which  brought 
:he  sentiment  which  had  prompted  the  gift  home 
;o  them  would  be  lost.”  As  an  illustration  of  the 
idvantage  of  an  annual  contribution  over  the  gift  of  a 
;hip,  he  quoted  the  remark  of  one  of  his  friends  during 
he  time  when  the  concessions  from  Lobengula  were 
ceing  sought  for  and  the  question  of  the  terms  to  be 
•ffered  to  the  Matabele  king  was  under  consideration, 
t  was  undecided  whether  the  Chartered  Company 
hould  offer  Lobengula  a  lump  sum  down  or  a  monthlv 
tipend.  The  gentleman  in  question  was  in  favour  of 
he  latter  alternative  for  the  following  reason.  “  If 
ou  give  the  king  a  monthly  instalment,”  he  said, 
you  will  be  continuallv  reminding  him  of  our  ex- 
rtence  and  of  the  benefits  he  is  receiving  from  us  : 
rhereas  a  lump  sum  paid  down  on  the  nail  may,  and 
robably  will,  instantly  be  squandered  over  the  rami- 

T 


290 


EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION. 


fications  of  his  harem.”  This  illustrates  very  clearly 
Rhodes’  view  on  the  question  of  Cape  Colony’s  contri¬ 
bution  to  the  British  navy. 

A  proposal  had  been  thrown  out  by  a  small  party  of 
the  advanced  Afrikander  party,  that  instead  of  a  ship 
or  an  annual  sum  of  money,  a  cable  to  bring  the  Cape 
into  closer  and  better  communication  with  the  mother 
country  should  be  substituted.  This  Rhodes  strongly 
opposed,  on  the  ground  that  the  proposal  then  before 
the  colony  was  one  of  a  contribution  to  the  navy. 
The  question  as  to  whether  they  should  at  some  future 
time  agree  to  bear  part  of  the  expense  of  laying  a  new 
cable  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Cape  was,  he 
contended,  quite  a  different  matter,  and  one  with  which 
they  were  not  concerned  at  that  moment. 

Naturally  Rhodes  had  to  devote  much  of  his  atten¬ 
tion  to  the  causes  of  the  unrest  which  was  then  prevail¬ 
ing  among  the  Uitlander  population  of  Johannesburg, 
and  to  explain  his  connection  with  it.  He  made  no 
secret  of  the  fact — and  indeed  it  would  have  been  the 
rankest  hypocrisy  on  his  part  if  he  had  done  so — of 
the  utter  detestation  that  he  felt  towards  the  corrupt 
oligarchy  of  Mr  Kruger  and  his  satellites.  He  saw, 
and  he  emphasised  the  fact  very  plainly,  that  the 
Transvaal  was  the  plague-spot  which  was  in  danger 
of  corrupting  the  whole  of  South  Africa.  The  Hol¬ 
lander  clique,  from  which  the  true  Boer  population  of 
the  Transvaal  has  ever  to  be  carefully  distinguished, 
was  wilfully  doing  all  that  lay  in  its  power  to  retard 
and  wreck  the  commercial  and  economic  progress  of 
the  sub-continent;  and  this  he  strenously  protested 
against. 

It  is  true,  too,  to  say  that  the  animosity  and 
rancour  with  which  Mr  Kruger  and  the  extreme 


THE  “LITTLE  AFRICA”  SCHOOL.  291 

Afrikander  party  were  pursuing  him  at  this  time 
stung  him  severely,  and  therefore  he  permitted  him¬ 
self  to  attack  his  opponents  and  their  policy — if  they 
had  a  policy  worthy  of  the  name — more  openly  and 
with  greater  fierceness  than  would  otherwise  have 
been  the  case. 

When  he  came  to  the  question  of  the  extension  to 
the  north  of  British  rule,  he  found  himself  on  a  rather 
different  footing,  inasmuch  as  he  had  here  opposed  to 
him  scores  of  people  who  were  in  agreement  with  him 
3n  other  points  and  were  very  indignant  at  the  un¬ 
scrupulous  methods  of  the  anti -Rhodes  party.  To 
nany  of  the  colonists  of  the  Cape,  mainly  those  of 
Dutch  extraction,  it  seemed  that  the  addition  of 
tlhodesia  to  the  British  Empire  was  an  unwise 
step,  and  would  ultimately  tend  to  the  disadvan- 
:age  of  Cape  Colony.  Such  an  opinion  may  read 
•ather  strangely  to  staunch  supporters  of  the  “  ex¬ 
pansionist”  policy  at  home,  but  it  must  be  borne 
n  mind  that  so  recently  as  the  date  of  the 
vithdrawal  of  the  British  claims  to  the  sove- 
■eignty  of  the  Orange  Free  State  a  responsible 
Minister  of  the  Crown  permitted  himself  publicly  to 
assert  that  “  all  Great  Britain  really  required  in  South 
Africa  was  a  coaling-station  at  the  Cape.”  How  we 
lave  progressed  since  those  days  ! 

Rhodes  found  it  a  matter  of  considerable  difficulty 
o  convince  this  “  little  Africa  ”  school — if  such  a  term 
flay  be  permitted — that  his  policy  of  bringing  the 
ast  hinterland  of  the  Cape  under  the  British  flag 
?as  the  best  one,  and  that  it  was  impossible  that  this 
tretch  of  fertile  and  healthy  country  should  remain 
allow,  as  it  were,  and  occupied  only  by  a  few  tribes 
f  savages.  If  Great  Britain,  through  the  instru- 


292 


EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION. 


mentality  of  Mr  Rhodes,  had  not  assumed  the  control 
of  what  is  now  known  as  Southern  and  Northern 
Rhodesia,  then  some  other  Power — Germany  probably 
— would  have  done  so.  Then  where  would  the  Cape 
have  been,  and  what  would  have  been  the  position 
of  Great  Britain  in  South  Africa  ?  On  the  ground 
of  expediency  alone,  and  without  any  reference  to 
other  and  higher  motives,  this  expansion-to-the-north 
policy  of  Rhodes  was  the  salvation  of  Cape  Colony. 

During  this  election  Rhodes  laid  great  stress  upon 
the  need  which  was  increasing  daily  for  the  federation 
of  the  various  states  of  South  Africa.  He  had  for 
years  preached  this  doctrine,  but  for  the  most  part 
it  had  fallen  on  unheeding  ears.  The  obstructive 
policy  of  the  Transvaal  prevented  any  real  union 
being  arrived  at,  and  whenever  Rhodes,  either  in 
Cape  Colony,  or  in  Rhodesia,  or  at  home  in  England, 
referred  to  his  ambition  for  the  federation  of  the 
various  South  African  states  under  the  supremacy 
of  the  British  flag,  he  was  promptly  met  with  the 
question,  “  What  about  the  Transvaal  ?  Will  she 
ever  consent  to  enter  a  union  which  will  mean 
the  acknowledgment  of  the  overlordship  of  Great 
Britain  ?  ” 

After-events  have  shown  pretty  conclusively  that 
the  Transvaal  never  would  have  taken  part  in  any 
such  scheme,  and  that  the  real  policy  of  Mr  Krugei 
and  his  government  was  to  bring  about  a  union  oi 
the  South  African  states,  it  is  true,  but  also  a  union 
in  which  the  British  should  have  no  place, — a  union  in 
which  the  Dutch  should  be  the  governing  body,  and 
members  of  other  nationalities  mere  helots — hewers  oi 
wood  and  drawers  of  water. 

It  was  Rhodes’  idea  at  this  time,  however,  that 


THE  HOLLANDER  CLIQUE. 


293 


“the  Transvaal  could  be  squared,”  as  he  put  it  in 
his  own  blunt  fashion.  Even  the  Jameson  Raid  he 
did  not  regard  as  forming  an  unsurpassable  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  this  federation  scheme.  His  idea  was 
that,  if  all  went  well,  he  would  in  time  be  able  to 
offer  the  Transvaal  such  terms  to  enter  the  union  that 
it  could  not  afford  to  remain  outside.  With  Cape 
Colony,  Natal,  the  Orange  Free  State,  and  Rhodesia 
banded  together  for  a  common  object,  and  with  a 
common  end  in  view,  the  Transvaal  could  not  have 
for  long-  remained  outside  and  aloof. 

A  point  on  which  Rhodes  laid  considerable  stress 
at  this  time  in  urging  the  possibility  of  the  Transvaal 
adopting  a  more  enlightened  policy  was  the  fact  that 
even  among  the  Boers  there  was  a  growing  discon¬ 
tent  with  the  system  of  misgovernment  which  the 
Hollander  clique  at  Pretoria  was  pursuing.  As  an 
evidence  of  this  discontent  he  quoted  the  significant 
fact  that  no  less  than  a  thousand  Burghers  had  at 
that  time  quitted  the  country  of  their  birth,  and  had 
settled  in  Rhodesia. 

The  reason  for  this  trek  to  the  north  on  the  part  of 
the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal  was  twofold.  In  the  first 
place,  they  found  that  there  was  better  grazing-land 
to  be  obtained  in  Rhodesia  than  was  the  case  in  the 
Transvaal ;  and,  in  the  second,  they  found  that  they 
enjoyed  greater  freedom  and  justice  under  the  rule 
ff  the  Chartered  Company  than  in  the  South  African 
Republic. 

Naturally  at  this  election  the  question  of  the  future 
relationship  of  the  two  races  in  Cape  Colony  received 
i  great  deal  of  attention.  Rhodes’  policy  was  the 
same  as  it  had  always  been,  to  bring  about  the  com¬ 
plete  fusion  of  the  British  and  Afrikander  sections 


294 


EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION. 


of  the  population,  and  to  show  them  that  their  in¬ 
terests  were  absolutely  identical.  The  policy  of  Mr 
Hofmeyr  and  the  Afrikander  Bond,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  to  use  the  Jameson  Raid  for  all  it  was 
worth  to  stir  up  race  hatred,  and  to  make  the 
Afrikanders  suspicious  of  their  British  neighbours. 
The  future  prosperity  of  the  colony  counted  as  noth¬ 
ing  with  them.  Let  them  snatch  a  party  victory 
at  the  polls,  and  bring  about  the  discomfiture  of 
Mr  Rhodes  and  his  supporters,  and  the  country  might 
go  to  rack  and  ruin  for  all  they  cared.  It  is  lament¬ 
able  to  observe  the  depths  to  which  the  anti-progress 
party  at  the  Cape  descended  at  this  time,  and  the 
unscrupulous  methods  which  it  employed  ;  but  since 
then  we  have  seen  much  the  same  tactics  employed 
nearer  home,  so  that  we  are  not  so  much  surprised  as 
might  otherwise  have  been  the  case. 

In  a  speech  which  he  delivered  during  the  course 
of  his  election  campaign  at  Vryburg,  on  the  very  land 
that  he  had  by  his  own  unaided  efforts  saved  for  Cape 
Colony  fourteen  years  previously,  Rhodes  exploded  in 
effective  fashion  the  argument,  which  his  opponents 
had  been  working  to  such  good  purpose,  that  he 
was  opposed — and  always  had  been  opposed — to  the 
Afrikander  element  in  the  colony. 

“  How,”  he  asked  his  audience,  “  am  I  against  the 
Afrikanders  ?  Can  you  quote  me  a  case  ?  Has  any 
privilege  ever  been  denied  an  Afrikander  and  granted 
to  any  other  race  or  class  ?  Surely  if  Kruger’s 
Burghers  have  equal  rights,  and  the  Free  State 
Burghers  have  rights,  it  is  not  likely  that  I  should 
deny  them  to  the  people  of  Cape  Colony.  I  tell  you 
these  are  lies,  and  now  I  put  another  aspect  of  the 
question.  Do  you  think  that  you  are  wise  in  howling 


MR  W.  P.  SCHREINER  PREMIER. 


295 


against  Rhodes  in  every  part  of  the  country,  and 
especially  here  in  Bechuanaland  ?  You  may  by  your 
folly  drive  the  north  to  take  up  a  hostile  attitude 
towards  you,  and  what,  I  ask,  do  you  imagine  that 
you  are  going  to  gain  ?  I  will  tell  you.  You  will 
gain  race  feeling,  you  will  succeed  in  setting  race 
against  race  ;  but  that  will  not  feed  you,  that  will 
not  give  you  land,  that  will  not  secure  the  freedom  of 
yourselves  or  your  children.  What,  then,  is  it  going 
to  do  ?  I  will  tell  you.  It  is  going  to  starve  you.” 

This  was  very  direct  speaking — almost  brutally  so, 
in  fact — and  Rhodes’  enemies  at  once  seized  on  this 
speech  and  claimed  that  it  contained  a  covert  threat 
that  if  Cape  Colony  refused  to  return  him  to  office, 
he  would  sever  himself  from  the  colony  and  devote 
himself  to  stirring  up  feeling  in  Rhodesia  against  the 
Cape,  and  to  the  employment  of  every  means  in  his 
power  to  wreck  Cape  Colony  and  to  exploit  the  north 
at  its  expense.  That  anything  of  this  nature  was 
meant  by  Rhodes  it  is  absurd  to  suppose ;  but  per¬ 
haps  the  words  he  used  on  this  occasion  were  open  to 
more  than  one  construction. 

The  result  of  the  election  was  a  narrow  victory 
for  the  Afrikander  party,  and  Mr  W.  P.  Schreiner, 
Rhodes’  old  friend  and  parliamentary  ally,  was  elected 
as  Premier  of  the  Bond  majority.  This  result  was 
mainly  brought  about  by  the  inequalities  of  the  elect¬ 
oral  system  in  vogue  in  the  colony,  and  an  agitation 
for  a  redistribution  of  seats  was  forthwith  set  on  foot 
by  the  Progressive  party.  In  a  speech  delivered, 
like  the  one  previously  quoted,  at  Vryburg,  Rhodes 
brought  out  the  unfairness  of  the  system  very  lucidly. 
He  said  :  “If  this  election  had  been  carried  out  on  the 
redistribution  they  [the  Afrikander  party]  had  agreed 


296 


EVENTS  AFTER  THE  REBELLION. 


to,  we  should  have  won  this  election  by  forty-fiv 
seats,  but  we  thought  it  unfair  and  would  not  agre 
to  their  terms,  and  so  we  fought  it  on  the  old  regis 
tration.  But  even  now  we  are  almost  at  a  tie  a 
regards  members,  and  as  regards  voters  we  have  ; 
vast  majority.” 

In  addition  to  this  hardly  fought  campaign,  1895 
was  an  eventful  year  for  Rhodes  in  other  ways.  Oi 
April  21,  for  example,  he  was  unanimously  recallec 
to  the  board  of  the  Chartered  Company  at  a  genera 
meeting  of  the  shareholders  held  in  the  Cannon  Streel 
Hotel,  London.  The  shareholders  had  learnt  by  ex¬ 
perience  the  value  of  Rhodes’  services,  and  looking  al 
the  matter  from  a  purely  commercial  standpoint,  thej 
decided  that  they  would  be  acting  against  their  owr 
interests  to  try  and  do  without  him  any  longer. 
Rhodes  immediately  assented  to  the  wishes  of  the 
shareholders,  and  forthwith  took  his  seat  once  more 
among  the  directors  of  the  Chartered  Company 
amidst  the  enthusiastic  plaudits  of  the  large  number 
of  people  present.  It  was  also  decided  at  this  meet¬ 
ing  to  increase  the  capital  of  the  British  South  Africa 
Company  to  £5,000,000  sterling,  so  as  to  provide 
funds  for  repairing  the  ravages  caused  by  the  Mata- 
bele  rebellion  and  the  rinderpest,  and  to  enable  the 
development  of  the  country  to  be  proceeded  with 
with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

On  October  20  of  this  year,  also,  an  Order  in 
Council  was  issued  which  modified  the  original 
charter  granted  to  the  British  South  Africa  Com¬ 
pany  and  provided  for  the  future  government  of 
Rhodesia.  This  document  was  the  most  important 
concerning  Rhodesia  which  had  been  issued  since  the 
granting  of  the  charter. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  RHODESIA. 


297 


Its  most  important  stipulation  was  for  the  forma¬ 
tion  of  a  legislative  council  for  Southern  Rhodesia 
)f  a  quasi  -  representative  character,  to  assist  the 
Resident  Commissioner — a  new  post  formed  by  the 
Drder,  which  was  to  be  filled  by  an  officer  under  the 
jontrol  of  the  Imperial  authorities.  This  council  in 
the  first  instance  was  to  consist  of  four  members  to 
oe  elected  by  popular  vote,  being  two  each  from  the 
provinces  of  Mashonaland  and  Matabeleland,  and  five 
members  nominated  by  the  Chartered  Company.  In 
addition  to  these,  the  administrators  of  Mashonaland 
and  Matabeleland  respectively  were  to  be  ex-officio 
members  of  the  council.  Seeing  that  the  Chartered 
Company  was  still  to  remain  responsible  for  finding 
the  necessary  capital  for  the  administration  and  de¬ 
velopment  of  the  country,  it  was  only  right  and 
proper  that  it  should  have  the  predominant  voice  on 
this  council,  whose  most  important  duties  would  be 
to  decide  how  the  money  should  be  expended. 

The  Order  further  provided  for  the  appointment  of 
an  Imperial  officer  to  decide  how  the  police  and  other 
armed  forces  of  Rhodesia  should  be  employed.  In 
the  case  of  this  officer,  and  in  that  of  the  resident 
commissioner,  salaries  had  to  be  provided  for  out  of 
the  funds  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company, 
though  the  Company,  and  quite  properly,  had  no 
voice  whatever  in  the  selection  of  these  two  officials. 


298 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  TRANS -AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 

xL 

It  was  in  the  early  days  of  Mr  Rhodes’  political  career 
that  there  first  occurred  to  him  the  idea  for  a  railway 
<  to  cut  right  through  the  heart  of  the  Dark  Continent 
and  to  connect  Cape  Town  with  Egypt  and  the 
Mediterranean.  The  dream  of  an  “  all-red  ”  railway 
line  from  the  south  to  the  north  of  Africa  seized  hold 
of  his  imagination,  and  the  more  he  dwelt  upon  it  the 
greater  his  determination  to  carry  it  out.  His  idea  of 
“  empire-making  ”  in  Africa  did  not  stop  short  at  the 
Zambesi,  or  even  at  the  lakes.  On  and  on  he  desired 
to  go,  absorbing  the  vdiole  of  the  unclaimed  portions  of 
Africa  in  his  gigantic  scheme,  until  the  whole  of  the 
interior  was  dominated  by  the  British  flag.  The 
sea  alone  was  to  be  the  boundary. 

That  his  great  scheme  for  an  uninterrupted  stretch 
.  of  British  territory  from  Cape  Colony  to  the  Nile  was 
not  destined  to  be  accomplished  is  now  a  matter  of 
•  history.  The  junction  of  the  Congo  Free  State  and 
German  East  Africa  effectually  put  an  end  to  the  “  all- 
'  red  ”  route  across  the  continent,  and  though  Rhodes 
did  all  in  his  power  to  rescue  even  the  smallest  ribbon 
of  territory  for  Great  Britain  across  which  his  iron 
road  might  run,  his  efforts  resulted  in  failure.  The 


THE  BECHUANALAND  RAILWAY  CO. 


299 


Imperial  Government  was  averse  from  undertaking 
any  further  responsibilities  in  Africa,  and  Rhodes  was 
forced  to  yield. 

He  has  always  been  a  firm  believer  in  the  efficacy  of 
the  railroad  as  an  agent  of  civilisation,  and  one  of  his 
earliest  efforts  in  the  Cape  Parliament  was  to  procure 
the  extension  of  the  Cape  Government  railway  to 
Kimberley.  This  line  really  formed  the  first  link  in 
the  great  “  Cape  to  Cairo  ”  railway  scheme  which  was 
to  become  so  famous  in  after-years.  Having  carried 
his  point,  in  the  teeth  of  considerable  opposition,  he 
paused  for  a  while,  but  he  resolutely  declined  to 
accept  the  dictum  of  the  Afrikander  Bond  that  Kim¬ 
berley  should  remain  for  all  time  the  terminus  of 
this  railway,  and  that  any  future  extension  north¬ 
wards  should  be  by  way  of  the  railway  from  the 
Cape  to  Bloemfontein  and  Johannesburg.  “  No,”  said 
Rhodes  in  effect  when  this  proposal  was  first  raised, 
“  the  result  of  that  policy  would  be  to  give  the  control 
of  the  trade  of  the  interior  into  the  hands  of  the  two 
Boer  states,  who  could  use  their  position  to  the  detri¬ 
ment  of  British  interests.”  Bechuanaland  was,  he 
saw,  the  true  route  through  which  this  railway  to  the 
north  should  pass,  consequently  the  next  section  of 
the  line  to  be  built  was  that  from  Kimberley  to  Vry- 
burg  and  Mafeking.  Here  a  long  halt  was  called 
while  Rhodes  raised  the  necessary  funds  to  carry  on 
the  line  farther. 

As  far  as  Kimberley  the  railway  had  been  built  and 
maintained  by  the  Cape  Government.  Beyond  that 
the  Cape  Legislature  resolutely  refused  to  go, /or  to 
accept  any  responsibility.  Nothing  daunted,  Rhodes 
set  about  forming  a  private  company,  the  Bechuana¬ 
land  Railway  Company,  to  carry  the  line  northwards. 


300 


THE  TRANS-AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


The  outbreak  of  the  Matabele  rebellion  and  the  grea 
difficulties  of  transport  through  the  death  of  the  trek 
oxen  from  the  terrible  rinderpest  brought  home  t< 
him  very  clearly  the  necessity  of  pushing  forward  hi: 
railway  to  Rhodesia  with  all  speed,  and  he  redoublec 
his  efforts.  The  line  reached  Bulawayo  towards  tht 
end  of  1897,  and  was  formally  opened,  amid  a  seem 
of  great  popular  rejoicing,  on  November  4  of  thal 
year.  Rhodes  was  now  1350  miles  nearer  the  realisa¬ 
tion  of  his  trans-continental  railway  scheme  than  wher 
he  started. 

V  As  the  pioneer  of  his  railway,  Rhodes  inaugurated 
his  trans-continental  telegraph  project,  and  even  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  native  rising  in  Rhodesia  had 
made  his  plans  for  the  carrying  of  the  magic  wire 
across  the  plateau  of  British  Central  Africa,  past  the 
great  lakes,  and  onward  through  the  innermost  re¬ 
cesses  of  that  mysterious  country  which  lies  between 
Lake  Tanganyika  and  the  head-waters  of  the  Nile. 

In  1898  the  telegraph  line  had  reached  Kota-Kota, 
to  the  north-east  of  Salisbury,  and  was  rapidly  being 
pushed  forward  to  Abercorn,  on  the  southern  shores 
of  Lake  Tanganyika.  The  cost  of  building  this  portion 
of  the  wire  had  been,  in  round  figures,  £140,000,  and 
the  original  capital  of  the  African  Trans-Continental 
Telegraph  Company,  Limited,  which  Rhodes  had 
formed  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  and  control¬ 
ling  the  line,  was  practically  exhausted.  The  next 
section  to  be  built  was  from  Abercorn  northwards  to 
Uganda,  a  distance  of  600  miles.  Rhodes  estimated 
the  cost  of  this  section  at  £100,000,  and  when  it  was 
built  there  remained  the  country  between  Uganda 
and  Khartoum — the  terminus  of  the  Egyptian  tele¬ 
graph  system — a  stretch  of  1300  miles,  which  the 


THE  TRANS-CONTINENTAL  TELEGRAPH. 


301 


wire  would  have  to  cross.  The  cost  of  building  the 
whole  of  the  line  would  be,  in  Rhodes’  opinion,  £100 
per  mile,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  this  estimate  will  be  greatly  exceeded. 

The  chief  object  which  the  telegraph  line  was  to 
serve,  in  Rhodes’  mind,  was  that  of  forerunner  to  the 
railway  and  pioneer  of  white  civilisation  ;  but  he  was 
keenly  alive  also  to  the  commercial  possibilities  of  the 
line,  which,  he  saw,  would  when  completecT~compete 
seriously  with  the  companies  owning  submarine  cables 
between  Great  Britain  and  South  Africa.  The  present 
sost  of  telegraphing  from  London  to  Cape  Town  is  4s. 
a,- word.  From  London  to  Egypt  the  cost  varies  from 
Is.  7 d.  to  2s.  3d.  The  charge  per  word  Rhodes  had 
Jecided  upon  for  telegraphing  over  the  whole  length 
of  the  trans  -  African  wire  was  6d.  ;  so  that  there 
would  be  a  net  saving  of  at  least  Is.  3d.  for  every  word 
sent  by  the  new  overland  route.  At  the  present  rate 
of  progress  the  entire  line  from  Cape  Colony  to  Egypt 
should  be  in  working  order  by  the  end  of  1903. 

There  was  rather  a  long  halt  in  the  building  of  the 
railway  after  the  line  had  reached  Bulawayo.  There 
were  other,  and  perhaps  more  pressing,  matters  for 
Rhodes  to  deal  with,  and  he  also  had  to  decide  on  the 
best  method  of  raising  the  large  amount  of  capital 
necessary  for  the  extension  of  the  railway  from  Bula¬ 
wayo  to  the  banks  of  the  Zambesi  river,  which  was  to 
form  the  next  section  of  the  line. 

In  the  early  part  of  1898,  however,  he  found  him¬ 
self  ready  to  move  in  this  matter,  and  accordingly 
sailed  for  Europe  for  the  purpose  of  putting  his 
schemes  on  foot.  His  idea  at  this  time  was  that  the 
Bechuanaland  Railway  Company  should  raise  the 
money  on  loan,  with  a  guarantee  for  the  due  pay- 


302 


THE  TRANS-AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


ment  of  the  interest  of  such  loan  from  the  Britisl 
South  Africa  Company.  With  the  object  of  giving 
additional  security,  and  to  enable  him  to  get  the 
money  on  easier  terms  than  might  otherwise  have 
been  possible,  he  decided  to  ask  the  Imperial  Gov¬ 
ernment  to  give  a  collateral  guarantee.  In  view  oi 
the  immense  benefits  which  the  opening  of  the  line 
would  confer  on  Imperial  interests  in  every  part  oi! 
Africa,  he  anticipated  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  this, 
especially  seeing  that  it  was  in  reality  only  a  for¬ 
mality,  as  the  whole  of  the  funds  of  the  Bechuanaland 
Railway  Company  and  the  British  South  Africa  Com¬ 
pany  would  have  had  to  be  exhausted  before  the 
Imperial  Government  was  called  upon  to  pay  a  single 
penny  in  connection  with  the  matter. 

On  his  arrival  in  England  Mr  Rhodes  inaugurated 
a  correspondence  with  the  Colonial  Office  on  the  sub¬ 
ject  of  this  guarantee,  which  it  is  to  be  regretted  is 
much  too  lengthy  to  be  reproduced  here.  His  first 
letter  on  this  question  was  dated  April  28,  1898,  and 
was  addressed  to  the  Colonial  Office.  He  opened  this 
letter  by  inviting  the  co-operation  of  the  Imperial 
Government  in  the  building  of  the  railway  from  Bul¬ 
awayo  as  far  north  as  Lake  Tanganyika,  and  stated 
that  the  length  of  this  section  was  between  700  and 
800  miles.  No  survey,  he  stated,  had  been  made  of 
the  country  through  which  this  portion  of  the  line 
would  pass,  but  trustworthy  information  had  been 
obtained  concerning  the  conformation  of  the  country 
to  be  crossed,  and  the  engineering  difficulties  which 
would  have  to  be  surmounted.  These  difficulties,  Mr 
Rhodes  added,  would  probably  be  no  greater  than 
those  which  had  been  successfully  dealt  with  on  the 
Mafeking- Bulawayo  section  of  the  line. 


CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  THE  COLONIAL  OFFICE.  303 

In  this  letter  Rhodes  enclosed  a  document  he  had 
-eceived  from  Sir  Gordon  Sprigg,  the  Premier  of  Cape 
Jolony,  which  stated  that  should  Rhodes  be  suc- 
:essful  in  obtaining  the  assistance  and  countenance 
>f  the  Imperial  Government  in  his  railway  schemes, 
he  members  of  the  Cape  Cabinet  would  be  prepared 
o  confer  together  with  a  view  to  submitting  proposals 
,o  the  Cape  Parliament  under  which  that  Govern¬ 
ment  also  might  practically  contribute  towards  the 
:ost  of  the  work  of  extending  the  line.  This  letter 
s  important  if  only  from  the  fact  that  it  demon- 
trated  the  interest  which  the  Government  of  Cape 
Colony  took  in  the  proposed  northern  extension  of 
he  railway,  and  the  benefits  which  they  anticipated 
vould  accrue  to  the  colony  from  the  opening  of  such 
,  line. 

Mr  Rhodes  then  went  on  to  say  that  he  estimated 
he  net  cost  of  the  construction  of  the  line  from 
lulawayo  to  Lake  Tanganyika  at  about  two  millions 
terling.  This  estimate  was  based  on  the  fact  that 
he  average  cost  of  the  existing  portion  of  the  railway 
ad  been  about  £3000  per  mile.  The  letter  continued 
s  follows  : — 

“  I  shall  recommend  the  Bechuanaland  Railway 
Company,  Limited,  to  undertake  the  extension,  and, 
nth  the  sanction  of  her  Majesty’s  Government,  to 
aise  the  necessary  funds  by  further  issues  of  de- 
entures,  which  will  be  secured  upon  the  whole  of 
;s  assets  and  undertakings,  after  provision  has  been 
lade  for  safeguarding  the  rights  of  holders  of  the 
resent  debenture  issue  of  £2,000,000.  Subject  to 
ie  present  debentures,  the  security  offered  will  be 
aat  of  the  whole  line  of  579  miles  from  Vryburg  to 
lulawayo,  of  any  further  extensions,  of  the  subsidies 


304 


THE  TRANS-AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


paid  by  the  Imperial  Government  and  the  Britisl 
South  Africa  Company,  at  present  amounting  t 
£30.000  per  annum,  and  of  blocks  of  valuable  lam 
in  the  Bechuanaland  Protectorate  of  an  aggregat 
area  of  8000  square  miles. 

“  In  the  event  of  my  recommendation  being  adopted 
the  British  South  Africa  Company  is  prepared  t< 
guarantee  the  interest  upon  the  whole  of  the  furthe 
issue  of  debentures  required,  and,  with  a  view  to  th 
creation  of  these  debentures  upon  more  favourabl 
terms  than  would  otherwise  be  possible,  I  wouk 
suggest  that  a  collateral  guarantee  should  be  givei 
by  her  Majesty’s  Government  on  the  basis  of  interes 
either  at  the  rate  of  3^  per  cent  for  a  limited  term  o 
thirty  years,  or  of  2^  per  cent  in  perpetuity.  I  wouk 
further  suggest  that  the  line  should  be  constructei 
in  200-mile  sections  ;  that  the  funds  required  for  eacl 
section  should  be  raised  separately  ;  and  that  it  shouk 
be  open  to  her  Majesty’s  Government  to  refuse  t< 
guarantee  the  interest  upon  the  debentures  to  bi 
issued  for  the  construction  of  any  section  unless  satis 
fied  as  to  the  commercial  prospects  of  the  proposec 
extension,  and  as  to  the  nature  of  the  contracts  to  bi 
entered  into.” 

The  first  of  these  proposed  200-mile  sections  would 
as  Mr  Rhodes  pointed  out,  tap  the  valuable  coalfield: 
which  had  been  discovered  in  the  Bubi,  Mafungubusi 
Sengwe,  and  Sanyati  districts  of  Rhodesia,  and  woulc 
traverse  the  promising  gold  districts  of  Bembesi,  the 
Lower  Sebakwe,  and  the  Lower  Umfuli.  The  seconc 
section  would  pass  through  the  Lo  Maghondi  dis 
trict,  which  is  covered  with  ancient  workings,  anc 
in  which  many  gold -reefs  that  had  been  favourabl} 
reported  upon  by  competent  engineers  had  alreadj 


PROSPECTS  OF  THE  LINE. 


305 


>een  exposed.  Once  the  Zambesi  was  crossed,  the 
ine  would  run  through  an  excellent  cattle  country, 
[ensely  populated  by  natives,  and  would  for  many 
ears  to  come  absorb  the  greater  portion  of  the  trade 
f  the  Upper  Zambesi,  the  Upper  Congo,  and  the 
western  portions  of  German  East  Africa,  in  addition 
o  that  of  Northern  Rhodesia.  Over  a  great  portion 
f  this  vast  area  of  country  it  is  probable,  as  Mr 
Ihodes  was  careful  to  emphasise,  that  an  important 
idustry  in  rubber  and  other  vegetable  products  will 
ie  developed  by  the  time  that  the  railway  is  running 
hrough  that  region. 

These,  then,  were  the  prospects  of  the  line  for  the 
onstruction  of  which  Rhodes  was  seeking  the  Gov- 
rnment  guarantee.  It  must  be  clearly  understood 
hat  he  did  not  ask  the  Imperial  Government  to 
ubscribe  a  solitary  farthing  towards  the  making  of 
his  railway.  It  has  never  been  his  policy  to  appeal 
d  the  home  authorities  for  financial  aid  for  his 
3hemes.  When  he  has  been  unable  to  raise  the 
loney,  or  to  provide  it  out  of  his  own  pocket,  for  the 
jalisation  of  his  gigantic  projects,  he  has  put  the 
latter  on  one  side  until  a  more  favourable  moment 
)r  obtaining  the  funds  he  required  has  presented 
self.  Instead  of  trying  to  draw  upon  the  Imperial 
reasury  for  the  extension  and  consolidation  of  the 
•ritish  Empire  in  South  Africa,  he  has  been  the 
leans,  on  at  least  one  notable  occasion,  of  relieving 

of  a  considerable  burden.  Had  it  not  been  for  the 
anual  subsidy  of  £10,000  which  for  some  years  he 
aid  to  the  Imperial  Government  out  of  the  funds  of 
ie  British  South  Africa  Company  for  the  adminis- 
■ation  of  the  British  Central  African  Protectorate, 
ther  the  taxpayer  at  home  would  have  had  to  find 

u 


306 


THE  TRANS-AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


that  sum,  or  the  small  but  promising  colony  would  havt 
had  to  have  been  abandoned  several  years  ago. 

The  reply  to  this  communication  of  Mr  Rhodes  wai 
forwarded  to  him  by  the  Colonial  Office  on  July  28 
exactly  three  months  after  his  letter  was  written 
which  must  be  considered  fairly  prompt  for  a  Govern 
ment  department.  In  it  Mr  Chamberlain  said  tha 
the  scheme  for  the  establishment  of  such  a  railway  a 
Mr  Rhodes  had  outlined,  tending  as  it  would  t< 
develop  the  territories  of  the  British  South  Afric: 
Company  for  trade  and  commerce  and  ultimately  t( 
render  them  self-supporting,  commended  itself  to  th< 
Government.  Before  the  Government  could  invitt 
Parliament  to  give  it  financial  support,  however,  the} 
desired  to  be  furnished  with  more  definite  informatioi 
on  certain  points.  The  Government  considered  than 
any  proposal  for  assistance  on  their  part  should  for  the 
time  being  be  confined  to  the  first  section  northward.1 
from  Bulawayo,  which  Rhodes  had  roughly  estimate! 
would  cost  £500,000  to  construct. 

Information  was  asked  for  as  to  the  data  on  whicl 
Rhodes  had  calculated  that  the  district  through  whicl 
this  portion  of  the  line  would  pass  would  yield  s 
sufficient  amount  of  traffic  to  justify  the  extensior 
of  the  line.  It  was  also,  and  very  properly,  deemec 
essential  by  the  Government  that  an  adequate  surve} 
of  this  section  of  the  line  should  be  made  on  which  a 
trustworthy  and  fairly  accurate  estimate  of  the  cost  oi 
its  construction  could  be  based. 

Mr  Chamberlain  said  that  in  return  for  the  support 
of  the  Imperial  Government  it  would  be  expected  that 
favourable  terms  for  the  transport  of  mails,  troops. 
Government  officials  and  stores  would  be  granted,  as 
was  the  case  with  the  portion  of  the  line  then  being 


THE  COLONIAL  OFFICE’S  ANSWER. 


307 


worked,  and  in  the  event  of  the  extension  becoming  a 
source  of  additional  profit  to  the  railway  company  the 
Government  would  want  a  reasonable  share  of  those 
profits.  Finally,  Mr  Chamberlain  stated  that  he 
attached  great  importance  to  substantial  co-operation 
an  the  part  of  the  Cape  Government  being  forthcoming, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  railways  of  the  colony 
would  be  largely  benefited  by  the  success  of  Mr  Rhodes’ 
scheme,  and  he  therefore  considered  that  evidence  of 
such  co-operation  should  be  a  first  condition  of  any 
assistance  to  be  rendered  by  the  Imperial  Government. 

With  this  letter  the  first  stage  of  the  negotiations 
between  Rhodes  and  the  Imperial  Government  came 
bo  an  end,  and  so  far  all  seemed  plain  sailing.  The 
lint,  however,  that  the  Imperial  Government  would 
sxpect  some  share  of  the  profits,  in  the  event  of  the 
ine  proving  a  financial  success,  did  not  commend 
tself  to  Rhodes  very  strongly  ;  but  as  this  was  a 
natter  which  he  considered  it  would  be  possible  to 
settle  with  the  Government  in  an  amicable  manner, 
md  one  which  should  be  satisfactory  to  both  sides 
dike,  he  did  not  let  it  worry  him  much.  Shortly 
ifter  the  receipt  of  this  letter  he  returned  again  to 
:he  Cape. 

He  was  back  in  England  very  early  in  the  follow- 
ng  year,  and  at  once  reopened  the  subject  by  a  letter 
lated  January  17,  1899.  He  had  employed  the  in¬ 
terval  to  obtain  as  full  and  complete  information  on  the 
joints  raised  in  the  letter  from  the  Colonial  Office 
is  was  possible.  He  had  despatched  Sir  Charles 
Metcalfe,  the  consulting  engineer  of  the  British 
South  Africa  Company,  to  inspect  the  proposed  route 
)f  the  line  from  Bulawayo  as  far  north  as  the  Zambesi, 
md  he  enclosed  the  report  of  this  gentleman  for  the 


308 


THE  TRANS-AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


information  of  the  Government.  Sir  Charles  Metcalfe 
considered  it  desirable  that  the  first  section  north¬ 
wards  from  Bulawayo  should  be  extended  from  200 
to  250  miles,  so  as  to  permit  its  tapping  the  extensive 
coal  deposits  in  the  Mafungubusi  district. 

In  addition  to  this  inspection  of  the  route,  Sir 
Charles  Metcalfe  had  made  a  detailed  survey  for  the 
line  from  Bulawayo  to  Gwelo,  a  distance  of  110  miles, 
and  this  survey  was  then  being  pushed  forward 
beyond  Gwelo.  The  engineer  had  satisfied  himself 
that  no  special  engineering  difficulties  would  be  en¬ 
countered,  and  estimated  that  the  average  cost  of 
construction  per  mile  would  not  exceed  £3500. 
According  to  this  estimate  the  total  cost  of  the 
construction  of  the  whole  250-mile  section  would  be 
£875,000,  but  for  the  sake  of  leaving  a  margin  for 
contingencies  Mr  Rhodes  took  it  at  £900,000. 

To  raise  this  sum  Rhodes  proposed  an  issue  at 
par  of  debentures  redeemable  at  par,  bearing  interest 
at  per  cent ;  that  the  interest  on  the  debentures, 
together  with  a  further  1  per  cent,  in  order  to  provide 
a  sinking  fund,  should  be  guaranteed  by  the  British 
South  Africa  Company  for  a  period  of  5  Of  years  ; 
and  that,  in  addition,  a  guarantee  of  3^  per  cent, 
required  for  interest  and  sinking  fund,  should  be  given 
by  the  Imperial  Government.  Under  this  proposal 
the  whole  of  the  debenture  issue  would  be  redeemed 
by  the  operation  of  the  sinking  fund  within  the  period 
he  had  named. 

As  he  had  stated  in  his  first  letter,  the  security 
offered  to  holders  of  the  proposed  debentures  would  be 
a  charge  upon  the  whole  of  the  assets  and  under¬ 
takings  of  the  Bechuanaland  Railway  Company,  after 
the  rights  of  holders  of  the  existing  debentures  issue 


A  CONVERSION  SCHEME. 


309 


of  £2,000,000  had  been  safeguarded.  Subject  to  the 
existing  debentures,  therefore,  the  security  offered 
would  be — (a)  that  of  the  whole  line  of  587  miles  from 
Vryburg  to  Bulawayo ;  ( b )  of  the  new  section  of  250 
miles  ;  (c)  of  the  subsidies  paid  by  the  Imperial  Govern¬ 
ment  and  the  British  South  Africa  Company,  which 
then  amounted  to  £30,000  per  annum  ;  and  ( d )  of 
blocks  of  valuable  land  in  Cape  Colony  of  an  aggregate 
area  of  approximately  8000  square  miles. 

In  case  the  proposal  outlined  above  did  not  meet 
with  the  approval  of  the  Government,  Mr  Rhodes 
submitted  the  following  alternative  proposal  :  That 
the  option  of  the  Bechuanaland  Railway  Company  to 
redeem  the  whole  of  its  existing  issue  of  £2,000,000 
of  5  per  cent  debentures  at  £105  per  cent  should 
be  exercised  ;  that  a  fresh  issue  of  £3,000,000  deben¬ 
tures,  bearing  interest  at  the  rate  of  2|-  per  cent,  should 
be  made.  If  this  were  done  it  would  provide  for  (l) 
the  £900,000  required  for  the  construction  of  the  new 
section  of  the  line,  and  (2)  the  £2,100,000  required 
for  the  redemption  of  the  existing  £2,000,000  deben¬ 
ture  issue  at  a  premium  of  £5  per  cent.  Mr  Rhodes 
further  went  on  to  suggest  that  a  guarantee  of  interest 
at  the  rate  of  2^  per  cent  and  of  the  1 -per-cent 
sinking  fund  should  be  given  by  the  British  South 
Africa  Company  for  a  period  of  5  Of  years  upon  the 
whole  £3,000,000  issue  of  debentures,  and  sinking 
fund  to  the  same  amount  should  be  given  by  the 
Imperial  Government. 

Under  this  conversion  scheme  the  security  offered 
to  the  holders  of  the  new  debentures  issue  would  be 
identical  with  that  already  described,  but  there  would 
only  be  one  class  of  debentures  instead  of  two.  Con¬ 
sequently,  all  holders  of  debentures  would  be  equally 


310 


THE  TRANS-AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


secured.  As  in  the  first  scheme,  the  whole  of  the 
proposed  issue  of  debentures  would  be  redeemed  by 
the  operation  of  the  sinking  fund  within  the  period 
named,  5 Of  years.  Power  could  be  taken  in  the 
debenture  trust-deed,  Mr  Rhodes  pointed  out,  to 
make  as  required,  with  the  approval  of  the  Imperial 
Government,  further  issues  of  debentures  ranking 
equally  with  the  issue  then  proposed  to  be  made. 

Of  the  two  schemes,  Mr  Rhodes  considered  that  the 
second  was  the  preferable,  for  from  a  financial  point  of 
view  it  was  undesirable,  in  his  opinion,  that  there 
should  be  different  classes  of  debentures.  His  prin¬ 
cipal  reason,  however,  for  commending  it  to  the 
favourable  consideration  of  the  Government  was 
that  a  large  annual  saving  could  be  effected  by  its 
adoption.  As  the  matter  then  stood,  the  annual 
liability  of  the  Bechuanaland  Railway  Company  for 
interest  at  the  rate  of  5  per  cent  on  its  £2,000,000 
issue  of  debentures  was  £100,000.  Under  the  con¬ 
version  scheme  the  annual  liability  for  interest  at  2^ 
per  cent  on  the  whole  £3,000,000  required  would  be 
only  £75,000,  or  a  clear  saving  to  the  railway  com¬ 
pany,  through  the  use  of  the  Imperial  credit,  of 
£25,000  per  annum,  with  an  addition  of  250  miles  of 
new  line  to  its  system. 

With  regard  to  the  stipulation  of  the  Colonial 
Secretary  that  the  Cape  Government  should  co¬ 
operate  in  the  construction  of  the  new  line,  Mr 
Rhodes  was  able  to  state  that  the  Cape  authorities 
had  expressed  their  willingness  not  to  charge  more 
for  the  carriage  of  the  materials  required  for  the  con¬ 
struction  of  the  line  than  the  actual  cost. 

On  the  receipt  of  this  letter  Mr  Rhodes  was  in¬ 
formed  unofficially  by  the  Colonial  Office  that  there 


ALTERNATIVE  PROPOSALS. 


311 


seemed  to  be  certain  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the 
Government  accepting  either  of  the  two  proposals  he 
had  submitted,  and  therefore  on  March  27  he  wrote 
another  letter  to  the  Colonial  Office  submitting  a 
third  suggestion. 

This  was  as  follows  :  That  the  Bechuanaland  Rail¬ 
way  Company’s  existing  debenture  issue  of  £2,000,000, 
bearing  interest  at  the  rate  of  5  per  cent  per  annum, 
should  be  paid  off;  that  a  new  issue,  at  par,  of  deben¬ 
tures  to  the  same  amount,  redeemable  at  par,  bearing 
interest  at  the  rate  of  2^  per  cent  per  annum,  should 
be  made  upon  the  same  security  ;  and  that  in  lieu  of 
a  guarantee  of  interest  upon  the  capital  to  be  raised 
for  the  extension,  the  Imperial  Government  should 
guarantee  the  interest  upon  that  amount,  and,  in 
addition,  a  sinking  fund  charge  at  the  rate  of  £  per 
cent.  The  total  liability  to  be  undertaken  under  this 
scheme  would  thus  be  3  per  cent  on  £2,000,000,  or 
£60,000  per  annum. 

If  these  conditions  were  accepted  by  the  Govern¬ 
ment,  the  British  South  Africa  Company  was  pre¬ 
pared  to  give  a  similar  guarantee  of  interest  and 
sinking  fund  charge,  to  which  the  guarantee  which 
he  proposed  should  be  given  by  the  Imperial  Govern¬ 
ment  would  be  additional.  The  Chartered  Company 
was  further  prepared,  in  the  event  of  the  proposal 
being  adopted,  to  deposit,  for  a  term  of  years  to  be 
mutually  agreed  upon,  the  sum  of  £300,000  in  Consols 
as  an  insurance  against  any  possible  shortfall  in  the 
receipts  of  the  line. 

If  this  proposal  were  accepted,  Mr  Rhodes  was  pre¬ 
pared  to  undertake  on  behalf  of  the  Bechuanaland 
Railway  Company — of  which  he  was,  of  course,  the 
moving  spirit — to  construct  immediately,  at  its  own 


312 


THE  TRANS-AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


risk  and  without  asking  for  any  further  guarantee  i: 
connection  with  the  undertaking,  the  first  section  c 
the  line  from  Bulawayo  to  the  north  at  an  approxi 
mate  cost  of  £875,000,  the  total  length  of  this  sectioi 
to  be  at  least  200  miles. 

The  reply  of  the  Colonial  Office  to  these  two  letter 
of  Rhodes  was  contained  in  a  letter  dated  May  1 
After  recapitulating  the  terms  of  the  three  proposal 
he  had  submitted,  the  letter  went  on  to  say  that  th( 
Imperial  Government  was  not  able  to  accept  any  om 
of  them. 

The  main  reasons  for  this  were  set  out  as  follows 
In  the  first  place,  the  Imperial  Government  considerec 
that,  while  they  would  incur  a  certain  risk,  no  ade¬ 
quate  financial  advantage  would  accrue  to  them  undei 
any  of  the  proposals.  The  line  of  railway,  it  was 
pointed  out,  which  was  the  subject  of  the  proposed 
guarantee  in  each  case  would  in  the  end  belong  ex¬ 
clusively  to  the  original  shareholders  of  the  Bechu- 
analand  Railway  Company,  who  subscribed  an  original 
capital  of  £6000.  In  the  second  place,  there  was  no 
provision  that  the  Cape  Government  should  partici¬ 
pate  in  the  guarantee,  though  that  Government 
was  greatly  interested  in  the  matter,  looking  to  the 
direct  practical  advantages  which  may  be  expected 
to  accrue  to  the  colony  from  the  traffic  which  would 
flow  between  the  north  and  the  sea  over  its  railway 
system. 

In  place  of  the  three  proposals  Mr  Rhodes  had  laid 
before  the  Government,  Mr  Chamberlain  now  suggested 
one  on  behalf  of  the  Government  for  Mr  Rhodes’  ac¬ 
ceptance.  This  was  couched  as  follows  : — 

1.  The  Imperial  Government  to  lend  to  the  Bechu- 
analand  Railway  Company  £2,100,000  for  the  redemp- 


MR  CHAMBERLAIN’S  PROPOSAL. 


313 


tion,  at  a  premium  of  5  per  cent,  of  the  existing  issue 
of  £2,000,000  5  per  cent  debentures. 

2.  Interest  to  be  fixed  at  2f  per  cent  and  sinking 
fund  at  f  per  cent. 

3.  Interest  and  sinking  fund  to  be  a  first  charge  on 
the  profits  of  the  existing  railway  from  Yryburg  to 
Bulawayo,  such  profits  including  net  earnings  and  the 
subsidies  receivable  from  the  Protectorate  Government 
and  the  British  South  Africa  Company. 

4.  No  guarantee  would  be  required  from  the  British 
South  Africa  Company. 

5.  This  arrangement  to  be  conditional  on  a  guar¬ 
antee  by  the  Cape  Government  to  pay,  for  the  period 
of  the  currency  of  the  loan,  one-third  of  any  deficiency 
which  might  at  any  time  exist  in  the  annual  payment 
of  interest  and  sinking  fund. 

6.  The  ordinary  shareholders  of  the  Bechuanaland 
Railway  Company  to  contract  that  at  the  expiry  of 
the  period  of  repayment,  the  railway  from  Vryburg  to 
Bulawayo  should  become  the  joint-property  of  the  Im¬ 
perial  Government  and  the  Cape  Government  on  pay¬ 
ment  to  the  shareholders  of  the  sum  of  £100,000  by 
she  respective  Governments. 

Rhodes’  answer  to  this  extraordinary  proposal  was 
pery  prompt,  being  dated  May  9,  and  was,  as  was  only 
so  be  expected,  a  polite,  but  none  the  less  firm,  refusal 
)f  the  Government’s  offer.  The  paragraph  of  his  letter 
showing  his  reasons  for  this  was  as  follows  : — 

“  In  regard  to  the  provisional  counter-proposal  which 
s  set  forth  in  your  letter  under  reply,  I  am  in  a 
sosition  to  state  that  the  directors  of  the  British 
3outh  Africa  Company,  whilst  recognising  that  in 
she  event  of  the  federation  the  railway  might  ulti¬ 
mately  be  vested  in  the  Federal  Government  of  South 


314 


THE  TRANS- AFRICAN  RAILWAY  SCHEME. 


Africa,  and  whilst  prepared  to  agree  that,  in  case 
federation  should  not  be  established,  the  reversior 
of  the  line  might  belong,  on  certain  conditions,  tc 
her  Majesty’s  Government  and  Rhodesia,  are  noi 
disposed  to  accept  the  substitution  of  the  Cape 
Colony  for  Rhodesia  as  the  ultimate  part-owner  oi 
the  line.  They  also  think  that,  in  view  of  the  present 
position  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company,  its 
guarantee  should  be  ample,  and  that  there  is  nc 
necessity  to  ask  for  a  partial  guarantee  from  the 
Cape  Colony.  The  company  has  now  in  hand  foi 
administrative  and  other  purposes  a  sum  of  £2,000,000. 
It  has  also  raised  during  the  last  month  for  railway 
development  a  further  sum  of  £3,000,000,  and,  in 
addition,  the  money  for  the  extension  of  the  line 
to  Tanganyika  is  also  now  practically  assured.  In¬ 
dependently  of  the  company  the  sum  of  about 
£2,000,000  has  been  raised  lately  by  various,  mining 
companies  for  expenditure  in  Rhodesia,  affording1 
striking  proof  of  the  confidence  of  investors  in  its 
future. 

“  I  think  that,  with  these  facts  before  them,  the 
guarantee  of  the  British  South  Africa  Company  should 
have  been  considered  ample  by  her  Majesty’s  Govern¬ 
ment  without  resort  to  the  Cape  Colony.  I  do  not) 
think  that  Rhodesia  should  place  itself  under  an  obli¬ 
gation  to  the  Cape  Colony  by  asking  for  a  guarantee, 
with  the  risk  of  a  refusal,  which  would  place  it  and 
her  Majesty’s  Government  in  an  absolutely  false  posi¬ 
tion.  Further,  I  am  convinced  that  the  participation 
of  the  Cape  Colony  in  the  undertaking  would  lead  to 
many  complications  in  the  future,  should  federation 
of  the  various  states  of  South  Africa  not  be  accom¬ 
plished.  The  future  is  at  present  uncertain,  and  it 


NEGOTIATIONS  ENDED. 


315 


must  be  remembered  that  the  question  of  the  des¬ 
tination  of  the  railway  would  only  arise  after  sixty 
years,  when  the  sinking  fund  would  have  redeemed 
the  loan. 

“  I  am  further  in  a  position  to  state  that  the 
financial  objections  to  the  scheme,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  Bechuanaland  Railway  Company,  Limited, 
are  also  vital.  The  board  of  that  company  points 
out  that,  under  clause  8  of  the  proposal,  all  the 
profits  of  the  line  are  to  be  devoted  to  its  extension 
or  improvement ;  that  for  sixty  years  the  shareholders 
are  to  get  no  profits ;  and  that  after  that  time  the 
whole  of  their  rights  are  to  be  purchased  for  £100,000. 
As  shares  representing  one-third  of  the  share  capital 
are  in  the  hands  of  independent  shareholders,  at  a 
present  market  value  of  £120,000,  they  are  unable  to 
understand  on  what  grounds  her  Majesty’s  Govern¬ 
ment  expect  the  shareholders  to  consent  to  hand  over 
their  whole  property  after  sixty  years  for  £100,000, 
and  to  receive  no  profits  in  the  mean  time.” 

There  the  negotiations  ended  :  Rhodes  had  flung 
the  grasping  proposal  of  the  Government  in  their 
teeth,  and  set  about  devising  some  other  way  of 
raising  the  necessary  capital  for  the  extension  of  his 
railway  to  the  north  without  the  assistance  of  the 
Imperial  Government.  To  quote  his  own  expression 
in  a  moment  of  not  altogether  inexcusable  petulance, 
“  Chamberlain  wanted  the  earth,  and  he  couldn’t 
have  it.” 

How  he  successfully  raised  the  money  he  needed 
remains  to  be  told  in  the  succeeding  chapter. 


316 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

BEFORE  THE  WAR. 

While  the  negotiations  with  the  Imperial  Govern¬ 
ment  which  were  dealt  with  in  the  previous  chapter 
were  going  forward,  Rhodes  found  time  to  carry  out 
his  long-cherished  project  of  visiting  Germany  and 
Belgium. -y^The  object  of  this  Continental  visit  was 
very  intimately  connected  with  the  future  of  his 
trans- African  railway  and  telegraph  schemes.  .  As  we 
have  seen,  the  junction  of  German  East  Africa  and 
the  Congo  Free  State  immediately  to  the  north  of 
Lake  Tanganyika  effectively  disposed  of  the  dream 
of  an  “all-red”  railway  across  Africa  ;  and  for  Rhodes 
to  join  up  his  railway  and  telegraph  systems  with 
those  of  Egypt,  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  traverse 
either  German  or  Congo  Free  State  territory.  Which 
was  it  to  be  ?  This  was  the  question  which  his  visit 
to  the  Court  of  Berlin  was  to  answer. 

He  tried  Germany  first,  because  those  who  had 
explored  the  land  between  Lake  Tanganyika  and 
Uganda  told  him  that  rather  a  better  country  was 
to  be  found  on  the  German  side  of  the  frontier.  His 
meeting  with  the  Emperor  William  II.  was  interesting 
in  the  extreme,  for  in  many  respects  they  are  the  two 
most  striking  personalities  of  their  times.  The  two 


THE  GERMAN  EMPEROR  AND  MR  RHODES.  317 


personages,  the  Kaiser  and  Mr  Rhodes,  who  have 
much  that  is  akin  in  their  natures,  were  mutually- 
attracted,  and  had  several  long  and  quite  unofficial 
discussions.  Mr  Rhodes  was  enthusiastic  in  his 
admiration  of  the  Emperor,  and  has  set  his  impres¬ 
sions  of  him  on  record.  “  No  wonder,”  he  said  to 
ane  of  his  friends  when  he  returned  from  one  of  his 
visits  to  the  royal  palace — “no  wonder  that  the 
Emperor  makes  a  success  of  his  life  when  he  gives 
limself  up  so  entirely  to  the  task  before  him.”  The 
business  capacity  of  William  II.,  and  his  grasp  of  a 
subject  down  to  its  minutest  details,  made  a  great 
mpression  on  Mr  Rhodes,  and  he  was  somewhat 
surprised  to  find  the  Emperor  manifesting  a  great 
idmiration  for  Great  Britain  and  for  all  things 
British. 

The  longest  interview  between  the  two  ambitious 
onpire-builders  lasted  for  forty  minutes,  and  at  the  end 
•f  that  time  Rhodes  returned  to  his  friends  radiant 
nth  delight.  “  Yes,”  he  said,  “  the  Emperor  has  been 
aost  kind  to  me  ;  he  has  treated  me  very  well  indeed, 
am  very  glad  I  came  to  Berlin,”  he  continued,  “  and 
shall  go  away  more  than  satisfied  with  what  I  have 
lanaged  to  accomplish.”  For  some  time,  however,  he 
muld  go  no  further  than  this,  and  refused  to  reveal 
o  his  friends  what  he  had  actually  achieved,  win  the 
nd,  however,  it  appeared  that  Rhodes  had,  with  his 
sual  directness  of  speech  and  with  his  dislike  for 
sing  two  words  where  one  would  do,  stated  clearly 
ffiat  he  hoped  to  obtain  from  Germany,  and  that  the 
iaiser,  who  had  been  equally  direct  in  stating  that 
lermany  would  assent  to  the  railway  and  the  tele- 
raph  lines  passing  through  its  colonies,  pointed  out 
aat  in  return  for  doing  so  his  Government  would 


318 


BEFORE  THE  WAR. 


require  a  substantial  quid  pro  quo,  and  would 
demand  a  large  share  in  the  profits  which  accrued 
from  the  section  of  the  lines  which  passed  ovei 
German  soil. 

Mr  Rhodes  saw  the  reasonableness  of  this  demand 
and  assented  to  it,  as  he  was,  of  course,  bound  to  do 
it  was  the  price  he  had  to  pay  for  the  short-sighted¬ 
ness  of  the  British  Ministry  some  years  previously  in1 
neglecting  to  keep  a  route  to  the  north  open  between 
the  lakes  and  Uganda.  He  told  his  Majesty  that  his 
idea  with  regard  to  the  portion  of  the  telegraph-wire 
and  railway  line  which  was  to  pass  through  German! 
East  Africa  was  that  it  should  be  subordinate  tc 
German  supervision  and  German  industry,  a  proviso 
that  did  not  at  all  prove  to  the  liking  of  some  of  Mi 
Rhodes’  ardent  British  supporters.  They  were  not 
very  pleased  at  the  project  of  a  portion  of  the  line  to 
be  built  with  British  money  being  practically  under 
the  domination  of  German  officials,  which  was  to  be, 
as  they  put  it,  “  used  for  exploiting  German  industry 
at  the  expense  of  the  British.”  This  was  rather  an 
extreme  view  to  take  of  the  situation,  but  there  were 
certainly  some  grounds  for  the  assumption. 

When  Mr  Rhodes  quitted  Berlin  he  visited  AmsterJ 
dam  and  The  Hague.  The  British  public,  and  more 
particularly,  perhaps,  the  British  press,  were  very 
curious  to  know  the  reason  for  this  extension  of  Mr 
Rhodes’  Continental  tour.  That  is  the  worst  of  being 
an  important  personage.  It  is  impossible  to  do  the 
smallest  and  most  trivial  action  without  half  the  world 
speculating  as  to  the  ulterior  motive  for  it.  When  a 
more  than  usually  pushing  journalist  sought  to  draw 
Mr  Rhodes  as  to  his  reason  for  his  visit  to  Holland, 
that  gentleman  assumed  his  blandest  smile,  said 


THE  GERMAN  GOVERNMENT’S  BARGAIN. 


319 


pleasantly,  “  Why  I  am  going  to  The  Hague  ?  I  will 
ell  you — to  look  at  the  pictures  there !  Good-day,” 
md  with  a  bow  and  another  smile  left  the  journalist 
mazing  helplessly  after  him. 

On  his  return  to  England  Rhodes  immediately 
■esumed  his  negotiations  for  the  granting  of  a  Govern- 
nent  guarantee  for  the  construction  of  the  line,  with 
he  result  that  was  described  in  the  last  chapter.  On 
lis  return  it  was  assumed,  and  Mr  Rhodes’  words 
eemed  to  justify  this  assumption,  that  he  had 
lefinitely  arranged  with  the  German  Government  to 
:arry  both  the  railway  and  the  telegraph  through  the 
olony  of  German  East  Africa.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
,s  after-events  demonstrated,  this  was  not  the  case. 
/Vhat  was  really  decided  upon  was  that  the  telegraph 
ine  should  pass  through  German  territory,  the  price 
o  be  paid  being  that  at  the  end  of  forty  years  from 
he  date  of  opening  the  line  should  become  German 
iroperty,  and  Germany  would  thereafter  maintain  the 
ine.  At  the  same  time  there  could  be  no  alteration 
a  the  rates  for  through  messages.  “  It  was  a  most 
ast  bargain,”  said  Mr  Rhodes,  “on  the  part  of  the 
lerman  Government,  because  the  conduct  of  Europe 
5  to  levy  blackmail  in  connection  with  every  telegraph 
Rich  passes  through  it.”  This  may  be  so;  but  to 
be  shareholders  in  the  Trans- African  Telegraph  Com- 
any  the  price  seemed  a  very  heavy  one  to  pay  for 
ermission  to  carry  their  line  through  what  is  prac- 
ically  a  deserted  country,  far  removed  from  the  pale 
f  white  civilisation. 

As  regards  the  railway,  this  matter  was  left  in 
beyance ;  but  Mr  Rhodes  was  certainly  of  the 
pinion  at  this  time  that  it  would  follow  the  tele- 
raph-wire  through  German  East  Africa,  and  there  is 


320 


BEFORE  THE  WAR. 


small  doubt  that  the  German  Emperor  and  his 
Government  would  have  placed  very  little  difficulty 
in  the  way  of  this  being  done.  Subsequent  events, 
however,  have  caused  Mr  Rhodes  to  change  his  plans 
in  this  direction.  With  the  discovery  of  the  valuable 
Wankie  coalfields  which  lie  to  the  north-west  ol 
Bulawayo,  which  promise  to  become  a  very  valuable 
acquisition  so  soon  as  the  advent  of  a  railway  permits 
of  their  being  developed,  Rhodes  decided  to  divert  his 
trans-continental  line  more  to  the  west,  so  as  to  pass 
through  this  field,  and  therefore  at  the  time  of  writing 
the  chances  are  in  favour  of  the  line  reaching  Uganda 
and  Egypt  by  way  of  the  Congo  Free  State,  though 
the  terms  for  the  building  of  this  section  of  the  line 
have  yet  to  be  settled. 

On  his  return  to  London  Mr  Rhodes  met  Lord 
Kitchener  of  Khartoum,  then  Sirdar  of  the  Egyp¬ 
tian  army,  whose  acquaintance  he  had  made  when 
visiting  Egypt  at  the  beginning  of  1899  to  ar¬ 
range  with  the  Egyptian  Government  the  details 
of  the  trans  -  African  telegraph-wire,  the  tariff  for 
messages,  and  other  matters.  There  had  long  been 
a  sympathy  between  these  two,  and  when  Lord 
Kitchener  found  that  he  was  short  of  railway  engines 
to  enable  him  to  push  forward  his  campaign  against 
the  Khalifa,  Rhodes  promptly  supplied  the  de¬ 
ficiency  from  the  rolling-stock  he  had  bought  for  the 
Rhodesian  lines.  In  London  the  two  men  who 
at  the  opposite  ends  of  the  African  continent  have 
done  so  much  for  the  British  Empire  spent  much 
of  their  time  together,  and  were  to  be  seen  nearly 
every  morning  riding  side  by  side  in  the  Row.  It  was 
during  this  visit  to  England  that  the  University  ol 
Oxford  presented  Mr  Rhodes  with  the  honorary  degree 


A  STEP  FORWARD. 


321 


if  D.C.L.  under  the  circumstances  described  in  the 
arly  part  of  this  book. 

How  Rhodes  raised  the  money  for  building  the  next 
ection  of  his  railway  line  to  the  north,  on  the  refusal 
f  the  Imperial  Government  to  give  him  the  guarantee 
ie  had  asked  for  (save  on  such  terms  as  absolutely 
revented  him  from  accepting  it),  now  remains  to  be 
old.  Despite  this  refusal  of  the  Government,  Rhodes 
/as  as  determined  as  ever  to  push  on  with  the  con¬ 
traction  of  the  line,  though  of  course  he  would  have 
o  proceed  more  slowly  than  would  have  been  the  case 
’  he  had  had  the  guarantee  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
lent  to  assist  him.  The  first  step  he  took  towards 
rising  the  necessary  capital  for  carrying  the  line 
orthwards  from  Bulawayo  was  to  approach  each  of 
tie  Rhodesian  mining  and  land  companies  which 
wned  property  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  route  to 
e  taken,  and  to  invite  them  to  take  up  debentures  in 
le  railway.  The  reply  to  this  was  eminently  satis- 
ictory,  nearly  half  a  million  sterling  being  subscribed 
imost  immediately.  This  was  sufficient,  on  Mr 
bodes’  estimate,  to  carry  the  line  forward  for  a 
istance  of  150  miles.  This  left  about  750  miles  of 
rnntry  to  be  crossed  before  the  northern  border  of 
hodesia  was  reached.  What  Rhodes  described  as 
flying  surveys  ”  of  the  country  between  Gwelo  and 
ake  Tanganyika  had  been  taken,  and  it  was  esti- 
ated  that  the  cost  of  building  this  750-mile  section 
ould  be  about  £3,000,000. 

The  manner  in  which  Rhodes  proposed  to  raise  this 
oney  was  as  follows :  The  Bechuanaland  Railway 
ampany  was  to  obtain  the  money  by  the  issue  of  4 
;r  cent  debentures,  the  interest  to  be  guaranteed 
r  the  British  South  Africa  Company.  As,  however, 

x 


322 


BEFORE  THE  WAR. 


the  line  would  only  be  built  at  the  rate  of  200  milei 
a-year  at  the  very  utmost,  this  sum  was  not  requim 
for  four  or  five  years.  Instead,  therefore,  of  issuing 
this  sum  all  at  once,  and  then  having  to  let  th< 
greater  part  of  it  lie  idle  for  some  years  in  the  vault; 
of  the  Bank  of  England,  he  proposed  to  issue  £600, 00( 
of  debentures  annually  for  five  years.  In  order  t< 
illustrate  the  procedure  he  proposed  to  adopt  witl 
regard  to  these  debentures,  Mr  Rhodes  took  the  cast 
of  a  person  who  bought  £100  of  these  debentures 
He  would  pay  £20  down,  and  on  this  he  would  receivi 
4  per  cent  interest.  The  balance  of  his  paymen 
would  be  divided  into  four  equal  instalments  sprea< 
over  a  period  of  five  years. 

This  is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  notable  financia 
schemes  Mr  Rhodes  has  ever  inaugurated,  and  serve; 
to  illustrate  his  methods  of  grappling  with  a  difficul 
problem.  It  is  idle  to  pretend  that  Mr  Rhodes  couk 
ever  become  a  great  financier,  like  the  various  mem 
bers  of  the  Rothschild  family,  or  Mr  Alfred  Beit :  hi 
is  too  impetuous  and  impatient  for  that.  The  onh 
method  of  dealing  with  a  problem  which  finds  favou: 
in  his  eyes  is  to  carve  a  path  straight  through  it 
“  Cutting  the  Gordian  knot  ”  has  become  quite  a  hobR 
of  Mr  Rhodes  in  late  years  ;  and  while  this  direc 
policy  may  not  always  be  justified  by  events,  it  cer 
tainly  is  by  far  the  most  interesting  policy  from  th< 
point  of  view  of  the  onlooker. 

He  is  quite  incapable  of  appreciating  the  niceties 
and  subtleties  of  the  delicate  point  in  finance.  Hi 
wants  a  certain  sum  of  money.  Good.  How  can  hi 
best  raise  it  ?  That  is  how  he  puts  the  problem,  and 
brushing  all  questions  of  detail  on  one  side,  he  pro 
ceeds  to  map  out  as  tersely  as  possible  the  best  mean 


MR  RHODES  AND  THE  CRISIS. 


323 


if  raising  it.  There  is  nothing,  however,  about  his 
inance  that  can  be  called  clumsy.  He  has  an  in- 
tinctive  grasp  of  figures,  and  can  manipulate  and 
wist  them  about  until  he  has  obtained  all  that  he 
equires  with  a  skill  that  is  really  quite  surprising, 
lut  Cecil  Rhodes  is  essentially  a  man  of  action,  and 
rould  never  under  any  circumstances  have  become  a 
nancier  pure  and  simple.  Had  he  not  taken  up  the 
ttractive  career  of  an  empire-builder,  he  would  in  all 
robability  have  become  an  explorer  or  a  soldier. 

Having  raised  the  money  he  needed  for  the  build- 
lg  of  a  further  150  miles  of  his  railway  to  the  north, 
nd  arranged  for  raising  the  capital  to  continue  the 
ne  as  far  as  Lake  Tanganyika,  he  returned  to  Africa 
1  July  to  set  on  foot  the  plans  he  had  matured. 

When  he  arrived  at  Cape  Town  he  found  that  the 
3nsion  which  had  for  long  been  springing  up  between 
5e  Imperial  Government  and  the  South  African  Re- 
ublic  had  greatly  increased,  and  that  the  spectre  of 
rar  was  already  hovering  over  South  Africa.  With 
dmirable  tact  and  forethought  he  studiously  held 
imself  aloof  from  the  negotiations  which  were  pro- 
jeding  between  Mr  Chamberlain  and  President 
huger.  He  pithily  explained  his  reason  for  doing 
) :  “  I  made  a  mistake  with  regard  to  the  Trans- 
aal  once,”  he  said,  “  and  that  is  quite  enough  for  me. 

,  burnt  child  dreads  the  fire.  I  keep  aloof  from  the 
hole  Transvaal  crisis,  so  that  no  one  will  be  able  to 
ly,  if  things  go  wrong,  ‘  That  Rhodes  is  in  it  again  ! 
Like  most  other  people  who  were  following  events 
i  the  Transvaal  at  all  closely  at  this  time,  Mr  Rhodes 
id  not  believe  that  it  would  come  to  war  between 
reat  Britain  and  the  Transvaal  before  the  year  was 
it.  On  the  contrary,  all  his  public  and  private 


324 


BEFORE  THE  WAR. 


utterances  during  the  summer  of  1899  showed  tha 
he  believed  that  President  Kruger  was  once  mor 
playing  a  game  of  “  bluff,”  and  that  so  soon  as  th 
Transvaal  President  was  convinced  that  the  Imperia 
Government  was  resolute  in  the  attitude  it  had  take] 
up  with  regard  to  the  redress  of  the  many  grievance 
under  which  the  Uitlanders  of  Johannesburg  am 
district  suffered,  he  would  “  climb  down  ”  and  agre> 
to  the  terms  proposed. 

On  his  arrival  at  Cape  Town  on  July  18  Mr  Rhode, 
received  an  unprecedented  welcome  from  the  towns 
people,  who  recognised  in  him  the  natural  leader  o 
the  party  of  Reform  and  Progress  in  South  Afric; 
against  the  forces  of  retrogression  and  conservatisn 
which  were  then  rampant  in  the  sub-continent.  H( 
remained  a  short  time  only  in  Cape  Town,  and  pro 
ceeded  almost  immediately  to  his  home  in  the  suburbs 
Wherever  he  halted  en  route  to  Groot  Schuur,  th( 
same  enthusiastic  welcome  awaited  him.  The  histor) 
of  his  triumphal  progress  through  the  colony  aftei 
the  Jameson  Raid  was  repeated,  but  on  a  somewhai 
greater  scale.  At  the  little  town  of  Mowbray,  foi 
instance,  the  populace  took  the  horses  from  his  car¬ 
riage  and  drew  him  in  triumph  to  the  drill  hall,  when 
he  was  forced  to  deliver  a  speech.  This  was  the  first 
occasion  on  which  he  had  spoken  during  the  time 
that  the  difficulties  with  the  South  African  Republic 
were  in  progress. 

After  referring  to  his  recent  visit  to  England  anc 
the  continent  of  Europe,  and  the  results  which  he 
had  achieved,  he  described  the  marvellous  change 
which  he  had  found  among  the  great  body  of  British 
people  with  regard  to  what  has  been  termed  “  the 
expansionist  party  ”  in  South  Africa. 


MR  RHODES  AND  MR  GLADSTONE. 


325 


“  The  people  of  England,”  he  said,  “  are  finding  out 
hat  ‘  trade  follows  the  flag,’  and  they  have  all  become 
imperialists.  They  are  not  going  to  part  with  any 
srritory,  and  the  bygone  ideas  of  ‘  nebulous  ’  repub- 
cs  are  past.  The  English  intend  to  retain  every 
ich  of  land  they  have  got,  and  perhaps  to  get  a  few 
iches  more.  When  I  began  this  business  of  annex- 
tion,  both  sides  (Liberals  and  Conservatives)  were 
lost  timid.  They  would  ask  one  to  stop  at  Kim- 
erley,  then  they  asked  one  to  stop  at  Khama’s 
)untry.  I  remember,”  he  went  on,  “  Lord  Salisbury’s 
lief  secretary  imploring  me  to  stop  at  the  Zambesi, 
ow  they  (i.e.,  the  people  of  England)  won’t  stop 
rywhere.  They  have  found  out  that  the  world  is 
it  quite  big  enough  for  British  trade  and  the 
ritish  flag.” 

While  dealing  with  this  subject  of  the  revulsion  of 
eling  among  the  people  of  Great  Britain  in  favour 
<’  the  “expansionist  policy”  in  South  Africa,  it  is 
teresting  to  recall  a  conversation  between  Mr 
hodes  and  Mr  Gladstone  which  took  place  on  this 
>licy  some  years  previously  to  the  speech  quoted 
oove.  The  late  Liberal  leader  took  Mr  Rhodes 
ither  seriously  to  task  for  desiring  to  extend  British 
isponsibilities  in  South  Africa.  “  Mr  Rhodes,”  he 
fid,  “we  have  quite  enough.  Our  obligations  are 
i ready  far  too  great;  but  apart  from  the  question 
(  increasing  our  obligations,  what  advantage  can 
pu  see  to  the  British  race  in  the  acquisition  of  fresh 
i  rritory  ?  ”  Mr  Rhodes  at  once  accepted  this  challenge 
i  d  replied  to  Mr  Gladstone  that  the  primary  reason 
L  the  further  acquisition  of  territory  by  Great 
hitain — and  this  applied  not  merely  to  South  Africa 
1 1  all  over  the  world— was  that  so  soon  as  every 


326 


BEFORE  THE  WAR. 


Power  in  the  world,  even  including  the  people  of  th 
United  States,  acquired  any  extension  of  territory 
the  first  thing  they  did  was  to  place  a  hostile  tari 
on  British-made  goods.  He  further  pointed  out  tha 
it  was  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  Great  Britai 
is  a  very  small  island,  not  nearly  so  large  as  Franc< 
and  that  she  does  not  possess  a  continent  as  does  th 
United  States.  Great  Britain’s  position,  Mr  Rhode 
impressed  upon  the  great  statesman,  depends  on  he 
trade,  and  if  the  people  of  the  United  Kingdom  di 
not  found  and  develop  new  dependencies  all  over  th 
world  in  countries  well  suited  to  white  colonisatioi 
but  at  present  occupied  by  barbarian  native  race! 
they  would  soon  find  themselves  shut  off  from  th 
trade  of  the  world.  The  question  of  tariffs,  M 
Rhodes  continued,  as  he  warmed  to  his  subject  an 
found  that  he  had  an  interested  auditor  in  Mr  Glac 
stone,  “  is  not  with  our  opponents  so  much  a  questio 
of  revenue  as  a  desire  to  exclude  absolutely  Grea 
Britain  from  trading  with  their  colonies.” 

Mr  Gladstone,  as  has  been  said,  listened  very  cart 
fully  to  what  Mr  Rhodes  had  to  say,  but  declined  t 
accept  his  view  of  the  question.  He  held  that  thoug 
other  countries  might  temporarily  diverge  from  th 
right  path,  yet  in  the  end  they  would  see  the  erre 
of  their  ways,  and  the  principles  of  Free  Trade  woulj 
prevail  ultimately. 

Mr  Rhodes  demurred  vigorously  from  this.  “N< 
Mr  Gladstone,”  he  said.  “  In  logic  you  are  all  right 
but  when  it  comes  to  practice  you  will  find  that  yo 
are  all  wrong.  You  will  see  that  as  each  new  countr 
is  opened  up  the  possessing  Power  will  immediate! 
establish  a  prohibitive  tariff  against  British  -  mac 
goods.  Now  England  absolutely  depends  for  he 


MR  RHODES  AND  FREE  TRADE. 


327 


)rosperity  and  her  continued  existence  upon  her 
vorking  up  of  raw  goods  and  distributing  them  to 
he  world  at  large.  If  the  markets  of  the  world  are 
lihut  against  us,  and  we  have  neglected  our  oppor- 
unities  to  acquire  colonies  of  our  own  beyond  the 
leas,  where  shall  we  be  then  ?  ” 

Mr  Gladstone  was  forced  to  admit  that  if  such  a 
'.ontingency  did  arrive,  if  in  every  new  colony  which 
vas  acquired  by  a  foreign  Power  hostile  tariffs  were 
)ut  in  force  against  us,  it  would  be  a  very  black  out- 
ook.  He  pinned  his  faith,  however,  on  the  principles 
>f  Free  Trade,  which  he  believed  were  bound  to  pre- 
/ail  in  the  long-run  ;  and  so  the  argument  ended,  in 
iach  of  the  two  being  the  better  for  the  discussion, 
)ut  holding  to  their  several  opinions  with  greater 
enacity  than  ever. 

In  a  speech  at  Cape  Town,  subsequent  to  the  one  in 
he  drill  hall  at  Mowbray  to  which  reference  has  been 
nade,  Mr  Rhodes  referred  to  this  conversation  with 
dr  Gladstone,  and  emphasised  the  fact  that  the  prin¬ 
ciples  of  Free  Trade  on  which  the  deceased  statesman 
lad  laid  so  much  stress  had  not  prevailed  in  the  past, 

,  ind  showed  very  little  probability  of  prevailing  in  the 
uture.  As  an  instance  of  this  he  cited  Madagascar. 
vVhen  France  took  that  island,  Mr  Rhodes  pointed 
>ut,  there  were  certain  treaties  in  connection  with  it 
vhich  provided  for  equality  in  trade,  or,  in  other  and 
nore  familiar  words,  the  policy  of  the  “open  door” 
vas  in  operation.  This  was  allowed  on  the  basis  of 
he  island  being  regarded  as  a  protectorate.  So  soon, 
lowever,  as  France  annexed  it,  the  French  tariff  was 
lirectly  hostile  to  the  importation  of  British  goods. 
Che  Imperial  Government,  as  Mr  Rhodes  reminded 
iis  audience,  continually  remonstrated  with  France 


32S 


BEFORE  THE  WAR. 


on  the  subject  of  this  tariff,  but  without  avail.  Th 
policy  of  the  French  was — and  we  can  scarcely  blam 
them  for  adopting  it — that  as  they  had  been  at  th 
trouble  and  expense  of  conquering  Madagascar,  the' 
and  they  alone  should  have  all  the  benefit  in  the  wa' 
of  trade  and  commerce  which  accrued  from  such  con 
quest.  “  We  have  spent  millions  in  taking  the  island, 
the  French  Government  said  in  effect,  “  and  we  an 
going  to  keep  all  the  good  that  comes  out  of  it  fo 
ourselves.” 

Before  he  ended  this  speech  at  Cape  Town  in  whicl 
he  referred  to  Madagascar  as  evidence  of  what  Grea- 
Britain  might — and  probably  would — have  to  contenc 
against  in  the  way  of  hostile  tariffs  when  a  foreigi 
Power  opened  up  a  new  colony,  Mr  Rhodes  related  ar 
amusing  anecdote,  of  which  the  principal  figure  was 
Sir  William  Harcourt.  That  gentleman,  who  for  lone 
has  been  one  of  the  chief,  and  certainlv  one  of  the 
fairest,  opponents  of  Mr  Rhodes’  Cape  to  Cairo  railway 
project,  had  a  }Tear  or  two  previously,  at  the  general 
election  of  1895,  been  defeated  in  Derby  largely  on 
the  Imperialist  question,  his  successful  opponent  being 
Mr  Drage,  w~ho  at  that  time  was  the  chairman  of  the 
South  African  Association.  Sir  William,  however, 
was  elected  as  a  member  for  West  Monmouth,  a  con¬ 
stituency  which  included  several  large  manufactories, 
ironworks,  and  what  not  ;  and  the  first  time  he  visited 
one  of  the  largest  ironworks  in  the  district  (controlled, 
by  the  way,  by  one  of  his  principal  supporters),  he 
found  by  the  irony  of  fate  that  the  wmrkers  were 
engaged  on  a  large  order  for  rails  for  the  very  Cape  to 
Cairo  line  that  he  had  been  so  persistent  in  denouncing 
as  being  of  no  service  whatever  to  the  countiy !  As 
Mr  Rhodes  remarked  with  a  sly  chuckle  when  he 


A  MISTAKEN  ESTIMATE. 


329 


•elated  the  story,  it  was  an  amusing  little  incident, 
)ut  one  which  contained  a  lesson  for  those  who  had 
•ecklessly  denounced  the  Cape  to  Cairo  railway  as  a 
‘wild-cat”  scheme  which  would  never  do  the  least 
rood  to  anybody. 

A  very  interesting  feature  of  this  speech  was  the 
•eference  to  the  Transvaal  which  Mr  Rhodes  per- 
nitted  himself  to  make.  As  it  shows  more  clearly 
Tan  pages  of  matter  written  by  an  outside  party 
lould,  what  his  views  were  on  the  prospect  of  war 
between  the  Boer  republic  and  this  country  at  this 
;ime,  July  1899,  no  apology  is  necessary  for  giving  it 
lere  in  detail. 

“  The  notion  of  the  Transvaal  being  able  to  trouble 
Jreat  Britain  at  all  seriously  is,”  he  said,  “  too  ridic- 
llous.  I  always  think  that  President  Kruger  must 
ie  very  proud  of  himself.  I  should  feel  alarmed  if  I 
leard  that  the  Czar  was  going  to  Peking,  or  that  the 
french  were  moving  in  Newfoundland  or  in  the  Niger 
territories,  or  were  quarrelling  over  the  Fashoda  settle- 
nent ;  but  when  I  am  told  that  the  president  of  the 
Transvaal  is  causing  trouble,  I  cannot  really  think 
ibout  it.  It  is  too  ridiculous.  If  you  were  to  tell 
ne  that  the  native  chief  in  Samoa  was  going  to  cause 
rouble  to  the  Imperial  Government,  then  I  would 
liscuss  the  proposition  that  the  Transvaal  was  a 
langer  to  the  British  Empire.” 

Yet  three  months  afterwards  Kruger  had  flung 
lown  the  gauntlet  to  the  Empire,  and  his  semi- 
:ivilised  Burghers  were  able  for  over  two  years  to 
lefy  all  the  force  that  the  Empire  could  bring  against 
hem.  This  speech  demonstrates  that  the  general 
;stimate,  that  a  war  with  the  South  African  Republic 
vould  be  little  more  than  a  procession  to  Pretoria,  had 


330 


BEFORE  THE  WAR. 


a  supporter  in  one  so  prominently  connected  with  the 
inner  ring  of  South  African  politics  as  Cecil  Rhodes. 
Those  who  recall  to  mind  the  manner  in  which  the 
nation,  and  indeed  the  whole  Empire,  seemed  to  reel 
under  the  successive  reverses  of  Stormberg,  Magers- 
fontein,  and  Colenso,  will  see  that  it  was  quite  possible 
for  one  so  impotent  in  Mr  Rhodes’  eyes  as  President 
Kruger  to  constitute,  temporarily  at  any  rate,  “  a 
danger  to  the  Empire.”  It  is  the  height  of  unwisdom, 
as  this  country  has  been  taught  by  many  severe  lessons 
in  the  past,  to  hold  a  possible  opponent  too  cheaply. 

In  a  subsequent  portion  of  his  speech  Mr  Rhodes 
declared  most  emphatically  that  war  in  South  Africa 
would  not  come  about.  “  There  is  not  the  slightest 
chance  of  war,”  he  said ;  “  but  the  Imperial  Govern¬ 
ment  are  going  to  get  the  terms  which  are  demanded 
as  being  fair  and  right  to  the  Uitlanders.”  This  was 
the  opinion  shared  by  nineteen  people  out  of  every 
twenty  who  were  following  the  course  of  events  in 
the  Transvaal  in  the  summer  of  1899.  A  very  rude 
awakening  was  in  store  for  them. 

Such,  then,  was  Rhodes’  view  of  the  situation  three 
months  previous  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with  the 
Transvaal.  Down  to  the  eve  of  Kruger’s  insulting 
ultimatum  he  believed  that  there  would  be  peace,  and 
that  a  satisfactory  settlement  would  be  arrived  at 
even  at  the  eleventh  hour.  This  being  so,  he  did 
what  little  he  was  able  to  bring  about  this  settlement. 
So  that  his  presence  should  not  needlessly  irritate 
President  Kruger  and  his  advisers,  he  voluntarily 
retired  into  the  background  and  effaced  himself  as 
much  as  was  possible,  and,  on  the  rare  occasions  that 
he  was  called  upon  to  speak,  carefully  avoided  any 
but  the  most  casual  reference  to  the  crisis  which  had 


ARRIVES  IN  KIMBERLEY. 


331 


arisen  in  South  African  affairs.  Indeed  the  short 
extract  given  above  contains  the  only  reference  of  any 
length  at  all  to  the  possibility  of  war. 

When,  however,  war  was  actually  declared  on  Great 
Britain  by  the  Transvaal,  and  the  Orange  Free  State 
threw  in  its  lot  with  the  sister  republic,  Rhodes  felt 
that  there  was  no  longer  any  need  for  him  to  remain 
inactive  ;  and  having  a  strong  desire  to  be  as  near  the 
fighting  line  as  possible,  and  in  view  of  the  enormous 
interests  he  had  in  Kimberley,  he  set  off  at  once  for 
that  city,  in  order  to  be  at  hand  to  take  such  steps  as 
were  possible  for  the  protection  of  the  diamond  mines, 
which,  he  guessed  instinctively,  would  be  one  of  the 
first  objectives  of  the  commandoes  of  the  allied  Boer 
republics.  He  was  fortunate  enough  to  reach  Kim¬ 
berley  by  use  of  the  last  train,  to  enter  the  town  before 
the  commencement  of  the  siege,  and  after  he  had  very 
narrowly  escaped  capture  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 


332 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

RHODES  BESIEGED  IN  KIMBERLEY. 

The  Boers  soon  heard  that  Rhodes  had  arrived  in 
Kimberley  from  the  south,  and  at  once  made  great 
preparations  to  lay  siege  to  that  town  and  to  capture 
it  and  its  inhabitants  at  almost  any  cost.  So  great 
was  their  vindictive  hatred  of  Mr  Rhodes  that  it  is 
no  exaggeration  to  say  that  they  would  sooner  have 
taken  him  prisoner  than  have  annihilated  the  entire 
British  army  and  have  entered  the  streets  of  Cape 
Town.  That  they  were  disappointed,  and  that  the 
iron  cage  they  had  built  in  which  to  imprison  Mr 
Rhodes  and  to  exhibit  him  publicly  through  the  two 
Boer  states  was  never  destined  to  be  filled  in  this 
way,  are  now  matters  of  history,  but  it  was  certainly 
not  for  want  of  trying. 

So  soon  as  Mr  Rhodes  arrived  in  the  town  he  took 
up  his  residence  at  a  pretty  little  sanatorium  which 
stands  in  the  pleasant  suburb  of  Beaconsfield,  and 
there  he  remained  during  the  whole  of  the  siege. 
Almost  immediately,  and  with  his  customary  impetu¬ 
osity,  he  set  about  doing  all  that  lay  in  his  power  to 
add  to  the  defences  of  the  town  and  to  aid  the  mili¬ 
tary  authorities.  The  only  regular  troops  in  Kim¬ 
berley  were  half  a  battalion,  about  500  strong,  of  the 


BRITISH  FORCES  IN  THE  TOWN. 


333 


gallant  Loyal  North  Lancashire  Regiment  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  G.  Kekewich  of 
that  regiment ;  a  battery  of  Royal  Field  Artillery, 
about  70  strong,  with  six  7-pounder  guns,  and  50 
men  of  the  Royal  Engineers.  There  was  also  the 
volunteer  force  known  as  the  Diamond-Fields  Artil¬ 
lery,  numbering  about  70  men,  with  six  field-guns 
and  a  Maxim  detachment,  and  the  Diamond-Fields 
Light  Horse,  another  volunteer  force,  about  150 
strong. 

In  order  to  provide  more  men  for  garrisoning  the 
town,  Rhodes  quickly  set  about  organising  a  new 
force,  called  the  Kimberley  Light  Horse,  paying  all 
the  expenses  in  connection  with  the  raising  and  equip¬ 
ment  of  it  out  of  his  own  pocket.  Recruits  for  this 
jorps  were  quickly  forthcoming  in  considerable  num¬ 
bers,  and  it  soon  had  a  strength  of  over  300  men. 
A.  very  useful  contingent  was  that  of  300  men  of 
the  Cape  Mounted  Police.  Another  corps  which  was 
raised  and  armed  as  the  siege  proceeded  was  the 
Kimberley  Rifles,  composed  of  nearly  400  men ;  while 
is  a  last  line  of  defence  every  able-bodied  man  was 
jailed  upon  to  enrol  himself  in  the  town-guard,  which 
soon  had  nearly  3000  men  on  its  roll.  In  all,  the 
garrison  of  Kimberley  amounted  to  about  4500  men, 
)f  whom  only  about  700  were  regulars. 

Throughout  the  siege  of  Kimberley  the  Boers  were 
wonderfully  well  supplied  with  information  regarding 
ill  that  transpired  in  the  town,  and  from  the  per¬ 
sistent  way  in  which  their  heavy  siege  ordnance  was 
lay  by  day  trained  on  to  the  sanatorium  it  was 
)bvious  that  they  knew  that  that  was  where  Rhodes 
was  living.  Strangely  enough,  though  the  Boer  shells 
lid  much  damage  in  other  parts  of  the  town,  the 


334 


RHODES  BESIEGED  IN  KIMBERLEY. 


sanatorium  escaped  without  much  injury.  Rhodes 
himself  seemed  to  bear  a  charmed  life.  He  displayed 
his  customary  disregard  of  danger.  Although  barri¬ 
cades  were  erected  at  every  point  of  egress  from  the 
town,  and  the  inhabitants  were  not  allowed  to  pass 
these  barricades  without  special  permits  signed  by  the 
commanding  officer,  Rhodes  day  after  day  would  ride 
for  considerable  distances  outside  the  barricades  on 
the  open  veldt  entirely  alone,  or  accompanied  only  by 
one  or  two  of  the  more  venturesome  of  his  friends. 
This  was  done  in  no  spirit  of  idle  bravado,  but  simply 
because  his  impatient  temperament  chafed  under  the 
confinement  of  the  town,  and  he  preferred  to  run  the 
risk  of  being  “  sniped”  by  a  Boer  sharpshooter. 

During  these  hazardous  rides  Mr  Rhodes  disdained 
to  take  even  the  elementary  precaution  of  donning 
clothes  which  might  render  him  less  conspicuous  than 
usual.  On  the  contrary,  he  adhered  to  his  favourite 
up-country  costume  of  a  light -grey  coat,  a  light- 
coloured  felt  slouch  hat,  and  a  pair  of  white  flannel 
trousers.  Indeed  a  better  target  for  the  Boer  marks¬ 
men  could  not  have  been  imagined ;  yet  he  escaped 
without  a  scratch,  though  at  times  he  had  some 
narrow  shaves  from  both  shell-  and  rifle-fire. 

Referring  to  the  way  in  which  Mr  Rhodes  passed 
backwards  and  forwards  through  the  barricades,  he 
one  day  had  an  amusing  and  at  the  same  time  an 
instructive  experience.  As  has  just  been  said,  it  soon 
became  obvious  that  there  were  people  in  the  town 
who  were  engaged  in  systematically  supplying  the 
enemy  with  information  of  all  that  was  going  on,  and 
many  complaints  were  made  as  to  the  free-and-easy 
manner  in  which  persons  could  leave  the  town  for  an 
unknown  destination  and  return  to  it  at  their  own 


RELIEF  WORKS. 


335 


reewill  and  without  any  interference  from  the  mili- 
;ary  guards.  In  order  to  test  the  truth  of  these 
statements  Mr  Rhodes  one  morning  rode  up  to  one  of 
she  barricades  and  attempted  to  pass  through  without 
showing  his  permit.  The  sentry  at  once  raised  his 
’ifle  and  stopped  him.  Rhodes  reined  in  in  well- 
issumed  surprise,  and  told  the  man  to  let  him  pass. 
The  soldier  stood  his  ground  and  declined  to  let 
lim  proceed  until  he  produced  his  pass.  “  But  I 
im  Cecil  Rhodes,”  said  that  gentleman,  adopting 
i  tone  of  great  indignation.  “  I  know  that,”  cheer- 
ully  responded  the  soldier,  “  but  I  must  see  a  pass 
before  you  go  out  here,  whoever  you  are.”  At 
his  point  Rhodes  burst  into  a  hearty  fit  of  laughter 
tnd  produced  his  permit,  commending  as  he  did  so 
he  conduct  of  the  sentry. 

In  many  ways,  besides  raising  the  Kimberley  Light 
Horse,  Mr  Rhodes  assisted  the  military  authorities  of 
he  town.  The  native  population,  for  instance,  who 
mder  ordinary  conditions  worked  in  the  diamond 
nines,  found  that  on  the  commencement  of  the  war 
heir  occupation  was  gone,  and  many  of  the  lower- 
lass  whites  were  in  the  same  predicament.  With 
he  assent  of  the  De  Beers  Company  Mr  Rhodes 
•rganised  relief  works  for  these  unemployed,  by  setting 
hem  to  make  up  the  roads  of  a  newly  formed  portion 
>f  the  town,  and  by  so  doing  not  only  relieved  the 
nilitary  authorities  of  the  great  responsibility  of 
laving  a  large  unemployed  population  to  keep  in 
land,  but  was  the  means  of  providing  many  thousands 
>f  men,  both  natives  and  Europeans,  with  the  where¬ 
withal  to  keep  body  and  soul  together.  Incidentally 
hese  relief  works  considerably  improved  and  beauti- 
ied  a  portion  of  the  town  which  previously  had  been 


336 


RHODES  BESIEGED  IN  KIMBERLEY. 


rather  uninviting.  To  the  chief  of  the  roads  so  built 
the  highly  appropriate  name  of  “Siege  Avenue”  was 
given. 

It  would  be  tedious  and  out  of  place  here  to  record 
the  events  of  the  prolonged  siege,  and  the  efforts  oi 
Lord  Methuen’s  column  to  reach  Kimberley  ;  there¬ 
fore  only  those  events  which  directly  concerned  Mr 
Rhodes,  or  in  which  he  played  a  leading  part,  will  be 
recorded.  Much  has  been  made,  since  the  termination 
of  the  siege,  of  friction  on  more  than  one  occasion 
between  Mr  Rhodes  and  the  military  authorities. 
How  these  difficulties  arose  is  not  very  clear,  but  it 
may  be  taken  for  granted  that  both  sides  were 
somewhat  to  blame. 

Mr  Rhodes,  as  I  have  had  occasion  to  remark 
previously,  is  impatient  of  control,  and  some  of  the 
military  regulations  which  Colonel  Kekewich  had 
occasion  to  issue  during  the  progress  of  the  siege, 
though  no  doubt  they  were  absolutely  imperative  from 
a  military  standpoint,  seemed  to  Rhodes  unnecessary 
and  irritating.  More  than  once  he  came  into  open 
conflict  with  the  commander  of  the  forces  in  the 
town.  Such  a  state  of  things  was  very  unfortunate, 
and  probably  no  one  now  regrets  that  it  existed  at 
such  a  critical  time  more  than  Rhodes  himself. 

So  strained  were  the  relations  at  times  between  the 
military  forces  in  Kimberley  and  Mr  Rhodes  and  the 
party  who,  quite  independently  of  him  and  in  direct 
opposition  to  his  wishes,  chose  to  follow  him,  that 
more  than  one  prominent  personage  present  in  the  town 
during  the  siege  has  declared  since  that  it  would  have 
been  far  better  had  Rhodes  remained  in  Cape  Town 
and  never  thrown  himself  into  Kimberley.  It  is  readily 
admitted  on  all  hands  that  Rhodes  in  his  own  way 


FRICTION  WITH  THE  MILITARY  AUTHORITIES.  337 


id  much  to  lessen  the  inevitable  privations  of  the 
iege  and  to  alleviate  the  sufferings  of  the  poorer 
3ctions  of  the  residents ;  but  in  the  eyes  of  many  all 
he  good  he  did  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by 
is  fractious  and,  as  it  appeared  in  the  eyes  of  out- 
ders,  unreasonable  opposition  to  the  dictates  of 
blonel  Kekewich  and  his  staff.  In  time  of  war  it 
;  an  axiom  that  every  other  interest  must  at  any 
ost  be  sacrificed  to  military  considerations,  and  while 
robably  Mr  Rhodes’  well-balanced  mind  enables  him 
)  see  this  and  to  admit  it  as  an  academic  truth,  yet, 
hen  it  became  a  personal  question,  he  chose,  as  the 
eight  of  evidence  clearly  shows,  to  ignore  it.  It 
.  an  unfortunate  truth  that  on  several  occasions  a 
ink  in  Mr  Rhodes’  mental  organism  has  led  him  to 
igard  himself,  so  far  as  is  possible  for  a  careful 
;udent  of  the  man  and  his  actions  to  judge,  as  being 
oo ve  the  rules  which  should,  and  which  do,  control 
ie  movements  of  an  ordinary  individual.  It  is  this 
irious  blend  of  character  which  makes  Mr  Rhodes  one 
the  most  fascinating  personages  for  a  psychol- 
gist  and  a  student  of  human  nature  to  analyse. 

In  placing  himself  in  a  condition  of  opposition  to 
le  military  authorities  in  Kimberley,  it  is  safe  to  say 
iat  Mr  Rhodes  thought  he  was  acting  for  the  best : 
ich  will  be  conceded  by  all ;  but  the  mistake  lay  in 
)t  recognising  that  it  was  Colonel  Kekewich,  and 
)t  himself,  who  had  been  selected  by  the  Empire, 
irough  its  representatives,  to  defend  Kimberley 
gainst  the  Boers.  He  ought  to  have  cheerfully 
ccepted  things  as  he  found  them,  and  contented 
mself  for  once  in  a  way  with  playing  second  fiddle, 
iich  a  position  would  have  had,  at  any  rate,  the 
uarm  of  novelty. 

Y 


338 


RHODES  BESIEGED  IN  KIMBERLEY. 


It  was  largely  through  the  initiation  of  Mr  Rhode 
that  the  workmen  in  the  De  Beers  factory  turne 
their  attention,  first,  to  the  manufacture  of  shells,  an 
then  to  the  turning’  out  of  the  siege-gun,  to  whic 
they  gave  the  appropriate  names  of  “  Long  Cecil 
and  “  St  Cecilia.”  Needless  to  say,  both  shells  an 
gun  were  rather  crude  in  make,  and  were  wantin 
in  finish  when  compared  with  those  turned  out  i 
the  arsenals  in  England ;  but  they  served  the: 
purpose  almost,  if  not  quite,  as  well  as  though  the 
had  been  made  by  the  latest  and  most  improve 
machinery  under  the  personal  supervision  of 
committee  of  experts. 

The  shells  made  in  the  De  Beers  engineering  shop 
were  7-pounders  for  the  field-guns  of  the  garrisor 
and  proved  very  useful.  The  building  of  the  gun  wa 
a  much  bigger  undertaking,  and  one  in  which  M 
Rhodes,  in  common  with  every  one  else  in  the  towi 
took  a  very  keen  interest.  The  designer  of  the  weapo 
was  the  chief  engineer  of  the  De  Beers  Company,  M 
Labrum,  an  American  of  great  fertility  of  idea  an 
resource,  and  his  material  was  an  ingot  of  stet 
10^-  inches  in  diameter.  This  gentleman  had  ha 
no  previous  experience  of  manufacturing  artiller} 
but  armed  with  a  file  of  engineering  journals  and  a: 
the  books  on  gunnery  on  which  he  could  lay  hi 
hands,  and  assisted  by  the  advice  of  such  artiller 
officers  as  were  in  Kimberley,  he  commenced  his  tas 
with  confidence.  His  idea  was  to  manufacture  a  4- 
gun  which  should  fire  a  2  8 -pounder  shell,  and  thui 
enable  the  garrison  to  cope  with  the  galling  fire  t 
which  they  were  subjected  from  the  heavy  siege-gun, 
which  the  Boers  had  mounted  round  the  town. 

After  twenty- four  days  of  incessant  labour,  the  gur 


“LONG  CECIL.”  339 

which  had  several  original  points  about  it  which  would 
probably  not  commend  themselves  to  the  artillery 
experts  of  the  War  Office,  was  finished,  and  mounted 
on  a  field-carriage.  When  the  weapon  came  to  be 
tested  it  was  found  to  possess  an  effective  range  of 
8000  yards,  and  its  first  shot  proved  a  great  surprise 
to  the  enemy,  who,  having  by  this  time  become 
thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  range  of  all  the 
small  field-guns  in  the  town,  were  at  a  loss  for  a 
long  time  to  understand  where  this  new  weapon  of 
large  calibre  bad  come  from.  In  all  “Long  Cecil” 
(to  give  it  its  most  popular  name)  fired  255  shells 
during  the  siege,  and  it  is  now  preserved  in  Kimberley 
as  an  interesting  memento  of  the  dark  days  through 
which  the  town  passed. 

By  the  irony  of  fate  Mr  Labrum,  who  had  made 
this  gun,  was  killed  instantaneously  by  a  shell  which 
burst  in  his  room  at  the  Grand  Hotel — one  of  the 
last  shells  fired  into  the  town  before  the  enemy  gave 
way  in  front  of  the  irresistible  advance  of  General 
French’s  cavalry  column. 

On  all  the  shells  manufactured  in  the  De  Beers 
ffiops  was  humorously  stamped,  “With  C.  J.  R.’s  com- 
iliments  ” — a  very  fair  retort  to  the  threats  of  the 
Boers  to  convey  Mr  Rhodes  in  a  cage  to  Pretoria  so 
50on  as  they  laid  hands  on  him. 

Rhodes  was  also  of  considerable  assistance  to  the 
luthorities  in  the  latter  stages  of  the  siege,  when  the 
ood-supply  began  to  run  short,  by  organising  at  his 
own  expense  a  system  of  soup  distribution  supple- 
nentary  to  the  rations  issued  by  the  military.  The 
■igours  of  the  siege  were  greatlv  lessened  by  it. 

It  is  necessary  to  refer  to  another  point.  Mr 
Rhodes  is  said  to  have  made  efforts  to  force  the 


340 


RHODES  BESIEGED  IX  KIMBERLEY. 


hand  of  Lord  Roberts  in  the  matter  of  sending  a 
relief  force  to  the  town,  and  Mr  Rhodes  has  even 
been  accused  in  certain  quarters  of  valuing  his  own 
safety  more  than  the  ultimate  victory  of  the  British 
forces.  This  is,  of  course,  absurd,  for  Rhodes  is  not  a 
coward,  and  fear  for  himself  never  enters  his  calcula¬ 
tions.  But  as  the  day^s  went  on,  and  the  privations 
of  the  people  in  Kimberley  became  more  and  more 
severe,  and  there  seemed  to  be  no  effort  whatever  on 
the  part  of  the  military  forces  to  relieve  the  town, 
Rhodes  undoubted^  became  impatient,  and  chafed  at 
what  he  considered  to  be  the  unnecessary  delay  and 
the  callous  neglect  of  the  besieged  town  by  the  army. 
Lord  Methuen  with  his  column  was  sitting  in  a  state 
of  “  masterful  inactivity  ”  before  the  Boer  trenches  of 
Magersfontein,  and  seemed  as  though  he  had  made  up 
his  mind  never  to  move  again  ;  while  as  the  troops 
from  home  kept  pouring  into  Cape  Town,  they  were 
promptly  sent  round  to  help  to  swell  General  Buller’s 
army  in  Natal. 

All  this  time  food  in  Kimberley  was  getting  scarcer 
and  scarcer,  and  the  mortality,  especially  among  the 
young  children,  was  growing  higher  every  week.  The 
Boer  bombardment,  too,  was  increasing  in  strength 
daily,  until  the  town  promised  to  become  soon  nothing 
more  than  a  heap  of  ruins.  Under  these  circum¬ 
stances  it  is  not  altogether  surprising  that  the  civil 
population  of  the  town  began  to  murmur  at  the  delay 
in  the  despatch  of  a  relief  force,  or  that  Mr  Rhodes 
was  prominently  identified  with  this  group  ;  though  it 
must  be  said  that  he  would  have  showm  better  judg¬ 
ment  had  he  exerted  his  influence  to  suppress  the 
growing  discontent,  and  to  strengthen  the  hands  of 
the  military. 


A  LETTER  TO  LORD  ROBERTS. 


341 


However,  Mr  Rhodes  chose  deliberately  to  act  as 
the  spokesman  of  the  civilian  portion  of  the  besieged 
community,  and  as  such,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Mayor  of  Kimberley,  Mr  H.  A.  Oliver,  towards  the 
snd  of  January  1900  he  despatched  an  earnest  appeal 
to  Lord  Roberts  to  effect  an  early  relief  of  the  town, 
pointing  out  that  the  defenders  could  not  resist  the 
Boer  attacks  indefinitely.  The  history  of  all  wars 
goes  to  show  that  there  is  ever  a  tendency  for  per¬ 
sons  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  the  operations 
in  the  particular  district  in  which  those  persons  hap¬ 
pen  to  reside,  and,  needless  to  say,  such  a  message  as 
the  one  from  Kimberley  was  not  allowed  by  Lord 
Roberts  to  influence  him  in  the  plan  of  campaign  he 
was  then  engaged  in  organising,  though  it  showed  him 
that  Kimberley  was  approaching  the  end  of  its  re¬ 
sources. 

On  February  7  a  new  bombardment  of  the  town  was 
inaugurated  by  the  Boers,  who  had  brought  up  several 
weapons  of  heavier  calibre  than  those  previously  in 
use  ;  and  especially  galling  was  a  6-inch  gun  throwing 
a  100-lb.  shell.  This  bombardment  lasted  for  three 
days,  at  the  end  of  which  time  Mr  Rhodes,  after  a 
long  consultation  with  the  mayor  and  other  prominent 
civilian  officials,  drew  up  the  following  message,  which 
he  requested  Colonel  Kekewich  to  forward  to  Lord 
Roberts  : — 

Kimberley,  February  10,  1900. 

“  On  behalf  of  the  inhabitants  of  this  town  we 
respectfully  desire  to  be  informed  whether  there  is  an 
intention  on  your  part  to  make  an  immediate  effort 
for  our  relief.  Your  troops  have  been  for  more  than 
two  months  within  a  distance  of  little  over  twenty 
miles  from  Kimberley,  and  if  the  Spytfontein  hills  are 


342 


RHODES  BESIEGED  IN  KIMBERLEY. 


too  strong  for  them  there  is  an  easy  approach  over 
a  level  flat.  This  town,  with  a  population  of  over 
45,000  people,  has  been  besieged  for  120  days,  and  a 
large  portion  of  the  inhabitants  has  been  enduring 
great  hardships.  Scurvy  is  rampant  among  the 
natives  ;  children,  owing  to  the  lack  of  proper  food, 
are  dying  in  great  numbers,  and  dysentery  and 
typhoid  are  very  prevalent.  The  chief  foods  of  the 
whites  have  been  bread  and  horse-flesh  for  a  long  time 
past,  and  of  the  blacks  meat  and  malt  only.  These 
hardships,  we  think  you  will  agree,  have  been  borne 
patiently  and  without  complaint  by  the  people. 
During  the  last  few  days  the  enemy  have  brought 
into  action,  from  a  position  within  three  miles  of  us, 
a  6-inch  gun,  throwing  a  100-lb.  shell,  which  is  setting 
fire  to  our  buildings,  and  is  daily  causing  death  among 
the  population.  As  you  are  aware,  the  military  guns 
here  are  totally  inadequate  to  cope  with  this  new  gun. 
The  only  weapon  which  gives  any  help  is  one  of  local 
manufacture.  Under  these  circumstances,  as  repre¬ 
senting  this  community,  we  feel  that  we  are  justified 
in  asking  whether  you  have  any  immediate  intention 
of  instructing  your  troops  to  advance  to  our  relief. 
We  understand  that  large  reinforcements  have  re¬ 
cently  arrived  in  Cape  Town,  and  we  feel  sure  that 
your  men  at  Modder  River  have  at  the  outside  10,000 
Boers  opposed  to  them.  You  must  be  the  judge  as  to 
what  number  of  British  troops  would  be  required  to 
deal  with  this  body  of  men,  but  it  is  absolutely  neces¬ 
sary  that  relief  should  be  afforded  to  this  place.” 

Whether  this  was  a  letter  which  should  ever  have 
been  drafted  by  the  civilian  element  of  a  besieged 
town  for  transmission  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  is 


LORD  ROBERTS  AND  MR  RHODES. 


343 


ipen  to  very  grave  doubt,  and  it  has  to  be  borne  in 
nind  that  the  person  to  whom  Lord  Roberts  looked 
'or  guidance  and  information  as  to  the  real  condition 
if  Kimberley  was  not  Mr  Rhodes,  nor  yet  the  mayor, 
)ut  Colonel  Kekewich. 

Acting  quite  within  his  rights,  Colonel  Kekewich, 
vho  by  this  time  was  no  longer  on  speaking  terms 
with  Mr  Rhodes,  declined  to  transmit  this  letter  to 
jord  Roberts.  This  friction  between  the  military 
md  civilian  elements  in  Kimberley  was  most  unfor¬ 
tunate,  and  ultimately  led  up  to  a  serious  misunder¬ 
standing  over  this  message  of  Mr  Rhodes.  Colonel 
kekewich,  with  the  weight  of  the  conduct  of  the 
lefence  of  the  town  on  his  shoulders,  had  but  little 
;ime  to  devote  to  the  matter  personally,  with  the 
•esult  that  a  distorted  version  was  transmitted  to 
ohe  Commander-in-Chief,  in  which  it  was  stated  that 
Mr  Rhodes  was  anxious  to  surrender  the  town  to  the 
Boers  if  it  was  not  speedily  relieved.  Of  course  this 
was  not  in  the  least  what  Mr  Rhodes  desired  to  say, 
md  he  protested  very  strongly  against  this  version. 
Leaving  on  one  side  all  other  questions,  Mr  Rhodes’ 
fate,  so  soon  as  the  Boers  had  him  in  their  power, 
was  not  one  which  would  have  led  him  to  contemplate 
the  fall  of  Kimberley  with  any  degree  of  equanimity. 

This  hashed  message,  moreover,  had  the  regrettable 
sffect  of  procuring  a  stern  official  rebuke  for  Mr  Rhodes 
from  Lord  Roberts.  In  his  reply  to  this  much  dis¬ 
torted  version  of  what  Mr  Rhodes  really  desired  to  say, 
the  British  Commander-in-Chief  wrote  as  follows  :  “  I 
beg  of  you  to  represent  to  the  mayor  and  to  Mr 
Rhodes  as  strongly  as  you  possibly  can  the  disastrous 
and  humiliating  effects  of  surrender  after  so  prolonged 
and  glorious  a  defence.  Many  days  cannot  possibly 


344 


RHODES  BESIEGED  IN  KIMBERLEY. 


pass  before  Kimberley  will  be  relieved,  as  we  com¬ 
mence  active  operations  to-morrow.  Future  military 
operations  depend  in  a  large  measure  on  your  main 
tabling  your  position  a  very  short  time  longer.” 

Rhodes  had  of  course  entered  a  vigorous  protest 
against  the  misrepresentation  to  which  his  attitude 
had  been  subjected,  but  on  the  receipt  of  this  re¬ 
assuring  message  from  Lord  Roberts  he  urged  that 
the  latter  part  of  it  should  be  published  broadcast 
over  -the  town,  so  that  the  inhabitants  might  learn 
that  their  sufferings  were  not  likely  to  be  much 
further  prolonged. 

As  a  further  precaution  against  danger  from  the 
shells  of  the  Boer  100-pounder,  Mr  Rhodes  decided  on 
a  step  that  he  had  long  been  contemplating,  and  threw 
open  the  diamond  mines  for  the  reception  of  all  those 
who  were  nervous  of  remaining  above  ground.  The 
lower  levels  of  these  mines  are  lighted  throughout  by 
electric  glow-lamps,  and  for  the  greater  part  are  per¬ 
fectly  dry. 

Accordingly,  the  following  notice  was  roughly 
painted  on  a  board  and  publicly  exhibited  in  the 
town  : — 

“  I  recommend  women  and  children  who  desire  com¬ 
plete  shelter  to  proceed  to  Kimberley  and  De  Beers 
shafts.  They  will  be  lowered  at  once  into  the  mines 
from  8  o’clock  throughout  the  night.  Lamps  and 
guides  will  be  provided.  C.  J.  Rhodes.” 

This  offer  was  at  once  taken  advantage  of,  and 
during  this  night  more  than  1500  persons  were  lowered 
into  the  De  Beers  mine,  while  another  thousand  or  so 
went  down  the  Kimberley  shaft.  Mr  Rhodes’  original 


GENERAL  FRENCH  RELIEVES  THE  TOWN. 


345 


idea  was  that  the  women  and  children  should  remain 
Fawn  the  mines  during  the  period  of  the  bombard¬ 
ment  and  return  to  their  houses  during  the  night,  but 
the  great  majority  preferred  to  remain  below  ground 
altogether,  and  soon  quite  an  underground  colony  had 
sprung  up  in  the  diamond  mines. 

Lord  Roberts  was  quite  as  good  as  his  word,  and  by 
a  series  of  brilliant  forced  marches,  which  have  been 
so  often  described  of  late,  General  French  at  the  head 
afa  mobile  cavalry  column  effected  the  relief  of  Kimber- 
ey  on  February  15,  amid  a  scene  of  delirious  joy  on 
the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  town.  That  even¬ 
ing,  in  order  to  celebrate  the  relief  in  characteristic 
British  fashion,  Mr  Rhodes  entertained  General  French 
and  his  staff  at  a  dinner  of  such  luxuries  as  the  im- 
aoverished  state  of  the  town  could  pi’ovide. 

So  soon  as  railway  communication  with  the  south 
ivas  re-established,  Mr  Rhodes  returned  to  Groot 
Schuur  to  recuperate  after  the  effects  of  the  siege, 
and  thus  ended  his  active  interest  in  the  war  ;  though, 
aeedless  to  say,  down  to  the  final  close  of  hostilities  he 
fallowed  events  with  the  closest  possible  interest. 


346 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Rhodes’  gift  to  the  liberal  party. 

In  the  ninth  chapter  of  the  present  book  Mr  Rhodes’ 
handsome  donation  of  £10,000  to  the  funds  of  the 
Nationalist  party  was  dealt  with,  and  it  now  remains 
to  dicuss  the  conditions  under  which  the  sum  of  £5000 
was  given  to  the  Liberal  party,  around  which  so  much 
controversy  has  raged  of  late.  It  was  in  1890  that 
this  latter  gift  to  the  funds  of  the  Liberal  party  was 
first  conceived.  In  that  year  Mr  Schnadhorst,  at 
that  time  the  chief  wirepuller  of  the  Liberal  caucus, 
was  visiting  South  Africa  for  the  benefit  of  his  health, 
and  while  in  Kimberley  obtained  an  introduction  to 
Mr  Rhodes. 

At  this  time  it  seemed  evident  to  all  in  the  inner 
ring  of  politics  in  England  that  a  general  election 
was  not  very  far  off,  and  the  Liberal  party  was  in 
dire  straits  financially.  Mr  Schnadhorst,  of  course, 
was  perfectly  aware  of  the  munificent  gift  to  the 
Irish  party  two  years  previously,  and  it  occurred  to 
him  that  Mr  Rhodes,  who  made  no  secret  of  his 
strong  Liberal  leanings,  might  be  induced  to  subscribe 
substantially  to  the  party  funds. 

Therefore  he  set  about  sounding  Mr  Rhodes  on  the 
matter,  at  first  delicately,  and  then,  as  he  met  with 


MR  SCHNADHORST  S  CALL. 


347 


10  repulse,  more  boldly.  Whatever  Mr  Schnadhorst’ s 
eal  politics  may  have  been,  he  at  any  rate  gave  Mr 
thodes  the  impression  that  he  was  at  one  with  him 
m  the  question  of  the  cultivation  and  the  strengthen¬ 
ing  of  the  bonds  which  bind  together  the  Colonies  and 
he  mother -land.  In  other  words,  while  he  was  in 
Kimberley  Mr  Schnadhorst  posed,  no  doubt  with 
jerfect  sincerity,  as  what  we  should  call  to  -  day  a 
jiberal  Imperialist. 

Mr  Rhodes  has  always  been  glad  to  meet  and  con¬ 
verse  with  those  who  are  in  the  inner  counsels  of  the 
lolitical  leaders  at  home,  and  therefore  he  spent  some 
onsiderable  time  in  the  society  of  Mr  Schnadhorst, 
rho  returned  to  England  about  the  end  of  1890.  Mr 
thodes,  it  happened,  quickly  followed  him.  At  the 
leginning  of  1891  Mr  Schnadhorst  called  on  Rhodes 
.t  his  hotel  in  London  and  renewed  his  suggestion 
hat  he  should  show  his  support  of  the  Liberal  party 
n  some  tangible  form. 

At  first  Rhodes  was  dubious.  As  he  has  himself 
old  us,  he  is  a  staunch  Liberal  in  most  things,  but 
vith  him  it  is  Liberalism  plus  Empire.  This  being 
o,  he  was  not  at  all  anxious  to  provide  a  party  with 
he  sinews  of  war  for  the  purpose  of  the  dismember- 
nent  of  the  Empire.  There  were  two  things  regard- 
ng  which  Rhodes  was  not  certain  as  to  the  attitude 
>f  the  Liberal  party.  The  first  was  the  old  question 
if  the  retention  of  a  certain  proportion  of  the  Irish 
members  at  Westminster  in  any  future  Home  Rule  bill 
vhich  Mr  Gladstone  might  introduce ;  and,  second, 
here  was  the  position  of  the  party  towards  Egypt. 
By  this  time  Mr  Rhodes’  trans- African  telegraph-wire 
vas  well  on  its  way  across  South  Africa  to  the  north, 
nd  this  alone  would  have  made  him  anxious  that 


34S  RHODES’  GIFT  TO  THE  LIBERAL  PARTY. 

British  rule  should  continue  on  the  banks  of  thi 
Nile. 

But  he  had  other  and  higher  motives  for  supporting 
the  upholding  of  the  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  ii 
Egypt.  He  could  see,  as  all  other  impartial  observer 
could  see,  that  if  the  British  control  of  Egypt  wen 
withdrawn  and  Lord  Cromer  were  recalled  from  Cairo 
it  vrould  not  be  long  before  France  proclaimed  a  pro 
tectorate  over  the  country,  and  thus  seriously  menace 
the  trade-route  to  India.  In  these  circumstances  ii 
is  small  wonder  that  Bhodes  hesitated  before  he 
responded  to  Mr  Schnadhorst’s  blandishments. 

When  the  two  met  to  discuss  the  question,  Mi 
Bhodes  at  once  inquired  what  Mr  Gladstone’s  position 
■was  with  regard  to  the  abandonment  or  retention  o 
Egypt.  On  this  head  Mr  Schnadhorst  at  first  could 
give  him  no  satisfactory  assurance.  He  promised,  how¬ 
ever,  to  consult  Mr  Gladstone  on  the  subject,  and  tc 
let  Bhodes  know  the  result.  Whether  Mr  Schnadhorst 
actually  did  consult  Mr  Gladstone  is  now  open  to  grave 
doubt,  and  it  would  seem  from  the  subsequent  atti¬ 
tude  of  the  great  Liberal  leader  that  he  knew  nothing 
whatever  about  either  Mr  Bhodes’  contribution  to  the 
funds  of  the  party  or  the  conditions  attached  to  it. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  certainly  Mr  Schnadhorst  at  a 
subsequent  interview  led  Mr  Bhodes  to  believe  that 
his  leader  had  definitely  made  up  his  mind  that  the 
British  control  of  Egypt  was  to  be  continued.  There¬ 
upon  Bhodes’  scruples  were  entirely  removed,  and  he 
wrote  the  following  letter  to  Mr  Schnadhorst : — 


“  February  23,  1891. 

“  My  dear  Schnadhorst, — I  enclose  you  a  cheque 
for  £5000,  and  I  hope  you  will,  with  the  extreme 


ME  JOHN  MORLEY’S  SPEECH  ON  EGYPT. 


349 


aution  that  is  necessary,  help  in  guiding  your  party 
o  consider  politics  other  than  England. 

“  I  do  not  think  your  visit  to  Kimberley  did  you 
tarm,  either  physically  or  politically,  and  I  am  glad  to 
end  you  the  contribution  I  promised.  The  future  of 
England  must  be  Liberal,  perhaps  to  fight  Socialism, 
make  but  two  conditions  ;  please  honourably  observe 
hem  :  (l)  That  my  contribution  is  secret  (if,  of  course, 
rou  feel  in  honour  bound  to  tell  Mr  Gladstone,  you 
an  do  so,  but  no  one  else,  and  he  must  treat  it  as 
onfidential) ;  (2)  If  the  exigencies  of  party  necessi- 
ate  a  Home  Rule  bill  without  representation  at  West- 
ninster,  your  Association  must  return  my  cheque. — 
fours,  &c.,  C.  J.  Rhodes. 

“  P.S. — I  am  horrified  by  Morley’s  speech  on  Egypt, 
f  you  think  your  party  hopeless,  keep  the  money,  but 
nve  it  to  some  charity  you  approve  of.  It  would  be 
m  awful  thing  to  give  my  money  to  breaking  up  the 
Empire.” 

In  the  light  of  later  events  this  letter  seems  unfor- 
unately  rather  loosely  worded.  As  has  been  said, 
dr  Rhodes  is  an  extremely  careless  correspondent, 
jooking  at  the  letter  without  bias,  however,  two 
hings  are  very  clear :  first,  that  if  a  Home  Rule  bill 
vas  introduced  which  did  not  provide  for  the  retention 
•f  a  certain  number  of  Irish  members  at  Westminster, 
he  money  was  to  be  returned ;  while  the  postscript 
nakes  it  plain  what  Rhodes’  position  was  towards 
he  “policy  of  scuttle”  in  Egypt,  of  which  Mr  John 
dorley  was  at  that  time  one  of  the  most  prominent 
upporters. 

Cecil  Rhodes  is  not  the  sort  of  man  to  give  away 


350  RHODES’  GIFT  TO  .THE  LIBERAL  PARTY. 

large  sums  of  money  without  the  hope  of  gain  in 
something  in  return,  and  the  something  he  wanted  i 
this  instance  was  the  retention  of  the  control  ove 
Egypt  by  this  country.  On  the  other  hand,  M 
Schnadhorst  was  too  astute  a  party  henchman  t 
think  of  returning  a  cheque  of  these  dimension 
without  making  some  outward  show  of  complyin; 
with  its  conditions.  It  is  not  a  pleasant  picture,  i 
must  be  admitted,  this  bargaining  for  the  observanc 
of  a  certain  line  of  conduct  by  one  of  the  great  partie 
of  our  political  constitution,  and  this  eager,  grasping 
anxiety  of  the  party  wirepuller  to  finger  the  mil 
lionaire’s  gold. 

In  November  1891  Mr  Gladstone  made  an  importan 
speech,  in  which  he  stated  that  “  he  wished  Lon 
Salisbury  would  take  some  step  which  would  relievt 
the  country  from  the  burdensome  and  embarrassing 
occupation  of  Egypt.”  Rhodes  was  in  South  Afric; 
when  he  read  this  speech,  and  to  say  that  he  wai 
astounded  by  it  would  be  a  mild  way  of  expressing 
his  feelings.  He  had  received  from  Mr  Schnadhors' 
what,  rightly  or  wrongly,  he  believed  to  be  a  complefi 
assurance  that  the  abandonment  of  British  rule  ii 
Egypt  no  longer  formed  a  plank  in  the  Liberal  plat¬ 
form,  and  that  Mr  Gladstone  had  definitely  made 
up  his  mind  that  the  occupation  must  go  on.  Yet 
in  this  speech  the  Liberal  leader  was  urging  upon  the 
Government  of  the  day  that  the  time  had  come 
when  the  British  troops  should  no  longer  remain  at 
Cairo. 

At  the  earliest  possible  moment  Rhodes  wrote  a 
letter  to  Mr  Schnadhorst  to  discover  what  was  the 
real  meaning  of  what  he  then  regarded  as  a  sud¬ 
den  and  inexplicable  volte-Jace  on  the  part  of  Mr 


MR  GLADSTONE  AND  EGYPT. 


351 


Gladstone.  This  letter  was  couched  in  the  following 
terms  : — 

“  On  board  the  Dunnottar  Castle, 
April  25,  1892. 

“My  dear  Schnadhorst, — I  am  sorry  to  have 
missed  you,  but  glad  to  hear  that  you  are  so  much 
better,  though  it  robs  one  of  the  chance  of  seeing  you 
igain  in  South  Africa. 

“  I  gather  in  England  that  your  party  is  almost 
certain  to  come  in,  though  there  may  be  subsequent 
iifficulty  as  to  the  shape  of  the  Home  Rule  bill. 

“  The  matter  that  is  troubling  me  most  is  your 
oolicy  in  Egypt.  I  was  horrified  when  I  returned 
from  Mashonaland  to  read  a  speech  of  Mr  Gladstone’s 
evidently  foreshadowing  a  scuttle  if  he  came  in.  I 
lould  hardly  believe  it  to  be  true,  and  sat  down  to 
write  to  you,  but  thought  it  better  to  wait  and  see 
^ou.  I  have  now  missed  you,  so  must  trust  to 
writing.  I  do  hope  you  will  do  your  best  to  check 
him  from  the  mad  step,  which  must  bring  ruin  and 
misery  on  the  whole  of  Egypt,  whilst  our  retirement 
will  undoubtedly  bring  it  under  the  influence  of  one 
ir  other  of  the  foreign  Powers,  which  of  course  by 
reciprocal  treaties  will  eventually  manage  the  exclu¬ 
sion  of  our  trade.  However,  if  your  respected  leader 
remains  obdurate  when  he  comes  into  power,  and 
idopts  this  policy  of  scuttle,  I  shall  certainly  call  upon 
pou  to  devote  my  subscription  to  some  public  charity 
n  the  terms  of  my  letter  to  you,  as  I  certainly,  though 
i  Liberal,  did  not  subscribe  to  your  party  to  assist  in 
bhe  one  thing  that  I  hate  above  everything — namely, 
the  policy  of  disintegrating  and  breaking  up  our 
Empire. 

“  As  you  are  aware,  the  question  of  Egypt  was  the 


352 


RHODES’  GIFT  TO  THE  LIBERAL  PARTY. 


only  condition  I  made,  and  it  seems  rather  extraor¬ 
dinary  to  me  that  the  first  public  speech  your  leader 
should  make,  which  sketches  generally  his  views  upon 
the  near  approach  of  office,  should  declare  a  policy  of 
abandonment. 

“  I  asked  you  at  the  time  I  wrote  to  see  him  and 
tell  him  of  my  action,  and  I  suppose  you  must  have 
mentioned  to  him  the  Egyptian  question,  which  was 
really  all  I  cared  about. 

“We  are  now  one-third  of  the  way  with  a  telegraph 
through  the  continent  from  the  south,  only  to  hear  of 
your  policy  of  scuttle  in  the  north. — Yours,  &c., 

“  C.  J.  Rhodes. 

“  P.S. — I  have  to  send  this  to  be  posted  in  England, 
as  I  have  forgotten  your  direction.” 

As  Mr  Rhodes  had  mislaid  Mr  Schnadhorst’s  address 
in  London,  he  was  forced  to  have  recourse  to  a  third 
party  in  order  to  get  the  letter  forwarded  ;  this  third 
party  was  Mr  W.  T.  Stead.  To  this  last  -  named 
gentleman  Mr  Rhodes  forwarded  the  following  cover¬ 
ing  note  : — 

“  On  board  the  Dunnottar  Castle, 
April  25,  1892. 

“  My  dear  Stead, — Kindly,  after  closing  up,  post 
the  enclosed.  I  shall  wait  with  anxiety  the  reply.  I 
would  send  it  direct,  but  do  not  know  the  address. 

“  Read  and  copy. — Yours,  &c.  C.  J.  Rhodes.” 

Mr  Stead  apparently  at  once  recognised  that  Mr 
Schnadhorst  had,  knowingly  or  unknowingly,  deceived 
Mr  Rhodes,  and  that  there  were  no  real  grounds  for 
the  wirepuller’s  promise  that  the  abandonment  of  Egypt 


MR  STEAD’S  LETTER. 


353 


3hould  no  longer  be  thought  of  by  the  Liberal  party, 
for  he  at  once  wrote  to  Mr  Rhodes  as  follows  : — 

“  May  6,  1892. 

“Dear  Mr  Rhodes, — I  received  your  letter  for 
schnadhorst,  and  duly  forwarded  it  to  him.  I  think 
die  fault  lies  with  Mr  Schnadhorst,  and  not  with  Mr 
Madstone.  I  was  writing  to  Mr  Gladstone  about 
something  else,  and  incidentally  mentioned  that  you 
vere  very  indignant  with  several  speeches  about 
Egypt ;  whereupon  Mr  Gladstone  wrote  asking  me 
*dhat  those  speeches  were  to  which  Mr  Rhodes  took 
ixception,  as  he  had  not  the  pleasure  of  knowing 
vhat  Mr  Rhodes’  views  were  concerning  Egypt. 
Erom  this  I  infer  that  Mr  Schnadhorst  has  never 
nformed  Mr  Gladstone  of  anything  you  said  to  him, 
n  which  case  he  deserves  the  bad  quarter  of  an  hour 
le  will  have  after  receiving  your  letter.  ...  I  saw 
dr  Balfour  the  other  day,  who  said  he  did  not  think 
he  difficulty  with  Egypt  was  with  Mr  Gladstone, 
)ut  rather  with  Sir  William  Harcourt,  who  believed 
n  the  curtailment  of  the  British  Empire  if  he  believed 
a  nothing  else.  Balfour  was  very  sorry  that  he  had 
lot  a  chance  of  seeing  you  when  you  were  here,  as  he 
lad  looked  forward  to  your  coming  in  the  hope  of 
aaking  your  acquaintance. — I  am,  yours  very  truly, 

“W.  T.  Stead.” 

When  Mr  Schnadhorst  received  Rhodes’  letter  he, 
s  Mr  Stead  anticipated,  experienced  a  very  bad 
uarter  of  an  hour  indeed,  and  in  his  subsequent 
eply  to  Rhodes’  letter  endeavoured  to  evade  the  point 
aised  therein  by  saying  that  the  only  two  conditions 
Ihodes  had  named  in  his  first  letter — viz.,  secrecy 

z 


354  RHODES’  GIFT  TO  THE  LIBERAL  PARTY. 

and  the  retention  of  the  Irish  members  at  West 
minster — had  been  observed,  and  would  be  in  th 
future.  A  more  unworthy  subterfuge  for  a  man  ii 
the  responsible  position  of  Mr  Schnadhorst  it  would  b 
impossible  to  imagine. 

In  the  postscript  of  the  first  letter  Rhodes  showe< 
clearly  what  was  passing  through  his  mind  with  regar< 
to  Egypt ;  and  if  he  did  not  deal  more  explicitly  witl 
this  matter  in  the  body  of  the  letter,  it  was  becaus' 
he  believed  that  he  had  sufficiently  impressed  hi 
wishes  concerning  Egypt  on  Mr  Schnadhorst  at  thei 
various  interviews. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  for  a  moment  that  M: 
Rhodes  had  any  idea  that  he  was  buying  the  Libera 
party  body  and  soul,  or  that  his  gift  would  permit  hin 
the  right  at  any  time  to  dictate  the  policy  of  tha 
party.  What  he  did  believe  was  that  he  had  givei 
a  handsome  sum  to  the  party  at  a  time  when,  02 
Mr  Schnadhorst’s  own  admission,  contributions  wen 
badly  needed.  To  this  gift  he  had  attached  certaii 
conditions  which  the  party  had  to  accept  or  decline 
By  taking  the  money  it  was  implied  that  the  condi 
tions  would  be  respected.  Now,  however,  the  leadei 
of  the  party  was  clearly  breaking  or  ignoring  the  con 
ditions  attached  to  the  gift,  and  therefore  Mr  Rhode! 
thought,  as  every  one  else  in  the  same  position  woulc 
have  thought,  that  it  was  only  a  matter  of  commor 
honesty  that  the  money  should  be  sent  to  some  charit} 
in  the  manner  indicated.  Mr  Schnadhorst,  however 
thought  differently,  and  wrote  the  following  letter 

“  Jime  4,  1892. 

“  My  dear  Rhodes, — I  regret  very  much  I  did  no! 
see  you  when  you  were  here,  as  your  letter  places  me 


MR  SCHNADHORST’S  LETTER. 


355 


n  a  position  of  extreme  perplexity.  Your  donation 
ras  given  with  two  conditions,  both  of  which  will  be 
hserved,  but  in  a  postscript  you  referred  to  John 
lorley’s  speech  on  Egypt  in  the  sense  in  which  you 
iave  written  about  Mr  Gladstone’s  reference  to  the 
ame  subject.  It  is  eighteen  months  ago  since  I  saw 
ou,  when  you  referred  to  the  subject  in  conversation, 
nd  I  told  you  then,  as  I  think  now,  that  J.  M.’s 
peech  was  very  unwise,  and  that  it  did  not  represent 
he  policy  of  the  party.  The  general  election  has 
een  coming  near,  and  now  it  is  close  at  hand.  Your 
ift  was  intended  to  help  in  the  Home  Uule  struggle, 
t  could  only  do  so  by  being  used  before  the  election, 
king  satisfied  that  I  could  observe  your  conditions, 
nd  that  J.  M.’s  speech  was  simply  the  expression  of 
n  individual  opinion,  I  felt  at  liberty  to  pledge  your 
mds  for  various  purposes  in  connection  with  the 
lection.  This  was  done  to  a  large  extent  before  Mr 
r.  spoke  at  Newcastle.  I  am  bound  to  say  that  in 
ly  view  his  reference  to  Egypt  was  no  more  than  the 
xpression  of  a  pious  opinion.  It  did  not  alter  my 
talings  that  a  Liberal  Government  would  not  attempt 
ithdrawal.  Sir  W.  Harcourt  was  annoyed  at  Mr  G.’s 
Terence  at  the  time,  and  since  I  heard  from  you  I 
ave  seen  Lord  Rosebery,  who  will  become  Foreign 
linister,  and  who,  I  am  satisfied  from  what  he  said  to 
te,  would  not  sanction  such  a  policy.  Mr  Gladstone, 
expect,  had  been  worked  on  by  a  few  individuals, 
)ssibly  by  J.  M.  alone;  but  in  my  opinion  it  would 
3  simply  madness  for  him  to  add  to  the  enormous 
fficulties  with  which  he  will  have  to  deal  by  risking 
>mplications  on  such  a  subject.  There  is  no  danger  ; 
asides,  the  next  Liberal  Foreign  Secretary  will  be  a 
rong  man  who  will  take  his  own  course,  very  different 


356 


RHODES  GIFT  TO  THE  LIBERAL  PARTY. 


from  the  pliant  and  supple  Granville.  Of  course  ’ 
may  be  wrong — time  alone  can  show  ;  but  if  I  waitec 
for  that,  the  purpose  for  which  I  asked  your  help,  ant 
for  which  you  gave,  would  go  unaided. 

“You  will  see  what  a  precious  fix  you  have  put  nr 
in.  I  will  not  make  any  further  promises  until  I  hea 
from  you. — With  all  good  wishes,  I  am,  faithful! 
yours,  F.  SCHNADHORST.” 

It  is  rather  amusing  to  note  here  the  way  in  whici 
Mr  Schnadhorst  kindly  informs  Mr  Rhodes  what  hi 
— Rhodes’ — real  objects  were  in  giving  the  mone} 
One  would  also  like  to  ask,  “  If  Rhodes  had  made  n 
stipulation  about  Egypt,  why  does  Mr  Schnadhors 
take  such  pains  to  explain  away  the  real  meaning  c 
Mr  Gladstone’s  speech  ?  ”  Mr  Schnadhorst’s  pictun 
too,  of  the  great  statesman  not  being  sincere  in  wha 
he  said,  and  of  urging,  for  electioneering  purposes,  o 
Lord  Salisbury  and  the  country,  a  step  which  he  ha 
no  intention  of  taking  himself  if  returned  to  powe] 
is  not  very  edifying.  Mr  Gladstone  would  scarcel 
have  been  obliged  to  his  chief  henchman  had  h 
known  the  character  the  latter  was  giving  him. 

Here,  then,  as  briefly  and  concisely  as  possible,  is  th 
story  of  Mr  Rhodes’  much-discussed  gift  to  the  Liben 
party.  It  is  a  story  which  would  have  been  told  Ion 
ago  had  it  not  been  for  a  reluctance  on  Mr  Rhodes’  par 
to  say  or  do  anything  which  might  seem  to  reflect  i 
any  way  upon  the  memory  of  the  late  Mr  Schnadhorsi 

An  impartial  observer,  however,  is  bound  to  sa 
that  neither  side  comes  out  of  the  affair  with  muc 
added  credit  or  dignity.  Mr  Rhodes’  knowledge  c 
the  world  and  his  keen  insight  into  human  natur 
should  have  told  him  that  a  great  party  of  the  Stat 


MR  SCHNADHORST  S  POSITION. 


357 


:oulcl  not  be  bound  even  by  its  own  agent  to  any  given 
jolicy,  and  that  even  if  nine  of  its  leaders  had  agreed  to 
tccept  the  conditions  laid  down,  the  tenth  might,  with 
>erfect  propriety,  decline  to  be  bound  by  them.  It  was 
t  crude  and  unstatesmanlike  action  to  attempt  to  intro- 
luce  the  methods  of  the  office  or  the  Stock  Exchange 
nto  affairs  of  State  ;  but  at  least  Mr  Rhodes  was  per¬ 
fectly  honest  and  straightforward  in  what  he  did,  and 
las  no  occasion  to  reproach  himself  on  that  score. 

As  for  Mr  Schnadhorst,  what  is  to  be  said  of  him  ? 
Liightly,  and  seemingly  without  any  thought  of  the 
:onsequences,  he  appears  to  have  promised  whatever 
le  was  asked  by  Mr  Rhodes.  He  was,  so  far  as  can 
ie  judged  after  this  lapse  of  time,  quite  convinced  in 
lis  own  mind  that  his  party  would  be  compelled  to 
•etain  Egypt  whether  it  wanted  to  do  so  or  not ;  but 
VIr  Gladstone’s  speech  to  which  Mr  Rhodes  refers  un- 
loubtedly  shows  that  he,  at  least,  was  of  a  different 
>pinion, — for  that  it  was  possible  for  Mr  Gladstone  to 
lave  played  the  unworthy  part  assigned  to  him  by 
fir  Schnadhorst  in  his  letter  to  Mr  Rhodes  cannot  be 
iredited  for  a  moment. 

Sir  William  Harcourt  and  Sir  H.  Campbell-Banner- 
nan  have  each  denied  with  great — and  almost  un- 
lecessary  —  emphasis  that  they  ever  knew  of  Mr 
Rhodes’  gift  to  the  party  funds  or  the  conditions 
ittached  to  it,  and  probably  Lord  Rosebery  was 
equally  ignorant.  In  other  words,  Mr  Schnadhorst 
seems  to  have  deceived  every  one  alike,  and  figures  in 
she  whole  affair  in  a  very  unpleasant  light. 

Thus  ends  Mr  Rhodes’  only  intimate  connection 
ivith  party  politics  in  this  country ;  and  with  the 
dosing  of  this  incident  the  present  volume  may  be 
fittingly  brought  to  a  conclusion. 


358 


APPENDIX  I. 

COPY  OF  AGREEMENT  SIGNED  BY  LOBENGULA  WITH  THE 
IMPERIAL  GOVERNMENT. 

The  chief  Lobengula,  ruler  of  the  tribe  known  as  the  Amande¬ 
bele,  together  with  the  Mashona  and  Makakalaka,  tributaries, 
of  the  same,  hereby  agrees  to  the  following  articles  and  con¬ 
ditions  : — 

That  peace  arid  amity  shall  continue  for  ever  between  her 
Britannic  Majesty,  her  subjects,  and  the  Amandebele  people; 
and  the  contracting  chief  Lobengula  engages  to  use  his  utmost 
endeavours  to  prevent  any  rupture  of  the  same,  to  cause  the 
strict  observance  of  this  treaty,  and  so  to  carry  out  the  spirit  of 
the  treaty  of  friendship  which  was  entered  into  by  his  late 
father  the  chief  Umzilagaas  with  the  then  Governor  of  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  1836. 

It  is  hereby  further  agreed  by  Lobengula,  chief  in  and  over 
the  Amandebele  country,  with  its  dependencies  aforesaid,  on 
behalf  of  himself  and  people,  that  he  will  refrain  from  entering 
into  any  correspondence  or  treaty  with  any  foreign  State  or 
Power  to  sell,  alienate,  or  cede,  or  permit,  or  countenance  any 
sale,  alienation,  or  cession  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  said 
Amandebele  country  under  his  chieftainship,  or  upon  any  other 
subject,  without  the  previous  knowledge  and  sanction  of  her 
Majesty’s  High  Commissioner  for  South  Africa. 

In  faith  of  which,  I,  Lobengula,  on  my  part  have  hereunto  set 


AGREEMENT  SIGNED  BY  LOBENGULA.  359 

nay  hand  at  Gubulowayo,  Amandebeleland,  this  eleventh  day  of 
February,  and  of  her  Majesty’s  reign  the  Fifty-first. 

Witnesses  :  Lobengula  X  his  mark. 

W.  Graham. 

G.  B.  van  Wyk. 

Before  me,  J.  S.  Moffat,  Assistant-Commissioner. 

February  11,  1888. 

Approved  and  ratified  by  me  as  her  Majesty’s  High  Com¬ 
missioner  for  South  Africa,  this  25th  day  of  April  1888. 

Hercules  Robinson,  High  Commissioner. 


Government  House,  Cape  Town. 


360 


APPENDIX  II. 

LOBENGULA’s  CONCESSION  TO  MESSRS  RUDD,  MAGUIRE,  AND 
Thompson,  30th  October  1888. 

Know  all  men  by  these  presents  that  whereas  Charles 
Dunell  Eudd,  of  Kimberley  ;  Kochfort  Maguire,  of  London ; 
and  Francis  Egbert  Thompson,  of  Kimberley,  hereinafter  called 
the  grantees,  have  covenanted  and  agreed,  and  do  hereby  cove¬ 
nant  and  agree,  to  pay  to  me,  my  heirs  and  successors,  the  sum 
of  one  hundred  pounds  sterling,  British  currency,  on  the  first 
day  of  every  lunar  month ;  and,  further,  to  deliver  at  my  royal 
kraal  one  thousand  Martini-Henry  breech-loading  rifles,  together 
with  one  hundred  thousand  rounds  of  suitable  ball  cartridge, 
five  hundred  of  the  said  rifles  and  fifty  thousand  of  the  said 
cartridges  to  be  ordered  from  England  forthwith  and  delivered 
with  reasonable  despatch,  and  the  remainder  of  the  said  rifles 
and  cartridges  to  be  delivered  as  soon  as  the  said  grantees  shall 
have  commenced  to  work  mining  machinery  within  my  terri¬ 
tory  ;  and  further,  to  deliver  on  the  Zambesi  river  a  steamboat 
with  guns  suitable  for  defensive  purposes  upon  the  said  river, 
or  in  lieu  of  the  said  steamboat,  should  I  so  elect,  to  pay  to  me 
the  sum  of  five  hundred  pounds  sterling,  British  currency.  On 
the  execution  of  those  presents,  I,  Lobengula,  King  of  Matabele- 
land,  Mashonaland,  and  other  adjoining  territories,  in  exercise 
of  my  sovereign  powers,  and  in  the  presence  and  with  the  con¬ 
sent  of  my  council  of  indunas,  do  hereby  grant  and  assign  unto 
the  said  grantees,  their  heirs,  representatives,  and  assigns  jointly 
and  severally,  the  complete  and  exclusive  charge  over  all  metals 
and  minerals  situated  and  contained  in  my  kingdoms,  princi¬ 
palities,  and  dominions,  together  with  full  power  to  do  all  things 
that  they  may  deem  necessary  to  win  and  procure  the  same, 


lobengula’s  concession. 


361 


md  to  hold,  collect,  and  enjoy  the  profits  and  revenues,  if  any, 
derivable  from  the  said  metals  and  minerals,  subject  to  the 
iforesaid  payment ;  and  whereas  I  have  been  much  molested  of 
[ate  by  divers  persons  seeking  and  desiring  to  obtain  grants  and 
concessions  of  land  and  mining  rights  in  my  territories,  I  do 
hereby  authorise  the  said  grantees,  their  heirs,  representatives, 
and  assigns,  to  take  all  necessary  and  lawful  steps  to  exclude 
from  my  kingdoms,  principalities,  and  dominions  all  persons 
seeking  land,  metals,  minerals,  or  mining  rights  therein,  and  I 
do  hereby  undertake  to  render  them  all  such  needful  assistance 
as  they  may  from  time  to  time  require  for  the  exclusion  of  such 
persons,  and  to  grant  no  concessions  of  land  or  mining  rights 
from  and  after  this  date  without  their  consent  and  concurrence ; 
provided  that,  if  at  any  time  the  said  monthly  payment  of  one 
hundred  pounds  shall  be  in  arrear  for  a  period  of  three  months, 
then  this  grant  shall  cease  and  determine  from  the  date  of  the 
last-made  payment ;  and,  further,  provided  that  nothing  con¬ 
tained  in  these  presents  shall  extend  to  or  affect  a  grant  made 
by  me  of  certain  mining  rights  in  a  portion  of  my  territory 
south  of  the  Eamaquaban  river,  which  grant  is  commonly  known 
as  the  Tati  Concession. 

This  given  under  my  hand  this  thirtieth  day  of  October,  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  eighteen  hundred  and  eighty-eight,  at  my 
royal  kraal.  Lobengula  X  his  mark. 

C.  D.  Rudd. 

Rochfort  Maguire. 

Witnesses :  F.  R.  Thompson. 

Chas.  D.  Helm. 

J.  F.  Dreyer. 

Copy  of  Indorsement  on  the  Original  Agreement. 

I  hereby  certify  that  the  accompanying  document  has  been 
fully  interpreted  and  explained  by  me  to  the  chief  Lobengula 
and  his  full  council  of  indunas,  and  that  all  the  constitutional 
usages  of  the  Matabele  nation  have  been  complied  with  prior  to 
his  executing  the  same. 

Dated  at  the  Umgusa  river  this  thirtieth  day  of  October  1888. 

Chas.  D.  Helm. 


362 


APPENDIX  III. 

COPY  OF  CHARTER  GRANTED  TO  THE  BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA 
COMPANY  BY  THE  IMPERIAL  GOVERNMENT. 

To  all  to  whom  these  presents  shall  come,  Greeting  : — 

Whereas  a  Humble  Petition  has  been  presented  to  Us  in  Our 
Council  by  the  Most  Noble  James,  Duke  of  Abercorn,  Com¬ 
panion  of  the  Most  Honourable  Order  of  the  Bath ;  the  Most 
Noble  Alexander  William  George,  Duke  of  Fife,  Knight  of  the 
Most  Ancient  and  Most  Noble  Order  of  the  Thistle,  Privy 
Councillor;  the  Eight  Honourable  Edric  Frederick,  Lord  Gifford, 
Y.C. ;  Cecil  John  Ehodes,  of  Kimberley,  in  the  Cape  Colony, 
Member  of  the  Executive  Council  and  of  the  House  of  Assembly 
of  the  Colony  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  ;  Alfred  Beit,  of  29 
Holborn  Viaduct,  London,  Merchant ;  Albert  Henry  George 
Grey,  of  Howick,  Northumberland,  Esquire,  and  George 
Cawston,  of  18  Lennox  Gardens,  London,  Esquire,  Barrister- 
at-Law. 

And  whereas  the  said  Petition  states  amongst  other  things — 

That  the  Petitioners  and  others  are  associated,  for  the  purpose 
of  forming  a  Company  or  Association,  to  be  incorporated,  if 
to  Us  should  seem  fit,  for  the  objects  in  the  said  Petition 
set  forth,  under  the  corporate  name  of  The  British  South 
Africa  Company. 

That  the  existence  of  a  powerful  British  Company,  controlled 
by  those  of  Our  subjects  in  whom  We  have  confidence,  and 
having  its  principal  field  of  operations  in  that  region  of 
South  Africa  lying  to  the  north  of  Bechuanaland  and  to 
the  west  of  Portuguese  East  Africa,  would  be  advantageous 


CHARTER,  BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA  COMPANY.  363 


to  the  commercial  and  other  interests  of  Our  subjects  in 
the  United  Kingdom  and  in  Our  Colonies. 

That  the  Petitioners  desire  to  carry  into  effect  various  con¬ 
cessions  and  agreements  which  have  been  made  by  certain 
of  the  chiefs  and  tribes  inhabiting  the  said  region,  and  such 
other  concessions,  agreements,  grants,  and  treaties  as  the 
Petitioners  may  hereafter  obtain  within  the  said  region, 
or  elsewhere  in  Africa,  with  a  view  to  promoting  trade, 
commerce,  civilisation,  and  good  government  (including 
the  regulation  of  liquor  traffic  with  the  natives)  in  the 
territories  which  are  or  may  be  comprised  or  referred  to 
in  such  concessions,  agreements,  grants,  and  treaties  as 
aforesaid. 

That  the  Petitioners  believe  that  if  the  said  concessions, 
agreements,  grants,  and  treaties  can  be  carried  into  effect, 
the  conditions  of  the  natives  inhabiting  the  said  territories 
will  be  materially  improved  and  their  civilisation  advanced, 
and  an  organisation  established  which  will  tend  to  the 
suppression  of  the  slave-trade  in  the  said  territories,  and 
to  the  opening  up  of  the  said  territories  to  the  immigration 
of  Europeans,  and  to  the  lawful  trade  and  commerce  of 
Our  subjects  and  of  other  nations. 

That  the  success  of  the  enterprise  in  which  the  Petitioners 
are  engaged  would  be  greatly  advanced  if  it  should  seem 
fit  to  Us  to  grant  them  Our  Eoyal  Charter  of  incorporation 
as  a  British  Company  under  the  said  name  or  title,  or 
such  other  name  or  title,  and  with  such  powers  as  to  Us 
may  seem  fit  for  the  purpose  of  more  effectually  carrying 
into  effect  the  objects  aforesaid. 

That  large  sums  of  money  have  been  subscribed  for  the 
purposes  of  the  intended  Company  by  the  Petitioners  and 
others,  who  are  prepared  also  to  subscribe  or  to  procure 
such  further  sums  as  may  hereafter  be  found  requisite 
for  the  development  of  the  said  enterprise,  in  the  event 
of  Our  being  pleased  to  grant  to  them  Our  Royal  Charter 
of  incorporation  aforesaid. 

Now,  therefore,  We,  having  taken  the  said  Petition  into  Our 
Royal  consideration  in  Our  Council,  and  being  satisfied  that 


364 


APPENDIX  III. 


the  intentions  of  the  Petitioners  are  praiseworthy  and  deserve 
encouragement,  and  that  the  enterprise  in  the  Petition  described 
may  be  productive  of  the  benefits  set  forth  therein,  by  Our 
Prerogative  Eoyal  and  of  Our  special  grace,  certain  knowledge, 
and  mere  motion,  have  constituted,  erected,  and  incorporated, 
and  by  this  Our  Charter  for  Us  and  Our  Heirs  and  Eoyal 
successors  do  constitute,  erect,  and  incorporate  into  one  body 
politic  and  corporate  by  the  name  of  the  British  South  Africa 
Company  the  said  James,  Duke  of  Abercorn,  Alexander  William 
George,  Duke  of  Fife,  Edric  Frederick,  Lord  Gifford,  Cecil  John 
Ehodes,  Alfred  Beit,  Albert  Henry  George  Grey,  and  George 
Cawston,  and  such  other  persons  and  such  bodies  as  from  time 
to  time  become  and  are  members  of  the  body  politic  and 
corporate  by  these  presents  constituted,  erected,  and  incor¬ 
porated,  with  perpetual  succession  and  a  common  seal,  with 
power  to  break,  alter,  or  renew  the  same  at  discretion,  and  with 
further  authorities,  powers,  and  privileges  conferred,  and  subject 
to  the  conditions  imposed  by  this  Our  Charter :  and  We  do 
hereby  accordingly  will,  ordain,  give,  grant,  constitute,  appoint 
and  declare  as  follows  (that  is  to  say) : — 

1.  The  principal  field  of  the  operations  of  the  British  South 
Africa  Company  (in  this  Our  Charter  referred  to  as  “The 
Company  ” )  shall  be  the  region  of  South  Africa  lying 
immediately  to  the  north  of  British  Bechuanaland,  and  to  the 
west  of  the  Portuguese  dominions. 

2.  The  Company  is  hereby  authorised  and  empowered  to 
hold,  use,  and  retain  for  the  purposes  of  the  Company  and  on 
the  terms  of  this  Our  Charter  the  full  benefit  of  the  concessions 
and  agreements  made  as  aforesaid,  so  far  as  they  are  valid,  or 
any  of  them,  and  all  interests,  authorities,  and  powers  comprised 
or  referred  to  in  the  said  concessions  and  agreements :  Provided 
always  that  nothing  herein  contained  shall  prejudice  or  affect 
any  other  valid  and  subsisting  concessions  or  agreements  which 
may  have  been  made  by  any  of  the  chiefs  or  tribes  aforesaid, 
and  in  particular  nothing  herein  contained  shall  prejudice  or 
affect  certain  concessions  granted  in  and  subsequent  to  the  year 
1880  relating  to  the  territory  usually  known  as  the  district  of 
the  Tati,  nor  shall  anything  herein  contained  be  construed  as 


CHARTER,  BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA  COMPANY.  365 

giving  jurisdiction,  administrative  or  otherwise,  within  the  said 
district  of  the  Tati,  the  limits  of  which  district  are  as  follows  : 
viz.,  from  the  place  where  the  Shasi  river  rises  to  its  junction 
with  the  Tati  and  Ramaquaban  rivers,  thence  along  the  Eama- 
quaban  river  to  where  it  rises,  and  thence  along  the  watershed 
of  those  rivers. 

3.  The  Company  is  hereby  further  authorised  and  empowered, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  one  of  Our  Principal  Secretaries  of 
State  (herein  referred  to  as  “  Our  Secretary  of  State  ”),  from 
time  to  time  to  acquire  by  any  concession,  agreement,  grant,  or 
treaty,  all  or  any  rights,  interests,  authorities,  jurisdictions,  and 
powers  of  any  kind  or  nature  whatever,  including  powers 
necessary  for  the  purposes  of  government,  and  the  preservation 
of  public  order,  or  for  the  protection  of  territories,  lands,  or 
property,  comprised  or  referred  to  in  the  concessions  and  agree¬ 
ments  made  as  aforesaid  or  affecting  other  territories,  lands,  or 
property  in  Africa  or  the  inhabitants  thereof,  and  to  hold,  use, 
and  exercise  such  territories,  lands,  property,  rights,  interests, 
authorities,  jurisdictions,  and  powers  respectively  for  the 
purposes  of  the  Company  and  on  the  terms  of  this  Our 
Charter. 

4.  Provided  that  no  powers  of  government  or  administration 
shall  be  exercised  under  or  in  relation  to  any  such  last-men¬ 
tioned  concession,  agreement,  grant,  or  treaty,  until  a  copy  of 
such  concession,  agreement,  grant,  or  treaty,  or  in  such  form, 
and  with  such  maps  or  particulars  as  Our  Secretary  of  State 
approves,  verified  as  he  requires,  has  been  transmitted  to  him, 
and  he  has  signified  his  approval  thereof,  either  absolutely,  or 
subject  to  any  conditions  or  reservations ;  and  provided  also 
that  no  rights,  interests,  authorities,  jurisdictions,  or  powers  of 
any  description  shall  be  acquired  by  the  Company  within  the 
said  district  of  the  Tati,  as  hereinbefore  described,  without  the 
previous  consent  in  writing  of  the  owners  for  the  time  being  of 
the  concessions  above  referred  to  relating  to  the  said  district 
and  the  approval  of  our  Secretary  of  State. 

5.  The  Company  shall  be  bound  by,  and  shall  fulfil  all  and 
singular  the  stipulations  on  its  part  contained  in  any  such  con¬ 
cession,  agreement,  grant,  or  treaty  as  aforesaid,  subject  to  any 


366 


APPENDIX  III. 


subsequent  agreement  affecting  those  stipulations,  approved  by 
Our  Secretary  of  State. 

6.  The  Company  shall  always  be  and  remain  British  in 
character  and  domicile,  and  shall  have  its  principal  office  in 
Great  Britain,  and  the  Company’s  principal  representative  in 
South  Africa,  and  the  Directors  shall  always  be  natural-born 
British  subjects,  or  persons  who  have  been  naturalised  as 
British  subjects,  by  or  under  an  Act  of  Parliament  of  Our 
United  Kingdom ;  but  this  article  shall  not  disqualify  any 
person  nominated  a  Director  by  this  Our  Charter,  or  any  person 
whose  election  as  a  Director  shall  have  been  approved  by  Our 
Secretary  of  State,  from  acting  in  that  capacity. 

7.  In  case  at  any  time  any  difference  arises  between  any 
chief  or  tribe  inhabiting  any  of  the  territories  aforesaid  and  the 
Company,  that  difference  shall,  if  Our  Secretary  of  State  so 
require,  be  submitted  by  the  Company  to  him  for  his  decision, 
and  the  Company  shall  act  in  accordance  with  such  decision. 

8.  If  at  any  time  Our  Secretary  of  State  thinks  fit  to  dissent 
from  or  object  to  any  of  the  dealings  of  the  Company  with  any 
foreign  Power  and  to  make  known  to  the  Company  any  sugges¬ 
tion  founded  on  that  dissent  or  objection,  the  Company  shall 
act  in  accordance  with  such  suggestion. 

9.  If  at  any  time  Our  Secretary  of  State  thinks  fit  to  object 
to  the  exercise  by  the  Company  of  any  authority,  power,  or 
right,  within  any  part  of  the  territories  aforesaid,  on  the  ground 
of  there  being  an  adverse  claim  to  or  in  respect  of  that  part,  the 
Company  shall  defer  to  that  objection  until  such  time  as  any 
such  claim  has  been  withdrawn  or  finally  dealt  with  or  settled 
by  Our  Secretary  of  State. 

10.  The  Company  shall  to  the  best  of  its  ability  preserve 
peace  and  order  in  such  ways  and  manners  as  it  shall  consider 
necessary,  and  may  with  that  object  make  ordinances  (to  be 
approved  by  Our  Secretary  of  State)  and  may  establish  and 
maintain  a  force  of  police. 

11.  The  Company  shall  to  the  best  of  its  ability  discourage 
and,  so  far  as  may  be  practicable,  abolish  by  degrees,  any 
system  of  slave-trade  or  domestic  servitude  in  the  territories 
aforesaid. 


CHARTER,  BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA  COMPANY.  367 

12.  The  Company  shall  regulate  the  traffic  in  spirits  and 
other  intoxicating  liquors  within  the  territories  aforesaid,  so  as, 
as  far  as  is  practicable,  to  prevent  the  sale  of  any  spirits  or  other 
intoxicating  liquor  to  any  natives. 

13.  The  Company  as  such,  or  its  officers  as  such,  shall  not  in 
any  way  interfere  with  the  religion  of  any  class  or  tribe  of  the 
peoples  of  the  territories  aforesaid,  or  of  any  of  the  inhabitants 
thereof,  except  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  in  the  interests  of 
humanity ;  and  all  forms  of  religious  worship  or  religious 
ordinances  may  be  exercised  within  the  said  territories,  and  no 
hindrance  shall  be  offered  thereto  except  as  aforesaid. 

14.  In  the  administration  of  justice  to  the  said  peoples  or 
inhabitants,  careful  regard  shall  always  be  had  to  the  customs 
and  laws  of  the  class  or  tribe  or  nation  to  which  the  parties 
respectively  belong,  especially  with  respect  to  the  holding, 
possession,  transfer,  and  disposition  of  lands  and  goods,  and 
testate  or  intestate  succession  thereto,  and  marriage,  divorce, 
and  legitimacy,  and  other  rights  of  property  and  personal  rights, 
but  subject  to  any  British  laws  which  may  be  in  force  in  any  of 
the  territories  aforesaid,  and  applicable  to  the  peoples  or 
inhabitants  thereof. 

15.  If  at  any  time  Our  Secretary  of  State  thinks  fit  to  dissent 
from  or  object  to  any  part  of  the  proceedings  or  system  of  the 
Company  relative  to  the  people  of  the  territories  aforesaid,  or 
to  any  of  the  inhabitants  thereof,  in  respect  of  slavery  or  re¬ 
ligion  or  the  administration  of  justice,  or  any  other  matter,  he 
shall  make  known  to  the  Company  his  dissent  or  objection, 
and  the  Company  shall  act  in  accordance  with  his  directions, 
duly  signified. 

16.  In  the  event  of  the  Company  acquiring  any  harbour  or 
harbours,  the  Company  shall  freely  afford  all  facilities  for  or  to 
Our  ships  therein  without  payment,  except  reasonable  charges 
for  work  done  or  services  rendered  or  materials  or  things 

supplied. 

17.  The  Company  shall  furnish  annually  to  Our  Secretary 
of  State,  as  soon  as  conveniently  may  be  after  the  close  of  the 
financial  year,  accounts  of  its  expenditure  for  administrative 
purposes,  and  of  all  sums  received  by  it  by  way  of  public 


368 


APPENDIX  III. 


revenue  as  distinguished  from  its  commercial  profits,  during 
the  financial  year,  together  with  a  report  as  to  its  public  pro¬ 
ceedings  and  the  condition  of  the  territories  within  the  sphere 
of  its  operations.  The  Company  shall  also  on  or  before  the 
commencement  of  each  financial  year  furnish  to  Our  Secretary 
of  State  an  estimate  of  its  expenditure  for  administrative  pur¬ 
poses  and  of  its  public  revenue  (as  above  defined)  for  the 
ensuing  year.  The  Company  shall  in  addition  from  time  to 
time  furnish  to  Our  Secretary  of  State  any  reports,  accounts,  or 
information  with  which  he  may  require  to  be  furnished. 

18.  The  several  officers  of  the  Company  shall,  subject  to  the 
rules  of  official  subordination,  and  to  any  regulations  that  may 
he  agreed  upon,  communicate  freely  with  Our  High  Commis¬ 
sioner  in  South  Africa,  and  any  others  Our  officers,  who  may 
be  stationed  within  any  of  the  territories  aforesaid,  and  shall 
pay  due  regard  to  any  requirements,  suggestions,  or  requests 
which  the  said  High  Commissioner  or  other  officers  shall  make; 
to  them  or  any  of  them,  and  the  Company  shall  be  bound  to 
enforce  the  observance  of  this  Article. 

19.  The  Company  may  hoist  and  use  on  its  buildings  and 
elsewhere  in  the  territories  aforesaid,  and  on  its  vessels,  such 
distinctive  flag  indicating  the  British  character  of  the  Company 
as  Our  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the 
Admiralty  shall  from  time  to  time  approve. 

20.  Nothing  in  this  Our  Charter  shall  be  deemed  to  authorise 
the  Company  to  set  up  or  grant  any  monoply  of  trade ;  pro¬ 
vided  that  the  establishment  of,  or  the  grant  of  concessions  for 
banks,  railways,  tramways,  docks,  telegraphs,  waterworks,  or 
other  similar  undertakings,  or  the  establishment  of  any  system 
of  patent  or  copyright  approved  by  Our  Secretary  of  State,  shall 
not  be  deemed  monopolies  for  this  purpose.  The  Company 
shall  not  either  directly  or  indirectly  hinder  any  Company  or 
persons  who  now  are,  or  hereafter  may  be,  lawfully  and  peace¬ 
fully  carrying  on  any  business,  concern,  or  venture,  within  the 
said  District  of  the  Tati,  hereinbefore  described,  but  shall,  by 
permitting  and  facilitating  transit  by  every  lawful  means  to 
and  from  the  District  of  the  Tati,  across  its  own  territories,  or 
where  it  has  jurisdiction  in  that  behalf,  and  by  all  other  reason- 


CHARTER,  BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA  COMPANY.  369 


)le  and  lawful  means,  encourage,  assist,  and  protect  all  British 
ibjects  who  are,  or  hereafter  may  be,  lawfully  and  peaceably 
igaged  in  the  prosecution  of  a  lawful  enterprise  within  the 
iid  District  of  Tati. 

21.  For  the  preservation  of  elephants  and  other  game,  the 
ompany  may  make  such  regulations  and  (notwithstanding  any- 
ting  hereinbefore  contained)  may  impose  such  licence  duties 
1  the  killing  or  taking  of  elephants  or  such  game  as  they  may 
;e  fit.  Provided  that  nothing  in  such  regulations  shall  extend 
i  diminish  or  interfere  with  any  hunting  rights  which  may 
ive  been  or  may  hereafter  be  reserved  to  any  native  chiefs  or 
ibes  by  treaty,  save  so  far  as  any  such  regulations  may  relate 
i  the  establishment  and  enforcement  of  a  close  season. 

22.  The  Company  shall  be  subject  to  and  shall  perform  and 
adertake  all  the  obligations  contained  in  or  undertaken  by 
urselves  under  any  treaty,  agreement,  or  arrangement  between 
urselves  and  any  other  State  or  Power,  whether  already  made 
c  hereafter  to  be  made.  In  all  matters  relating  to  the  observ- 
rce  of  this  Article,  or  to  the  exercise  within  the  Company’s 
irritories  for  the  time  being  of  any  jurisdiction  exercisable  by 
s  under  the  Foreign  Jurisdiction  Acts,  the  Company  shall 
inform  to  and  observe  and  carry  out  all  such  directions  as  may 
•om  time  to  time  be  given  in  that  behalf  by  Our  Secretary  of 
fate,  and  the  Company  shall  appoint  all  necessary  officers  to 
srform  such  duties,  and  shall  provide  such  Courts  and  other 
iquisites  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  necessary  for  the 
Iministration  of  justice. 

23.  The  original  share  capital  of  the  Company  shall  be 
1,000,000,  divided  into  1,000,000  shares  of  £1  each. 

24.  The  Company  is  hereby  further  specially  authorised  and 
npowered  for  the  purpose  of  this  Our  Charter  from  time  to 
me : — 

(i)  To  increase  shares  of  different  classes  or  descriptions,  to 

increase  the  share  capital  of  the  Company,  and  to 
borrow  money  by  debentures  or  other  obligations. 

(ii)  To  acquire  and  hold,  and  to  charter  or  otherwise  deal 

with,  steam  vessels  and  other  vessels. 

(iii)  To  establish  or  authorise  banking  companies  and  other 

2  A 


370 


APPENDIX  III. 


companies  and  undertakings,  or  associations  of  every 
description,  for  purposes  consistent  with  the  provi¬ 
sions  of  this  Our  Charter. 

(iv)  To  make  and  maintain  roads,  railways,  telegraphs,  har¬ 

bours,  and  any  other  works,  which  may  tend  to  the 
development  and  improvement  of  the  territories  of  the 
Company. 

(v)  To  carry  on  mining  and  industries,  and  to  make  con¬ 

cessions  of  mining,  forestall,  or  other  rights. 

(vi)  To  improve,  develop,  clear,  plant,  irrigate,  and  cultivate 

any  lands  included  within  the  territories  of  the 
Company. 

(vii)  To  settle  any  such  territories  and  lands  as  aforesaid,  and 

to  aid  and  promote  immigration. 

(viii)  To  grant  lands  for  terms  of  years  or  in  perpetuity,  and 
either  absolutely  or  by  way  of  mortgage  or  otherwise. 

(ix)  To  make  loans  or  contributions  of  money  or  money’s 

worth,  for  promoting  any  of  the  objects  of  the  Com¬ 
pany. 

(x)  To  acquire  and  hold  personal  property. 

(xi)  To  acquire  and  hold  (without  licence  in  mortmain  or 

other  authority  than  this  Our  Charter)  lands  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  not  exceeding  five  acres  in  all,  at 
any  one  time,  for  the  purposes  of  offices  and  business  of 
the  Company,  and  (subject  to  any  local  laws)  lands,  in 
any  of  Our  Colonies  or  Possessions  and  elsewhere,  con¬ 
venient  for  carrying  on  the  management  of  the  affairs 
of  the  Company,  and  to  dispose  from  time  to  time  of 
any  such  lands  when  not  required  for  that  purpose. 

(xii)  To  carry  on  any  lawful  commerce,  trade,  pursuit,  business, 

operations,  or  dealing  whatsoever  in  connection  with 
the  objects  of  the  Company. 

(xiii)  To  establish  and  maintain  agencies  in  Our  Colonies  and 
Possessions  and  elsewhere. 

(xiv)  To  sue  and  be  sued  by  the  Company’s  name  of  Incorpora¬ 
tion  as  well  in  Our  Courts  in  Our  United  Kingdom,  or 
in  Our  Courts  in  Our  Colonies  or  Possessions,  or  in  Our 
Courts  in  Foreign  Countries  or  elsewhere. 


CHARTER,  BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA  COMPANY.  371 

(xv)  To  do  all  lawful  things  incidental  or  conducive  to  the 
exercise  or  enjoyment  of  the  rights,  interests,  authori¬ 
ties,  and  powers  of  the  Company  in  this  Our  Charter 
expressed  or  referred  to,  or  any  of  them. 

25.  Within  one  year  after  the  date  of  this  Our  Charter,  or 
such  extended  period  as  may  be  certified  by  Our  Secretary  of 
State,  there  shall  be  executed  by  the  Members  of  the  Company 
for  the  time  being  a  Deed  of  Settlement,  providing  as  far  as 
necessary  for — 

(i)  The  further  definition  of  the  objects  and  purposes  of  the 
Company. 

(ii)  The  classes  or  descriptions  of  shares  into  which  the  capital 
of  the  Company  is  divided,  and  the  calls  to  be  made  in 
respect  thereof,  and  the  terms  and  conditions  of  mem¬ 
bership  of  the  Company. 

(iii)  The  division  and  distribution  of  profits. 

(iv)  General  Meetings  of  the  Company ;  the  appointment  by 

Our  Secretary  of  State  (if  so  required  by  him)  of  an 
Official  Directory,  and  the  number,  qualification,  ap¬ 
pointment,  remuneration,  rotation,  removal,  and  powers 
of  the  Company,  and  of  other  officers  of  the  Company. 

(v)  The  registration  of  Members  of  the  Company,  and  the 

transfer  of  shares  in  the  capital  of  the  Company. 

(vi)  The  preparation  of  annual  accounts  to  be  submitted  to  the 

Members  at  a  General  Meeting. 

(vii)  The  audit  of  those  accounts  by  independent  auditors. 

(viii)  The  making  of  bylaws. 

(ix)  The  making  and  using  of  official  seals  of  the  Company. 

(x)  The  constitution  and  regulation  of  Committee  or  Local 

Boards  of  Management. 

(xi)  The  making  and  execution  of  supplementary  deeds  of 

settlement. 

(xii)  The  winding  up  (in  case  of  need)  of  the  Company’s  affairs, 
(xiii)  The  government  and  regulation  of  the  Company  and  of  its 
affairs. 

(xiv)  Any  other  matters  usual  or  proper  to  be  provided  for  in 
respect  of  a  Chartered  Company. 

26.  The  Deed  of  Settlement  shall,  before  the  execution  thereof, 


372 


APPENDIX  III. 


be  submitted  to  and  approved  by  the  Lords  of  Our  Council,  an 
a  certificate  of  their  approval  thereof,  signed  by  the  Clerk  of  Ou 
Council,  shall  be  indorsed  on  this  Our  Charter  and  be  conclusiv 
evidence  of  such  approval,  and  on  the  Deed  of  Settlement,  an 
such  Deed  of  Settlement  shall  take  effect  from  the  date  of  sue 
approval,  and  shall  be  binding  upon  the  Company,  its  memberi 
officers,  and  servants,  and  for  all  other  purposes  whatsoever. 

27.  The  provisions  of  the  Deed  of  Settlement,  or  of  any  supple 
mentary  Deed  for  the  time  being  in  force,  may  be  from  time  t 
time  repealed,  varied,  or  added  to  by  a  supplementary  Deed  mad 
and  executed  in  such  manner  as  the  Deed  of  Settlement  pre 
scribes.  Provided  that  the  provisions  of  any  such  Deed  rek 
tive  to  the  official  Director  shall  not  be  repealed,  varied,  c 
added  to  without  the  express  approval  of  Our  Secretary  c 
State. 

28.  The  Members  of  the  Company  shall  be  individually  liabl 
for  the  debts,  contracts,  engagements,  and  liabilities  of  the  Com 
pany  to  the  extent  only  of  the  amount,  if  any,  for  the  time  bein 
unpaid  on  the  shares  held  by  them  respectively. 

29.  Until  such  Deed  of  Settlement  as  aforesaid  takes  effec 
the  said  J ames,  Duke  of  Abercorn,  shall  be  the  President ;  th 
said  Alexander  William  George,  Duke  of  Fife,  shall  be  Vice 
President;  and  the  said  Edric  Frederick,  Lord  Gifford,  Cec: 
John  Rhodes,  Alfred  Beit,  Albert  Henry  George  Grey,  an 
George  Cawston  shall  be  the  Directors  of  the  Company ;  and  ma 
on  behalf  of  the  Company  do  all  things  necessary  or  proper  t 
be  done  under  this  Our  Charter  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  Company 
Provided  always  that  notwithstanding  anything  contained  i 
the  Deed  of  Settlement  of  the  Company,  the  said  Jame: 
Duke  of  Abercorn,  Alexander  William  George,  Duke  of  Fifi 
and  Albert  Henry  George  Grey,  shall  not  be  subject  to  retir 
from  office  in  accordance  with  its  provisions,  but  shall  be  an 
remain  Directors  of  the  Company  until  death,  incapacity  to  ac 
or  resignation,  as  the  case  may  be. 

30.  And  We  do  further  will,  ordain,  and  declare  that  this  Ou 
Charter  shall  be  acknowledged  by  Our  Governors  and  Our  nave 
and  military  officers  and  Our  Consuls  and  Our  other  officers  i 
Our  Colonies  and  Possessions,  and  on  the  high  seas,  and  else 


CHARTER,  BRITISH  SOUTH  AFRICA  COMPANY.  373 

/here,  and  they  shall  severally  give  full  force  and  effect  to  this 
)ur  Charter,  and  shall  recognise  and  be  in  all  things  aiding  to 
he  Company  and  its  officers. 

31.  And  We  do  further  will,  ordain,  and  declare  that  this  Our 
charter  shall  be  taken,  construed,  and  adjudged  in  the  most 
avourable  and  beneficial  sense  for  and  to  the  best  advantage  of 
he  Company  as  well  in  Our  Courts  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
nd  in  Our  Courts  in  our  Colonies  or  Possessions,  and  in  Our 
lourts  in  Foreign  Countries  or  elsewhere,  notwithstanding  that 
here  may  appear  to  be  in  this  Our  Charter  any  non-recital,  mis- 
ecital,  uncertainty,  or  imperfection. 

32.  And  we  do  further  will,  ordain,  and  declare,  that  this  Our 
Charter  shall  subsist  and  continue  valid,  notwithstanding  any 
awful  change  in  the  name  of  the  Company  or  in  the  Deed  of 
Settlement  thereof,  such  change  being  made  with  the  previous 
.pproval  of  Our  Secretary  of  State  signified  under  his  hand. 

33.  And  We  do  further  will,  ordain,  and  declare  that  it  shall 
)e  lawful  for  Us,  Our  heirs  and  successors,  and  We  do  hereby 
ixpressly  reserve  to  Ourselves,  Our  heirs  and  successors,  the 
■ight  and  power  by  writing  under  the  Great  Seal  of  the  United 
Kingdom,  at  the  end  of  twenty-five  years  from  the  date  of  this 
3ur  Charter,  and  at  the  end  of  every  succeeding  period  of  ten 
rears,  to  add  to,  alter,  or  repeal  any  of  the  provisions  of  this 
Our  Charter  or  to  enact  other  provisions  in  substitution  for  or 
n  addition  to  any  of  its  existing  provisions.  Provided  that  the 
right  and  power  thus  reserved  shall  be  exercised  only  in  relation 
;o  so  much  of  this  Our  Charter  as  relates  to  administrative  and 
public  matters.  And  we  do  further  expressly  reserve  to  Our¬ 
selves,  Our  heirs  and  successors,  the  right  to  take  over  any 
buildings  or  works  belonging  to  the  Company,  and  used  ex¬ 
clusively  or  mainly  for  administrative  or  public  purposes,  on 
payment  to  the  Company  of  such  reasonable  compensation  as 
may  be  agreed,  or  as,  failing  agreement,  may  be  settled  by 
the  Commissioners  of  Our  Treasury.  And  We  do  further 
appoint,  direct,  and  declare  that  any  such  writing  under  the 
said  Great  Seal  shall  have  full  effect  and  be  binding  upon 
the  Company,  its  members,  officers,  and  servants,  and  all  other 
persons,  and  shall  be  of  the  same  force,  effect,  and  validity 


374 


APPENDIX  III. 


as  if  its  provisions  had  been  part  of  and  contained  in  these 
presents. 

34.  Provided  always  and  We  do  further  declare  that  nothing 
in  this  Our  Charter  shall  be  deemed  or  taken  in  anywise  to 
limit  or  restrict  the  exercise  of  any  of  Our  rights  or  powers 
with  reference  to  the  protection  of  any  territories  or  with  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  government  thereof  should  We  see  fit  to  include  the 
same  within  Our  dominions. 

35.  And  We  do  lastly  will,  ordain,  and  declare,  without  pre¬ 
judice  to  any  power  to  repeal  this  Our  Charter  by  law  belong¬ 
ing  to  Us,  Our  heirs  and  successors,  or  to  any  of  Our  Courts, 
ministers,  or  officers  independently  of  this  present  declaration 
and  reservation,  that  in  case  at  any  time  it  is  made  to  appear 
to  Us  in  Our  Council  that  the  Company  has  substantially  failed 
to  observe  and  conform  to  the  provisions  of  this  Our  Charter,  or 
that  the  Company  is  not  exercising  its  powers  under  the  con¬ 
cessions,  agreements,  grants,  and  treaties  aforesaid,  so  as  to 
advance  the  interests  which  the  Petitioners  have  represented  to 
Us  to  be  likely  to  be  advanced  by  the  grant  of  this  Our  Charter, 
it  shall  be  lawful  for  Us,  Our  heirs  and  successors,  and  We  do 
hereby  expressly  reserve  and  take  to  Ourselves,  Our  heirs  and 
successors,  the  right  and  power  by  writing  under  the  Great  Seal 
of  Our  United  Kingdom  to  revoke  this  Our  Charter,  and  to 
revoke  and  annul  the  privileges,  powers,  and  rights  hereby 
granted  to  the  Company. 

In  witness  whereof  We  have  caused  these  Our  Letters  to  be 
made  Patent. 

Witness  Ourself  at  Westminster,  the  29th  day  of  October,  in 
the  fifty-third  year  of  Our  reign. 

By  Warrant  under  the  Queen’s  Sign  Manual. 


Muir  Mackenzie. 


INDEX. 


Abercom,  Duke  of,  112. 

“-Aborigines Protection  Society,”  111. 

Africa,  H.M.S.,  289. 

African  Lakes  Corporation,  adminis¬ 
trative  rights  taken  over  by  the 
Chartered  Co.,  132. 

African  Trans-Continental  Telegraph 
Co.,  Ltd.,  300. 

Afrikander  Bond,  retrogressive  and 
anti-British,  50 — attack  Rhodes  for 
his  settlement  of  the  Stellaland 
difficulty,  85 — Rhodes’  letter  deal¬ 
ing  with  the  threatened  northward 
trek  of  the  Boers,  189  et  seq. — his 
speech  at  the  Annual  Congress  at 
Kimberley,  193  et  seq. — in  opposi¬ 
tion  to  Rhodes,  286. 

Alderson,  Colonel,  273. 

Alexander,  Prince,  of  Teck,  273. 

Alverstone,  Lord,  255. 

Baden-Powell,  Major  R.  S.  S.,  273. 

Barkly  West,  Rhodes  elected  member 
for,  39 — opposition  of  the  Bond  at 
the  general  election  in  1898,  286  et 
seq. 

Barnato,  Mr  B.  I.,  opposes  Rhodes’ 
scheme  for  amalgamating  the  dia¬ 
mond  mines,  87 — conference  with 
Rhodes,  92  et  seq. 

Barnes- Lawrence,  Rev.  A.  L.,  recol¬ 
lections  of  Rhodes  at  college,  26  et 
seq. 

Basutos,  Rhodes  opposes  the  disarma¬ 
ment  of  the,  41  et  seq. 

Beal,  Lieut. -Colonel  Robert,  269  et 

seq. 


Bechuanaland,  Transvaal  claim  a  por¬ 
tion  of,  16  et  seq. — British  protect¬ 
orate  proclaimed  over  southern 
part,  58 — Mr  John  Mackenzie  ap¬ 
pointed  deputy  Commissioner,  59 
— difficulties  with  the  Boer  settlers, 
ib.  —  Rhodes  takes  the  matter  in 
hand,  61 — settlement  with  Van 
Niekerk  and  Delarey,  62 — General 
Joubert’s  attitude,  63  —  Kruger’s 
proclamation  adding  Bechuanaland 
to  the  Transvaal,  ib.  —  the  con¬ 
ference  at  Fourteen  Streams,  64 — 
the  proclamation  recalled,  65 — 
Rhodes  defends  the  annexation  in 
the  Cape  Assembly,  85 — the  pro¬ 
tectorate  extended  to  include 
Khama’s  country,  100. 

Bechuanaland  Railway  Co.,  Ltd.,  299, 
301,  303,  321. 

Beira  to  Salisbury  railway,  146,  186, 
283. 

Beit,  Mr  Alfred,  first  acquaintance 
with  Rhodes,  36  —  assists  in  the 
amalgamation  of  the  diamond 
mines,  87  —  concurs  in  Rhodes’ 
plan  of  northern  expansion,  105  et 
seq. — director  of  the  Chartered  Co., 
112 — resigns  his  directorship  of  the 
Chartered  Co.,  256  —  before  the 
Select  Committee,  ib.,  263,  265. 

Bigham,  Mr,  255. 

Bishop’s  Stortford,  Rhodes’  birth¬ 
place,  3. 

Bismarck,  Prince,  his  scheme  for  the 
conquest  of  the  Transvaal,  86. 

Blake,  Mr,  255. 


376 


INDEX. 


Bowyer,  Sir  Graham,  238,  239,  242, 
266. 

Brand,  President,  100. 

British  South  African  Company, 
charter  of  incorporation  obtained, 
112  —  leading  provisions  of  the 
charter,  130  et  seq. — no  northern 
boundary,  130  —  administrative 
rights  of  the  African  Lakes  Cor¬ 
poration  taken  over,  132 — the  Com¬ 
pany  to  remain  British  in  character, 
133 — regulation  of  liquor  traffic  with 
natives,  ib. — native  administration, 
134  —  charter  granted  for  twenty- 
five  years,  ib.  — no  monopoly  of  trade 
to  be  permitted,  135  —  prelimin¬ 
ary  arrangements  for  occupation 
of  Mashonaland,  ib.-- the  pioneers 
under  Major  Johnson,  140 — country 
formally  taken  under  British  pro¬ 
tection,  142  —  hardships  of  the 
settlers,  145  —  Dr  Rutherfoord 
Harris  sent  to  advise,  ib.  —  diffi¬ 
culties  with  the  Portuguese  in 
Manicaland,  146 — the  Anglo-Portu- 
guese  treaty,  ib. — oppose  the  Boer 
trekkers  at  the  Limpopo,  166 — the 
Jameson  Raid,  176  et  seq.,  234  et 
seq. — grievances  of  the  settlers,  186 
et  seq. — second  annual  meeting  of 
the  Company,  199 — the  Company 
in  difficulties,  201  —  Dr  Jameson 
appointed  administrator,  202 — re¬ 
ducing  expenditure,  204  —  the 
Beira  -  Salisbury  railway,  205 — 
hostile  attitude  of  the  Matabele, 
206 — Matabele  war,  208  et  seq. — 
the  native  question,  222,  230 — 
proposed  modifications  of  the 
charter,  251  et  seq. — the  House  of 
Commons  inquiry,  255  et  seq. — 
recall  Rhodes  to  the  Board,  296 — 
capital  increased  to  £5,000,000,  ib. 
— revision  of  the  charter,  297 — 
text  of  the  charter,  362. 

Bulawayo,  Rhodes  decides  on  site  for, 
215  —  during  the  Matabele  rebel¬ 
lion,  269 — the  railway  reaches,  300. 

Butler,  Rev.  A.  G.,  recollections  of 
Rhodes  at  college,  22  et  seq. 

Buxton,  Mr  Sydney,  255. 

Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir  Henry,  255, 
357. 


Cape  Colony,  effect  of  diamond  boor 
on,  10 — discontent  at  Rhodes  com 
bining  the  two  offices  of  Premie 
and  managing  director  of  tlr 
Chartered  Co.,  197 — proposed  ta: 
on  brandy,  287 — education  laws,  ib 
et  seq. — the  subsidy  to  the  Britisl 
navy,  288  et  seq. — the  racial  ques 
tion,  293  —  warm  reception  oi 
Rhodes  in  1899,  324. 

Cape  House  of  Assembly,  Rhodes 
enters,  39 — the  proposed  disarma¬ 
ment  of  the  Basutos,  41  et  seq. 
introduction  of  Dutch  as  the  official 
language  opposed  by  Rhodes,  48 
refusal  to  ratify  the  Stellaland  con¬ 
cession,  54 — Rhodes  made  Premier, 
137 — resigns  office  after  the  Raid, 
241. 


Cist 


Cape  to  Cairo  railway,  completed  to 
Bulawayo,  283,  299 — Rhodes  en- 
deavours  to  obtain  the  British 
Government’s  guarantee  on  further 
extensions,  302  et  seq. — the  first 
proposal,  303  et  seq. — the  second 
proposal,  309  —  the  third  pro¬ 
posal,  311 — the  Government’s 
counter-proposal,  312 — negotiations 
terminate,  315 — how  Rhodes  raised 
the  additional  capital,  321  et  seq. 

Cape  to  Pretoria  railway,  96,  99,  155 
et  seq. 

Carnarvon,  Lord,  his  policy  in  South 
Africa,  13. 

Carrington,  Sir  Frederick,  commands 
the  Imperial  forces  in  the  Matabele 
war,  273 — sanctions  Rhodes’ scheme 
for  arranging  peace,  275. 

Cawston,  Mr  George,  112. 

Chamberlain,  Mr  Joseph,  prompt 
action  in  the  closing  of  the  drifts 
incident,  161  et  seq. — 241 — inter¬ 
view  with  Rhodes  after  the  Jameson 
Raid,  251  et  seq. — on  the  Select 
Committee,  255  etseq. — correspond¬ 
ence  with  Rhodes  regarding  Gov¬ 
ernment  guarantee  on  railway  ex¬ 
tension  beyond  Bulawayo,  306  et  seq. 

Chartered  Company.  See  British 
South  African  Company. 

Colenbrander,  Mr  Johann,  275,  277. 

Colesberg  Kopje  mine,  9,  20. 

Colquhoun,  Mr  A.  R.,  leads  an  ex¬ 
pedition  into  Manicaland,  146,  182. 


INDEX. 


377 


Cripps,  Mr,  255. 

Customs  Union,  South  African, 
Rhodes  urges  a  preferential  tariff 
on  President  Kruger,  95. 

Dalston,  2. 

De  Beers  Consolidated  Mines,  Ltd., 
Rhodes  amalgamates  the  diamond 
mines  under,  41,  86  et  seq. — clause 
permitting  use  of  surplus  funds  for 
northern  expansion  scheme,  92 — 
offer  for  diamond  rights  in  Mata- 
beleland,  109. 

De  Beers  mine,  9,  86. 

Delagoa  Bay,  dispute  as  to  ownership, 
16 — awarded  to  Portugal,  ib. 

Delagoa  Bay  to  Pretoria  railway,  99, 
153. 

Delarey,  Rhodes’  conciliation  of,  in 
Stellaland,  62. 

Derby,  Lord,  and  the  Stellaland  diffi¬ 
culty,  55 — authorises  a  protectorate 
over  southern  Bechuanaland,  58. 

Diamonds,  discovery  of,  in  South 
Africa,  8 — the  “  Star  of  Africa,”  9 — 
the  Griqualand  West  fields,  ib. — 
diamond  laws,  20 — revision  of  the 
laws,  35 — methods  of  working  the 
mines,  36  et  seq. — Rhodes’  scheme 
for  amalgamating  the  Kimberley 
mines,  40  et  seq.,  86  et  seq. 

Drifts,  closing  of  the,  incident,  160 
et  seq. 

Durban,  Rhodes’  first  arrival  at,  7. 

Dutch,  Rhodes’  attitude  towards,  in 
Cape  Colony,  25,  26,  49,  96  et  seq. 

Du  Toit’s  Pan  mine,  9. 

Dyke,  Sir  William,  255. 

Education,  Rhodes’  suggested  amend¬ 
ment  of  the  Cape  Colony  laws, 
287. 

Ellis,  Mr  John,  255. 

Enkeldoorn,  Boers  at,  welcome 
Rhodes,  270. 

Expansionist  policy,  Rhodes’,  33,  34, 
131,  291. 

Fairfield,  Mr,  256,  257. 

Federation  of  South  African  States, 
Rhodes’  scheme  for,  292. 

Fife,  the  Duke  of,  112. 

Forbes,  Major,  212,  213. 

Fourteen  Streams,  conference  at, 


settling  the  Bechuanaland  question, 
64. 

Free  trade,  326  et  seq. 

French  Diamond  Mining  Co.,  88. 

French,  General,  345. 

Fry,  Mr,  envoy  to  Lobengula,  106. 

German  South  Africa,  annexation  of, 
56. 

Germany,  Rhodes’  visit  to,  316  et  seq. 

Gifford,  Lord,  V.C.,  112. 

Gladstone,  Mr,  first  meeting  with 
Rhodes,  75 — discussion  of  free  trade, 
325  et  seq. — his  views  on  the 
Egyptian  question,  350  et  seq. 

Glen  Grey  Act,  the,  111,  218 — local 
self-government,  219 — regulation  of 
sale  of  liquor,  221 — opposed  by  the 
Dutch,  222. 

Goold-Adams,  Major,  211. 

Gordon,  General,  meets  Rhodes  in 
Basutoland,  46. 

Grey,  Earl,  112,  265. 

Griqualand  West,  discovery  of 
diamonds,  9 — dispute  as  to  owner¬ 
ship,  10 — the  British  intervene,  11 
—  awarded  to  Waterboer,  12  — 
placed  under  British  control,  ib. — 
the  Stellaland  difficulty,  52  et  seq. 

Groot  Schuur,  purchased  by  Rhodes, 
67 — description  of  the  house,  68 — 
the  private  menagerie,  69  —  the 
flower-gardens,  ib. 

Gwelo,  272,  308. 

Harcourt,  Sir  William,  76,  240 — on 
the  Select  Committee,  255 — cross- 
examines  Rhodes,  261  —  anecdote  of, 
328 — ignorant  of  Rhodes’  donation 
to  the  Liberal  party,  357. 

Harris,  Dr  Rutherfoord,  125,  145, 
256. 

Hawkesley,  Mr,  256. 

Hicks-Beach,  Sir  Michael,  255. 

Hofmeyr,  Mr,  the  controlling  power 
in  the  Afrikander  Bond,  50 — on 
the  Stellaland  question,  54 — offers 
Rhodes  the  Premiership  of  the 
Colony  as  the  Bond  nominee,  137, 
285,  286. 

Imperial  Federation,  Rhodes’  scheme 
of,  115,  123,  124. 

Irish  Home  Rule,  Rhodes’  criticism 


378 


INDEX. 


of  Mr  Gladstone’s  Bill,  76 — his  pro¬ 
posal  to  subscribe  to  the  party 
funds,  117 — differences  with  Mr 
Parnell,  ib.  et  seq. — interview  with 
Mr  Parnell,  118  et  seq. — conditions 
of  the  gift,  120  et  seq. — Mr  Parnell’s 
acceptance,  125  et  seq. 

Jackson,  Mr  W.  L.,  255. 

Jameson,  Dr,  beginning  of  friendship 
with  Rhodes,  36,  38,  39 — the  Raid, 
178, 234  etseq.  — accompanies  Rhodes 
to  Mashonaland,  182  —  appointed 
Administrator,  202  —  reduces  the 
Chartered  Company’s  expenditure 
on  administration,  204 — difficulties 
with  the  Matabele,  207 — the  Mata- 
bele  war,  208  et  seq. — before  the 
Select  Committee,  256  et  seq. 

Jameson  Raid,  the,  168  et  seq. — con¬ 
dition  of  the  Uitlanders  in  Johannes¬ 
burg,  169 — Rhodes  interested  in  the 
reform  movement,  170 — assists  in 
smuggling  arms  and  ammunition 
into  Johannesburg,  173— his  plan 
of  action,  174 — moves  the  B.  S.  A. 
Co.’s  police  under  Jameson  to  Pit- 
sani,  176 — the  flag  incident,  177 — ■ 
Dr  Jameson  invades  the  Transvaal, 
178,  234' — disregards  the  High 
Commissioner’s  order  to  return, 
243 — surrenders  his  force,  246 — 
the  House  of  Commons’  inquiry, 
255  et  seq.  —  the  Committee’s  re¬ 
port,  264  et  seq. 

Joel,  Mr  Woolf,  87. 

Johannesburg,  condition  of  the  Uit¬ 
landers,  163  —  the  Reform  Com¬ 
mittee,  ib. — objects  of  the  move¬ 
ment,  172  —  feeling  against  the 
Uitlanders  after  the  Raid,  246. 

Johnson,  Major  Frank,  leads  the 
Mashonaland  pioneers,  140  et  seq. 

Joubert,  General,  action  in  the  diffi¬ 
culty  with  the  Rooi-Grond  Boers, 
63 — his  letter  to  Lobengula,  101. 

Keate,  Lieutenant-Governor,  11. 

Kekewich,  Lieut. -Colonel,  in  com¬ 
mand  in  Kimberley  during  the 
siege,  333 — friction  with  Rhodes, 
336 — refuses  to  transmit  Rhodes’ 
letter  to  Lord  Roberts,  343. 

Kimberley,  Rhodes  at,  23,  25,  33  et 


seq. — effect  of  the  amalgamation  of 
the  diamond  mines,  41 — proposed 
railway  from  the  Cape,  47 — Rhodes’ 
first  important  speech  in,  50  et  seq. 
—  amalgamation  of  the  diamond 
mines,  86  et  seq. — 248  —  siege  of, 
332  et  seq. 

Kimberley,  Lord,  11,  13. 

Kimberley  Central  Mining  Co.,  87, 
91,  93  et  seq. 

Kipling,  Mr  Rudyard,  his  estimate  of 
Rhodes,  73. 

Kitchener,  Lord,  of  Khartoum,  320. 

Knutsford,  Lord,  131. 

Kruger,  Paul,  endeavours,  with  Pre- 
torius,  to  secure  the  Baralong  coun¬ 
try,  17 — his  position  in  1870,  19 — 
made  President  of  the  Transvaal, 
44 — his  policy  of  expansion,  ib. — 
attempts  to  bar  the  British  trade- 
route  northwards,  53  et  seq. — issues 
proclamation  annexing  Bechuana- 
land,  63  —  conference  with  Sir 
Charles  Warren  and  Rhodes,  64 — 
recalls  the  proclamation,  65 — sanc¬ 
tions  the  Delagoa  Bay  to  Pretoria 
railway,  99  • —  contrasted  with 
Rhodes,  147  et  seq. — hostility  to 
railways,  151 — allows  the  Nether¬ 
lands  South  African  Railway  Co. 
to  continue  the  line  from  Komati 
Poort  to  Pretoria,  153 — agrees  to 
the  extension  of  the  Cape  railways 
to  Pretoria,  155 — attempts  to  ruin 
the  Cape  line,  156  etseq. — outwitted 
by  Rhodes,  159 — closes  the  drifts, 
160  —  withdraws  on  receipt  of 
British  ultimatum,  162 — attempted 
northward  trek  of  the  Boers,  165 
et  seq. — refuses  the  petitions  of  the 
Uitlanders,  172 — misses  his  oppor¬ 
tunity  after  the  Raid,  180 — assists 
the  Bond  in  attempting  to  discredit 
Rhodes,  286 — his  policy  condemned 
by  Rhodes,  290. 

Labouchere,  Mr,  249,  255,  259,  266. 

Labrun,  Mr,  338,  339. 

Leonard,  Mr  Charles,  235. 

Leyds,  Dr,  accompanies  Kruger  to  the 
Fourteen  Streams  conference,  64. 

Liberal  Party,  Mr  Schnadhorst  sug¬ 
gests  that  Rhodes  should  subscribe 
to  the  funds,  346 — the  conditions 


INDEX. 


379 


of  the  gift,  349 — Rhodes’  letter  re¬ 
garding  Mr  Gladstone’s  Egyptian 
policy,  351 — Mr  Schnadhorst’s  ex¬ 
planation,  354  et  seq. 

Lobengula,  becomes  chief  of  the  Mata- 
bele,  18 — grants  the  Moffat  treaty, 
104 — grants  a  concession  to  Rhodes’ 
envoys,  107 — hostile  attitude  to  the 
Mashonaland  pioneers,  141,  206  et 
seq. — at  war  with  the  British,  208 
et  seq.  —  abandons  Gu-Buluwayo, 
212 — his  death,  213 — text  of  his 
agreement  with  the  Imperial  Gov¬ 
ernment,  358 — text  of  the  Rudd, 
Maguire,  and  Thompson  conces¬ 
sion,  360. 

Loch,  Sir  Henry,  166,  210. 

M'Carthy,  Mr  Justin,  his  estimate  of 
Rhodes,  73. 

Mackenzie,  Mr  John,  59. 

M'Murdo,  Colonel,  100,  153. 

MacNeill,  Mr  Swift,  M.P.,  interviews 
Rhodes  regarding  the  Home  Rule 
policy,  114  et  seq.  — arranges  a 
meeting  between  Rhodes  and  Par¬ 
nell,  118. 

Maguire,  Mr  Rochefort,  beginning  of 
friendship  with  Rhodes,  36 — one  of 
the  expedition  to  negotiate  with 
Lobengula,  107 — director  of  the 
Chartered  Co.,  112,  265. 

Majuba,  43. 

Manicaland,  trouble  with  the  Portu¬ 
guese  in,  146. 

Mashonaland,  pioneers  settle  in,  142 
— hardships  of  the  settlers,  145 — 
Rhodes’  first  visit  to,  182  et  seq. — 
grievances  of  the  settlers,  186 — the 
rising  of  the  Mashonas,  270. 

Matabeleland,  Portuguese  compelled 
to  withdraw  their  claim  to,  101 — 
General  Joubert’s  letter  to  Loben¬ 
gula,  ib. — the  Boers  organise  a 
trek  into,  102 — the  Moffat  treaty, 
104 — Rhodes  obtains  a  concession 
from  Lobengula,  107 — formation  of 
the  Chartered  Company,  112,  113 
— the  Matabele  war,  207  et  seq. — 
colonisation  of  the  country,  213  et 
seq. — the  rising  of  the  Matabele, 
255, 268  et  seq. — peace  restored,  280. 

Merriman,  Mr  J.  X. ,  92. 

Metcalfe,  Sir  Charles,  272,  307,  308. 


Moffat,  Mr,  104. 

Morley,  Mr  John,  349,  355. 

Moshesh,  chief  of  the  Basutos,  14  et 
seq. 

Mowbray,  Rhodes’  speech  at,  324. 

Native  question,  the,  Rhodes’  stand¬ 
point,  80,  110,  217 — the  Glen  Grey 
Act,  111,  133,  218  et  seq. — local 
self-government,  219  —  regulation 
of  liquor  traffic,  221,  228,  287 — 
labour  tax,  226 — bad  effects  of  mis¬ 
sionary  schools,  227  —  the  labour 
bureau,  229 — regulation  of  sale  of 
liquor  in  Rhodesia,  133  —  native 
administration  in  Rhodesia,  134 — 
labour  difficulty  in  Rhodesia,  230, 
231  —  Rhodes’  opposition  to  the 
disarming  of  the  Pondoland  natives, 
232,  233. 

Netherlands  South  African  Railway 
Co.,  153. 

Newton,  Mr  F.  J.,  242,  243,  266. 

Oliver,  Mr  H.  A.,  Mayor  of  Kimber¬ 
ley,  341. 

Orange  Free  State,  claim  Griqualand 
West,  10 — British  decide  for  Water- 
boer,  12  —  discontent  among  the 
Boers,  ib.  —  attempts  to  seize 
Basutoland,  14 — -Basutoland  an¬ 
nexed  by  Britain,  15 — the  Aliwal 
North  agreement,  ib.  —  favour 
Rhodes’  railway  scheme,  100 — sign 
railway  convention  with  Cape 
Colony,  154. 

Oxford,  Rhodes  at  Oriel  College,  21 
et  seq.  —  takes  his  degree,  22  — 
reminiscences  of  his  college  life  by 
contemporaries,  ib.  et  seq.  —  his 
speech  in  Oriel  Hall  in  1899,  23 — 
his  indebtedness  to  the  University, 
28 — receives  the  honorary  degree  of 
D.C.L.,  320. 

Parnell,  Mr,  Rhodes’  cheque  to,  76 — 
informed  by  Mr  Swift  MacNeill  of 
Rhodes’  proposal,  117 — interviews 
with  Rhodes,  118  et  seq. — the  ar¬ 
rangement  completed,  120  et  seq. 

Pennefather,  Lieut. -Colonel,  141. 

Phillips,  Mr  Lionel,  256. 

Pitsani,  176. 

Plumer,  Colonel,  273. 


380 


INDEX. 


Pondoland,  annexation  of,  232. 

Portuguese,  withdraw  their  claim  to 
Matabeleland,  101 — trouble  with, 
in  Manicaland,  146  —  the  Anglo- 
Portuguese  treaty,  ib. 

Pretorius,  President,  16. 

Railways — 

Beira  to  Salisbury,  146,  186,  283. 
Cape  to  Bulawayo,  283,  299,  301 

et  seq.,  321  et  seq. 

Cape  to  Pretoria,  96,  99,  155  et 

seq. 

Delagoa  Bay  to  Pretoria,  99,  153. 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  his  family,  1  et  seq. — 
birth,  3 — at  school,  4 — entered  at 
Oxford,  6  —  visits  his  brother  in 
Natal,  ib.  et  seq. — cotton-planting, 
7,  20 — on  the  diamond-fields,  20 — 
matriculates  at  Oxford,  21 — takes 
M.A.  and  B.A.  degrees,  22 — re¬ 
collections  of  his  college  life  by 
contemporaries,  ib.  et  seq.  —  his 
idea  of  British  expansion  in  South 
Africa,  33 — determines  on  a  polit¬ 
ical  career,  34 — his  aim  in  amass¬ 
ing  wealth,  35  —  success  on  the 
diamond-fields,  ib.  et  seq.  — forms 
friendships  with  Rudd,  Maguire, 
Beit,  and  Jameson,  36  —  Kimber¬ 
ley’s  opinion  of  him,  38 — elected 
to  the  Cape  Assembly  for  Barkly 
West,  39 — scheme  for  amalgamat¬ 
ing  the  Kimberley  diamond  mines, 
40  —  opposes  the  disarmament  of 
the  Basutos,  41  et  seq. — Kruger’s 
conflicting  scheme  of  Boer  expan¬ 
sion,  44  et  seq.  —  on  the  Basuto 
Compensation  Commission,  46  — 
meets  General  Gordon,  ib. — urges 
the  construction  of  a  Cape  to 
Kimberley  railway,  47 — his  atti¬ 
tude  to  the  Dutch,  49 — his  qualities 
as  a  speaker,  51 — the  Stellaland 
difficulty,  52  et  seq.  —  secures  a 
British  protectorate  in  southern 
Bechuanaland,  58  —  settles  the 
difficulty  with  the  Boers  in  Bechu¬ 
analand,  61  et  seq. — the  conference 
at  Fourteen  Streams,  64 — his  home 
at  Groot  Schuur,  67— recreations, 
71 — Mr  Kipling’s  and  Mr  Justin 
M‘Carthy’s  impressions  of  him,  73 
— his  character,  74  et  seq. — his 


farm  in  the  Matoppos,  79 — friction 
with  Sir  Charles  Warren  regarding 
administration  of  Bechuanaland,  81 
et  seq. — resigns  his  commissioner- 
ship,  84 — his  position  criticised  by 
the  Cape  Assembly,  85 — struggle 
with  Barnato  to  secure  the  diamond 
amalgamation,  86  et  seq. — urges  a 
preferential  South  African  tariff 
on  President  Kruger,  95  —  popu¬ 
larity  with  the  Cape  Dutch,  96 
et  seq. — unsuccessful  in  negotiat¬ 
ing  with  President  Kruger  for 
a  northward  railway,  99  —  frus¬ 
trates  the  Boer  trek  into  Mata¬ 
beleland,  103  et  seq.,  164  et 
seq.  —  obtains  the  Moffat  treaty, 
104  —  gains  a  concession  from 
Lobengula,  107  —  his  attitude  to 
the  natives,  111 — forms  the  Char¬ 
tered  Co.,  112,  113 — subscribes  to 
the  Irish  Home  Rule  party,  114 
et  seq. — takes  over  administrative 
rights  from  the  African  Lakes  Cor¬ 
poration,  132 — succeeds  in  having 
the  northern  boundary  undefined 
by  charter,  ib. — his  views  on  sale 
of  liquor  to  natives,  133 — prelim¬ 
inary  arrangement  for  settling  the 
country,  135  —  made  Premier  of 
the  Colony,  137 — English  opinion 
of  him,  142  —  struggling  with 
Kruger,  147  e<  seq. — the  Cape  to 
Pretoria  railway  sanctioned,  154 — 
outmanoeuvres  Kruger,  159  —  the 
closing  of  the  drifts,  160  et  seq. — 
represented  on  the  Johannesburg 
Reform  Committee,  170 — smuggles 
arms  and  ammunition  into  Johan¬ 
nesburg,  173 — moves  the  B.  S.  A. 
Co.’s  police  to  Pitsani,  176 — insists 
that  the  Uitlanders  should  fight 
under  the  union -jack,  178  —  his 
first  visit  to  Mashonaland,  182  et 
seq. — returns  to  the  Cape,  188 — 
letter  to  the  Afrikander  Bond  on 
the  threatened  northward  Boer  trek, 
189  et  seq. — visits  England,  192 — 
interview  with  Queen  Victoria,  ib. 
— his  scheme  for  a  Cape  university, 
193,  196 — his  view  of  the  relation¬ 
ship  of  Colonies  to  England,  195 — 
speech  to  the  Afrikander  Bond, 
196  et  seq. — addresses  the  second 


INDEX. 


381 


annual  meeting  of  the  Chartered 
Co. ,  199  e<  seq.  —  appoints  Dr 

Jameson  administrator  of  Mashona- 
land,  202  —  the  Beira  -  Salisbury 
railway,  205  —  anxiety  to  avert 
war  with  the  Matabele,  206  — 
enigmatic  telegram  to  Jameson, 
209  —  obtains  sanction  of  the 
Colonial  Office  for  the  war,  210 
— in  Matabeleland,  212 — disbands 
the  forces,  213 — fixes  site  of  cap¬ 
ital  at  Bulawayo,  215  —  Rhodesia 
adopted  as  name  of  the  country, 
216 — his  method  of  dealing  with 
the  natives  in  Cape  Colony  and 
Rhodesia,  217-233 — receives  Jame¬ 
son’s  telegram  announcing  his  start 
for  the  Transvaal,  235 — endeavours 
to  stop  the  Raid,  236  —  letter  to 
Sir  Graham  Bowyer,  239 — inter¬ 
views  Mr  W.  Schreiner,  241 — re¬ 
signs  the  Premiership,  ib.  —  fails 
in  inducing  the  Commissioner  to 
delay  his  proclamation,  242 — orders 
the  Rhodesia  Horse  not  to  be 
moved,  245  —  goes  to  Kimberley, 
248 — sails  for  England,  250 — dis¬ 
cusses  modifications  of  the  charter 
with  Mr  Chamberlain,  251  et  seq. 
— returns  to  South  Africa,  254 — 
the  Matabele  rebellion,  255,  268 
et  seq. — resigns  the  directorship  of 
the  Chartered  Co.,  257  —  before 
the  Select  Committee,  258  et  seq. 
— the  Committee’s  report,  264  et 
seq.  —  accompanies  Beal’s  column, 
269  et  seq.  —  meeting  with  the 
indunas,  275  et  seq.  —  arranges 
peace,  280  —  measures  to  restore 
prosperity  to  Rhodesia,  282  et  seq. 
— fighting  for  his  seat  at  Barkly 
West,  286  et  seq. — recalled  to  the 
Board  of  the  Chartered  Co.,  296 
— his  trans-African  telegraph  and 
railway  schemes,  298  et  seq. — 
endeavours  to  get  a  Government 
guarantee  for  the  extension  of  the 
railway,  302  et  seq. — meeting  with 
the  German  Emperor,  316  et  seq. — 
visits  Amsterdam  and  The  Hague, 
318  —  meets  Lord  Kitchener  in 
London,  320 — made  D.C.L.  of  Ox¬ 
ford,  ib.  —  raising  the  capital  for 
the  extension  of  the  railway,  321 


— warm  reception  in  Cape  Colon  y> 
324 — an  interview  with  Mr  Glad¬ 
stone,  325  et  seq. — speech  at  Cape 
Town,  327  et  seq. — in  Kimberley 
during  the  war,  331  et  seq. — 
organises  the  Kimberley  Light 
Horse,  333 — initiates  relief  works, 
335  —  friction  with  the  military 
authorities,  336  et  seq. — the  appeal 
to  Lord  Roberts  for  early  relief, 
341  et  seq. — throws  the  mines  open 
for  the  shelter  of  women  and 
children,  344  —  returns  to  Groot 
Schuur,  345 — his  donation  to  the 
Liberal  party,  346  et  seq. 

Rhodes,  Miss  Edith,  70. 

Rhodes,  Captain  Ernest,  170. 

Rhodes,  Colonel  Francis,  3,  6,  170, 
171. 

Rhodes,  Rev.  Francis  William,  2  et 
seq.,  39. 

Rhodes,  Herbert,  3,  6,  20,  26,  35, 
39. 

Rhodesia,  early  explorers  in,  19 — 
name  decided  on,  216  —  labour 
difficulty,  230,  231  — administra¬ 
tion  after  the  Jameson  Raid,  251 
et  seq.  —  rebellion  of  the  natives, 
268  et  seq. — effect  of  the  war,  282 
— measures  for  the  betterment  of 
the  country,  283 — renewed  pros¬ 
perity,  285  —  alterations  in  the 
government,  297. 

Rinderpest,  269,  282. 

Ripon,  Marquis  of,  210. 

Roberts,  Lord,  340  et  seq. 

Robinson,  Sir  Hercules,  arbitrates  on 
the  disarmament  of  the  Basutos,  42 
— recommends  a  protectorate  over 
southern  Bechuanaland,  58  —  au¬ 
thorises  Rhodes  to  settle  matters  in 
Bechuanaland,  61 — assists  Rhodes 
in  preserving  Matabeleland  to  the 
British,  103  et  seq.  —  actions  in 
connection  with  the  Jameson  Raid, 
238,  241  et  seq. — 265. 

Rooi-Grond,  59,  63,  65. 

Rosmead,  Lord.  See  Sir  Hercules 
Robinson. 

Rothschild,  Lord,  88,  205. 

Rudd,  Mr  C.  D.,  36,  107. 

Salisbury,  142,  185,  186,  269. 

Salisbury,  Lord,  76. 


382 


INDEX. 


Sauer,  Dr  Hans,  275,  2S0. 

Saurdale,  Rhodes’  farm  in  the  Matop- 
pos,  79. 

Schnadhorst,  Mr,  346  et  seq. 

Schreiner,  Mr  W.  P.,  162,  237,  240, 
241,  286,  295. 

Selous,  Mr  F.  C.,  101,  135,  141. 

Spreckley,  Colonel,  245. 

Sprigg,  Sir  Gordon,  241,  303. 

Stead,  Mr  W.  T.,  352,  353. 

Stent,  Captain,  275. 

Stellaland,  the  quasi-republic  of,  53 
— Rhodes  obtains  a  cession  from 
Mankoroane,  ib.  —  Cape  Govern¬ 
ment  refuses  to  assume  control,  54 
— British  protectorate  established, 
58  —  friction  between  Boers  and 
Deputy  Commissioner,  60 — Rhodes 
arranges  a  settlement,  62  —  Sir 
Charles  Warren’s  administration, 
81  et  seq. 

Tariff,  preferential  South  African,  95. 

Tati  goldfields,  19,  106. 

Telegraph,  the  trans-African,  283, 
300,  319. 

Thompson,  Mr  F.  R.,  107. 

Transvaal,  hostility  to  the  gold  in¬ 
dustry,  13 — first  gold  law,  14 — 
proclamation  extending  boundaries, 


16  —  Delagoa  Bay  dispute,  ib. — 
claim  the  Baralong  country,  17 — 
defeat  the  British  at  Majuba,  43 — 
the  London  Convention,  58 — Ger¬ 
many’s  scheme  of  conquest,  S6 — 
refuse  to  grant  a  preferential  South 
African  tariff,  95  —  influx  of  for¬ 
eigners  to  the  mines,  140 — proposed 
northward  trek,  164  et  seq.,  189  et 
seq. — the  Boer  war,  331  et  seq. 

Umsilaagas,  18. 

University  at  Cape  Town,  Rhodes’ 
scheme  for  a,  193,  196. 

Victoria,  207. 

Victoria,  Her  Majesty  Queen,  192. 

Vyvyan,  Major,  273. 

Warren,  Sir  Charles,  63  et  seg^l  et  seq. 

Waterboer,  10  et  seq. 

Wesselton  diamond  mine,  37. 

Wharton,  Mr,  255. 

William  II.,  Emperor  of  Germany, 
316  et  seq. 

Willoughby,  Sir  John,  141. 

Wilson,  Major  Alan,  212. 

Witwatersrand  goldfields,  99. 

Wodehouse,  Sir  Philip,  9. 

Wyndham,  Mr  George,  255. 


THE  END. 


PRINTED  BY  WILLIAM  BLACKWOOD  AND  SONS. 


923.242 


R475K 


